Fascinating Politics

Third Term Twaddle

Ulysses S. Grant, the first president to try for a third term.

President Donald Trump and his supporters have now and again teased the idea of him having a third term despite the existence of the 22nd Amendment limiting presidents to two terms and the 12th Amendment which does not allow someone to run for vice president if they are not permitted to serve as president, thus putting the kibbutz on the idea of running Trump has VP and flipping once whoever is elected president resigns. The talk about third term Trump, from him, his supporters, and Trump’s opponents, is simply twaddle. I don’t dismiss the notion that he could influence the next Republican president through social media, private calls, etc., but president for a third term he will not be. Only one president in American history has served beyond Washington’s two-term precedent, and that was Franklin D. Roosevelt. After his presidency, Roosevelt’s foes managed to secure the support to make his break the last from tradition with the aforementioned 22nd Amendment. However, he was not the only president to seek a third term, and he wasn’t the first to do so. I will not include Roosevelt in this post as he was successful and I will also not include Woodrow Wilson thinking he could run again in 1920 despite having suffered a massive stroke only to be rebuffed by party bosses, as he never actually got to candidate stage. The first to seek a third term was Republican Ulysses S. Grant.

1880: Grant’s Final Run

When Rutherford B. Hayes ran for president in 1876, he promised to serve only one term, and he kept his promise, thus leaving the Republican field open. The Stalwart faction of the Republican Party, which was led by New York Senator Roscoe Conkling and opposed civil service reform, had done quite well under the Grant Administration, and thus wanted to run him again. After his presidency, Grant with his wife Julia had gone on a two and a half year tour around the world, where he gained much greater understanding and insight into foreign relations, and even mediated a dispute between Japan and China (National Park Service). Both him being out of the country and perhaps enough time passing for people to not think about or think less about the corruption that happened during the Grant Administration helped his prospects. Conkling himself was bullish on Grant, “nothing but an act of God could prevent Grant’s nomination” (National Park Service). However, given how well known his support of Grant was, his strong pride and ego, and that the Stalwart faction was closely tied with Grant, many came to reasonably believe that Conkling’s power would rise under a third Grant Administration, and many Republicans didn’t want that. Furthermore, Maine Senator James G. Blaine, who sought civil service reform (although he wasn’t nearly the reformer as popularly thought), and Secretary of the Treasury John Sherman (General Sherman’s brother) also sought the Republican nomination. Furthermore, Although the Stalwart faction was considerable and in the first round of balloting Grant got the most votes, he did not make the threshold to win. In order for the Blaine and Sherman factions to block the Stalwarts, they had to unify behind a candidate, and they found one in Congressman James Garfield, to this day the last sitting member of the House to win both a presidential nomination and an election. Garfield had delivered a powerful nominating speech for Sherman, but rather than convincing voters to support him, it convinced them to support Garfield. Garfield came out with the nomination. Conkling had said nothing short of an act of God would prevent Grant’s nomination, and it is ironic that given his high estimation of himself that it was Conkling who was a major reason why Grant did not get the nomination.

1912: The Bull Moose Run

When Theodore Roosevelt left office in 1908, he did so with some regret; regret that he had promised not to run for another term in 1904. Nonetheless, he at the time of leaving believed that President Taft would continue his moderate path of progressive reform. However, he learned of certain key conflicts within the GOP while abroad, and found himself increasingly displeased with his successor. His sources of dissatisfaction included how Taft addressed tariff reduction, the Ballinger-Pinchot affair over conservation, and his legalistic rather than case-by-case basis for regulating trusts. In 1912, Roosevelt put himself forth for the Republican nomination, but Taft and party conservatives had control over party machinery and managed to deny him his effort to return to office. Instead of bowing out for the election, he ran for president on the Progressive Party ticket, also known as the Bull Moose Party. The 1912 platform would call for numerous reforms, such as initiative, referendum, and recall for direct democracy, numerous labor reforms, called for easing the process for adopting amendments to the Constitution, women’s suffrage, unemployment and old age insurance, and restrictions on courts striking down legislation. With Roosevelt’s entry, Taft’s reelection was doomed, and party conservatives focused on clamping down on controlling party machinery. The real election became Wilson vs. Roosevelt, and Wilson knew it, focusing his attacks on Roosevelt. Some conservatives in the GOP thought Wilson preferable to Roosevelt at the time as at least he seemed less radical at the time. Wilson prevailed, and would do so again in 1916, in which he again focused his attacks on Theodore Roosevelt.

1952: Truman Tests a Third-Term Run

The 22nd Amendment interestingly exempted the sitting president from the block on running for more than two terms, thus President Truman could legally serve again. Truman did have interest in running again, but there were several issues. First, he was unpopular, having an only 22% approval rating at the start of 1952 due to the US being in a stalemate on Korea, a set of unpopular price controls he enacted in the name of economic stability, and increasing unemployment and inflation (Glass). Second, there had been some significant corruption scandals within his administration, particularly with the IRS. Third, a compelling alternative was rising in Senator Estes Kefauver (D-Tenn.). Kefauver was a folksy liberal populist who although he was not the best orator, he was second-to-none on one-on-one voter interactions who often donned his trademark coonskin hat and had gained acclaim for his televised hearings on organized crime. In this author’s opinion, he is one of the few Southern Democrats of this period who would still carry appeal for Democratic base voters today. In the March 1952 primary in New Hampshire, the earliest indicator of where the Democratic race was going, Truman lost to Kefauver. Such a poor showing convinced him it was time to hang up his hat. Interestingly, it turns out Kefauver would not net the nomination in 1952 nor would he ever, the closest he got was winning the VP nomination in 1956.

1968: Johnson’s Half-Hearted Hurdle

Although Johnson’s run would not be technically a third term as he had only served the last year of JFK’s term, he was eligible as the 22nd Amendment allows for a president to serve a maximum of ten years in office. His “run” was not particularly enthusiastic given his declining popularity but also his health. His health habits had long been poor, smoking two to three packs a day, having a fatty diet, exercising little, and heavy drinking, and this produced a heart attack that was the most severe one could have without dying in 1955. After this, he dropped smoking, improved his diet, started exercising more, and rationed his alcohol. During his presidency, a computer had analyzed his and his family’s medical history and determined that he would not live past 64 (Time Magazine). Furthermore, the old New Deal coalition was coming apart, the 1966 midterms being the first indicator, and the Democratic Party was splitting into factions. However, in early 1968 the only candidate who had risen to challenge Johnson was Minnesota’s Senator Eugene McCarthy, who was running on an anti-Vietnam War platform. Once again, New Hampshire would figure in faltering a president from getting a third term. Although McCarthy was not considered a big name in Washington, his campaign ginned up an unexpected level of enthusiasm from the youth, particularly college students. While Johnson did win the March primary, he did so by the unexpectedly low margin of 7 points. This indicated that Johnson was indeed beatable, and on March 16th, Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-N.Y.) announced his candidacy. McCarthy wasn’t a heavy-hitter for Democrats, but Kennedy was. On March 31st, Johnson announced his withdrawal from reelection, leaving an open primary. He commented on his health, “I’m going to enjoy the time I’ve got left. When I go, I want to go quick. I don’t want to linger on the way Eisenhower did” (Time Magazine). Although Johnson had been compliant with the orders of his doctors, he resumed his old ways of heavy smoking, eating, and drinking in 1971. This resulted in the computer turning out to be right; Johnson died of a heart attack on January 22, 1973 at 64, which would have only been two days after another term would have ended for him.

References

Glass, A. (2019, March 29). Truman declines to seek another term, March 29, 1952. Politico.

Retrieved from

https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/29/truman-declines-to-seek-another-term-march-29-1952-1238358

Medicine: The Heart of LBJ. (1973, February 5). Time Magazine.

Retrieved from

https://time.com/archive/6840691/medicine-the-heart-of-l-bj/

Progressive Party Platform of 1912. The American Presidency Project.

Retrieved from

https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/progressive-party-platform-1912

Ulysses S. Grant and the Presidential Election of 1880. National Park Service.

Retrieved from

https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/ulysses-s-grant-and-the-presidential-election-of-1880.htm

Fascinating Politics

The Fulbright and Connally Resolutions: America Embraces Its New Role in the World

Congressman J. William Fulbright

As early as 1943, Americans as well as their politicians were thinking about what would happen in the post-war world. Most were haunted by the failure of international law to stop Axis aggression, and believed something stronger and more permanent than the League of Nations must be established, and must have the United States as an active player. Spearheading the resolution stating America’s postwar aims was Representative J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), a freshman who was known as an intellectual proponent of internationalism.

Rep. Robert Sikes (D-Fla.) gave his support, Mr. Speaker, to win the war is not enough. We need not go far back in memory to recall another time when we fought and won a war against aggressor nations, a war to make the world safe for democracy. We thought we gave democracy to the world. Then we turned our backs, and in nation after nation freedom exploded into anarchy, dictators reaped the benefit of America’s good intentions. We must think ahead, for we cannot endure the horror and cost of war every 25 years. Human lives are too precious to be sacrificed in vain. This time we must also win the peace. If we are to win the peace, it is not a day too soon to start laying the groundwork for a peace that is lasting and just. Today as never before the world looks to this Nation for leadership. If we again refuse to accept the mantle of world leadership, it must fall to other shoulders, and world policies will again be shaped by other hands. God forbid that they be the hands of another Hitler, but wishful thinking will not make them friendly hands or kind hands” (Congressional Record, 7718).

Rep. Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.), who would later serve as Senate Republican leader, announced his support, “I favor collaboration, organized justice, the curbing and prevention of military aggression, the disarmament of Axis Powers, a clarification of peace aims now before it is too late, a strong United States Army and Navy, the use of constitutional processes, and the preservation of our national interests. Why not say so in language that all can understand? Must language be used to obscure rather than reveal our intent? Peace will come from the bottom up, not from the top down and the time is here to let the people know what we mean that they might speak their minds” (Congressional Record, 7709).

Opponents

Rep. Frederick C. Smith (R-Ohio), one of the most if not the most conservative member of the House, voiced opposition to the Fulbright Resolution on Constitutional grounds, stating, Mr. Speaker, I am impelled to vote against the Fulbright resolution that Congress favor the setting up of international machinery with power to establish and maintain peace among the nations of the world. It seems to me the lower House is attempting here to perform a function which does not properly belong to it. The subject matter of this resolution deals specifically with treaties. The Constitution definitely vests in the President the “power to make treaties,” but only “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.” I think this is sufficient reason for voting against this resolution. The phrase in the Fulbright resolution, “international machinery with power adequate to establish and maintain * * * peace among the nations of the world * * * participation by the United States therein,” can mean but one thing, namely, creation of an international police force, with the United States participating, for maintaining an armed peace among the nations of the world. In my opinion, this is no time for the United States to be making any such commitments as this. There are entirely too many unknown factors at this juncture to safely undertake the formulation of so far-reaching and revolutionary a policy as this would involve. Moreover, those of us who take the position that the peace treaty should be made in strict conformity with the Constitution can hardly be consistent when at the same time we vote for the Fulbright resolution. It would be wholly incongruous to attempt to stand on constitutionalism in the writing of the peace, on the one hand, and to vote for the Fulbright resolution, on the other, since this resolution seeks to perform a duty which the Constitution vests exclusively in the upper Chamber. It may be expected the Senate will uphold its constitutional prerogative” (Congressional Record, 7708).

Despite Smith’s objections, this resolution was adopted 360-29 on September 21st, and it is rather interesting to point out some of the dissenters here:

Malcolm Tarver (D-Ga.), not a usual opponent of FDR’s foreign policy who opposed a number of New Deal measures. His opposition is rather curious, but if he was going the Constitutionalist route, it would have been based on Smith objecting to the House acting on such a matter.

Jessie Sumner (R-Ill.), the first woman to be reelected to the House from Illinois, and an extreme conservative.

Clare Hoffman (R-Mich.), a constant thorn in the side of President Roosevelt who badly wanted him indicted for sedition.

Roy Woodruff (R-Mich.), a former Bull Moose Progressive turned arch-conservative.

Harold Knutson (R-Minn.), a tax expert who had voted against the U.S. declaring war on Germany in 1917.

Daniel Reed (R-N.Y.), another tax expert, had voted against every major New Deal initiative that attracted ideological controversy.

William Lemke (R-N.D.), an agrarian radical who had run for president on the Union Party ticket in 1936 who got a bit more conservative in his later years.

The Senate Resolution

Senator Tom Connally

The Senate’s corresponding resolution was the Connally Resolution, sponsored by Tom Connally (D-Tex.). Support was overwhelming, and many non-interventionists were won over.

Senator David Walsh (D-Mass.) gave a reserved argument for, and he had opposed the Versailles Treaty and had been a non-interventionist. He stated, “I in tend to vote for the resolution. It is obvious that a vote against the resolution would be tan t amount to a denial of any willingness to cooperate with other free nations in the post-war world. Such a denial would in my opinion misrepresent the sentiments of the American people, and would misrepresent my own sentiments. But let there be no misunderstanding of the nature of the resolution and of my position in supporting it. The resolution is an offer – not a commitment. It is expressive of a desire for a just and honorable peace, and of a willingness to cooperate in its maintenance. But as to what is a just and honorable peace and as to ways and means for its maintenance, those are questions which cannot possibly be decided until the terms and conditions are resolved, and until the post-war international organization is translated from the realm of theory to the realm of fact” (Congressional Record, 9203).

Senator Carl Hayden (D-Ariz.), who had been consistent in his support of President Roosevelt’s foreign policy before Pearl Harbor, backed the resolution while expressing an understanding of the limit of its impact: “Mr. President, I intend to vote for Senate Resolution 192 as revised by the Committee on Foreign Relations, but I desire to make it perfectly clear that I know just what I am voting for. It is a simple resolution which does nothing more than express the idea that the Senate favors the establishment of a just peace throughout the world and is willing that the United States shall assume a fair share of the responsibility for the maintenance of such a peace. It does not bind any Senator to vote for or against any treaty, in whole or in part, which may hereafter be submitted to the Senate to implement this general declaration. And above all, even though adopted by a unanimous vote, the resolution does not amend the Constitution of the United States by merely repeating some of the words of the supreme law of the land” (Congressional Record, 9206).

Senator William Langer (R-N.D.) spoke in opposition, “Mr. President, when the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations introduced his resolution, we were urged to vote for

it because it was said to be so elastic that it could be construed to mean anything. That had a familiar sound to me. It reminds me of one of those smooth, slick salesmen we men in the West are so familiar with, who in the old days used to get some farmer behind the barn and give him a drink of rot gut, and get him to sign a contract to buy a $7,000 or $8,000 threshing machine and threshing engine. They would get him to sign the contract; and when the farmer said, “There is some fine print on the back

of this contract,” the smooth, slick salesman would say, “Oh, that does not mean anything.” When I was Governor, we finally got rid of those practices, by North Dakota statute “ (Congressional Record, 9201).

Langer’s words did not amount to much, as the vote came out 85-5 in favor of the Connally Resolution on November 5, 1943. The only senators who joined him in opposition were:

. Hiram Johnson (R-Calif.), one of the leaders of the opposition to the Versailles Treaty and Theodore Roosevelt’s running mate in 1912.

. Henrik Shipstead (R-Minn.), an old-time progressive who had returned to the Republican Party, become more conservative, and was resolutely against the U.S. taking the role of world policeman.

. Burton Wheeler (D-Mont.), one of the leaders of the opposition to FDR’s foreign policy before World War II and had come out early against his “court packing plan”.

. Robert R. Reynolds (D-N.C.), one of the few Southern non-interventionists who had a bad habit of associating himself with disreputable figures.

. Robert La Follette Jr. (P-Wis.) paired against the resolution. He had consistently opposed FDR’s pre-World War II foreign policy and his father, La Follette Sr., had been one of the irreconcilables in the Versailles Treaty debate. The communists later smeared him as a Nazi sympathizer.

Interestingly, unlike the House in which the vote had more of a core of hardcore conservatives, the only senator who was a hardcore conservative by this point who voted against was the aging Johnson, considerably past his old progressive days.

This resolution reminds me of the Emancipation Proclamation. Although the measure didn’t have immediate practical effect, it had a strong symbolic effect and much like the Emancipation Proclamation set the tone for the narrative of the War of the Rebellion from then on, the Fulbright and Connally Resolutions set the tone for the direction of the United States after World War II, which became the creation of the United Nations. The votes, as well as the DW-Nominate scores of the voting politicians, are included. A checkmark is a pair or announcement in favor and an “X” is a pair or announcement against.

Fulbright Resolution

Fulbright ResolutionDownload

Connally Resolution

Connally ResolutionDownload

References

Collaboration for Postwar Peace. (1943, November 5). Congressional Record, 9174-9222. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Retrieved from

Click to access GPO-CRECB-1943-pt7-11-1.pdf

Participation in World Peace. (1943, September 21). Congressional Record, 7705-7729. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Retrieved from

https://www.congress.gov/bound-congressional-record/1943/09/21/house-section

Fascinating Politics

Zell Miller: The Senate’s Last Conservative Democrat

In recent times, less and less is required for the press to count a Democrat as a “moderate” or even “conservative”. The closest one has come in recent years was West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin, but someone who really did fit this bill was Zell Bryan Miller (1932-2018). Miller was always two things: a Democrat and a man of Young Harris, Georgia. He never knew his father, as his father died only 17 days after his birth from cerebral meningitis. He and his sister were raised by their mother in modest circumstances and the fact that she had built the family home with rocks she got from a stream instilled into young Zell the value of rugged independence (Grant). As a young man, Miller attended and graduated from Young Harris College but lacked the discipline to proceed at Emory University. However, he gained the discipline required from his subsequent service in the U.S. Marines (Grant). In 1954, Miller married Shirley Carver and they had two sons, with him continuing his education in 1956 at the University of Georgia, earning Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in history, learning from prominent historian E. Merton Coulter, a proponent of the Dunning School of historical interpretation of Reconstruction. In 1958, while teaching history and political science at Young Harris College, Miller won his first election to serve as Young Harris’s mayor at the young age of 26. Serving from 1959 to 1960, he was then elected to the Georgia State Senate, serving until 1964. He attempted to win the Democratic nomination for Congress in both 1964 and 1966, and like most Georgia politicians of the time, he ran on a segregationist platform. Although not successful in his bids for Congress, Miller served as executive secretary for Governor Lester Maddox from 1968 to 1971. In this role, he was credited with influencing Maddox to make more appointments of blacks to government positions and to improve higher education (Grant). From 1971 to 1973, Miller served as chairman of the state’s Democratic Party, which set him up for a run in 1974 for lieutenant governor. Miller proved popular in this role, and his time resulted in him considering a run for the Senate.

The 1980 Senate Primary

Although the name Talmadge carried a lot of political heft in Georgia, during his fourth term, Senator Herman Talmadge’s reputation began to suffer. An alcoholic, his drinking got out of hand after the drowning death of his son in 1975, and his publicized divorce was ugly and bitter. In addition, Talmadge was hit with a dishonor that only nine senators have ever suffered, and only one has ever served another term after: he was censured by the Senate (although the term “denounced” was used in his case). Furthermore, his past as a segregationist was not aging well as black participation was increasing in the state’s Democratic Party, thus Zell Miller challenged him for renomination and received endorsements from numerous black political figures, including State Senator Julian Bond and Atlanta Mayor Maynard Jackson (Harris). Talmadge, however, commanded a lot of loyalty in the Democratic Party, his seniority helped, and there were black supporters of him for delivering on certain priorities. Miller fell short in his bid to deny Talmadge renomination by 18 points, but in the general election, he would narrowly lose reelection to Mack Mattingly, chairman of the Georgia Republican Party. Some Democrats believed that Miller’s candidacy made the difference in the general election. in the meantime, he would continue to serve as lieutenant governor. In 1990, Miller decided to move up to governor, successfully gaining the nomination in 1990 and winning against Republican Johnny Isakson by over 8 points.

As governor, he pledged to serve only one term and sought to make the most of the time. Miller focused strongly on education, and proposed an amendment to the state’s constitution to permit a state lottery with the funds going to fund the state’s education system, which the voters passed. He also established the HOPE Scholarship Program, in which every Georgia student who averages a B or better is eligible for a fully paid scholarship to any Georgia state college or university. Miller was keen on both preventative and punitive measures on criminal justice, and got the toughest sentencing guidelines in the country passed, a two strikes law (Grant).

In 1992, Miller gave his strong backing to the candidacy of Bill Clinton and helped him get the Democratic nomination. He delivered a strong keynote speech at the Democratic National Convention, in which he said, “I made it because Franklin Delano Roosevelt energized this nation. I made it because Harry Truman fought for working families like mine. I made it because John Kennedy’s rising tide lifted even our tiny boat. I made it because Lyndon Johnson showed America that people who were born poor didn’t have to die poor” (Stout).

Although Miller was successful in helping Clinton to the White House and carrying Georgia for him, he had his own political future to consider. He had been quite a success as governor, and this motivated him to change his mind and run for a second term. This was far from without controversy, and Georgia voters were souring on the Clinton Administration, which resulted in Miller only winning reelection by two points in 1994. Although on the presidential level, second terms are often considerably worse than first, Miller’s second term as governor was even better than the first. He worked hard to make the state attractive for growth and investment. Miller even established a special program to use private funding to distribute classical music CDs to every family with babies born in Georgia, and by the end of his second term, his approval rating was an astronomical 85% (Grant). Although after his term, Miller sought to continue his education career and taught at Emory, University of Georgia, and of course Young Harris College, the call of political office would come to his doorstep.

Senator Miller

On July 18, 2000, Republican Senator Paul Coverdell died of a cerebral hemorrhage, and Democratic Governor Roy Barnes tapped Miller to serve in the interim. He sought a full term, and for the 2000 special election, he faced Mack Mattingly. However, Miller had recently been an extremely popular governor while Mattingly had been out of elective office since his reelection loss in 1986. The result was a blowout for Miller, winning by 20 points while Republican George W. Bush carried the state by over 11 points. One could interpret this victory as a vindication of Miller’s 1980 candidacy for the Senate. As a senator, Miller’s record started moderate, and he was one of a few Senate Democrats to vote for the Bush tax cuts in 2001. He stated, “I agree with President Bush that the taxpayers are better judges of how to spend their own money than we are” (Stout). His disagreement with Democratic leadership grew when they came out strongly against an amendment he sponsored with Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) to loosen union and personnel rules for the Department of Homeland Security and held up the legislation shortly before the 2002 midterms over the issue, he became a critic of the party’s leadership. Miller saw this as placing the priorities of an interest group (federal employees) over the priority of national security. He blamed the results of the 2002 midterm on the Democratic Senate leadership, stating, “When you bring it down to whether you are for homeland security or for protecting federal employees’ jobs, that is pretty hard to defend” and blamed repeated votes on the issue for the defeats of Max Cleland (D-Ga.) and Jean Carnahan (D-Mo.) (Preston). Miller had campaigned for the former’s reelection. After the 2002 midterms, his record shifted strongly to the right. In 2004, Miller announced that he would not be running for a full term. This freed him to do what he wanted, including introducing a Constitutional amendment repealing the 17th Amendment (direct election of senators) as he believed this lessened the power of states in favor of the federal government. Miller’s separation from the national Democratic Party was complete with his endorsement of George W. Bush. This time, he was a keynote speaker at the Republican National Convention. Miller delivered yet another strong speech,

“Never in the history of the world has any soldier sacrificed more for the freedom and liberty of total strangers than the American soldier.

And, our soldiers don’t just give freedom abroad, they preserve it for us here at home.

For it has been said so truthfully that it is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us the freedom of the press.

It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech.

It is the soldier, not the agitator, who has given us the freedom to protest.

It is the soldier who salutes the flag, serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who gives that protester the freedom he abuses to burn that flag” (Presidential Rhetoric).

He was also staunchly critical of Senator John Kerry’s (D-Mass.) voting record on defense issues, as he had a history of voting for defense cuts. During his speech, he told the audience, “This is the man who wants to be the commander in chief of the U.S. Armed Forces? U.S. forces armed with what? Spitballs?” (Stout). After the speech, reporters started asking him questions. When correspondent Chris Matthews asked him over a microphone to elaborate on the “spitballs” remark, Miller snapped, “Do you know what a metaphor is? Get out of my face!” and subsequently stated, “I wish we lived in the day when we could challenge someone to a duel,” but expressed regret for the remark (Stout).

Despite his endorsement of Bush, as noted earlier, Miller never switched parties, always seeing the Democratic Party as his home. He made the direct comparison when asked about why he didn’t switch, stating, “I compare it to being in an old house. It’s a house that I’ve lived in for years that’s getting kind of drafty and hard to heat. The plumbing won’t work, and some strangers have moved into the basement, and I don’t know who they are, and there’s no doubt I would be more comfortable in another house. But, you see, I was here first. I’ve lived in this house for years and years. It’s home, and I’m not going to leave” (Stout). With his departure from the Senate on January 3, 2005, was the departure of the last true conservative Democrat of the Senate in this author’s opinion. Miller sided with the liberal Americans for Democratic Action only 23% of the time, while he sided with the American Conservative Union 71% of the time. His DW-Nominate score is a 0.146, which is extremely high for a Democrat. Miller’s storied political life and the various stances he took over his career led some to call him “Zigzag Zell”, and this reflected the mixed feelings people in the Georgia Democratic Party had about him at the end. His successor, interestingly enough, was Johnny Isakson, the man he bested in 1990. President Bush subsequently appointed him to the American Battle Monuments Commission, and in 2008 the University of Georgia honored him by dedicating the Zell B. Miller Learning Center (Grant).

Although in retirement from elective office, Miller did still let his opinions be known, and often supported Republican candidates for public office, such as Saxby Chambliss for reelection to the Senate in 2008 and Governor Nathan Deal. However, he did support Democrats now and again, such as Michelle Nunn in her 2014 Senate run. In 2017, Miller retired from public life due to a diagnosis of Parkinson’s disease and died the next year on March 23rd at 86 in Young Harris. Whatever happened in his life, wherever he politically stood, and whoever he supported, Zell Miller was born a Young Harris Democrat and died a Young Harris Democrat.

References

ADA Voting Records. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Voting Records

Former U.S. Sen. Zell Miller dies at 86; Was 2-term Georgia governor. (2018, March 23). The Florida-Times Union.

Retrieved from

https://www.jacksonville.com/story/news/2018/03/23/former-us-sen-zell-miller-dies-at-86-was-2-term-georgia-governor/12867515007/

Grant, C. (2018, June 4). Zell Miller. New Georgia Encyclopedia.

Retrieved from

https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/zell-miller-1932-2018/

Harris, A. (1980, August 23). Drawlin’ and Brawlin’. The Washington Post.

Retrieved from

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/08/23/drawlin-and-brawlin/636ce4af-b747-40f5-909e-618566f13946/

Miller, Zell Bryan. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/49904/zell-bryan-miller

Preston, M. (2003, February 14). Miller Blames Leaders for ‘02. Roll Call.

Retrieved from

https://rollcall.com/2003/02/14/miller-blames-leaders-for-02/

Speeches from the 2004 Republican National Convention: Zell Miller. (2004, September 1). Presidential Rhetoric.

Retrieved from

http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign/rncspeeches/miller.html

Stout, D. (2018, March 23). Zell Miller, Feisty Democrat Who Sided With G.O.P., Is Dead at 86. The New York Times.

Retrieved from

Fascinating Politics

William F. Knowland: The Golden State’s Senate Republican Leader

At one time, California Republicans were of great significance; Hiram Johnson was a celebrated leader of the progressive faction of the Republican Party and nationally known for his role in defeating the Versailles Treaty, Richard Nixon was from California, and Ronald Reagan’s political career began in California. As late as 2023, a California Republican had a leadership role, Speaker Kevin McCarthy. Another figure of significance, although not as well known as Nixon or Reagan, was William Fife Knowland (1908-1974), who was one of the foremost figures of Washington at the height of his power.

Knowland’s birth as well as how his father, J.R. Knowland, regarded him set him up for a career in politics. The elder Knowland had been a member of Congress in the conservative faction of the party from the Roosevelt to Wilson Administrations representing Oakland (different time, different Oakland). J.R. also was a mentor to Earl Warren, who would diverge considerably from conservative politics with time. From his youth, the younger Knowland was an active player in California politics, serving in the State Assembly from 1933 to 1935 and the State Senate from 1935 to 1939. In 1942, at the age of 34, he joined the army; he and his father’s newspaper, the Oakland Tribune, for which he worked as assistant publisher, had supported the peacetime draft law and he figured that if he supported such a policy that he should live it for the duration of the war.

After Senator Hiram Johnson died in 1945, Warren approached J.R. Knowland about a temporary Senate appointment, but he declined and recommended his son. Interestingly, Knowland learned of his appointment by the reading the Stars and Stripes newspaper; his wife Helen had attempted to call him to tell him about his appointment, but her call was turned down by military censors as “not essential government business” (Hill). The army honorably discharged him and sent him to Washington to serve.

Although Knowland would develop a public reputation as a conservative, in his first years in the Senate he was politically moderate. Indeed, when appointed, he publicly identified himself as a “liberal Republican pointed toward national social programs and business stability and international cooperation based on a non-partisan approach to foreign policy” (Montgomery and Johnson, 53). He demonstrated his willingness by backing President Truman’s Full Employment bill in 1945, which would be signed into law but in a compromised form the following year. He was, however, fiscally conservative, and was concerned about the accumulation of debt (Montgomery and Johnson, 67). Knowland’s warnings on debt have since been largely unheeded by both parties. In 1950, Knowland, a strong supporter of authority of states, sponsored an amendment to that year’s Social Security bill restricting the authority of the Social Security Administrator to require states to adopt federal standards for unemployment compensation, requiring a 90 day notice for noncompliance findings and required judicial review before funds could be withheld from states. The amendment was adopted as part of that year’s legislation. Bill Knowland was also not what we would think of as a politician temperamentally, he was humorless, not charismatic, and had a tendency not to remember people he had previously met. However, he was also highly principled, and indeed the integrity of his public life is unblemished. However, Knowland’s private life was a different story. Although he and his wife Helen loved each other, both had extra-marital affairs. They had married very young and hadn’t had a chance to “sow their wild oats”. Helen conducted an affair with journalist and later senator Blair Moody, while Knowland had an affair with Moody’s wife, Ruth.

In 1952, Knowland faithfully backed fellow Californian and family friend Earl Warren for the Republican nomination for president. Richard Nixon was also supposed to be a backer of Warren, but he double-crossed Warren by working behind the scenes to get the California delegation to flip to Eisenhower on key procedural votes during the Republican National Convention, thus securing his nomination (Farrell). Knowland himself had received an offer for an arrangement from Taft which he declined, most likely meaning a vice president nomination in exchange getting California’s delegates to his side. Had Knowland acted before Nixon, he would have secured the nomination for Taft. And since Taft died on July 31, 1953, we would have had President Knowland. This demonstrates that principles in politics can come at a cost. Earl Warren, however, would get a pretty substantial consolation prize with the advocacy of Knowland: Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. During the Eisenhower presidency, he increasingly identified with the conservative wing, particularly once he succeeded Taft as Senate Republican leader, and voted against Senator Joseph McCarthy’s censure in 1954. Although not a slavish devotee of his, indeed Knowland had voted against his pushes to reject Charles Bohlen’s nomination as Ambassador to Russia as well as reducing aid to nations trading with Red China in 1953 and objected to his breaches of Senatorial decorum, he nonetheless thought that McCarthy’s prime sin was exaggeration as opposed to the validity of his crusade. He reflected on McCarthy in 1970, “…one of Joe McCarthy’s liabilities was a tendency to overstate his case. I think he hurt himself a good deal by this overstating his case, and he offended a lot of Republican senators by some of the statements he made” and further stated, “I haven’t agreed with Senator Fulbright on the way he performed either during the Eisenhower Administration or during the Johnson Administration, or even currently. But he was a senator of the United States, and I really resented when McCarthy got up on the floor and referred to him as Senator Halfbright. I mean, it was this kind of a thing, you know, that just isn’t done” (Frantz, 21).

As a leader, Knowland was not as skilled as Democratic leader Lyndon B. Johnson, who often got the better of him. As veteran journalist William S. White noted, “Knowland was very inflexible and not one-tenth as bright as Johnson in maneuvers and so on. So Johnson took care that he always maintained a very close personal relationship with Knowland, so that he could approach him at any time. He really just sort of overwhelmed Knowland with his brilliance as a leader” but also added that, “It only meant that he was a more intuitive man, operating with more freedom of motion in a more relaxed party. To put it another way, the stiffness of Knowland, an honorable and very down-right man quite incapable of subtlety, had a kind of inevitability in the very nature of his party. The flexible, inventive, more volatile characteristics of Johnson were in a sense really the human characteristics of his party” (Montgomery and Johnson, 140-141). President Eisenhower also noted Knowland’s deficit in leadership. He wrote in his diary on January 18, 1954, “Knowland means to be helpful and loyal, but he is cumbersome. He does not have the sharp mind and the great experience that Taft did. Consequently, he does not command the respect in the Senate that Senator Taft enjoyed” (Montgomery and Johnson, 150-151). While Knowland was without question a man of integrity in his public actions, his leadership deficiencies precluded moving higher. Interestingly, something that also connects to today is Knowland’s recounting of himself and other members of the Republican Senate leadership trying to convince President Eisenhower to replace some of Truman’s people in government departments, which he would not budge on as he did not want to be seen as attacking the civil service (Frantz, 24-25). Republican presidents since have been more friendly to the views of Knowland and other Republican bigwigs in the need to build up the party. Although Eisenhower had his differences with Knowland and others in the Republican leadership, Knowland rejected the interpretation that Eisenhower was ideologically closer to Democratic leader Lyndon B. Johnson than the GOP (Frantz, 29). In 1957, he sponsored an unsuccessful amendment retaining the restriction on bartering of commodities for communist nations, in keeping with his anti-communist stance. In 1958, Knowland successfully introduced an amendment blocking liberalization of the Battle Act as an amendment to foreign aid legislation to permit aid to communist nations aside from the USSR, China, and North Korea. Consistent with his views on unions, he also sponsored two unsuccessful secret ballot amendments to that year’s proposed labor reform bill.

Knowland and Civil Rights

After the decision of Brown v. Board of Education (1954), legislative action was bound to follow. In 1956, the House passed an Eisenhower Administration-backed civil rights bill, which focused on voting rights. Knowland and Majority Leader Johnson wanted to hold off on civil rights until after the election, and all but five senators agreed. In 1957, Knowland backed the Eisenhower Administration bill fully, and managed to bypass the Senate Judiciary Committee to bring it to the floor. The committee was chaired by James Eastland (D-Miss.), one of the most prominent and outspoken segregationists who made the committee a graveyard for civil rights bills. However, Knowland did not prevail in his effort to prevent weakening amendments, most notably striking the section of the bill granting the Attorney General authority to initiate 14th Amendment lawsuits and the adoption of a jury trial provision for contempt of court voting rights cases. Majority Leader Johnson had prevailed in the adoption of the latter two, which resulted in passage of the bill, as the Southern bloc had agreed not to have a coordinated filibuster if these weakening amendments were added. Johnson got a good deal of credit for securing the passage of the first civil rights bill, which also cemented him as a national rather than regional figure and made him a presidential contender.

Knowland atop an elephant during the 1958 Senate campaign.

Defeat and After

I have already covered the story of Knowland and the 1958 election, so long story short, he lost the gubernatorial election badly to Pat Brown in a deeply troubled campaign, and this ended his political career. Knowland sided with the liberal Americans for Democratic Action 31% of the time, and the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action 77% of the time, both measures indicating a moderate conservatism. His DW-Nominate score is a 0.227. Knowland’s political career was over at the age of 50, and he resumed publishing, succeeding his father as publisher for the Oakland Tribune.

Although Helen Knowland’s extra-marital activities had ended with Blair Moody’s death in 1954, Bill’s affair with Ruth lasted until her death in 1961, and he continued to have affairs after. Finally, in 1972, the couple divorced so Bill could marry a much younger woman. However, she was a tempestuous woman, a full-blown alcoholic, and addicted to spending. This, combined with Knowland’s gambling addiction drained the family fortune. By 1974, Knowland was over $900,000 (over $5 million in today’s money) in debt to banks and mobsters. He considered selling the Oakland Tribune, but he ended up landing on a different course of action. On the morning of February 23, 1974, Knowland drove up to his compound in Guerneville, got his gun, went to his pier on the Russian River, and fired a shot into his right temple, dying instantly at the age of 65.

References

ADA Voting Records. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Voting Records

Farrell, J.A. (2017, March 21). Richard Nixon’s Ugly, 30-Year Feud with Earl Warren. Smithsonian Magazine.

Retrieved from

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/inside-story-richard-nixons-ugly-30-year-feud-earl-warren-180962614/

Frantz, J.B. (1970, March 23). Oral history transcript, William F. Knowland, interview 1 (I). LBJ Presidential Library.

Retrieved from

https://discoverlbj.org/item/oh-knowlandw-19700323-1-00-05

Knowland, William Fife. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/5343/william-fife-knowland

Montgomery, G.B. & Johnson, J.W. (1998). One step from the White House: the rise and fall of Senator William F. Knowland. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Retrieved from

https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft4k4005jq;chunk.id=0;doc.view=print

Fascinating Politics

A Look at Hitler Was a Liberal by Joseph P. Kamp

There is a persistent ideological debate on where to place the Nazis. The American left loves to tar and feather the American right with comparisons to Nazis, and the common designation for Nazis is “far right” and the same people who apply that label I notice apply this label to a growing number of Republican officeholders. The right hits back by claiming that Nazism is a form of socialism, a rival socialism to Marx. The application of the term “Liberal” to Hitler is for most people a bizarre and unthinkable application. After all, Hitler and the Nazis were extremely socially conservative. However, it definitely can be argued that the Nazis’ efforts to undermine Christianity with a state-sponsored “Positive Christianity” go against the social conservatism of the United States, which is overwhelmingly based in Christianity. Joseph P. Kamp argued for Hitler being a liberal, as least a New Deal one, in 1949. But before I dive further into this, a bit of background on the author.

Background on the Author

Joseph P. Kamp, 1944.

Joseph Peter Kamp (1900-1993) was perhaps the most prolific right-wing pamphleteer of the 20th century. He started his activities in 1919 when the Constitutional Educational League was formed. Kamp become the organization’s lead spokesman in 1925, and basically became the League. In 1934, he would collaborate with Harold Lord Varney, Lawrence Dennis, and former Populist Congressman Milford W. Howard of Alabama in launching The Awakener, a newspaper that was strongly opposed to the New Deal and to the growing power of organized labor. Kamp authored numerous provocative pamphlets the Constitutional Educational League and later through Headlines, including Vote CIO and get a Soviet America (1944), We Must Abolish the United States: The Hidden Facts Behind the Crusade for World Government (1950), and Behind the Plot to Sovietize the South (1956). A notable pamphlet attacking Kamp was Joe Kamp: Hero of the Pro-Fascists by the organization Friends of Democracy. He was also regularly accused of anti-Semitism and fascism, including an indictment of the Constitutional Educational League in 1942 for allegedly seeking to undermine the U.S. Army and Navy. He was also indicted twice for contempt of Congress; first over his refusal to answer questions and the second time for refusal to disclose his backers and was convicted for the first time but acquitted the second time. While I think the charge of fascism is highly disputable for him, the anti-Semitism is pretty beyond dispute given what I have read of Kamp, and his association with notorious anti-Semite Willis Carto from the 1960s all the way up to the 1980s as part of Liberty Lobby includes letters the two wrote to each other. There is one in particular demonstrating that he was actively seeking to deny the Holocaust. The damning passage reads, “…I think I wrote to you once that I intended to deal with the allegation that six million Jews are supposed to have been put to death by the Nazis because the ADL now has the Catholic Church spreading this lie. When I get through demolishing the fable I am going to quote a Jewish author who writes that while FIVE million Jews are said to have been liquidated between 1933 and 1945, there were SEVEN million Christians who suffered the same fate” (Kamp, 1968). Kamp here is, ironically for someone on the right, not understanding “per capita” as there were far less Jews than Christians in Europe even if the figures he cites were accurate, as well as papering over that Jews were targeted directly for their religion as opposed to Christians who unless they were vocal faith-based dissenters were targeted because they were part of other groups the Nazis were interested in terminating. Simply put, he wished to downplay the impact of what he calls “Hitler’s anti-Jewish terror” (Kamp, 1968).  Anyway, on to Kamp’s pamphlet, Hitler Was a Liberal!

Kamp’s (1949) premise is, “Hitler’s ideology and program are shockingly parallel to the philosophy and measures currently expounded and promoted by a powerful clique of Americans who have the effrontery to call themselves “liberals”. This same “liberal” clique hails the results at the polls in the 1948 election as a “liberal” victory and a “mandate” from the American people for a “liberal” legislative program, a program which is strikingly similar to proposals set forth in Hitler’s Mein Kampf”. The paradox is due to the Red political smog which has been systematically exuded over our people to becloud their understanding of this time-honored and deeply-cherished American characteristic” (3-4).

Kamp proceeds to argue that the term “liberal” as commonly applied at the time of writing is a bad misnomer. He defines a traditional liberal as, “…one with generous mental horizons. He is open-minded, looks at both sides of a question. He has foresight as well as hindsight. He knows the past, and resolutely faces the future. He is not rutted in iron-clad tradition, nor given to impractical wishful thinking. He judges an issue in the light of fact and existing circumstance, and is not unduly swayed either be precept or roseate promise. He has common sense, good will and a profound belief in individual rights and liberties” (Kamp, 5).

Kamp considers those who call themselves liberal in 1949 thusly, “For the most part, his “liberalism” is characterized by VIOLENT OPPOSITION TO THE ESTABLISHED ORDER; which, according to him, has plenty of faults and few virtues; he is “all out” for revolutionary change – without a serious thought as to the consequences; he admits that there are two sides to every question – but the other side is always “reactionary;” he claims an open mind on everything – provided that it conforms to his own view” (6).

Kamp (1949) holds that “The real power behind the scenes Is not the Politburo; it is THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIALISM. We are inclined to think of the cold war in terms of the Kremlin, and to forget that Russian Communism is but one form of Socialism in action. The history of Soviet Socialism goes back no farther than November, 1917. Marxist Socialism with its plan of world revolution goes back a hundred years. All Socialism springs from the same root and produces the same narcotic to liberty. There is no Socialism of any hue which is not based upon the sacrifice of human rights and liberties for State slavery, and all Socialism is a political pyramid dominated by a dictator and his chosen bureaucrats. Every attempt at applied Socialism in the world has resulted in a dictatorship” (9-10).

His case for Hitler the Liberal?

“If opposition to the conservative social order, the building of a welfare state, wholesale raids on private property and fundamental human rights (all of which the new “liberalism” is promoting in the United States) are the earmarks of a “Liberal”, then Adolf Hitler should be enshrined as one of the mighty heroes of the “liberal movement,” for who more than the paperhanger of Bavaria gave wholeheartedly of his time and genius to the “liberal” cause of destroying governments, property and human rights, and building Socialist – welfare – slave states” (Kamp, 13). He makes his case by comparing points in the Nazi Party’s 25 point program to what New Deal liberals were standing for in 1949.

Kamp’s Comparisons:

“Hitler proposed “nationalization of education to give equality of advantages to all.” Our “liberals” demand Federal Aid to Education – the prelude to “nationalization.”

“Hitler demanded “equal rights for all German citizens.” Our “liberals” demand an F.E.P.C. law.”

“Hitler promised “old age pensions.” Our “liberals” propose increased old age pensions and expanded Social Security.” (14)

“Hitler sponsored “nationalization of public health service.” Our “liberals” are backing Socialized Medicine.”

“Hitler demanded the “nationalization of trusts.” Our “liberals” want 19 more TVAs and the right to “nationalize” our steel industry as a starter.”

“Hitler was for “a strong central state power.” Our “liberals” want all Government power to be concentrated in a bureaucratized executive department, and to make Congress a “rubber stamp.”

“Hitler did something else that is “happening here.” He concentrated the taxing power in Berlin, and doled back locally collected tax money to local politicians who did his bidding. Thus he broke down local self-government which was in Germany, as it has been in the United States, the bulwark of freedom”. (Kamp, 15)

There are some significant issues here. While all of the NSDAP points he reports are accurate, the context leaves a bit to be desired to put it lightly. First, lets cover the most obvious one, “equal rights for all German citizens” equating to proposed anti-discrimination laws. This point completely neglects that anti-discrimination laws in the United States would cover Jews as religion-based discrimination was to be prohibited, while in Germany Jews were stripped of their citizenship, consistent with another one of these 25 points, thus “equal rights” does not apply to them. This cannot have escaped Kamp given that he clearly read the 25 points.

Second, the point of “nationalization of trusts” has an anti-Semitic basis, in that the owners of major department stores in Germany at the time of the platform were Jewish. Thus, it wasn’t just out of a sense of left-wing populism that Nazis went against “trusts”.

Third, Hitler’s proposed “nationalization of public health service” was not the equivalent of single-payer healthcare. Single-payer healthcare was a post-World War II phenomenon, not something that arose in Nazi Germany. Kamp seeks to tie New Deal liberalism together with the totalitarianism of Hitler and call both forms of socialism.

Some points that I find have greater accuracy are:

The comparison of “old age pensions”. Something to note is that Germany had already set up a social insurance system for invalidity and old age under Otto von Bismarck, and although the Nazi regime did plan on an expanded old age pension scheme to be paid for by “plutocrats”, the plan was shelved in 1940 until the war was to be won (The New York Times). This is a bit more accurate on Kamp’s part because the Nazis did intend on this to happen, although their focus was far more on war preparation.

The comparison of states and federal control. Nazi Germany outright replaced the authority of German states with party district leaders, who reported directly to Hitler. This destroyed sovereignty of individual German states. Kamp’s comparison between liberal efforts to expand and concentrate federal authority in the United States and Germany’s knocking out of sovereignty of individual states, although hyperbolic, is admittedly in the same direction of power orientation that modern liberals since at least the New Deal have sought. Democrats seek to consolidate power in the federal, and the Nazis sought to consolidate power on Germany’s national level.

Despite some actual points, the validity of comparisons have significant limitations. For one thing, the staunch social liberalism would find little to no place in the Nazi agenda save for pushes against traditional religions. Although there is a point to be had about parties making lofty promises for providing a lot and then providing dictatorship. Although Kamp points to federalization as a potential threat to freedom and I think there are substantial arguments behind this, he engages in hyperbole and regarding Hitler and “equal rights”, gross distortion.

References

Kamp, J.P. (1968, December 31). Letter to Willis Carto.

Retrieved from

Joseph P. Kamp

Kamp, J.P. (1949). Hitler was a Liberal. New York, NY: Constitutional Educational League.

Retrieved from

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=osu.32435001551258&seq=3

Nazis Seen Shelving Old-Age Pension Plan. (1940, April 4). The New York Times.

Retrieved from

Stapp, A. (2019, March 11). Tim Wu’s Bad History: Big Business and the Rise of Fascism. Niskanen Center.

Retrieved from

Retrieved from

https://www.niskanencenter.org/big-business-rise-fascism-bad-history-tim-wu/

Fascinating Politics

The California Swap: A Great Political Misstep

Back in the 1950s, California had two Republican senators. What a concept, right? Their two senators were Minority Leader William F. Knowland and Thomas Kuchel. Knowland was counted among the conservatives and was a Cold War hawk, making opposition to Communist China and support of Nationalist China a signature issue. He had been a key player in pushing the Civil Rights Act of 1957 to passage, although he was unable to prevent the adoption of weakening provisions. California’s governor at the time was Goodwin “Goodie” Knight. From the late 19th century to this time, Republicans had been the dominant party in California. The last time the state had two Democratic senators was during the War of the Rebellion, and from 1896 onward, only once had a Democrat been elected governor, Cuthbert Olson, in 1938. He only served one term and is not considered one of the state’s notable governors, and had been succeeded by Republican Earl Warren, one of the state’s most notable governors and by this time chief justice. California Republicans were at the time a big tent party, having had prominent conservatives as well as progressives. Knowland as Republican leader since 1953 was one of the most prominent men in Washington.

William F. Knowland

By 1957, Knowland had his eyes set outside of the Senate. The 1958 elections were coming up, and on October 3rd, he announced he was running for governor. A popular narrative surrounding this decision is that Knowland had his eyes on the presidency and thought that being governor would be a good stepping stone to a 1960 run. He addressed this at the time, stating, “if nominated and elected, I will devote myself faithfully to the administration of the duties of the office for the term or terms to which I might be elected” but declined to issue a Sherman statement definitively ruling out a presidential run (Montgomery & Johnson, 240). Knowland’s declining to do so continued the speculation and accusations. In a 1970 interview, he denied the presidency was his motive, rather that he wanted to end his career on a high note and he wanted to return to California to be closer to his family (Frantz, 46). Knowland, however, would have to challenge popular Governor Knight for renomination, a task he felt up to. Knight initially resolved to face off Senator Knowland, however, he had secured the support of his colleague Kuchel as well as the entire Republican Congressional delegation and worse yet polling was showing he would be losing to Knowland 3 to 1 (Montgomery & Johnson, 240-241).  Knight kept out of the public eye in early November, but once he reemerged, he announced his bid for the Senate. Critics accused Knowland of masterminding the swapping of offices. However, he held that circumstances had “…opened up a false charge that this was a deal, whereby in effect I had entered into [an agreement] with Knight to get him out of the governorship and in turn get him into the senatorial race, which plagued me during the campaign” (Frantz, 45). If this is so, who or what was behind Governor Knight choosing to switch elections? The major sources were Vice President Nixon and the Chandler family, which owned the Los Angeles Times and were backing Knowland. In 1964, Knight himself identified Richard Nixon as the source of pressure for his switch, stating, “The long series of disasters which Republicans have suffered in California since 1958 can be traced to the ‘big switch’ in which I was denied financial aid unless I agreed to run for senator instead of governor” (Montgomery & Johnson, 242-243).  This switch negatively impacted the Republican ticket but in particular Knowland’s campaign. Essentially, Knowland was taking the fall for Nixon’s scheming. What’s more, Democrats had two solid candidates for both offices: Edmund “Pat” Brown and Clair Engle. Brown had been elected state attorney general in 1950 and Engle had represented the Sacramento Valley in Congress since 1943. Brown, a popular figure, ran on a platform of “responsible liberalism” and Engle could point to a significant achievement in his record in securing funds for the Central Valley irrigation project. There was also a significant statewide issue that benefited the Democrats and haunted the Republicans.

The Impact of Prop 18

An important issue in a number of states were “right to work” proposals. In California, this was Prop 18, and if enacted it would have allowed employees at a company that had a union to not join it as a condition of employment. This proposition motivated unions to go into overdrive in campaigning and getting their members out to vote. Knowland, who had repeatedly supported measures curbing the power of organized labor in the Senate, supported Prop 18 while Governor Knight opposed. Knight’s opposition as well as his record as governor did secure him some organized labor support. Knowland’s opponent, Democrat Edmund “Pat” Brown, ran heavily against Prop 18. Knight’s opponent, Democratic Congressman Clair Engle, also managed to win organized labor support.

Other Issues

Another issue for Knowland’s campaign was that he did not appear all that much in California in the early stages of the primary campaign, opting instead to campaign from Washington and worse yet, while he initially supported complete federal funding of the Trinity River portion of the Central Valley Project, he changed course and announced support or a deal involving Pacific Gas and Electric Company, in which they would construct power stations and sell the power for profit, with Pat Brown promptly taking the opposite position (Montgomery & Johnson, 243-244). Numerous missteps occurred in the Knowland campaign and there was clear disunity between Knowland and Knight. One such misstep was his wife Helen sending out copies of a pamphlet to Republican officials titled “Meet the Man Who Plans to Rule America”, a hit piece on United Auto Workers leader Walter Reuther by the extremely right-wing pamphleteer Joseph P. Kamp who had been accused of being anti-Semitic and a fascist (Montgomery & Johnson, 248-249). However, a devastating blow to the campaign came about when the disunity of the Republican ticket became official. On October 4th, Knight announced that he would not be supporting Knowland’s campaign for governor over his positions on labor issues (Montgomery & Johnson, 249). By the final weeks of the campaign, obituaries were being preemptively written for the Knowland campaign. Historically in California, the press supported Republican politicians, but the senator and Helen continued to make missteps on the campaign, and this resulted in a withdrawal of an endorsement by the San Francisco Chronicle and the endorsement of Pat Brown by the normally Republican San Francisco Examiner (Montgomery & Johnson, 252).

Results

The 1958 election resulted in Democrat Pat Brown winning 60-40 and Democrat Clair Engle winning 57-43 for the Senate. This was the real start of the rise of the Democratic Party in California. In Knowland’s home turf of Oakland, Republican Congressman John J. Allen lost reelection to Democrat Jeffery Cohelan, and Oakland would only move more and more to the left, never again being represented by a Republican. Knowland was reserved on whether he had made a mistake running for governor, stating, “Now, I don’t say that I would have been elected that year because we lost a lot of Republicans. You remember Sputnik had been put up. We had a recession on. We lost senators in the states where they didn’t even have the right-to-work issue on the ballot” (Frantz, 45). Worse yet for Republicans, Democrats managed to win control of both the State Senate and Assembly, the first time they had held both in many years. Democrats have consistently held majorities in both chambers since, the only exceptions being 1969 to 1971, when Republicans held a majority in both, and 1994 to 1996, when Republicans held a majority in the State Assembly. It is honestly hard for me to overstate how good of an election 1958 was for Democrats and liberalism and how bad it was for Republicans and conservatism. Pat Brown summed up the situation for the GOP, “The election has eliminated two people who very frankly, no matter what they say, don’t like Mr. Nixon. And I’m referring to Mr. Knowland and Mr. Knight. He’s the only one left, so you might say that helped – that left Nixon in charge of the Republican Party in California. There’s no one to challenge his leadership out here now” (Montgomery & Johnson, 258). Newly elected Clair Engle thought similarly. He stated, “Knight and Knowland were fighting like men until [Nixon] interceded and ran them in tandem” although he did not rule out a political comeback for Knowland (Montgomery & Johnson, 258)

Aftermath

Although Knowland maintained background influence in the California Republican Party and publicly through his ownership of the Oakland Tribune and supported Goldwater, Reagan, and Nixon, his political career was over. His end was tragic, he committed suicide in 1974 as he was facing financial ruin. His successor, Clair Engle, would tragically die of a brain tumor in office in 1964. Knight would try for office one more time, but lost the 1962 gubernatorial primary to Richard Nixon. Pat Brown would win another term in 1962, defeating Nixon and resulting in Nixon’s famous remark to the press, “You don’t have Nixon to kick around anymore, because, gentlemen, this is my last press conference”. Although Brown would be defeated by Ronald Reagan in 1966, his son, Jerry, would serve in multiple positions in California, most notably governor from 1975 to 1983 and again from 2011 to 2019.

References

Frantz, J.B. (1970, March 23). Oral history transcript, William F. Knowland, interview 1 (I). LBJ Presidential Library.

Retrieved from

https://discoverlbj.org/item/oh-knowlandw-19700323-1-00-05

Knight and Engle Win Labor Backing. (1958, April 15). The New York Times.

Retrieved from

Knowland Bid for Governor Fails; Engle Beats Knight in Senate Race. The Harvard Crimson.

Retrieved from

https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1958/11/5/knowland-bid-for-governor-fails-engle/

Montgomery, G.B. & Johnson, J.W. (1998). One step from the White House: the rise and fall of Senator William F. Knowland. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Retrieved from

https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft4k4005jq;chunk.id=0;doc.view=print

Nov. 7, 1962 – Richard Nixon’s “Last Press Conference”. Real Time 1960s.

Retrieved from

Pawel, M. (2018, November 6). The 1958 Governor’s Race That Launched a Dynasty. Zocalo Public Square.

Retrieved from

The 1958 Governor’s Race That Launched a Dynasty
Fascinating Politics

William Jennings Bryan Dorn: When Politicians Change

A general assumption exists that with politicians they ideologically come and go from Washington as the same people on ideological matters. Although more true today than it used to be, it is never a full guarantee. One example from the Deep South was Democrat William Jennings Bryan Dorn (1916-2005). Dorn was named after the politician William Jennings Bryan as his father wished for him to have a life in politics. He came on to the scene early, being elected to the State House in 1938 and the State Senate in 1940. His political career was interrupted by him serving in the US Army during World War II. On Dorn’s return, he sought to win election to Congress. He challenged incumbent Butler B. Hare of the 3rd district, who had served in Congress 16 years, and defeated him. Dorn proved to be to Hare’s right in his first term, and often disagreed with his party on certain key issues. Notably, he voted for Republican tax reduction bills, voted for Taft-Hartley, and even was one of the few Southern Democrats to vote against the Marshall Plan. Although only a man of 32 by the 1948 election, Dorn was highly ambitious and decided to challenge incumbent Senator Burnet R. Maybank. However, Maybank was sufficiently popular to survive Dorn’s challenge from his right. Although out of office, he wasn’t for long, and sought his old seat in 1950, now held by Hare’s son, James. This election proved to be a boon to the political right, and Dorn won renomination, tantamount to election in the at-the-time one party state of South Carolina.

Although of the right, Dorn stood out among the South Carolina House delegation in his support for public housing. However, he was opposed to price and rent controls and consistently backed foreign aid cuts. During the Eisenhower Administration, Dorn continued his opposition to foreign aid, supported releasing the regulation of natural gas prices from the Federal Power Commission, and started voting against public housing measures. He did, however, express a preference for public control over power generation and transmission, one of the ways in which many Southern Democrats remained New Dealers.

From 1961 to 1964, Dorn proved South Carolina’s foremost foe of New Frontier and Great Society measures in the House, even though his district had voted for Kennedy in 1960. This included opposing highly popular measures such as the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 for vocational training of the unemployed and the Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962 for the construction of public television stations for educational broadcasting. He voted against the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the Food Stamp Act of 1964, as well as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and Medicare in 1965. Notably, this is contrary to South Carolina Encyclopedia’s biography on him, which depicts him as a supporter of LBJ’s anti-poverty program, which simply wasn’t so during Johnson’s time as president (Moore). Like other South Carolinian officeholders, Dorn was a segregationist and opposed every civil rights measure during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations. Given this record quite hostile to social welfare measures and high spending, how Dorn would legislatively behave during the Nixon Administration would prove surprising if not shocking.

The Nixon Administration: Some Surprises

Agreement rates, ADA and ACA.

A preview of Congressman Dorn’s changes came in 1968, when he supported an open-ended appropriation for food stamps. Although this change is not nearly as represented in Americans for Democratic Action’s (ADA) ratings as opposed to Americans for Constitutional Action’s (ACA) ratings, these came in the form of how he addressed social programs and even civil rights. In 1969, Dorn opposed a conservative substitute to extending the Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which he had opposed only four years before. In 1970, Dorn was the only South Carolina representative to vote for a bill for federal aid for desegregation. This absolutely floored his colleagues, especially when one considers that in other ways Dorn’s record remained in his old ways. For instance, he opposed extending the Voting Rights Act in 1970 and continued to oppose funding for the Civil Rights Commission. Dorn was also the only South Carolina representative to vote against the Equal Rights Amendment in 1971. However, he also voted against another amendment that proved even more surprising; he was also the only South Carolina representative to vote against a school prayer amendment that same year. Dorn also voted against several legislative efforts to curb busing as a means for desegregation, including Rep. Broomfield’s (R-Mich.) and Rep. Ashbrook’s (R-Ohio) 1971 proposals. Although in 1969 Dorn had supported transferring anti-poverty functions to the states, he supported extending such programs despite President Nixon’s opposition to the bill for the level of spending and for containing a provision for government daycare. He also opposed a Republican substitute to anti-poverty legislation which had a simple extension with no funding increases or government daycare program or legal services corporation the following year. The reason, however, that ADA found him still pretty conservative while ACA found him considerably less so was due to his staunchly pro-military voting record. Dorn constantly opposed defense cuts and was always supportive of President Nixon on the Vietnam War. He also voted against the War Powers Act of 1973, which was passed over President Nixon’s veto. ADA placed considerably more weight on military issues than ACA, which although far from neglectful of military spending and Vietnam, placed more weight on issues of spending and government expansion. Dorn was furthermore an advocate for veterans, and thus was well suited for his time as chairman of the Veterans’ Affairs Committee from 1973 to 1974. In 1974, Dorn opted against another term in Congress to run for governor. This certainly seemed like a good idea, after all Republicans were being dragged down by Watergate. However, South Carolina defied this trend with the election of Republican Governor James Edwards. Dorn had sided with ADA 15% of the time during his time in Congress, ACA 72% of the time, and his DW-Nominate score is -0.017. None of these criterion really reflect the notion that Dorn was a “progressive populist” as South Carolina Encyclopedia’s profile depicts him in his later career (Moore). Sure, he became a bit more liberal, but his ACA agreement never fell below 48% and he never agreed with ADA more than 58% of the time in a given year. Although DW-Nominate’s score does not look conservative at all, bear in mind that party-line procedural votes get counted and that his score is higher than any Democrat serving nationally. Dorn tried again for governor in 1978, but lost the Democratic primary. From 1980 to 1984, he did one last service for his party by serving as the chairman of the state’s Democratic Party. Perhaps aside from the shifts in his record, the most interesting thing about Dorn is that his portrayal seems a bit different from reality.

References

ADA Voting Records. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Voting Records

Dorn, William Jennings Bryan. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/2672/william-jennings-bryan-dorn

Moore, W.V. (2016, May 17). Dorn, William Jennings Bryan. South Carolina Encyclopedia.

Retrieved from

https://www.scencyclopedia.org/sce/entries/dorn-william-jennings-bryan/

Fascinating Politics

Ideologically Evaluating Democratic Nominees, 2000-2024

I have noticed among online liberals on social media and in comment sections (I should never read most comment sections TBH), there is this notion that Democrats are moderate, or by the tellings of some radicals, even “conservative”. They will make certain surface level comparisons that do not involve how their nominees actually vote or cherry-pick a vote or two to obscure a larger picture. Thus, I have taken it upon myself to find out how often Democratic nominees running for terms in the 21st century figured ideologically, based upon votes. I use for this purpose votes that the liberal Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) counts as key votes, votes that the conservative American Conservative Union (ACU) counts as key votes, and in the cases of Al Gore and Joe Biden the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA) as they were in Washington before 1985. Also included of course is the academic measurement of DW-Nominate, which has -1 to 1 as its scale, the former being most liberal and the latter being most conservative.

Fortunately, all from 2000 on can be ideologically evaluated as they have legislative records. Bear in mind, my use of ADA, ACU, and ACA are based on agreement rates rather than the ratings they put out themselves. This means politicians are on record agreeing or voting for their positions. Thus, there is none of the nonsense of counting absences as against liberalism that ADA does, as well as the nonsense of counting non-votes (such as opinions on holding a vote to confirm Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court in 2016 and signing an amicus curiae brief in 2020) and weighing certain votes by more than one (although non-votes is a far greater beef for me) that ACU has done. Now, let’s look at the six nominees…

Kamala Harris, you will know why by the end of this post why her picture is being featured!

2000:

Al Gore

ADA: 70

ACA: 24

ACU: 15

DW-Nominate: -0.316

Al Gore was around far back enough to have been evaluated by Americans for Constitutional Action, an organization that shuttered its doors after releasing its 1984 ratings. Thus, ACA’s ratings only cover Gore’s House record. Interestingly, both of Gore’s ACA and ADA scores find him a moderate liberal. He is also the one individual for who ADA and ACU differ significantly. ACU finds him to be a solid liberal while ADA only finds moderate liberal.

2004:

John Kerry

ADA: 95

ACU: 5

DW-Nominate: -0.352

Remarkably, John Kerry’s agreement rates with ADA and ACU both reveal him as 95% liberal. However, Kerry’s DW-Nominate score places him more as a standard liberal than extremely liberal as both ADA and ACU agreement rates indicate. John Edwards is rather similar with ADA and ACU, and he is notably less liberal than any of the Democratic nominees here by DW-Nominate score.

2008 and 2012:

Barack Obama

ADA: 98

ACU: 9

DW-Nominate: -0.343

Given how much Obama agreed with ADA (he only differed with them on one vote!) and disagreed with ACU, it is safe to say that on key issues he was very liberal. However, DW-Nominate’s finding places him as standard liberal. None of the standards find him to be moderate or as some deluded and ridiculous people who are probably close to the ideology of Marx if not there find him, “conservative”. They view how much he was able to get done as a measure of his ideology as opposed to his stances. It kinda hurts your prospects at getting all of your agenda done when you don’t have united government. Obama only had the benefit of both the House and Senate being Democratic for his first two years. Yes, there are people out there who also think Obama as not being liberal because of some similarities Obamacare had to something crafted in the Heritage Foundation in the early 90s and initially supported by some Republicans. I may choose to do a takedown of that narrative some day.

2016:

Hillary Clinton

ADA: 97

ACU: 8

DW-Nominate: -0.367

Hillary Clinton is frankly not a huge surprise here. As a polarizing figure, she is with the liberal position over 90% of the time per ADA and ACU key votes. By DW-Nominate, she is just standard liberal, and the best case liberals have of her being on the moderate end. I suppose if one is comparing her to Bernie Sanders and using DW-Nominate that’s the case. But I suppose the questions that are always to be asked when comparative ideology is asserted is “by whose standard?” and “compared to who?” This is, of course, what I’m trying to accomplish in this post.

2020:

Joe Biden

ADA: 86

ACA: 19

ACU: 12

DW-Nominate: -0.314

Joe Biden as a senator was not an ultra-liberal, but rather solidly liberal as all the interest group ratings indicate, with ACU giving Biden the lowest marks on conservatism. His DW-Nominate score makes him the least liberal person the Democratic Party has run for president in the 21st century by that standard. However, I should note that much of his crossover votes were decades behind him by the time he was elected vice president in 2008.

2024:

Kamala Harris

ADA: 100

ACU: 6

DW-Nominate: -0.709

Again, conservatives ironically make a better case for the Democratic nominee’s moderation than liberals! She never disagreed with ADA once, their only faults with her record was when she was absent. By the way, Harris’s “moderation” was only rhetorical for the 2024 election, as all three measures demonstrate, contrary to the narrative spun by much of our media. Her DW-Nominate score even places her to the left of Bernie Sanders, who gets a -0.545. Bernie Sanders’ DW-Nominate score is linked in References just in case you don’t believe me! One might argue that conservatives always will call Democrats extreme, but the case they had against Harris on that I think was rock solid. However, she did have a slightly higher incidence of agreement with ACU than John Kerry. Nonetheless, on two of three measures she ranks most liberal among the Democratic nominees.

Interestingly, with the exception of Kamala Harris, all Democratic nominees score between -0.3 and -0.4 by DW-Nominate. All three measures reveal barely any significant ideological differences between Clinton and Obama, and ironically ACU’s ratings make a better case for Clinton’s and Obama’s perceived moderation by left-wing Democrats than ADA’s ratings. However, the best case is their DW-Nominate scores, which place them as liberal, but not extremely liberal. On two of three measures, Clinton ranks as more liberal than Obama, but only very slightly. The differences between them were mostly a matter of establishment vs. not as establishment. Indeed, if we look at elections over the past 50 years it is consistently the candidate who is seen as less establishment who wins presidential elections with only two exceptions: George H.W. Bush in 1988 and Joe Biden in 2020.

References

ADA Voting Records. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Voting Records

Biden, Joseph Robinette (Joe), Jr. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/14101/joseph-robinette-joe-biden-jr

Clinton, Hillary Rodham. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/40105/hillary-rodham-clinton

Gore, Albert Arnold, Jr. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/14423/albert-arnold-gore-jr

Harris, Kamala Devi. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/41701/kamala-devi-harris

Kerry, John Forbes. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/14920/john-forbes-kerry

Sanders, Bernard. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/29147/bernard-sanders

Sen. Albert Gore. American Conservative Union.

Retrieved from

http://ratings.conservative.org/people/G000321

Sen. Barack Obama. American Conservative Union.

Retrieved from

http://ratings.conservative.org/people/O000167

Sen. Hillary Clinton. American Conservative Union.

Retrieved from

http://ratings.conservative.org/people/C001041

Sen. Joseph Biden. American Conservative Union.

Retrieved from

http://ratings.conservative.org/people/B000444

Sen. John Kerry. American Conservative Union.

Retrieved from

http://ratings.conservative.org/people/K000148

Sen. Kamala Harris. American Conservative Union.

Retrieved from

http://ratings.conservative.org/people/H001075

Fascinating Politics

Trade Agreements from NAFTA Onwards – Important Votes

President Clinton signs NAFTA into law.

Given Friday’s Supreme Court ruling on tariffs and Trump’s condemnation of the decision and his move forward under different laws, it strikes me that the way the parties are regarding tariffs these days are laser-focused on what Donald Trump thinks. And neither of the directions the Democrats or the Republicans are going are ones that have been consistent with what the parities have been standing for for the past few decades. Below I am going to show you the splits on trade agreements, and you will see where the parties have been standing and to what degree:

House

North American Free Trade Agreement

Passed 234-200: D 102-156; R 132-43; 1 0-1, 11/17/93.

China Trade Normalization

Passed 237-197: R 164-57; D 73-139; I 0-1, 5/24/00.

Andean Trade Bill

Passed 215-212: R 190-27; D 25-184; I 0-1, 7/27/02.

Dominican Republic-Central America-Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act

Passed 217-215: R 202-27; D 15-188, 7/28/05.

U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement

Passed 221-205: R 199-28; D 22-177, 7/20/06.

U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement

Passed 285-132: D 109-116; R 176-16, 11//08/07.

South Korea Trade Agreement

Passed 278-151: R 219-21; R 59-130, 10/12/11.

U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement

Passed 262-167: R 231-9; D 31-158, 10/12/11.

U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement

Passed 300-129: R 234-6; D 66-123, 10/12/11.

Trade Facilities and Trade Enforcement Act (Conference Report)

Passed 256-158: R 232-3; D 24-155, 12/11/15.

Senate

North American Free Trade Agreement

Passed 61-38: D 27-28; R 34-10, 11/20/93.

China Trade Normalization

Passed 83-15: R 46-8; D 37-7, 9/19/00.

Andean Trade Bill – Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru

Passed 66-30: D 25-25; R 41-5, 5/23/02.

Dominican Republic-Central America-Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act

Passed 54-45: R 43-12; D 11-33, 6/30/05.

U.S.-Oman Free Trade Agreement

Passed 60-34: R 48-5; D 12-29, 6/29/06.

U.S.-Peru Trade Agreement

Passed 77-18: D 30-17; R 47-1, 12/04/07.

South Korea Trade Agreement

Passed 83-15: D 38-14; R 45-1, 10/12/11.

U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement

Passed 66-33: R 44-2; D 22-31, 10/12/11.

U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement

Passed 77-22: R 46-0; D 31-22, 10/12/11.

Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act (Conference Report)

Adopted 75-20: R 47-3; D 28-17, 2/11/16.

As you can see, strong majorities of Republicans have consistently favored trade agreements and Democrats have opposed them, although their margins of opposition are a bit more variable. Interestingly, the Senate tends to be more favorable to trade agreements than the House. However, part of the Trump base are people who are deeply opposed to “globalism” and part of this means trade agreements. Whether we like it or not, Trump is the center of the US political universe for the time being, and the parties’ stances on this issue are increasingly motivated by where he stands and what he is doing on trade. Most Republicans are scared to death of being primaried by someone who promises 100% loyalty to Trump, while Democrats by and large want to make showings of opposition to Trump, especially since many of their base supporters are outraged with them based on a perception that Democrats don’t do enough against him. Since Democratic base voters are a dime a dozen in my part of Washington, I’ve noticed that they don’t seem to have a real idea of what would be sufficient against him aside from immediate removal from office, but they don’t have a legal means to do it within reach (they would have to win 2/3’s of the Senate or short enough of that for a few Republican rebels to vote for conviction).

Fascinating Politics

Mark Andrews: North Dakota’s Independent Voice

On July 18, 1963, 57-year-old Representative Hjalmar Nygaard, on his second term, went to see Dr. George Calver, the physician of Congress, for chest pains. However, it was too late, and he died in Dr. Calver’s office of a heart attack. This opened a vacancy in North Dakota’s 1st district. Quick to enter the race was Mark Andrews (1926-2020), a 38-year-old farmer who had run for governor the year before and narrowly lost. Some conservatives were rather suspicious of Mark Andrews, who had a moderate reputation. They did not think he was sufficiently conservative, and this resulted in the entry of John Bircher John W. Scott, who ran as an Independent. This had the potential to spoil the race for the Republicans, and it was of great help when Barry Goldwater stepped in. He endorsed Andrews’ run in a wire to him, “Your views on fiscal responsibility, less Government interference and a firm foreign policy are in accord with the sentiments of all Americans” (Time Magazine).

In Congress, Andrews proved to be in opposition to many new government programs, voting against the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, against federal aid to education in 1965, and against Medicare. However, he was more socially liberal, supporting funding for the arts. Andrews also voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, but would be in opposition to busing as a means of desegregation during the 1970s. On civil rights, Andrews said, “It was the right thing to do. People need to be treated with dignity” (Shaw). He was also more supportive of government intervention in agriculture than most of his fellow Republicans, but this was a popular position in the wheat-producing North Dakota. In 1966 and 1973, Andrews supported minimum wage increases, and over the president’s veto in the latter case. Despite Goldwater having backed his run, Andrews preferred Nelson Rockefeller in the 1964 Republican presidential primary (McFadden). Although North Dakotans regularly saw fit to reelect Mark Andrews, one figure who apparently did not like him was Senator Milton Young. Apparently, Young had considered retiring in 1974, but it became clear that his obvious successor was going to be Andrews, thus despite his advancing age he decided to stick around for one more term (Hill). Depending on what ideological scale you use, Andrews’ peak conservatism was either during the Johnson Administration or the Carter Administration.

By 1980, Young was 83 years old and could not go for one more term, thus Andrews ran for the Senate. He won a resounding victory, winning with 70% of the vote and all counties. As a senator, Andrews would be quite independent from President Reagan, including voting for overriding one of his vetoes on an appropriations bill in 1982 and often voting in opposition to his military policies. He did vote for some signature conservative proposals, including a Balanced Budget Amendment in 1982 and the Eagleton-Hatch Human Life Amendment in 1983. However, Andrews opposed a school prayer amendment and a reinstatement of the federal death penalty in 1984. His bipartisan approach was described by his daughter who recounted him saying in his old age, “in those days people from both parties worked together and we got things done – Quentin Burdick was a good Democrat and I was a good Republican but we were good friends and we worked together for North Dakota. This not working together is foolishness!” (The Dickinson Press, 3). Indeed, the Reagan years appear to be Andrews’ least conservative period as a legislator. Despite his independence, he faced considerable headwinds in the 1986 election. Running against him was young and popular State Tax Commissioner Kent Conrad. Conrad ran a negative campaign against Andrews, and blamed North Dakota’s struggling farm economy on large trade and budget deficits (Wetzel). Andrews was well aware of the issues of the struggling economy and addressed it during his campaign. He even pledged not to run for reelection in 1992 if federal trade and budget deficits were not cut 80% by then (Wetzel). However, by the final weeks of the race he was clearly at risk of losing. President Reagan made a campaign stop on his behalf on October 17th in Grand Forks and he had plenty of money to fight, but 1986 was rough on Senate Republicans and Andrews lost by less than a point. Republicans lost a net of eight Senate seats, with Democrats regaining control of the Senate. This was the first time since 1944 that an incumbent senator had lost reelection. Andrews backed the position of the liberal Americans for Democratic Action 25% of the time while siding the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action 61% from the start of his career until 1984. His DW-Nominate score is a 0.087, an indicator of centrism.

Andrews did not run for public office again, but he started a consulting firm in Washington D.C. but continued to live in North Dakota. He lived many years after the end of his career and was cognizant until the end, dying on October 3, 2020, in Fargo, North Dakota, only months after the passing of his wife Mary, who he had been married to for 71 years.

References

ADA Voting Records. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Voting Records

Amundson, B. (2020, October 9). Former US Sen. Mark Andrews dies at 94. The Dickinson Press, 3.

Retrieved from

https://www.newspapers.com/image/1186532078/

Andrews, Mark. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/10569/mark-andrews

Hill, R. (2021, July 5). Milton R. Young of North Dakota. The Knoxville Focus.

Retrieved from

https://www.knoxfocus.com/archives/this-weeks-focus/milton-r-young-of-north-dakota/

McFadden, R.D. (2020, October 7). Mark Andrews, North Dakota Farmer-Politician, Dies at 94. The New York Times.

Nation: More Sound Than Steam. (1963, November 1). Time Magazine.

Retrieved from

https://time.com/archive/6813021/nation-more-sound-than-steam/

Shaw, J. (2018, May 20). Commentary: We need more politicians like Mark Andrews. The Dickinson Press.

Retrieved from

https://www.thedickinsonpress.com/opinion/commentary-we-need-more-politicians-like-mark-andrews

Wetzel, D. (1986, October 30). U.S. Senate – Andrews fighting for political life in campaign; Conrad could make history with Senate victory. (1986, October 3). The Bismarck Tribune, 46.

Retrieved from

https://www.newspapers.com/image/346063779/