As noted in my post on Wesley Jones, the Republicans used to be the dominant party in Washington. The first figure to really stand out as changing this status quo was Clarence Cleveland Dill (1884-1978). Like many early Washingtonians, Dill was not born in the state, having been born and raised in Ohio. After attending Ohio Wesleyan University and finished his undergraduate degree at the University of Delaware in 1907. The following year, Dill moved to Spokane, Washington, where he taught English, was a journalist, and pursued a career in law. As a prominent citizen, he was sufficiently known to run for public office.
In 1914, Dill was elected to the newly created 5th district, which was based in Spokane and unlike today, was the most amenable district to electing Democrats at the time. In 1916, Dill won reelection while Republican presidential candidate Charles Evans Hughes won the state and the state’s other Republicans were returned to office. Dill supported both Prohibition and women’s suffrage, as did other Washingtonians in Congress. However, a critical decision in the next year would change this for Dill: World War I.
In 1917, he was one of 50 representatives to vote against American entrance into World War I, and defended the civil liberties of war dissenters. His vote against World War I was deeply controversial, including with the Spokane Democratic Party, which considered censuring him for the vote, but declined to do so (Kershner). Although the Democrats did not censure him, his vote cost him reelection to Republican J. Stanley Webster, justice of the Washington Supreme Court. Although down, Dill was not out of the game, not by a long shot.
By 1922, the issue of having voted against World War I was passe, which was most unfortunate for Senator Miles Poindexter, whose use of the vote against Dill proved insufficient to keep him in office. Clarence Dill, who campaigned to repeal the Esch-Cummins Act (a law returning the railroads to the private sector that included favorable terms for the railroads and an anti-strike clause) and for the Columbia Basin Project defeated Poindexter by less than two points, the margin of victory certainly being lessened by the presence of Farmer-Labor candidate James A. Duncan. This was the first time in Washington’s history that its voters had elected a Democrat.
Dill stood as a progressive in the Senate like he had in the House, and he joked that the North Pole should be renamed to “Coolidgeland” as “it is so cold and silent” (Hill). However, he was inclined to side with the GOP on the issue of tariffs, being especially supportive of lumber tariffs, and played a key role in enacting a significant law of the Coolidge era. In 1927, Senator Dill sponsored with Rep. Wallace White (R-Me.) the Radio Act of 1927. Since radio was a fairly young technology back then, few politicians knew the ins-and-outs, and thus it was up to Dill and White to craft a law to effectively regulate the at-the-time chaotic airwaves and end signal interference, a law that created the Federal Radio Commission and was satisfactory to the conservatism of President Coolidge, who signed the measure on February 23, 1927. The following year, he won reelection against Washington Chief Justice Kenneth Mackintosh by seven points in what was an excellent year for Republicans, including in Washington. What’s more, Dill prevailed despite being from a region not favored by the press establishment of Washington, which was concentrated in the Puget Sound, and from a party not favored by its establishment, the latter being quite the reversal from what it is today (Irish, 7).
In 1932, Dill extracted a promise from Democratic presidential candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt to support the construction of the Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River. The Dam would be constructed between 1933 and 1942, with Dill becoming known as the “Father of the Grand Coulee Dam”. This dam would have great importance for war production during World War II, as the power generated from it resulted in the production of 60% of the aluminum for the nation’s planes (Irish, 6). Although Dlll proved a strong supporter of the New Deal and supported the First 100 Days legislation, he made a few exceptions in his support for Roosevelt. In 1934, he voted against the Reciprocal Trade Act as he believed it would harm the local fishing and lumber industries and that year he also voted against the confirmation of New Deal Brain Truster Rexford G. Tugwell as Secretary of Agriculture. The death of Dill’s colleague, Wesley Jones, had a strong impact on his interest in the Senate, with him choosing not to run for a third term in 1934. However, Dill did not leave before having one more accomplishment: the sponsoring of the Communications Act of 1934 with Rep. Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.), which replaced the Federal Radio Commission with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and moved regulation of telephone companies from the Interstate Commerce Commission to the FCC (Hill). It is interesting to think that Dill, the pioneer of the Democratic rise in Washington, was leaving just as Washington Democrats had become the undisputed power in the state. Despite the perception of him as a progressive and his numerous votes for such positions, his DW-Nominate score is a surprisingly high -0.022, which may have been due to, among a few other things, his favorable stance on tariffs, which admittedly was quite a pillar of Republican politics of his day.
In 1940, Dill wanted to get back into the game and ran for governor, campaigning as “The Builder” and with good reason with his successes as senator with the Radio Act and the Federal Communications Act and the Grand Coulee Dam, but despite many Democratic successes in Washington that year, he was narrowly defeated by Seattle Mayor Arthur B. Langlie (yes, Seattle once did elect Republican mayors) by less than a point. He tried again for public office in 1942, when he attempted to return to his old district, but Republican Walt Horan defeated him by 25 points; the Spokane-based district he had once represented had shifted decisively to the GOP, where it is today. Dill hadn’t known it when he left the Senate, but at 50 his time in elected office was over. He never again ran for public office, but he did serve on two posts during the Truman Administration: on the Columbia Basin Commission from 1945 to 1948, and as special assistant to the Attorney General from 1946 to 1953. Although Dill was blessed with long life, living for 43 years after his retirement from the Senate and 25 years after his retirement from politics, Professor Kerry Irish (2002) notes the downside of this, “Clarence Dill retired too early from the Senate and lived too long afterward for his death to receive a great amount of attention” (3). He died on January 14, 1978, at the age of 93. Much had changed in the world since Dill’s birth, and he had been part of it. He had been born during the era of the horse and buggy and died at the height of Disco.
In 2022, Washington Republicans thought they just might have a shot in winning a Senate seat from Washington with Tiffany Smiley, but she was defeated by 15 points. Indeed, Republicans have not won a Senate seat from the state since 1994. However, at one time, Republicans were the status quo of Washington, and the foremost representative of this status quo was Wesley Livsey Jones (1863-1932).
An Illinoisan by birth, Jones found his way to the Republican Party before he found his way to Washington. He studied law and with this came an an enthusiasm for politics. In 1884, he energetically campaigned for James G. Blaine and did likewise for Benjamin Harrison in 1888 (Forth, 3). The following year, Washington was admitted, and he moved to North Yakima to establish his law practice. Jones continued to be active in the Republican Party, and although Republicans had a bit of a hiccup with Democrat William Jennings Bryan winning the state in 1896 over the currency issue, the 1898 midterms proved to be better for them, and Jones went head to head against Congressman J. Hamilton Lewis, who would do the opposite of Jones by moving to Illinois for his later political career. Dubbing him “Yakima Jones”, he was described in the press as “a plain solid looking sort of man…of medium height, broad shouldered and strong, he looks what he is, a man of intelligence” (Papavizas). Although a debate between him and Lewis was reported by some sources as a disaster for him, others thought that Jones had trounced Lewis, and Jones ultimately benefited from the US victory in the Spanish-American War and was elected. This was the start of a long, successful career in Washington. Lewis would serve as a senator from Illinois from 1913 to 1919 and again from 1931 to 1939.
Congressman Jones
Jones regarded himself as a “conservative progressive”, meaning that he supported reform pushes he considered to be moderate while rejecting radicalism, thus he was seen as a moderate during the Progressive Era (Papavizas). This was pretty safe for Washington’s politics, which although they were inclined towards Republicans at the time, Washingtonians were strongly supportive of certain progressive era pushes, such as for Prohibition and women’s suffrage, as was Jones. In an age in which hypocrisy was rife on Prohibition, he was certainly the ideal figure to push for it. One historian described Jones as “…a tall, sincere, devout former lawyer from Yakima. He did not drink, gamble, smoke, or swear. He was dedicated to middle-class American values and to the Republican party, both of which he in many ways personified” (Papavizas). On women’s suffrage, he expressed his support for it early. In 1914, he asked his colleagues rhetorically, “What peculiar sexual difference is there that entitles man to vote and prevents woman? Can anyone point out any such peculiarity? No one has ever done so” (Papavizas). In 1909, the state legislature sent Jones to the Senate.
Senator Jones
Jones was supportive of the Taft Administration on a number of issues, but he did embrace some progressive Constitutional pushes, such as for direct election of senators and for abolishing the Electoral College. During the Wilson Administration, Jones flew the Lincoln flag in his opposition to the institution of segregation in numerous departments of the federal government. However, he in truth was sometimes in support and sometimes in opposition to Wilson’s agenda. Jones kept up protectionism with his vote against the Underwood Tariff and strongly supported expanded naval construction. However, he also supported the creation of the Federal Reserve and during World War I he was one of a minority of Republican senators to strongly support the Sedition Act, including opposing the France Amendment for free speech protections for telling the truth with good motives. As William Forth (1962) writes in his dissertation, “Until after the World War he supported liberal legislation as often as he opposed it although alarmed at the divisive nature of the emotions such actions had on his party” (v). Although Jones was supportive of the advancement of blacks, he was also strongly supportive of blocking Japanese immigration, consistent with the views of many laboring white men of Western states at the time. Neither he nor them wanted Asian labor competition and subscribed to the belief that they could not assimilate in society. Jones had initially opposed American involvement in World War I, stating in 1916 that an American who “persists in travelling for pleasure or profit in the danger zone and in a belligerent ship shows that he is utterly lacking in patriotism” (Papavizas). The following year, he attempted to find a middle ground on arming merchant vessels, but this met with great criticism. The Seattle Star went as far as to condemn him for having “failed pathetically on the one big thing in his generation” (Papavizas).
In 1920, Jones sponsored the Jones Act, which was designed to revitalize the shipbuilding industry in the US by requiring that all ships moving from US port to US port be built by Americans, owned by American citizens, and crewed by Americans. Jones was considered a diligent and hard worker, and he worked incredibly hard to win passage of this legislation, including holding 37 hearings in 51 days, hearing testimony from over 100 witnesses (Papavizas). This was in keeping with the protectionist stance of the GOP of his day.
From 1924 to 1929, Jones served as Majority Whip. He was a good figure for this role as he could appeal to both the conservative and progressive wings of the GOP. Jones supported basic conservative policies on taxes and tariffs in the 1920s while still sometimes siding with the progressive wing. His colleague, Democrat Clarence Dill, commented, “Senator Jones never knocks any flies. He bunts and always plays low ball. That is why he is always safe” (Papavizas). Although he played it safe, Jones did have a bit of a close race in 1926, winning reelection by 5 points.
In the later part of his career, became foremost known for what was called the “five and ten law” in 1929, which made certain Prohibition violations felonies to curb professional bootleggers and provided for five years’ imprisonment or a $10,000 fine (or both) for first-time violations. He did not author this law, rather introduced it on behalf of the Coolidge Administration. This was in keeping with his fundamental moral stances as well as state voter preferences, as Prohibition had come into effect in the state before the nation adopted it. However, this also hurt him as Prohibition’s popularity began to decline not long after this law’s adoption.
In 1932, the Great Depression was severely impacting the nation and killing the confidence of the nation in President Hoover and the Republican Party. Washington was no exception, and radicalism dramatically increased in the state and support for Prohibition had declined. The Democrats selected Homer T. Bone, a former member of the Socialist Party, to run against Jones. Not only did the national environment harm Jones, his poor health following abdominal operations in 1928 and 1929 precluded his campaigning effectively. While in the past he had consistently been able to win, this time around he lost reelection by a whopping 28 points and lost all counties. The ailing senator did not have much time to mourn his loss, as the day after he entered a sanitarium in grave condition and died a mere eleven days after the election of heart failure at 69. His time, and the time of his brand of Republicanism having appeal in the state, was over. Jones’ DW-Nominate score stands at 0.319, making him moderately conservative. No Republican would be elected to Congress from Washington until 1942, and the Commonwealth Federation of Washington, a communist-dominated faction of the Democratic Party, would have substantial sway for years on the state’s politics. In all, Jones was an honest figure in the GOP who struck a careful balance in his positions, and that worked for him up until his final days.
References
Forth, W.S. (1962). Wesley L. Jones: A Political Biography [Doctoral Dissertation, University of Washington]. ProQuest.
Thirty years ago, I was nine years old and spent the Fourth of July in Connecticut, where I was visiting my great grandma. I remember there were no real fireworks to speak of but the beach was nice and warm to swim. I remember A&P market, being taught to shoot a BB gun, and riding a motorboat. Those are my memories of Connecticut, and on this, our 250 year anniversary as a nation, I think it best to honor the state’s foremost Founding Father, Roger Sherman (1721-1793).
Although Sherman largely lacked a formal education, he committed himself to the study of law and became highly involved in the colony’s politics, serving in Connecticut’s House of Representatives and serving as a justice of Connecticut’s Superior Court from 1766 to 1789. During this time, Sherman was involved in the crafting of four critical documents to America: the Continental Association, the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution. He is the only person to have signed all four. Although Sherman was reluctant for the colonies to split from Britain, he believed that the British were not being true to the rights of the colonists and came to accept revolution as the answer.
Although Thomas Jefferson was the central author of the Declaration of Independence and often gets sole credit in the minds of the public, Sherman was among the five who drafted it (the others were John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Robert Livingston). He also supported the creation of the original government under the Articles of Confederation, but the Articles of Confederation proved too limited in governing a nation, and given Revolutionary War debts, there needed to be a more effective way of collecting taxes.
The Constitution
Roger Sherman agreed with other Founding Fathers on the need to expand the power of the national government, particularly to establish interstate commerce and to tax. However, he differed with others in his belief that this objective could be achieved without scrapping the Articles of Confederation. Of course, we all know Sherman did not prevail on this. His crowning achievement to the Constitution was his role in forming the legislative branch.
The Creation of the House and the Senate
In the debate on setting up a legislative branch, a major issue arose in what would constitute a fair balance between big and small states. Big states wanted a population basis while small states sought an equality basis for how the legislature was to be apportioned. James Madison proposed the “Virginia Plan”, which called for three branches of government with the legislative branch being bicameral and
based on population. This alarmed small states, which responded with the New Jersey Plan, proposed by William Paterson, which would have established a unicameral legislature with all states having equal representation. Sherman, representing a small state, initially backed the New Jersey Plan, but it was voted down. Thus, he proposed the Connecticut Compromise, which embraced the bicameral legislature but had the Senate be based on political equality while the House remained based on population size. Sherman also unsuccessfully pushed for each state to have only one senator. The finalized plan was sufficient to assuage fears of states of smaller states that they would be dominated by states with big populations…after all, the Founding Fathers feared the rise of two tyrannies: the tyranny of the majority and the tyranny of the minority. Indeed, this was one of numerous compromises that needed to be crafted to create an effective Constitution.
Dissenting on the Bill of Rights
Sherman’s belief was that the Bill of Rights was an unnecessary add-on to the Constitution, as he believed such rights were assumed to be protected by the states as such powers were not granted to the federal government. Indeed, he feared that the Bill of Rights could serve to limit rights. However, this dissent was initial, and he ended up raising no objection to the proposing of ten amendments. Madison’s original draft of the Bill of the Rights would have had these amendments throughout the Constitution, but Sherman argued against this, stating, “we cannot incorporate these amendments in the body of the Constitution. It would be mixing brass, iron, and clay” (Hall). This argument won the day, and a separate Bill of Rights section was created. He was also responsible for making the Vice President the president of the Senate with authority to vote in cases of a tie with Article 1, Section 3, Clause 4, stating that otherwise “he would be without employment” (Schmitt). This once again highlights the utter ridiculousness of the argument that a vice president can reject electors.
Although Sherman supported an expanded government from that of the Articles of Confederation, his views of government were nonetheless limited. Farrand’s Records summarizes one of Sherman’s speeches, “The objects of the Union, he thought were few. 1. defence agst. foreign danger. 2. agst. internal disputes & a resort to force. 3. Treaties with foreign nations 4. regulating foreign commerce, & drawing revenue from it … All other matters civil & criminal would be much better in the hands of the States” (Gutzman).
In 1788, the voters of Connecticut sent Sherman to the House. He was not there long, since in 1790 he was elected to the Senate. While a member of Congress, he staunchly supported George Washington, backed the federal assumption of state debts, the creation of a national bank, tariffs, and internal improvements to expand commerce. Sherman was also an early foe of slavery, and had been the key figure in getting the state to adopt a law that gradually ended slavery. Again, he was not in the Senate long as in May 1793 he contracted typhoid fever. The 72-year-old Sherman lost his battle on July 23rd. Although his views were not always adopted, he was highly regarded, even by those who often disagreed with him. Thomas Jefferson praised him as “a man who never said a foolish thing in his life”. Recorded history has yet to contradict Jefferson on Sherman. Fisher Ames, a man far more in line with Sherman’s philosophy of governance and another “Great Conservative”, praised him thusly, “If I am absent during the discussion of a subject, and consequently know not on which side to vote, I always look at [him], for I am sure if I vote with him I shall vote right” (Werther). By the standards of DW-Nominate, Sherman ranks as strongly conservative, with his DW-Nominate score at 0.589.
Sherman also had numerous descendants, including Roger Sherman Baldwin (his grandson), a prominent Connecticut politician who successfully defended the slaves of the Amistad, General William Tecumseh Sherman, Senator John Sherman, Senator William M. Evarts, and Senator George Frisbie Hoar, the latter particularly concerned with preserving his constitutional legacy in his opposition to the direct election of senators and abolishing the Electoral College. Sherman stands as among the more conservative of the Founding Fathers, as he had a distrust in pure democracy and his views aligned with the Federalist Party. Interestingly, all of these descendants died as Republicans.
Sherman’s statue sits in the National Statuary Hall Collection, where all states contribute two statues to honor key figures in their histories.
References
Gutzman, K. (2013, August 1). Roger Sherman: Constitutional Calvinist. The Imaginative Conservative.
Starting with the 1860 election, Pennsylvania had an exceptionally long record of loyalty to the GOP, with Simon Cameron, a former Democrat, running the first Republican machine. This started a string of Republican state bosses and indeed the Philadelphia machine had quite a reputation for corruption. Pennsylvania did not even vote Democratic in the three-way 1912 election, rather Bull Moose Progressive Theodore Roosevelt won the state. Republicans were typically able to keep numerous working-class voters happy through tariff policies that benefited the prominent industries of state and served to raise wages but at the same time these policies raised costs of goods. Joseph Finch Guffey (1870-1959) was for many years in the minority in Pennsylvania as a Democrat. He hailed from a strongly Democratic family and made a key connection when he attended Princeton University and befriended Woodrow Wilson, whose political career he strongly supported. Guffey was both active in business and politics, being, rather unconventionally at least in the eyes of modern liberals, an oil executive, heading up the Guffey-Gillespie Oil Company beginning in 1918. He was instrumental in swaying the Pennsylvania Democratic delegation to supporting Wilson at the 1912 Democratic National Convention, much to the consternation of his party boss uncle, who was backing House Speaker Champ Clark (D-Mo.) (Hill).
Guffey in the Wilson Administration and Controversy
During World War I, President Wilson tapped Guffey to serve as Director of Sales for the Alien Property Custodian. In this position, he was responsible for managing billions. Because during the war 18,000 people had become millionaires and $20 billion had been spent on the war, Congressional Republicans reached the conclusion that there was some graft in war expenditures (Sanderlin, 465). After Attorney General Harry Daugherty dragged his feet on indictments (people who live in glass houses shouldn’t cast stones!), in 1922, Guffey was indicted on twelve counts of embezzlement by misappropriating funds he had managed. The case, however, stalled for years and in 1930 the government dropped the case as they did not believe they would be able to win a conviction. Guffey maintained his innocence for the rest of his life, and this matter, while haunting him, did not prove fatal to his political career.
The 1934 Election
Although Pennsylvania had remained loyal to Hoover in 1932 as had the black vote, FDR’s New Deal policies proved popular with both blacks and working-class voters. Republicans had been able to do well with both in the past, but the Great Depression and Roosevelt’s popularity politically taxed them, even in the Keystone State. Guffey ran for the Senate against Republican incumbent David A. Reed, who was one of the Senate’s standard-bearers of conservatism and had sponsored the Immigration Act of 1924. Governor Gifford Pinchot attacked Guffey on the basis of the 1922 indictment and declared “I can’t stand Guffey” while accusing him of obtaining a dismissal of the indictment through prominent New York State Republican Clarence H. Fay (Sanderlin, 466). The 1934 midterms proved a smashing success for the Democrats in the Keystone State as they cobbled together a coalition of working class and black voters, resulting in a net gain of eleven House seats in the state, Democrat George Earle winning the gubernatorial election to succeed Republican Gifford Pinchot, and Guffey defeating Reed by four points. Guffey’s election was the first time in sixty years that a Democrat was elected to the Senate from Pennsylvania.
Senator Guffey
He quickly became the political boss of Pennsylvania given that as senator the Roosevelt Administration funneled patronage through him as well as New Deal money. Guffey made himself known as a “100 per cent Roosevelt man” and indeed his record almost entirely reflected that (Hill). In 1935, he sponsored the Guffey-Snyder Coal Act, establishing the National Bituminous Coal Commission setting minimum prices, establish fair labor practices, and guarantee collective bargaining rights. However, this measure was struck down by the Supreme Court in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936), which resulted in Guffey quickly drafting and getting passed a new law, Guffey-Vinson, in 1937 that left out the labor provisions that had resulted in the Supreme Court striking the law down. Even on questions in which Roosevelt was not so popular he sided with the administration, such as his vote against the 1935 Patman Bonus bill, his vote against killing the “court-packing plan” in 1937, and his vote for Roosevelt’s executive reorganization plan in 1938, which would be defeated in the House. There was a rare exception or two, such as in 1939 when he voted against the legalization of TVA’s purchase of Commonwealth & Southern’s southern properties. He was also known as rather politically shrewd. For instance, early in his time in the Senate, Guffey attacked Bureau of Narcotics chief Harry Anslinger for his racism; Anslinger was married to Republican former Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon’s niece and his criticizing a public official for racism certainly helped his standing with black voters (Hill). Unsurprisingly, he was also a supporter of civil rights legislation. In 1936, Guffey played a key role, despite being a senator, in determining the next House majority leader. After he hosted a fine luncheon for Pennsylvania’s Democrats they held an 18-6 vote for Texan Sam Rayburn over New York’s John J. O’Connor, and then he got all but one of the remaining to back Rayburn (Time Magazine). That year, Roosevelt won Pennsylvania by 16 points, the first time a Democrat had won the state in 80 years, a testament to the success of the New Deal coalition and to Guffey’s leadership of the state party. In 1940, a majority of Pennsylvanians proved pleased with Roosevelt and Guffey, reelecting them by seven and four points respectively. Pennsylvania’s Democratic organization was functioning well. In 1943, as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he was profiled by Isaiah Berlin in a confidential analysis for the British Foreign Office as “a noisy Administration supporter who wraps himself in the Roosevelt flag and has been advocating for a fourth term for some time. A very typical Pennsylvania politician who has decided to throw his lot in with the President and has thus become an obedient party hack not of the purest integrity. Consistently votes in the opposite direction of his fellow Senator from Pennsylvania, James Davis” (Hachey, 146). Guffey was even more supportive of Roosevelt on foreign policy than his already staunch support of his domestic agenda.
During the 78th Congress, the pro-New Deal Union for Democratic Action found nothing amiss with Guffey’s voting record. In the prior UDA release, the only two votes he got “wrong” by them out of twenty were on a progressive “ability to pay” formula in 1939 and on tax-exempt securities in 1940. In 1944, President Roosevelt once again won reelection in Pennsylvania, this time by less than three points, and Republican Senator James Davis was finally defeated by Philadelphia Democratic Congressman Francis J. Myers by less than a point.
In 1946, the national environment proved far different from that of 1934 or 1940. The Great Depression was over, World War II was over, and people were chafing under price controls, particularly on meat, which resulted in meat shortages. Guffey’s record had remained staunchly liberal if not having even gotten more so. Worse yet for him was that Pennsylvania had a popular Republican governor in Edward Martin, who represented a return to the sort of politics of Guffey’s predecessor, David A. Reed. The environment of 1946 was so bad for Democrats in Pennsylvania that it resulted in Republicans picking up nine House seats, including all of Philadelphia’s seats, and Guffey lost reelection by a whopping twenty points. By this time a man of 76, his career was over. According to DW-Nominate, Guffey had been the most liberal senator at -0.656 throughout his 12 years in the Senate save for the 79th Congress, in which he was beaten by Idaho’s Glen H. Taylor. Guffey retired to Washington D.C., where he lived as an elder Democratic statesman until his death on March 6, 1959, at the age of 88.
Hachey, T.E. (Winter, 1973-1974). American Profiles on Capitol Hill: A Confidential Study for the British Foreign Office in 1943. The Wisconsin Magazine of History, 57(2), 141-153.
On July 20, 1930, Congressman Edgar R. Kiess died in office, and Robert Fleming Rich (1883-1968), general manager of his family’s firm, Woolrich Woolen Mills (which still exists today), ran and won the election to replace him. He had been active in Republican politics for quite some time and had been a delegate to the 1924 Republican National Convention. He was from the start committed to holding the line on spending.
Rich opposed nearly every New Deal law; the only significant law he supported that was liberal was the Revenue Act of 1935 as a way to raise revenue in the midst of all the spending. This means that he was in opposition to numerous New Deal reforms that stuck, such as Social Security and the federal minimum wage. If FDR was in agreement with Rich, it was mostly because he had taken a stand that to Rich was conservative. For example, he voted for the Economy Act in 1933, against overriding President Roosevelt’s 1935 and 1936 vetoes of veterans’ bonus legislation, and voted against the third Frazier-Lemke farm mortgage bill in 1936. Rich was most known for consistently asking “Where are we gonna get the money?” for various New Deal spending programs, and others would join in but humorously, as all knew the money printing press (Manion). His reputation as a “watchdog of the Treasury” was difficult to match in his day.
Rich was no more accommodating to the Roosevelt Administration on foreign policy; indeed he was if anything even more in opposition than on domestic issues. Regarding Lend-Lease, Rich stated, “I do not care what the people in my district think. If I received a telegram tomorrow from everybody in my district wanting me to vote for this bill, I would resign my job in Congress before I would vote for it” (Congressional Record). Part of his strong opposition was his uncompromising stand against communism. The considered the notion of the US allying with the USSR as the equivalent of getting “in bed with a rattlesnake and a skunk” (McMeekin, 350). As an eastern businessman, he was also fiercely against the tariff-lowering agenda of the Roosevelt Administration.
In 1942, Rich opted not to run for reelection as his home district was split in two with redistricting (Mallon). House Minority Leader Joe Martin (R-Mass.) praised him thusly, “We may have differed with him on occasion, but no one ever questioned his courage, integrity, or his zeal to work for what he believed was best for hist country” and added, “As a result of his tireless industry and his ceaseless watchfulness, he has saved the taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars. We regret to see him go, because we need more than one “watchdog of the Treasury” as we move toward the abyss of wild inflation and national bankruptcy” (Mansfield Advertiser). Not all were sorry to see him leave. The left-wing New Republic (1942) wrote, “A glance at The New Republic’s voting-record chart will show that Rich has a perfect minus score both on foreign and domestic issues. For twelve years he has been the loudest critic of all things decent in the whole big House. He is the owner of the company town of Woolrich, an open-shopper and a mean opponent of social progress. Getting rid of him means more than just getting rid of a reactionary Republican vote” (763). That year, he was also one of only four House Republicans to vote against banning the poll tax in federal elections. Rich would also oppose anti-poll tax legislation in 1945, 1947, and 1949. Not all was negative for him on civil rights, however; in 1937 and 1940 he voted for anti-lynching legislation and in 1946 he voted for the anti-segregation Powell amendment to the school lunch bill.
Rich was not satisfied with being out of Congress for long, and in 1944 he ran again and won. He proved no less opposed to the Truman Administration than he was to the Roosevelt Administration. In 1946, he led the successful push to kill the construction of a government-run phosphate fertilizer plant at or near Mobile, Alabama as part of the Tennessee Valley Authority. That year, in a rare siding with the liberal position, he opposed the Tidelands bill. From 1947 to 1950, Rich was only in agreement with the liberal Americans for Democratic Action 2% of the time; the one vote he sided with them on was his vote to kill the Rankin pension bill in 1949, which was devised at least in part to hamstring President Truman’s push to expand Social Security. That means he opposed aid to Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan and supported all domestic priorities of the conservative 80th Congress. In 1950, Rich voted against admitting Hawaii and Alaska as states. That year, he opted to retire for good, wanting to focus on his business. His DW-Nominate score is a 0.664, being in the top 5 conservatives for almost his entire time in the House.
Rich vs. the Majority
Some examples of Rich taking stances against the overwhelming majority included:
On April 19, 1935, he paired against Social Security, which only 33 representatives voted against.
On May 23, 1940, he was one of 21 representatives to vote against a compromise work relief appropriations measure.
On December 18, 1945, he was one of 15 representatives to vote against US participation in the UN.
On April 18, 1946, he was one of 20 representatives to vote for a motion to kill extending price control legislation.
On May 23, 1946, he was one of 41 representatives to vote against membership and participation in UNESCO.
On February 9, 1949, he was one of 69 representatives to vote against extending the Reciprocal Trade Act.
On August 11, 1949, he was one of 35 representatives to vote against a compromise bill increasing the minimum wage.
On October 3, 1949, he was one of 42 representatives to vote against extending and increasing funding for hospital construction.
On August 26, 1950, he was on the only representative to vote against a supplemental appropriations bill.
On December 5, 1950, Rich was one of 20 representatives to vote against extending the excess corporate profits tax.
After Politics
Rich continued his business pursuits in retirement, and served as president of Woolrich Woolen Mills from 1959 to 1964, chairman of its Board of Directors from 1964 to 1966, and finally entered semi-retirement in 1966 by stepping down to honorary chairman. He died on April 29, 1968, at the age of 84.
References
87 Cong. Rec. (Bound) – Volume 87, Part 1 (January 3, 1941 to February 18, 1941), 561.
ADA Voting Records. Americans for Democratic Action.
Rural Ohio is not generally known as a friendly place for liberalism, but during the New Deal, it certainly was, and Roosevelt was popular in many rural places in his first term, Marion, Ohio, included. However, Roosevelt’s popularity was taxed by the Roosevelt recession and the perception that he was trying to become a dictator through certain power-grabbing pushes as the “court packing plan” and his 1938 executive reorganization that got defeated by Congress. In this political context, Republicans came back in the North, and Frederick Cleveland Smith (1884-1956) of Marion was among them. Smith had served as mayor of Marion from 1935 to 1939 and had been a practicing osteopathic physician since 1908. Although Marion’s history was largely Republican, it was possible for Democrats to win there for a while, and the Democrat he defeated for reelection by nine points, Thomas B. Fletcher, had in total represented the district for ten years, from 1923 to 1927 and from 1933 to 1939.
Smith vs. The New Deal
Smith was a dedicated, uncompromising opponent of the New Deal and its works. So known he was for this that the press dubbed him “No No Smith”, which he enthusiastically embraced (The Marion Star). Had he served in the future, he would have definitely been nicknamed “Dr. No”. The liberal Union for Democratic Action identified Smith as among the obstructionists they wanted defeated in the 1942 election, profiling him thusly, “His isolationist position extends back to the last war, and his anti-New Deal position extends back to its beginning. Smith thinks of himself in the old Ohio Republican tradition of McKinley and the rest and holds what might be called a McKinley gold bias. He votes regularly in the interest of the private-power companies and thus to the benefit of his friends in the Marion Reserve Power Company. He operates the Smith Clinic for male diseases, which is not looked upon without criticism by other members of the Ohio medical profession. He finds time in the Congress to introduce numerous measures for the benefit of Dr. Tucker’s Asthma Specific, a patent medicine made in his district which has had difficulties because of the pure-food-and-drug laws” (The New Republic, 710). In 1939, Smith introduced a bill to exempt a Mount Gilead, Ohio, laboratory from an incoming pure food and drug law against mail prescribing. He spoke on behalf of the medicine’s effectiveness as did numerous other members of Congress, stating, “A Food and Drugs Act passed last year would compel firms of this sort to cease prescribing by making a diagnosis through the mails….I have practiced medicine for a good many years and have myself prescribed this remedy many times….I know physicians who use it themselves. Just before I left for Washington one of my colleagues told me he hoped they would not take this remedy away from the people. This colleague of mine has since died. He used this remedy himself [laughter]—not from the remedy” (Time Magazine). Smith was such a pain for Union for Democratic Action that they found absolutely nothing to like about his record from 1939 to 1945. However, its successor organization, Americans for Democratic Action, would find him siding with their positions 13% of the time from 1947 to 1950, although this is due to him objecting to certain measures not being strong enough from a conservative standpoint. On civil rights, you might think that Smith was also simply also a no-man, but this wasn’t necessarily so; he voted for the 1940 anti-lynching bill and for the 1946 anti-segregation Powell Amendment to that year’s school lunch bill. However, he also paired against the 1949 bill banning the poll tax.
Smith vs. Internationalism
Smith compromised no more, and arguably even less, with the Roosevelt Administration on foreign policy than he did on domestic policy. Not only did he join the majority of Republicans in opposing Lend-Lease in 1941, he was also one of 55 representatives to vote against the first appropriation, which had attracted a lot more Republican support as it was a vote on simply aiding Britain rather than granting new powers to the Roosevelt Administration. During World War II, Smith voted against Lend Lease appropriations despite them getting near unanimous support. In 1943, he was one of 29 representatives to vote against the Fulbright Resolution, an official statement of the House in favor of the formation of a United Nations. Smith argued against it thusly, “I am impelled to vote against the Fulbright resolution that Congress favor the setting up of international machinery with power to establish and maintain peace among the nations of the world. It seems to me the lower House is attempting here to perform a function which does not properly belong to it. The subject matter of this resolution deals specifically with treaties. The Constitution definitely vests in the President the “power to make treaties,” but only “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.” I think this is sufficient reason for voting against this resolution” (Congressional Record, 7708). Smith would not change with the end of World War II, and voted against aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947 and the Marshall Plan in 1948.
Smith vs. The Majority
If there were a small minority of conservatives taking a position, chances are really good Smith was among them, and on occasion voted against major GOP legislation as he thought it too accommodating to the New Deal, such as with the House version of the Taft-Hartley Act (he had previously voted for other bills curbing organized labor). Some examples of his dissents include:
On March 10, 1943, Smith was one of 6 representatives to oppose extending Lend-Lease for one year.
On May 21, 1943, Smith paired against Lend-Lease funding, a measure that 4 representatives voted against.
On April 19, 1944, Smith was one of 21 representatives to vote against extending Lend-Lease for one year.
On December 18, 1945, Smith was one of 15 representatives to vote against appointing representatives to the UN and its organizations.
On March 7, 1946, Smith was one of 24 representatives to vote against a housing bill that was considerably compromised in its liberalism by conservative limiting amendments, including his own to limit the power of the housing expediter.
On April 2, 1946, Smith was the only representative to vote against a bill for temporary additional compensation for postmasters and employees of the postal service.
On April 18, 1946, Smith was one of 20 representatives to support a motion to recommit the price control bill to immediately end all controls.
On August 7, 1948, he was one of 9 representatives to vote against the resolution considering accepting the Senate amendment to that year’s housing bill.
On August 11, 1949, he paired against a compromised increasing of the minimum wage, which 35 representatives voted against.
On December 5, 1950, he paired against extending the excess profits tax, which 20 representatives voted against.
Congressman Smith did on a few occasions vote against nearly all Republicans in the 80th Congress, but this was out of a refusal to accept compromise, such as his vote against the Wolcott Housing Bill in 1948, which did not include any public housing and a vote for was considered by the liberal Americans for Democratic Action against their position.
In 1947, Smith’s health began to decline, which resulted in frequent absences that year and in 1949 and 1950. Reading the writing on the wall by 1950, he opted to retire. In his retirement announcement, he stated, “I wish to announce that I shall not seek the nomination for re-election to Congress at the coming primary, and want to take this opportunity to than the citizens of this Congressional District, the 8th Ohio, for the splendid cooperation and loyal support they have given me throughout all the years of my service in striving to stop the growth of political power, which I have always regarded as Communism, or dictatorship by another name. To the extent that my health permits I shall, during the remainder of my term, continue to pursue the same course as I have in the past, perhaps stressing more than I have heretofore, if that be possible, the gravity of the situation that now menaces the way of life our fathers bequeathed us” (The Marion Star). He was among the representatives that anarcho-capitalist theorist Murray Rothbard (1950) was sad to see leave and his DW-Nominate score was a whopping 0.92, making him the most conservative individual to serve during the Roosevelt Administration per that measurement. His health continued to decline after his retirement and he died on July 16, 1956, at the age of 71 at Marion General Hospital.
References
A Congress to Win The War. (1942, May 18). The New Republic.
Hamilton Fish (R-N.Y.), who supported both anti-lynching and anti-poll tax bills but opposed a federal ballot for GIs.
The phenomenon of Republicans opposing loosening voter registration laws, changing voting laws in a more representative direction, and pushing election rules to their own benefit, especially on the federal level, is not as new as people might think. Indeed, both parties have interest in pushing election rules they see as increasing the likelihood that they will win elections. During the 78th Congress, the very same one in which most Republicans voted to ban the poll tax in the House, House Republicans overwhelmingly rejected the Worley bill for uniform federal ballots for GIs, thus bypassing strict voter registration laws in numerous states. Republicans feared, and not without reason, that the GI ballots would favor FDR for the 1944 election. The vote breakdown for the bill banning the poll tax in 1943 and the Worley bill in 1944 are thus:
Poll Tax Ban: 265-110 (D 92-93; R 169-17; P 2-0; FL 1-0; ALP 1-0), 5/25/43.
Worley Bill: 168-224 (D 147-48; R 18-175; P 2-0; FL 0-1; ALP 1-0), 2/3/44.
151 House Republicans either cast a vote or paired in favor of the poll tax ban and against the Worley Bill, thus, at least among the Republican votes, indicating that they considered the Worley bill to be separate from the civil rights question. 17 opposed both, and 16 supported both. Thus, 82% of Republicans who had a measurable opinion on both, support for the poll tax ban was not based on some broader voter access expansion principle. Interestingly, no Republicans were in opposition to the poll tax ban but in support of the Worley bill. However, Southern Democrats (defined as Democrats from the former Confederate states) did have such people.
If we break down the Southern Democratic vote on both, it looks like this:
Poll Tax Ban: SD 3-83 (8 paired against)
Worley Bill: 49-42 (1 paired for, 3 against)
The three who voted to ban the poll tax also voted for the Worley Bill, while 51% of those who voted against banning the poll tax also voted for the Worley Bill. Thus, while certainly numerous Southern Democrats were thinking about the civil rights issue with GI voting, it was far from all.
On “One Man, One Vote”
The concept of “one man, one vote” came along as challenges to legislative apportionment came before the courts. Urban areas were increasingly liberal and growing in population, which made traditional legislative setups that weren’t based on population more disproportionate. This matter at around the time that civil rights was becoming more of a national focus. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a comprehensive bill that had a voting rights section, thus it stands as the closest comparison to a bill denying the Supreme Court jurisdiction over legislative apportionment cases. The house votes were as follows:
Civil Rights Act of 1964: 289-126 (D 153-91; R 136-35), 7/2/64.
State Legislative Reapportionment Bill: 218-175 (D 96-140; R 122-35), 8/19/64.
With only four exceptions, the Republicans who opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also opposed the reapportionment bill. These were Republicans in states historically dominated by Democrats in Florida’s Bill Cramer, Kentucky’s Gene Snyder, Oklahoma’s Page Belcher, and Tennessee’s Bill Brock. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also had a roll call vote in the Senate as did a motion to table a rider to a foreign aid bill authorizing temporary stays for federal court orders for immediate population-based reapportionment of state legislatures.
Senate
Civil Rights Act of 1964: 73-27 (D 46-21; R 27-6),
Table Reapportionment Rider: 38-49 (D 32-23; R 6-26), 9/10/64.
Unlike in the former case, no Republicans who opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 supported tabling the reapportionment amendment.
Senate
In 1965, the very same group of Republican senators who voted for the Voting Rights Act of 1965 30-2 voted 29-3 for a constitutional amendment permitting the redistricting of state legislatures on grounds other than population, which would directly overturn the 1962 Supreme Court decision Baker v. Carr and the 1964 Supreme Court decisions Reynolds v. Sims and Wesberry v. Sanders. This would serve to strengthen the power of the Republican vote in many places, and the central advocate behind this proposal was Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.), who was concerned about Chicago dominating Illinois politics, which to this day it does. 27 of 32, or 84% of Republican senators were in support of both the Voting Rights Act and a Constitutional amendment to undo “One Man, One Vote” Supreme Court decisions.
The GOP on Postcard Voter Registration
In 1973, the Senate voted 57-37 for Gale McGee’s (D-Wyo.) postcard voter registration legislation, with Democrats voting for 45-7 and Republicans voting 12-28 against. Conservative James Buckley of New York and Independent Harry Byrd Jr. of Virginia also voted against. In 1974, Representative John Dent (D-Penn.) proposed a similar bill, but it failed to be considered 197-204: D 176-44; R 21-160. This means that 70% of Senate Republicans and 88% of House Republicans opposed postcard voter registration, the failure of which to be enacted could be considered sustaining “voter suppression”. In fact, the following Republicans voted for the Voting Rights Act and voted against postcard voter registration:
John Rhodes (Ariz.), Don Clausen (Calif.), Charles Gubser (Calif.), Burt Talcott (Calif.), Delwin Clawson (Calif.), Alphonzo Bell (Calif.), Craig Hosmer (Calif.), Bob Wilson (Calif.), Don Brotzman (Colo.), Ed Derwinski (Ill.), Robert McClory (Ill.), Leslie Arends (Ill.), John Anderson (Ill.), Robert Michel (Ill.), Paul Findley (Ill.), William Bray (Ind.), Garner Shriver (Kan.), Joe Skubitz (Kan.), Tim Carter (Ky.), Edward Hutchinson (Mich.), Charles Chamberlain (Mich.), Al Cederberg (Mich.), William Broomfield (Mich.), Al Quie (Minn.), Ancher Nelsen (Minn.), David Martin (Neb.), Peter Frelinghuysen (N.J.), William Widnall (N.J.), James Grover (N.Y.), John Wydler (N.Y.), Howard Robison (N.Y.), Carleton King (N.Y.), Frank Horton (N.Y.), Barber Conable (N.Y.), Henry Smith (N.Y.), Donald Clancy (Ohio), Del Latta (Ohio), John Stanton (Ohio), Samuel Devine (Ohio), John Ashbrook (Ohio), William Minshall (Ohio), Wendell Wyatt (Ore.), Joseph McDade (Penn.), Herman Schneebeli (Penn.), George Goodling (Penn.), Vernon Thomson (Wis.)
The major change in voting laws really began in 1993 with the “Motor Voter” bill. This proposal had been vetoed in 1992 by President George Bush, but with a new Democratic President Bill Clinton, he signed into law the bill as one of his first priorities, which provisions included that states were required to permit voter registration at DMVs, permit registration to vote by mail, and required states to allow people to register to vote at welfare offices. The House passed the bill on a vote of 259-160 on February 4, 1993, with 237 Democrats and 21 Republicans, and one Independent (Bernie Sanders) voting for while 14 Democrats and 146 Republicans voted against. The Senate passed the bill on a vote of 62-37 on March 17, 1993, 57 Democrats and 5 Republicans voted for while 37 Republicans voted against. All five were of the moderate to liberal wing of the party. Future presidential candidate John McCain (R-Ariz.) was among the votes against while future President Joe Biden (D-Del.) was a vote for.
The truth about calling what the GOP is pushing “voter suppression” is that they are pushing against certain policy changes or reversing certain modern ones, in other words, bringing voter registration and voting laws closer to where they were before Motor Voter. This is not a new phenomenon or evidence of some burgeoning “authoritarianism” in the GOP, rather if you believe that to be “authoritarianism” then the GOP has long been this way. In conclusion, for Republicans the question of voting rights on race was indeed a separate consideration from an overall broadening of the franchise.
References
A bill to establish national voter registration procedures for Federal elections, and for other purposes. Voteview.
H.R. 7152. Civil Rights Act of 1964. Adoption of a Resolution (H.Res. 789) Providing for House Approval of the Bill as Amended by the Senate. Voteview.
To Agree to H Res. 929, Rule for Consideration of H.R. 8053, to Establish Within the Bureau of the Census a Voter Registration Administration to be Administered Through the Postal Service. Voteview.
To Pass H.R. 7, a Bill to Make Unlawful the Requirement for Payment of a Poll Tax as a Prerequisite for Voting in a Primary or Other Election of National Office-Holders. Voteview.
To Pass S.J. Res. 66, a Proposal for a Constitutional Amendment Permitting Apportionment of One House of a Bicameral State Legislature Using Population, Geography, and Political Subdivisions as Factors. Voteview.
To Recommit S. 1285, The Soldiers Voting Bill, with Instructions to Substitute the “Worley Bill”, Which Provides that a Federal Ballot be Automatically Issued to Each Soldier Serving Overseas. Voteview.
In 1934, Speaker of the House Henry T. Rainey of Illinois died, and taking his place was Rules Committee Chairman Jo Byrns of Tennessee. Because since 1910 the Speaker of the House was not allowed to simultaneously chair committees, this post went to John Joseph O’Connor (1885-1960) of New York City.
A lawyer by profession, O’Connor’s first public office was as State Assemblyman from 1921 to 1923, and he was then elected to Congress to fill the vacancy left by the death of William Bourke Cockran, who had been Winston Churchill’s American mentor who I’ve already covered. During the 1920s, there wasn’t much in O’Connor’s voting record that would indicate that he would give FDR problems, indeed he differed little from other New York Democrats in his voting behavior. O’Connor was a strong supporter of Al Smith for the 1928 election, and likewise backed Smith in 1932.
O’Connor backed all of the First 100 Days legislation, but a warning sign of difficulties ahead may have been his vote against the tax-raising Revenue Act of 1934. One of the issues O’Connor could have been considered conservative on was ironically one in which he was in accord with President Roosevelt; his votes against veterans bonus bills in 1934 and 1935.
The 74th Congress provided a lot of work for O’Connor, as not only was he the chairman of the Rules Committee, he also had to perform the duties of Majority Leader William B. Bankhead of Alabama for weeks at a time as he was in ill health. It turns out Speaker Jo Byrns of Tennessee was in poor health too, and he died in 1936. O’Connor was a major contender for majority leader, but two things went against him despite him being the brother of his former law partner and his insistence that he was a New Dealer: 1. O’Connor had fought against the “death sentence” clause of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act as too punitive, and 2. He was a Tammany Hall man. Sam Rayburn of Texas, by contrast, was not a Tammany Hall man and he sponsored the Public Utilities Holding Company Act. Rayburn won the post. The key to Rayburn’s victory was the votes of the Pennsylvania Democratic delegation, whose direction in this matter was determined by Senator Joseph Guffey, a staunch supporter of the New Deal. O’Connor was initially sour in defeat, remarking, “The country got along pretty well when there were no Democrats from Pennsylvania” (Time Magazine, 1936).
In 1937, O’Connor again irked FDR with his vocal opposition to the court-packing plan and in the following year he opposed his executive reorganization plan, which was killed in the House. These two issues, as well as the “Death Sentence” clause, were seen as part of the litmus test for loyalty to the New Deal program, and O’Connor was thus targeted for defeat. However, O’Connor had voted for most of the New Deal, and the highly esteemed Senator Robert F. Wagner, known as a New Dealer, had voted to kill the court packing plan and voted against the 1938 reorganization plan. Indeed, O’Connor’s record in most respects matched that of Wagner. One way he certainly stood out negatively for New Dealers was his lone stand among New York Democrats in his vote for an investigation into sit-down strikes in 1937. Although he was reported as in opposition to the Fair Labor Standards Act, none of his votes reflect this, including him voting against the successful motion to recommit the first version of the bill, which was stronger than the version that reached the president’s desk in 1938. In 1937, O’Connor called for a special session of Congress in the wake of the “Roosevelt Recession” for tax relief to restore business confidence and curb their fear of government. He stated, “We are picking on them, abusing them and snooping on them. Yet the only place anybody can get a job is from a private employer. The employers won’t do anything while living under the fear of the Government, with taxes, snooping and so on to harass them” (Pittsburgh Post Gazette). In 1938, he voted to strike a proposed excess profits tax from that year’s Revenue Act, but more Democrats than not voted to strike it too.
Roosevelt stated of him that he was “one of the most effective obstructionists in the lower house. Week in and week out O’Connor labors to tear down New Deal strength, pickle New Deal legislation” (The American Presidency Project). O’Connor protested that he had been a New Dealer and that the only vote he had cast against a major New Deal proposal was the executive reorganization bill (the court-packing plan didn’t come to a vote in the House). This protestation didn’t stop the Democratic base from heeding Roosevelt; he was the one major scalp that FDR got from his effort to purge his party of dissidents, getting his preferred man of James H. Fay, a World War I veteran who had lost his leg. O’Connor then switched parties and ran for reelection as a Republican but lost by five points…the party label mattered more than the man in 1938. Ironically, O’Connor’s insistence that he was a New Dealer had mostly been on point. He had supported all of the “First 100 Days” legislation, had voted for pretty much everything except the Revenue Act of 1934 and FDR’s 1938 reorganization plan. O’Connor even backed the final version of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act despite it containing the “Death Sentence” clause. Indeed, O’Connor’s obituary noted that he “had had a major hand in promoting much of the landmark legislation of the New Deal” (Daily Press). His ouster reminds me in some way of Liz Cheney’s 2022 ouster; she had voted most of the time with Republicans, its just that she crossed the head honcho, like O’Connor crossed the head honcho of his day. Indeed, although FDR identified O’Connor as one of the most effective “obstructionists”, his DW-Nominate score is a -0.466.
After his time in Congress, he resumed his legal career. O’Connor also supported America First causes and represented Rep. Hamilton Fish’s (R-N.Y.) aide, George Hill, when he was being prosecuted for perjury for claiming under oath that he didn’t have a role in a franking scheme with German propaganda agents George Sylvester Viereck and Prescott Dennett and that he didn’t know Viereck. O’Connor died while hospitalized on January 26, 1960. Of all FDR’s targets in the 1938 purge, O’Connor was easily the most ideologically loyal, but that he wouldn’t do everything FDR wanted was enough to get him the boot.
References
Democratic Leader Urges Quick Tax Cut as Job Aid. (1937, November 13). Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 1.
I’d already written a post earlier about UDA-New Republic ratings from 1943, but I have found through a search of newspapers.com more information on the organization, the first vote guide they put out.
In 1942, Union for Democratic Action published through the left-wing The New Republic a pamphlet for voters led in crafting by former Representative Thomas Amlie of Wisconsin, who I already covered as a major example of a genuine RINO (Republican in Name Only), which he was during his first term. In the House and Senate he and his team tabulated 20 votes, 10 domestic, and 10 foreign by which to judge them. On its back, the upcoming 1942 election was proclaimed to be the most important in the nation’s history. Gee, how many have times have we heard that one before?
The House criterion for votes presents an issue as one of the twenty is not a roll call vote, rather a teller vote on whether to adopt FDR’s proposed $875 million WPA bill, which the House rejected 137-226 on January 13, 1939. They count the vote based on a reconstruction based on witness accounts as well as how legislators said they voted. This reconstruction was done by labor leader John L. Lewis’s Labor’s Non-Partisan League, but most troubling for my analysis, however, is that because they are so focused on making this relevant for 1942, they don’t tabulate the vote for representatives who left office in 1940. Thus, in order to reconstruct the vote myself I must find more sources…if I do reconstruct it I’ll update this post. It is rather compelling that there’s a vote so relevant but only done by voice vote that a labor group reconstructed it. There was, incidentally, a recorded Senate vote in which the $875 million bill was rejected by one vote. This, as well as reporting on the House vote indicates House GOP opposition to the $875 million bill to be overwhelming and one of the earliest victories of the Conservative Coalition.
The House roll call votes they count are, and I am going to put these in chronological order:
1. Fortification of Guam
Delete $5 million for fortification of Guam.
Adopted 205-168 (D 64-152; R 138-15; P 2-0; FL 1-0; AL 01), 2/39.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
2. Cut Military Plane Spending
Reducing funds for airplane construction by the military by $37 million.
Rejected 150-217 (D 3-207; R 145-8; P 2-0; FL 0-1; AL 0-1), 6/22/39.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
3. RFC Bond Authority
Motion to consider the bill providing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation authority to issue bonds.
Rejected 167-193: D 164-47; R 0-146; P 2-0; AL 1-0, 8/1/39.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
4. Continue Arms Embargo
Rep. James Shanley (D-Conn.) amendment to the Neutrality Act amendments, retaining the arms embargo.
Defeated 181-243, 11/2/39.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
5. Neutrality Revision
Passage of the bill repealing the arms embargo, a weakening of the Neutrality Acts.
Passed 244-171, 11/3/39.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
6. National Youth Administration
Amendment to the Department of Labor, Federal Security Administration, and related agencies, increasing funds for the National Youth Administration.
Adopted 218-159 (D 183-42; R 31-117; P 2-0; FL 1-0; AL 1-0), 3/28/40.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
7. Food Stamp Plan
Reduce funds for the food stamp plan, providing surplus food to the needy, from $85 million to $72.7 million.
Rejected 173-191 (D R 17-105), 5/9/40.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
8. Wagner Act Amendments
Passage of the Smith (D-Va.) amendments to the Wagner Act, which sought to limit the power of organized labor.
Passed 258-129 (D 116-112; R 142-14; P 0-1; FL 0-1; AL 0-1), 6/7/40.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
9. Conscription Bill
Passage of the bill instituting a peacetime draft for military preparedness.
Passed 263-149 (D 211-33; R 52-112; P 0-2; FL 0-1; AL 0-1), 9/7/40.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
10. Lend-Lease
Passage of the bill authorizing the U.S. to lend ships to Britain.
Passed 260-165 (D 236-25; R 24-135; P 0-3; FL 0-1; AL 0-1), 2/6/41.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
11. First Lend-Lease Appropriation
Passed 336-55 (D 231-6; R 104-45; P 0-3; FL 1-0; AL 0-1), 3/19/41.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
12. Property Seizure Bill
Passage of the bill authorizing the President to acquire property, with compensation, as needed for the national defense.
Passed 240-133 (D 215-11; R 25-122; P 0-3; AL 1-0), 08/05/41.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
13. Draft Extension
Passage of the bill extending the draft for an additional 18 months, the closest major vote of the session.
Passed 203-202 (D 182-65; R 21-133; P 0-3; AL 0-1), 8/12/41.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
14. Ban on Arming Ships Repeal
Adopted 259-138 (D 219-21; R 39-113; P 0-3; FL 0-1; AL 1-0), 10/17/41.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
15. Lifting Belligerent Port and Combat Zone Ban
Passed 212-194 (D 189-53; R 22-137; P 0-3; FL 0-1; AL 1-0) , 11/13/41.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
16. Vinson Anti-Strike Bill
Passage of the Vinson (D-Ga.) Anti-Strike bill, which includes the Smith (D-Va.) amendments placing numerous restrictions on organized labor activities.
Passed 252-136 (D 129-108; R 123-24; P 0-3; AL 0-1), 12/3/41.
A “nay”’ is the liberal position.
17. Price Control Limitation
Rep. Jesse Wolcott (R-Mich.) amendment, strike authorization for creation of the Office of Price Administration to issue and revoke licenses and provide for a board of review.
Rejected 189-210 (D 36-204; R 149-6; P 3-0; FL 1-0; , 1/6/42.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
18. Continue the Dies Committee
Adoption of the resolution extending the life of the investigative Dies Committee, which investigates communist and fascist, among other “un-American” activities.
Passed 331-46 (D 183-41; R 145-3; P 3-0; FL 0-1; AL 0-1), 3/11/42.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
19. Increase Funds for Public Power Projects
Adoption of the amendment providing $24 million in funds for the Table Rock and Bull Shoals public power projects.
Defeated 117-202 (D 110-76; R 3-126; P 3-0; AL 1-0), 3/27/42.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
Senate
Unlike the House, in which the votes go back to 1939, the Senate goes back to 1937 to account for a full term of senators up for reelection in 1942. This is the same thing that the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action did for their first set of ratings, which like UDA’s, were designed to influence voters for an upcoming election. Rather peculiarly, only foreign policy issues are counted for the 1941 Senate and the same goes for all but one of the House votes.
The following 29 legislators were singled out by Union for Democratic Action as obstructionists for defeat in the 1942 election, among them 18 Republicans and 11 Democrats.
1. Gilbertsville Dam
Adoption of the amendment appropriating funds for the Gilbertsville Dam as part of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
Adopted 46-29 (D 40-20; R 3-9; FL 1-0; P 1-0; I 1-0), 5/12/37.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
2. Recommit (Defeat) Court Packing Plan
Passed 70-20 (D 53-18; R 16-0; FL 1-1; I 0-1; P 0-1), 7/22/37.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
3. Housing Act Restriction
Sen. Harry Byrd (D-Va.) amendment limiting the housing bill’s costs to $4000 a unit.
Adopted 40-39 (D 26-37; R 13-0; FL 1-1; P 0-1), 8/4/37.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
4. Reorganization Plan
Adoption of FDR’s reorganization plan, which centralized more power in the executive. Although it passed here, it was defeated in the House.
Passed 49-42 (D 47-26; R 0-14; FL 0-2; P 1-0; I 1-0), 3/28/38.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
5. Roosevelt Administration WPA Measure
Sen. Kenneth McKellar (D-Tenn.) proposed to adopt the Roosevelt Administration figure of $875,000 for the Works Progress Administration.
Defeated 46-47 (D 41-26; R 2-20; FL 1-1; P 1-0; I 1-0), 1/27/39.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
6. Surtax on Incomes Starting at $3000 Instead of $4000
Sen. Robert La Follette Jr. (P-Wis.) amendment, providing for a more proportional tax system.
Defeated 38-38 (D 23-32; R 11-6; FL 2-0; P 1-0; I 1-0), 6/22/39.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
7. Delete RFC Loan for Railroads
Sen. Burton Wheeler (D-Mont.) amendment to the Public Works bill, deleting a Reconstruction Finance Corporation loan to railroads.
Adopted 45-32 (D 23-31; R 19-0; FL 2-0; P 0-1; I 1-0), 7/28/39.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
8. Resume Mandatory Arms Embargo
Rejected 33-60 (D 14-52; R 17-7; FL 2-0;P 1-0; I 0-1), 10/27/39.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
9. Passage of the Arms Embargo Repeal
Passed 63-30 (D 54-12; R 8-16; FL -1; P 0-1; I 1-0), 10/27/39.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
10. Cut Civilian Conservation Corps
Reduce funds for Civilian Conservation Corps camps by $25 million.
Defeated 14-43 (D 11-33; R 3-8; FL 0-1; P 0-1), 4/25/40.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
11. Labor Anti-Spy Bill
Passage of the bill stopping certain oppressive labor practices, such as employing spies within unions.
Passed 47-20 (D 37-14; R 7-6; FL 1-0; P 1-0; I-0), 5/27/40.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
12. Conscription Bill
Passage of the bill instituting a peacetime draft for military preparedness.
Passed 58-31 (D 50-17; R 8-10; FL 0-2;P 0-1; I 0-1), 8/28/40.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
13. Tax-Exempt Securities
Sen. Prentiss Brown (D-Mich.) amendment, stopping further issuing of tax-exempt securities.
Defeated 30-44 (D 19-34; R 8-10; FL 1-0; P 1-0; I 1-0), 9/19/40.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
14. Restrict Armed Forces to Western Hemisphere
Amendment to the Lend-Lease bill, restricting deployment of US forces to the Western Hemisphere.
Rejected 38-51 (D 12-48; R 25-2; P 1-0; I 0-1, 3/7/41.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
15. Substitute Loan for Lend-Lease
Amendment substituting Lend-Lease with a $2 billion loan to Britain.
Rejected 33-56 (D 13-48; R 19-7; P 1-0; I 0-1), 3/8/41.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
16. Lend-Lease Bill
Passed 60-31 (D 49-13; R 10-17; P 0-1; I 1-0), 3/8/41.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
17. No Transfer of Axis Ships to Great Britain
Amendment barring transfer of Axis ships to Great Britain.
Rejected 38-43 (D 15-39; R 22-3; P 1-0; I 0-1), 5/15/41.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
18. Extend Military Draft for 18 Months
Passed 45-30 (D 38-16; R 7-13; P 0-1), 8/7/41.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
19. Retain Belligerent Port and Combat Zone Bans
Defeated 38-49 (D 15-43; R 22-5; P 1-0; I 0-1), 11/7/41.
A “nay” is the liberal position.
20. Neutrality Act Revision
Passage of the bill repealing sections 3 and 6 of the Neutrality Act of 1939.
Passed 50-37 (D 43-15; R 6-21; P 0-1; I 1-0), 11/7/41.
A “yea” is the liberal position.
Not only was this offered as a guide for the voters, but UDA also highlighted three senators and twenty-six representatives who were up for reelection as key obstructionists of President Roosevelt’s agenda. These were:
Senate
C. Wayland “Curly” Brooks, R-Ill. – Staunch non-interventionist and domestic conservative.
Arthur Capper, R-Kan. – Longtime advocate for agriculture, his record was once supportive of the New Deal but had since moved to the right.
W. Lee “Pappy” O’Daniel, D-Tex.
House
Joe Starnes, D-Ala. – For his role on the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
Leland M. Ford, R-Calif. – Although Ford was an interventionist, he was one of the staunchest opponents of FDR on domestic issues.
Eugene Cox, D-Ga. – Cox was a prominent member of the House Rules Committee and a key figure in the Conservative Coalition.
Everett Dirksen, R-Ill. – Although considered an effective figure, that’s part of why he makes the list as a foe of FDR’s domestic and foreign policies. From 1959 to 1969 he would lead the Senate Republicans.
Stephen A. Day, R-Ill. – Prominent non-interventionist who published speeches through Flanders Hall, which was run by the Nazis’ top paid agent in the US, George Sylvester Viereck.
William P. Lambertson, R-Kan. – A rural progressive turned staunch conservative.
Thomas Winter, R-Kan. – A a strong opponent of the president on domestic and foreign policy.
Paul Shafer, R-Mich. – A representative taking after Clare Hoffman in his sheer opposition to the Roosevelt Administration.
Clare Hoffman, R-Mich. – A man whose record is described as almost 100% bad by UDA.
Harold Knutson, R-Minn. – Minnesota’s staunchest foe of President Roosevelt’s agenda.
John Rankin, D-Miss. – A staunch bigot who shifted right on numerous issues, but still was a strong supporter of public power.
Dewey Short, R-Mo., a staunch conservative known for his strong oratory against he Roosevelt Administration, in particular on the draft.
James F. O’Connor, D-Mont., for his allegiance to Senator Burton K. Wheeler and his non-interventionism.
Harry B. Coffee, D-Neb., who had been voting like a Republican.
J. Parnell Thomas, R-N.J., a prominent member of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
William B. Barry, D-N.Y., for his status as a non-interventionist Democrat who spoke at America First events.
Hamilton Fish, R-N.Y., for his leading role in opposition to the Roosevelt Administration who had been careless in his connections.
Frederick C. Smith, R-Ohio, a conservative traditionalist in the mold of McKinley.
Martin Sweeney, D-Ohio, for his non-interventionism and having been the House’s leading supporter of Father Charles Coughlin.
James Van Zandt, backed by railroad interests and a consistent pusher of America First.
Charles Faddis, D-Penn. -For his increasingly rightist stances on domestic issues.
Karl Mundt, R-S.D., prominent non-interventionist.
Martin Dies, D-Tex. – For his leading the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
Howard W. Smith, D-Va. – Another Southern Democrat on the Rules Committee who pushed legislation to limit the power of organized labor.
Frank Keefe, R-Wis. – A staunch foe of the Roosevelt Administration on domestic and foreign policy.
Joshua L. Johns, R-Wis. – Another staunch Midwestern non-interventionist first elected by the splitting of the Democratic and Progressive votes.
Most of these people, including all of the senators, were returned to office in 1942. The successor organization, Americans for Democratic Action, would be a lot more successful in advancing liberal causes.
The approach of balancing out domestic and foreign votes met with criticism from another liberal, Morris H. Rubin of The Progressive magazine. He critiqued that Democrats with opposition records to the New Deal and organized labor were faring better than certain progressives because of foreign policy and that the release of this serves to divide real progressives. Although he opposes inclusion of foreign policy votes, which I don’t agree with, I largely concur with his criticism. I think UDA’s selection is over-weighted to the inclusion of foreign policy issues by making matters 50-50. Although a UDA representative in response held that the foreign policy records of a number of progressives served to cause division and denied that these scorecards were meant to be averaged out, I think the presentation of pluses and minuses gives ammo to this interpretation. This overall constitutes an early, flawed, and largely unsuccessful effort to bolster President Roosevelt. Yet, it is an interesting look at the issues the staunchly left among FDR’s backers found to be most important. There is more to say about UDA, but I will leave that for later.
References
A Congress to Win The War. (1942, May 18). The New Republic.
Robert Frederick Drinan’s (1920-2007) background in one way was rather unusual for a political career, but in another way it was all too usual. In 1942, he entered the Jesuit order and while in the order he earned his law degree from Georgetown in 1950. Drinan was ordained in 1953 and was admitted to the bar in 1956, but his primary work was as a law professor. He kept himself busy, serving as vice president of the Massachusetts Bar Association from 1961 to 1964 and on the Massachusetts Civil Rights Commission from 1962 to 1971. This legal background provided a basis for a political run, while his status as a Catholic priest added an aura of moral authority and interest in him as a candidate.
In 1970, Father Drinan ran for Congress, challenging incumbent Philip J. Philbin for renomination. Philbin had served in Congress since 1943 and was vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. His record, although in many ways liberal and included a vote for the Cooper-Church Amendment, did not meet the anti-Vietnam War litmus test of young liberals, and Drinan narrowly defeated him. Drinan’s campaign manager was none other than John Kerry. This run attracted great attention, with National Review’s William F. Buckley, Jr. dubbing him “the greatest threat to orderly thought since Eleanor Roosevelt left this vale of tears” (Feeney). Indeed, his win came on the heels of other ultra-left-wing victories in Democratic primaries, such as the ouster of Berkeley’s Jeffery Cohelan for Ron Dellums, and New York City’s Leonard Farbstein being tossed for Bella Abzug. While in Congress, Drinan wore his Jesuit priest outfit with a Congressional pin. When questioned about the propriety of wearing this instead of a regular suit, he responded, “It’s the only suit I own” (Glass).
Drinan filed the first impeachment against President Nixon in 1973, but this was not for Watergate, rather for his secret bombing of Cambodia. Tip O’Neill recalled this effort in his memoirs, “Morally, Drinan had a good case. But politically, he damn near blew it. For if Drinan’s resolution had come up for a vote at the time he filed it, it would have been overwhelmingly defeated — by something like 400 to 20. After that, with most of the members already on record as having voted once against impeachment, it would have been extremely difficult to get them to change their minds later on” (Feeney). Two years later, he would file impeachment charges for Ambassador to Iran Richard Helms for his activities as CIA director. Father Drinan was also a passionate advocate for imprisoned Soviet dissidents, and he was among the leaders of efforts to free Natan Sharansky, who eventually was freed after eight years in a Soviet gulag. As a Catholic priest in Congress, he stood out for his opposition to the Hyde Amendment barring Medicaid funding for abortions, a stance that attracted a lot of criticism from other prominent Catholics. In 1980, Pope John Paul II issued a papal order that all priests leave elected office. Drinan then announced that he would not run for reelection but was allowed to finish out his term, and when some of his staunch supporters suggested that he ignore the papal order, he responded, “That would be unthinkable” (Sprigg).
Although reported by Politico on his death that Drinan was the only Catholic priest elected to Congress, this is not true. While he was the only Jesuit priest, Robert John Cornell of Wisconsin, also a liberal Democrat, was also a Catholic priest. However, he lost reelection before the Pope’s order for all priests to depart elected office and unlike Drinan, opposed government funding for abortion. Drinan’s liberal status was most indicated by the fact that he sided with the liberal Americans for Democratic Action 100% of the time and never missed any of the votes they counted. He also sided with the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action only 8% of the time, and his DW-Nominate score stands at -0.422. He would become the chairman of Americans for Democratic Action after his time in office and for the rest of his life teach at Georgetown University Law Center. In 1996, Drinan spoke in support of President Clinton’s veto of the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act. Upon his death on January 28, 2007 at the age of 86, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) lauded him, “He was a profile in courage in every sense of the word, and the nation has lost one of the finest persons ever to serve in Congress” (Feeney).
References
ADA Voting Records. Americans for Democratic Action.
Mad Politics: The Bizarre, Fascinating, and Unknown of American Political History 