The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) is aiming to find waste, inefficiency, and areas to cut government spending. One subject that they have touched on is veterans benefits as has prospective Trump nominee to the post of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. On that one from a historical perspective, they are in for one hell of a fight! Veterans’ benefits have a long history of being politically difficult to resist. In 1949, for instance, the House by only one vote rejected Veterans Affairs Committee chairman John Rankin’s (D-Miss.) measure that would have provided for a massive pension program for World War I and World War II veterans at $90 a month (or $1,193.69 in October 2024 dollars) starting at age 65 that at the same time would have served to fiscally prevent President Truman from expanding Social Security as he planned (Time Magazine). The measure’s defeat was in no small part due to the vocal opposition of certain World War II veterans in Congress, most notably Olin “Tiger” Teague of Texas, the second-highest decorated soldier of the war. Even President Roosevelt at the height of his power struggled with the issue.
Speaker Henry Rainey (D-Ill.) was perfectly willing to let the executive branch write laws and have the House rubber stamp them, but there was a fight in the early New Deal that Roosevelt lost, and not even the opposition of Speaker Rainey could overcome this, and this was on funding New Deal programs in part through cuts in veterans’ benefits.
The first New Deal law to pass, and one that actually got substantial support from conservatives, was the Economy Act, which cut spending for the purposes of making room in the budget for FDR’s New Deal programs and served to effectively repeal all laws passed after the War of the Rebellion for veterans’ pensions, granting FDR the power to restructure veterans’ benefits, and he did so by cutting benefits by over $400 million. This provoked a lot of bipartisan opposition, including from individuals thought of as progressive in this time, such as Senator Burton Wheeler (D-Mont.). On June 14, 1933, the Senate responded to FDR’s veterans’ benefits reduction with the Steiwer (R-Ore.)-Cutting (R-N.M.) amendment 51-39 (D 19-39; R 31-0; P 1-0) to the Independent Offices Appropriations bill, which if enacted into law would have only permitted Roosevelt to cut up to 25% of an individual veteran’s benefits, amounting to a maximum overall reduction between $100-160 million. Interestingly, this vote presaged further opposition to Roosevelt’s agenda in the future, most notably on foreign policy, from certain senators who were at least nominally for the New Deal at this point, including Wheeler, Pat McCarran of Nevada, and Robert R. Reynolds of North Carolina. This was also a point of contention between the flamboyant Huey Long of Louisiana and the president. Roosevelt was prepared to veto the bill if the amendment remained, but the House came to his rescue and refused to adopt Steiwer-Cutting 177-209 (D 79-201; R 93-8; FL 1-0) the following day. However, the battle was far from over on veterans’ benefits, the most hotly contested part of the Economy Act, and the House voted to increase veterans benefits to largely offset Roosevelt’s cuts. Although President Roosevelt vetoed the bill, the House overrode his veto of the bill 310 to 72 (D 209-70; R 97-2; FL 4-0) on March 27, 1934. Among Republicans, only Robert Luce and George Tinkham of Massachusetts, normally opponents of Roosevelt and the New Deal, voted against this effort. Although Majority Leader Robinson (D-Ark.) was more successful at persuading his fellow Democrats to sustain Roosevelt’s veto, his veto was overridden the following day 63-27 (D 29-27; R 33-0; FL 1-0) that same day. This would be predictive of the override of another of President Roosevelt’s vetoes, on the Patman Bonus bill. Like President Hoover before him, Roosevelt opposed the Patman Bonus bill, which permitted veterans to collect their bonuses at any time as opposed to 1945 as established by the 1924 World War Adjusted Compensation Act as a budget-busting measure. Unlike with the appropriations bill, he got some sizeable conservative Republican support for his position. Although the House overrode President Roosevelt’s veto on May 22, 1935, 322-98 (D 248-60; R 64-38; P 7-0; FL 3-0), Majority Leader Joseph Robinson (D-Ark.) was successful in getting the Senate to sustain the veto the following day 54-40 (D 41-28; R 12-12; P 1-0). However, a compromise Patman bill was pressed into 1936. This one managed to pass over President Roosevelt’s veto, with members of Congress feeling more pressure as the next election approached. The House voted to do so on January 24th 326-61 (D 249-32; R 67-29; P 7-0; FL 3-0) and the Senate voted to do so 76-19 (D 57-12; 17-7; P 1-0; FL 1-0) three days later. Although veterans’ organizations advised veterans to wait until 1945 to collect, many chose to do so right away. This measure would essentially serve as a stimulus for veterans. Roosevelt would later do quite well for veterans in his signing of the GI Bill in 1944.
References
Ortiz, S.R. (2009). Beyond the Bonus March and GI Bill: How Veteran Politics Shaped the New Deal Era. New York, NY: NYU Press.
Although there is no royalty in the United States and never can be as a matter of constitutionality (unless we decide to repeal that part of the Constitution for reasons that escape me), there have been political families who have been tremendously influential: the Kennedys, the Bushes, and the Roosevelts. Two of FDR’s sons had political careers of their own in FDR Jr. and James Roosevelt. Today I will be writing about the former, who fell far from the tree of his father in terms of political acumen.
When it came to war service, President Roosevelt was no hypocrite, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt Jr. (1914-1988) served in the war and he did so with honor. In his personal life, however, Roosevelt Jr. had issues, being married a grand total of five times. In 1948, he sought to recruit Dwight Eisenhower for the Democratic nomination, not knowing that his true sympathies lay with the Republicans. His time for public office would come in 1949.
Congressional Career
In 1949, longtime Congressman Sol Bloom, who had been chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, died, and Roosevelt Jr. ran to succeed him, managing to defeat the Tammany Hall picked candidate as the Liberal candidate. Roosevelt Jr., who would win his subsequent reelections as a Democrat, was per Americans for Democratic Action a perfect liberal during his time in Congress, never having voted against a single one of the issues they regarded as a key vote. He supported public housing, price controls, foreign aid, reciprocal trade, public power, more immigration, and opposed the McCarran Internal Security Act. His DW-Nominate score was quite a low -0.619. Although Roosevelt Jr. was a perfect liberal by the standards of Americans for Democratic Action, he proved a poor member of Congress for laziness and general lack of enthusiasm for the job. Speaker Sam Rayburn of Texas would tell his brother James upon his entrance into Congress in 1955 to “not waste our time like your brother did”, and James himself would recount that Jr. “had a dreadful record in Congress. He was smart, but not smart enough. He had good ideas and the power of persuasion, but he did not put them to good use. He coasted instead of working at his job, considering it beneath him, while he aimed for higher positions. He may have had the worst attendance record of any member of those days, and it cost him those higher positions” (Roosevelt, 314). Instead of running for reelection for Congress, Roosevelt Jr. ran for attorney general, but was defeated by fellow Congressman Jacob Javits, thus being the only Democrat to lose a statewide election that year.
In 1960, he served as something of a bulldog for his friend John F. Kennedy’s campaign in the hopes that he could revive his faltering political career, and falsely insinuated during the West Virginia primary that Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.), who was also running for the nomination, had been a draft-dodger during World War II (Time Magazine). The truth was that Humphrey was not allowed to fight due to a disability, and Roosevelt would subsequently apologize. Kennedy’s win in that race tipped the primary decisively for him. Although Kennedy had initially wanted Roosevelt to be Secretary of the Navy, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara nixed the idea. Roosevelt would instead serve as Under Secretary of Commerce from 1963 to 1965. Any hope Roosevelt Jr. had of further rise died with Kennedy, although he did serve in one more federal position as head of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from 1965 to 1966. Roosevelt made one last bid for elective office in running for governor on the Liberal Party ticket in 1966, but he didn’t stand a snowball’s chance in hell against the powerhouse of incumbent Nelson Rockefeller.
Roosevelt would pursue business ventures for the remainder of his life, including the distribution of imported cars. He died on August 17, 1988, his 74th birthday, of lung cancer.
References
ADA Voting Records. Americans for Democratic Action.
The idea of defiance of the Supreme Court is one that seems remote in the minds of many, although the court is certainly unpopular among liberals right now, an outright defiance of any one decision still seems remote. The closest that a president came to defying the Supreme Court as far as my memory goes was if the Supreme Court had ruled against FDR in the Gold Clause Cases in 1935. They ruled for the Administration 5-4, but Roosevelt had every intention to defy the court if they ruled otherwise, and the Supreme Court had ruled against numerous New Deal laws without FDR defying their verdicts. Andrew Jackson and the state of Georgia, however, did in 1832.
Samuel A. Worcester
One of President Jackson’s priorities, which really appealed to the South at the time, was moving the five civilized tribes out of their ancestral lands to make room for settlers to farm. Although popular in the South, the issue was highly controversial, and the Whig Party was opposed. The vote in the House was exceptionally close at 102 to 97. In the meantime, the tribes had a number of white sympathizers, which included missionaries. One of these missionaries was Samuel A. Worcester, who was helping the Cherokee, and Georgia’s state government didn’t appreciate their efforts. The state in response passed a law that prohibited whites from living in tribal land unless they got a special license from Georgia’s governor and swore an oath to the state. Worcester and his fellow missionaries were subsequently arrested, convicted, and imprisoned. He appealed his imprisonment to the Supreme Court, and in 1832 they ruled 5-1 in Worcester v. Georgia that Georgia had no authority to make laws regarding Cherokee land, and that treating tribal land as separate nations was consistent with the history of treaties by the United States with the tribes. Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the court, holding that “the nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights as the undisputed possessors of the soil” (31 U.S. 515) Marshall conceded that the Cherokee had surrendered some sovereignty with treaties, that this was not sufficient for enacting such a law.
John Marshall
That was all well and good, except who was going to enforce it? Georgia refused to comply, and President Jackson refused to enforce the ruling. Although Jackson is famously reputed to have said to Brigadier General John Coffee, “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it”, what he actually said was, “The decision of the supreme court has fell still born, and they find that it cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate” (Garrison). Not as defiant, memorable, or smooth, right? After intense public pressure and criticism, the missionaries were pardoned the following year, and Indian removal would proceed in the coming years in what was infamously known as the Trail of Tears. That subject undoubtedly warrants a separate post. Andrew Jackson would have greater appreciation of the Supreme Court, however, when it came to the Nullification Crisis, another subject that warrants a separate post in which South Carolina nullified two tariff laws as it found them unconstitutional, and Jackson proclaimed that South Carolina had no authority to determine constitutionality of federal legislation and that the Supreme Court had the ultimate authority on constitutionality (Rosen). The full stories of the Trail of Tears and nullification will be written about at a later date. Overall, it would be quite foreign and scandalous to us if a Supreme Court decision was actively defied and the White House would not enforce the ruling, indeed it would produce a Constitutional crisis. However, Worcester was not in vain and remains good law, thus it has served as a precedent for numerous Indian rights cases.
References
Garrison, T.A. (2004, April 27). Worcester v. Georgia. New Georgia Encyclopedia.
In 1930, Senator Frank Greene died during an operation, and selected to succeed him by Governor John E. Weeks was Frank C. Partridge, a personal friend and longtime presence in Vermont politics. The following year, however, there was to be an election to finish out the term, and prominent attorney Warren Austin (1877-1962) of St. Albans was persuaded to challenge Partridge, announcing shortly before the end of 1930. Although incumbency is often an advantage, in Partridge’s case it was not; he had to attend to the Senate while Austin was free to campaign across the state, delivering 60 speeches (Mazuzan, 130). Austin’s age was also to his advantage as he was 15 years younger than the 68-year old Partridge, and he won the Republican nomination for the election to finish the late Greene’s term. In 1931, winning the Republican nomination was tantamount to election, as Vermont was the Wyoming of its day in Republicanism.
Austin became a quick study of the Senate, and he thought there was some room for procedural change, namely that his fellow senators had too much room to bloviate (Mazuzan, 130-131). He voted like a traditional Republican, with a wariness of a largesse in federal government, spending, and the powers of the executive. This translated to a strong opposition to FDR’s New Deal, with him voting against all major “first 100 days” legislation except the Economy Act. As Austin wrote to his mother, “I am very apprehensive of the arbitrary powers which are being placed in the hands of one man” (Mazuzan, 131). Austin was opposed to measures he saw as intruding on states and localities as well as on individuals, and saw this in the New Deal. In particular, Austin strongly opposed the cancellation of air mail contracts based on ultimately unsubstantiated charges of fraud and collusion, writing “However unfortunate may seem the material and intimate results of the cancellations of the air-mail contracts and the acts which have succeeded that, the poignancy of the event was the grave and serious doubt excited in the minds of men and women of the purpose of the “New Deal” which is neither Republican nor Democratic. Is it an emergency policy? Or is it a permanent departure from free institutions and a surreptitious establishment, without the knowledge or consent of the people of ideas of government which are in conflict with the breeding, the traditions, and the settled purpose of the American people” (Mazuzan, 134). However, the politics of old were under increasing fire, even in Vermont. Austin’s opponent for reelection in 1934 was Fred C. Martin, FDR’s IRS collector for the state, who ran as a New Dealer and challenged Austin’s record as well as touted areas of Vermont that were assisted by New Deal programs. In a portend of Vermont’s future, this message got a lot of traction, particularly in the state’s western portion. In response Austin touted Vermont’s traditions, regarded the administration as pushing “foreign doctrines and socialistic ideas”, and asserted that there was a need for an independent voice from that of the Roosevelt Administration (Mazuzan, 138-139). Although the election result of Austin winning reelection was “business as usual”, he only won with 51% of the vote, and three western counties had voted for Martin. He would not change his ways for the most part in his next term on domestic issues and in 1935 he voted against Social Security. Only seven other senators either voted or paired against. In 1937, Austin would participate in the drafting of the Conservative Manifesto, a ten-point document proposing alternative policies to the New Deal that emphasized private enterprise and state as opposed to federal authority (Moore). In 1939, he was elected assistant minority leader and would serve as acting minority leader while Oregon’s Charles McNary was running for vice president.
Foreign Policy
Austin was well-versed in dissent, but this dissent was not confined to the ruling Democratic Party. Unlike most of his Republican colleagues before World War II, Austin was an internationalist. In 1935, he had voted for the US joining the World Court (one of FDR’s few policy defeats in his first term), and this debate largely portended the internationalist/anti-interventionist divide. Austin would vote for repealing the arms embargo in 1939, vote for the peacetime draft, be the Senate’s strongest supporter of Lend-Lease, and support permitting merchant ships to enter belligerent ports. He was even one of two Senate Republicans to oppose an amendment to the Lend-Lease bill striking aid for the USSR. He was interestingly at odds with his new colleague George Aiken both from right and left, as Aiken was significantly more liberal than him on domestic policy but was opposed to FDR’s foreign policy before World War II and more willing to permit age-based deferments to the draft. Austin strongly supported the creation of the United Nations, but kept national sovereignty in mind when he voted for the Connally Reservation, which excludes domestic disputes from the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. During the 1940s, Austin also moderated somewhat on domestic issues, for instance supporting retaining the National Youth Administration in 1943 and his support (albeit limited) of wartime price control. On August 2, 1946, Austin resigned from the Senate as President Truman announced his appointment as Ambassador to the United Nations. Austin’s DW-Nominate score was a 0.106, which seemed to strongly reflect his internationalism given that his record was mostly oppositional to the New Deal.
UN Ambassador
As Ambassador to the UN, Austin became known as a forceful advocate of the West as a cold warrior. During this time, he allegedly gaffed, “I hope Arabs and Jews will settle their differences in a truly Christian spirit”, but his assistant who was present held that what Austin was communicating was that as a Christian he would be impartial towards Muslims and Jews regarding the creation of Israel (Traveling for History). In 1951, Austin presented to the United Nations Security Council a Soviet submachine gun found in possession of captured North Korean troops to demonstrate that the Soviets were providing arms to them.
He served until two days after the end of the Truman Administration, with President Eisenhower picking another New England internationalist who had served in the Senate to replace him in Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.
Austin retired from public service after and was forced to curb his activities after suffering a stroke in October 1956. He died on December 25, 1962. Times have changed much in Vermont since he left office in 1946. For instance, his old Senate seat is held by none other than Bernie Sanders, a marked contrast to Austin’s anti-New Deal politics.
The 1800 election marked some firsts in American history. For one thing, it was the first time a president lost reelection and the smooth transfer of power in this case was an important precedent in American as well as world history. However, there was a significant complication that could have derailed the public’s will in electing Thomas Jefferson.
Background
When the Constitution was adopted in 1788, the Founding Fathers were largely of the belief that political parties were to be avoided. President George Washington, who never identified with a party, certainly thought so. However, factionalism developed from the beginning with groups we retroactively call the Pro and Anti-Administration factions. The Pro faction of course sided with George Washington and was also supportive of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton and Vice President John Adams, believing in the use of federal power to grow the nation through the funding of internal improvements to grow commerce and imposing tariffs to finance such developments. The Anti faction sided with Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, who idealized an agrarian society of the people and disliked the Hamiltonian system of government of protective tariffs to fund internal improvements. However, because the Constitution had it that the winner would be president and the runner-up would be vice president, it created a situation in which the president would have a political foe in the vice presidency, as happened with John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. By the 1796 election, America’s first two parties had developed in the Federalist and Republican parties. For the purposes of avoiding confusion, however, historians and others call the latter the Democratic-Republican Party, as today’s Republican Party traces its lineage to the Whigs, which traced their lineage to the Federalists. Despite the wishes of many Founders, the seeds for political parties had been planted from the very beginning. Although both Adams and Jefferson had their picks for vice president, the tickets were not official and the results made it so that under the Constitution Adams was president and Jefferson was vice president, creating a rather awkward situation in the White House. Imagine this applied to recent politics in addition to the greater role of the vice president, and you can imagine how well this would go over. Electors cast two votes each, but there was no distinction as to president and vice president in these votes.
The 1800 Election
In the 1800 election, the Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties officially selected president and vice president. Jefferson’s running mate was New York’s Aaron Burr and Adams’s running mate was South Carolina’s Charles C. Pinckney. In that election, the tides decisively turned against John Adams, with the Administration being unpopular due to numerous factors, including their support of greater relations with Britain, their tariffs, and the Alien and Sedition Acts, now widely regarded as an unconstitutional overreaction to fears about the influence of revolutionary France. Thomas Jefferson won with 60.6% of the vote as opposed to Adams’ 39.4%. The problem was that in the casting of electoral votes, the electors gave Jefferson and Burr 73 electoral votes, and because the electoral votes didn’t distinguish between president and vice president a Burr presidency was now possible! The Adams electors had been careful about this; his VP nominee Charles C. Pinckney received one less electoral vote than Adams, but this didn’t matter as the ticket hadn’t won. The conundrum had to be resolved by Congress, and the Federalists initially sought to make life difficult for Jefferson by voting for Burr and producing a stalemate, resulting in 35 ballots without a winner. Because state delegations were what mattered in the voting for president, this had the result of giving Delaware’s single representative, the staunchly Federalist James A. Bayard, the same power as the considerably more populous Democratic-Republican state of Virginia in determining the president. Burr, ever ambitious and far from the most ethical politician the US has ever had, was during this time accused of campaigning for himself being president as he did not rule himself out as a candidate for president. As a consequence, Burr would be completely frozen out of the Jefferson Administration’s inner circle. However, Alexander Hamilton realized that Jefferson was the preferable president. He didn’t like the idea of Burr being an instrument of the Federalists throughout his career. In 1804, Hamilton’s opinion on Burr reflected his views on him in 1801, asking, “Is he to be used by the Federalists, or is he a two-edged sword, that must not be drawn?” (Thomas Jefferson Monticello) He managed to convince some Federalists to switch their votes to Jefferson, and on the 36th ballot, Delaware’s Bayard cast his vote for Jefferson, thus producing the intended outcome of the people. An election being decided in the House of Representatives is, to say the least, not ideal as Americans would find out in 1824 (the election of the alleged “corrupt bargain”) and 1876, the only time in which a presidential candidate lost who got the majority, as opposed to the plurality, of the popular vote. Thus, Jefferson and his party proposed the 12th Amendment to the Constitution regarding the elections of the president and vice president. This amendment distinguished electoral votes for president and vice president, held whoever should have the greatest number of votes for vice president would be the vice president, and prohibited electors from a state for voting for more than one candidate from their state. The latter has had some relevance in decisions surrounding presidents; in 2000, Dick Cheney had to legally change his residence from Texas to Wyoming to still be Bush’s running mate, and this issue certainly factored in Trump declining to pick Senator Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) as his running mate this year. In a close election year, it is best not to risk loss because Florida’s electors can’t vote for the ticket if there are two Florida residents. The Federalist Party strongly opposed this proposal, as they saw it as a way to benefit Jefferson and his party and to further reduce their influence in politics. Senator Samuel White of Delaware argued that “we have not given it a fair experiment,” that “we should be cautious how we touch it”, and cautioned that the measure had potential to increase corruption, holding that the result would be to “more than double the inducement to those candidates, and their friends, to tamper with the Electors, to exercise intrigue, bribery, and corruption…” (Alder).
However, the Federalist Party was quite weak in representation and the Senate voted for the amendment on December 2, 1803, by a vote of 21-10, with all Federalists opposing and one Democratic-Republican joining them. On December 8, 1803, the House voted to ratify the amendment 84-42, or with 2/3’s of the vote. All Federalists and five Democratic-Republicans voted against, but the Jeffersonian majority was strong enough to ratify. Among the opponents was future President John Quincy Adams.
The 12th Amendment, it is true, did serve Jefferson and the Democratic-Republican Party, but it also adjusted to the reality of the existence of political parties, which with 20/20 hindsight just seems inevitable. That being said, Federalists were understandably self-interested in their opposition to the 12th Amendment, trying to stave off their long-term decline. The 1804 election turned out to be a cakewalk for the popular Jefferson, who had a new running mate in New York’s George Clinton and won in a massive landslide against South Carolina’s Charles C. Pinckney, who only won Connecticut and the staunchly Federalist outpost of Delaware. The Federalist Party would gradually die out, but it would ironically technically outlast the Democratic-Republican Party. The Federalist Party was finally dissolved around 1828 while the Democratic-Republican Party fell victim to its own success as the party’s tent had become far too big and it was split over the candidacy of the populistic General Andrew Jackson, dissolving around 1825. That partisan politics didn’t end with the “Era of Good Feelings” that characterized James Monroe’s administration should be demonstrative that the “end of history” will not come without the end of humanity itself.
References
Alder, C. (2016, March 3). A Far Superior Method – the Original Electoral College. In Search of the American Constitutional Paradigm.
To Concur in the Senate Resolution to Submit for Approval to the Legislatures of the States, an Amendment to the Constitution Regulating the Election of the President and Vice President. (Speaker Voting in the Affirmative). Govtrack.
I will not be covering the election results in this post as the results are not all in yet. Although Trump officially won all seven swing states, there is still one Senate race that is too close to call and there are still House races to be counted before it is determined which party controls the chamber. Although I did not bring up Arizona’s Senate race, by implication of predicting Republicans would get 53 Senate seats I thought Democrat Ruben Gallego would win. Instead of writing about the election, today’s post is about a rather interesting fellow, perhaps Texas’s worst senator of all time.
Born to Southern aristocracy in South Carolina, Lewis Trezevant Wigfall (1816-1874) had all the advantages, save his birth parents, who died when he was young. Although he got a good education and was far from a stupid man, Wigfall was a highly ill-tempered and violent alcoholic who lacked work ethic (Mellon). In 1836, Wigfall served in the Second Seminole War for three months. Although he became a lawyer (it was not that hard to become one in those days), he would preoccupy himself with gambling, frequenting brothels, quarreling with fellow members of South Carolina’s planter aristocracy, and going to taverns and getting in fights. The products of Wigfall’s preoccupations included the failure of his law practice, squandering his inheritance, killing another man in a quarrel under disputed circumstances, and fighting a duel with future Congressman Preston Brooks, with both men seriously wounded and Brooks having to use a cane for the rest of his life as his hip was shattered. Brooks would use this cane to infamously beat Senator Charles Sumner for an anti-slavery speech in which he insulted his uncle. Wigfall would be greatly burdened by guilt over the man he killed, and for years the man would appear in his nightmares (Copperas Cove Leader Press). His belief system was formed not only through the circumstances of his upbringing but also his university education. The college president of South Carolina State, his alma mater, had in 1827 called for South Carolina to secede from the Union (Copperas Cove Leader Press). This was not the only way in which Wigfall was a man of his time and place. He also believed that the society of the planter aristocracy was the peak of civilization, was unapologetically pro-slavery, and believed in the virtues of chivalry (King). In 1841, Wigfall married Charlotte Cross, the marriage producing five children and resulting in him abandoning dueling. However, he still had a positive view of the practice, regarding it as a crucial “factor in the improvement of both the morals and manners of the community” (Wright, 32). By 1846, Wigfall’s money problems caught up to him as in addition to his irresponsible spending, he had to pay medical bills for his dying eldest son. His house and property were sold off at a Sheriff’s auction (McCawley). After his son died, he and his family moved to Texas for a new life. Wigfall also changed the spelling of his first name to Louis in the process.
In Texas, he got serious about practicing law and made for an effective attorney. Wigfall also serves in the state House from 1849 to 1850 as a Democrat where he was an early advocate of secession over the issues of slavery and tariffs. Like many other prominent people of his time and place, he owned slaves. Secession wasn’t popular at the time in Texas, and this stalled his career. However, as the events and tensions that led to the War of the Rebellion were accelerating in the 1850s, more Texans found Wigfall’s secessionist message appealing, and he proved a talented stump speaker. He was elected to the Texas State Senate in 1856, and the following year his speeches on the campaign trail were credited with the election of Hardin Runnels, a secessionist, as Texas’s governor over Senator Sam Houston (Drane).
Senator Wigfall
In 1859, Wigfall is elected to the Senate and is among the chamber’s staunchest fire-eaters, or advocates of secession. After Republican Abraham Lincoln is elected to the presidency in 1860, Southern states begin seceding from the Union, including Texas. Wigfall stayed in Washington until April 1861, gathering intelligence for the Confederacy and recruiting troops from Maryland. He was expelled from the Senate on July 11th for his support of the Confederacy.
Wigfall the Confederate
During the War of the Rebellion, he served as a brigadier general, commanding the Texas Brigade. However, his service was marred by his drinking, being visibly drunk on numerous occasions, including while on duty. In 1862, he was elected to the Confederate Senate.
In the Confederate Senate, Wigfall proved an advocate for state’s rights, including opposing Confederate President Jefferson Davis’s proposal for a Supreme Court. Davis was often frustrated in his efforts to centralize government as numerous Confederates did hold strong to the philosophy of state’s rights, and Wigfall was a frequent antagonist. He declared that Davis’s “pig-headedness and perverseness” were losing the war for the South (Drane). Wigfall was also a strong supporter of Robert E. Lee commanding all Confederate forces and was successful in enacting a conscription law and funding railroad construction. He was also unalterably opposed to conscripting black soldiers as a last-ditch effort, declaring, “Sir, I wish to live in no country where the man who blacks my boots or curries my horse is my equal” (Drane).
Wigfall fled to Britain after the war ended and his family later followed. He never met with the professional success he had in Texas again, and he and his family fell into poverty by 1869 with Wigfall only being able to get odd jobs (Drane). In 1872, Wigfall and his family returned to the United States after it was certain that he would not be tried for treason, and in January 1874 they moved back to Texas, settling in Galveston. Wigfall didn’t have the opportunity to attempt another comeback, becoming seriously ill; his decades of alcoholism had caught up with him and he suffered a fatal stroke on February 18th.
References
Drane, R.E. Louis T. Wigfall. Road to the Civil War.
Although many Americans take “one man, one vote” for granted today as a concept, this was far from always so, and this only changed sixty years ago. One can talk about the lower relative value of a vote in nationwide elections, but that’s not what I am discussing here. And for the record, I for one don’t mind too terribly that my vote as a resident of Washington is regarded as less important than the vote of someone from Nevada. If Washington voters really wanted greater relevance that badly, they would vote less Democratic. What I am discussing is the rough equality in population size of districts, and indeed states used to have full command over legislative apportionment. However, the postwar environment was one for change and for lessening the power of states. In 1947, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the federal government for title U.S. v. California, depriving the state of much revenue over loss of title over offshore oil deposits. In 1946, in his opinion of the decision Colegrove v. Green in which Illinois’ state legislative districts were upheld, Justice Felix Frankfurter, far from regarded as a political conservative, cautioned against the Supreme Court entering the “political thicket” of state legislative reapportionment. This remained the state of affairs during the Vinson Court, but after Chief Justice Fred Vinson’s death in 1953, Earl Warren was confirmed as chief justice. Warren had different ideas about the trajectory of the court in many ways, and in 1956 he was joined on the court by William Brennan, a man who President Eisenhower mistakenly assumed would be a conservative Democrat on the court. The team of Warren as leader and Brennan as the legal brains, the Warren Court, rather than Congress or the White House, took the lead on social policy. And of all the far-reaching decisions made by the Warren Court on civil rights and the rights of criminal defendants, Chief Justice Warren regarded their rulings on legislative reapportionment to be the most important. In 1962, Charles W. Baker and other Tennesseans sued the state, alleging that a 1901 reapportionment law was being ignored by the state, resulting in districts malapportioned by a failure to adjust to population growth and shifts (Oyez, Baker). the Supreme Court ruled in Baker v. Carr 6-2 that redistricting was a justiciable question under the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black with Justices Douglas, Clark, and Stewart issuing concurring opinions. Dissenting were Justices Frankfurter and Harlan. Frankfurter was sticking to his guns on refusing to intervene on political questions and Harlan held that the 14th Amendment didn’t apply to voting, as this was the purview of the 15th Amendment. One justice was absent, however. Charles Whittaker, who was struggling to find his own way on the court ideologically, finally suffered a nervous breakdown and his inability to decide broke him. With the stage set for a ruling to rule legislative districts unconstitutional, this happened in Reynolds v. Sims (1964), with the court ruling 8-1 (Frankfurter had retired by this point), when the Supreme Court ruled that Alabama’s legislative districts were unconstitutional. Justice Stewart concurred, but held that only obvious violations of the equal protection clause should be struck down (Oyez, Reynolds). That same year, another case, Wesberry v. Sanders was decided 6-3. This decision held that Georgia’s Congressional districts were a violation of the Equal Protection Clause (Oyez, Wesberry). Joining Harlan in dissent this time were Stewart and Clark.
Congress Responds
The decisions on legislative reapportionment, particularly Reynolds v. Sims (1964), were met with outrage by conservatives in Congress. That year, Congressman William M. Tuck (D-Va.) proposed a bill removing state legislative apportionment from the jurisdiction of federal courts. This measure met with initial success as it passed the House 218-175 (D 96-140, R 122-35) on August 19th. Although the vote fell on largely ideological lines, there were a few interesting details in the vote. For instance, in a few states, the most conservative of its representatives were voting against it. In Oklahoma, Republican Page Belcher and Democrat John Jarman voted against, and they were the only two representatives from the state to vote against the Economic Opportunity Act that year. Same goes for Republican Gene Snyder of Louisville, Kentucky. In Tennessee, Democrats Richard Fulton (Nashville) and Clifford Davis (Memphis) plus Republican Bill Brock (Chattanooga) voted against. A few Republicans it seems had overriding interests in shaking up the Democratic status quo of the states they were representing. In Alabama, the state of the lawsuit, only George Huddleston (Birmingham) voted against, as Birmingham stood to gain in representation from Reynolds. Birmingham had had 41 times the population of one of Alabama’s districts yet still only got one representative as it was contained in one county (Oyez, Reynolds). it faltered in the Senate. This measure attracted a lot of support from Midwestern and Southern states, the conservatives eager to curb the power of growing cities. Senator Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.) was a particularly strong opponent of “one man, one vote” as he feared that Democratic Chicago would come to dominate the state’s politics (was he wrong on that one?) and he proposed an amendment to the Constitution in response that would permit one House of a bicameral legislature to be apportioned on factors other than population, including geography and political subdivisions. Liberal critics condemned the amendment as the “rotten borough amendment”. The amendment was voted on in the Senate both in 1965 and in 1966. In the first vote, the Senate failed to ratify 57-39 (D 28-36, R 29-3) on August 4th, the three Republican dissenters were Cale Boggs of Delaware, Clifford Case of New Jersey, and Jacob Javits of New York. The latter two were the most liberal of the Senate Republicans. The only three senators from the former Confederacy to vote against were Tennessee’s Ross Bass and Albert Gore and Texas’s liberal stalwart Ralph Yarborough. The second time around the vote failed 55-38 (D 26-35, R 29-3) on April 20th. The only senator whose position changed was Montana Democrat Lee Metcalf, who switched from “yea” to “nay” between the first and second votes.
Although the proposal could have potentially been voted on in the next Congress, the Senate’s numbers weren’t much better for conservatives…liberals had a strong bench even for politically popular proposals. The push for curbing the court’s authority on legislative apportionment died down and especially so after Dirksen’s death in 1969. Now state redistricting is a regular subject of judicial review, and multiple cases make their way up to the Supreme Court.
H.R. 11926. Bar the Supreme Court and Lower Federal Courts Jurisdiction Over Matters Dealing with State Legislative Reapportionment. Passage. Govtrack.
To Pass S.J. Res. 66, a Proposal for a Constitutional Amendment Permitting Apportionment of One House of a Bicameral State Legislature Using Population, Geography, and Political Subdivisions as Factors. Govtrack.
To Pass S.J. Res. 103, a Proposed Constitutional Amendment Permitting Apportionment of One House of a Bicameral State Legislature Using Population, Geography, and Political Subdivisions as Factors. Govtrack.
The role of Confederates in American political life after the War of the Rebellion is truly remarkable, even if their influence could never translate to being elected to the presidency or vice presidency. One of the more prominent figures in postwar America was Roger Quarles Mills (1832-1911) of Texas.
Early Political Life
As a young man, Mills was an attorney by profession in Corsicana and identified as a Whig, which is strange when you consider his stance on trade in his time in Congress. However, the dissolution of the Whig Party due to both to their devastating 1852 presidential election loss and most finally the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 had him move into the American (“Know Nothing”) Party, which was common for Southern Whigs. Mills was as a Texas politician a defender of slavery and shifted into the Democratic Party in the late 1850s as the Republican Party overtook the American Party as the core opposition to the Democrats. Even before the outcome of the 1860 election he was supporting secession over the issue of slavery. That year, he voted for Democrat John Cabell Breckinridge, but Breckinridge’s support was largely confined to the South. After this loss, Mills solidly supported secession, and this position was highly popular in Texas including Navarro County, which included Corsicana. 94% of the people who voted in Navarro County’s public referendum on secession were in support (Putman). With Texas’s departure from the Union, he left with it, serving as an officer in the Confederate Army, participating in numerous battles and rising to the rank of colonel.
During Reconstruction, Mills coordinated the activities of Texas’s KKK, but as a very loosely organized group, he may have had no direct hand in its violence. As historian Christopher Long (2021) notes, “Members of every social stratum belonged to the Klan, though the more respectable elite usually shied away from acts of violence”. In 1869, Grand Wizard Nathan Bedford Forrest ordered the disbanding of the Klan, but the Klan continued into the early 1870s.
Although the 1872-1873 elections were a triumph for Grant and the Republicans, this was not the case in Texas. In 1873, Republican Governor Edmund Davis was seeking reelection and in Corsicana a big barbeque dinner was held with a politically and racially mixed audience with black policemen part of the governor’s entourage he delivered a speech defending his policies and advocating for his reelection. Stepping up to retort was Mills. Researcher Wyvonne Putnam (1988) wrote on the impact of the speech, “Paying no attention to the Negro police he broke into one of those extemporaneous speeches so typical of him when roused. He lambasted Davis’ administration up one side and down the other. Especially did he denounce Davis’ use of the Negro police. The crowd was taken off its feet by his oratory, and when he sat down they cheered long and loud. The Negroes, who as a race always know a strong man when they see one, were not a whit behind the whites in the applause. So taken back was Davis by the demonstration that he did not stay to partake of the barbecue dinner, but got in his buggy and headed for Austin. Largely on the strength of this episode Mills was elected to Congress”.
As a member of Congress, Mills was a loud and proud Democrat, and embraced the label of “free trader”, a label that even many Democrats shied away from in the late 19th century. He supported inflationary currency through free coinage of silver as did many Texans of the time. However, this didn’t mean that Mills always was voting the way his constituents wanted him to. He was highly principled and was an unwavering opponent of Prohibition, a position gaining popularity in Texas in the 1880s. Mills regarded many of its proponents as hypocrites, and in 1887, he delivered a speech condemning such a proposal, “Prohibition was introduced as a fraud; it has been nursed as a fraud. It is wrapped in the livery of Heaven, but it comes to serve the devil. It comes to regulate by law our appetites and our daily lives. It comes to tear down liberty and build up fanaticism, hypocrisy, and intolerance. It comes to confiscate by legislative decree the property of many of our fellow citizens. It comes to send spies, detectives, and informers into our homes; to have us arrested and carried before courts and condemned to fines and imprisonments. It comes to dissipate the sunlight of happiness, peace, and prosperity in which we are now living and to fill our land with alienations, estrangements, and bitterness. It comes to bring us evil– only evil– and that continually. Let us rise in our might as one and overwhelm it with such indignation that we shall never hear of it again as long as grass grows and water runs” (Putnam). After the 1886 election, Mills would become the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and it was there that he proposed his most famous (or infamous by Republican standards) legislation, his tariff reduction bill known as the Mills Bill, which struck at the heart of the tariff system that the Republicans so staunchly embraced. As passed by the House, this bill removed tariffs on wool, lumber, and salt and overall reduced rates by an average of 7%. Although justified as a necessary measure to reduce the surplus in the treasury (which was a problem at the time!), Republican opponents feared that this measure would constitute the first step towards the dismantling of the tariff system altogether (Ann Arbor Register). They didn’t have to fear that measure becoming law in that Congress though, as the bill was DOA in the Republican Senate. It was quite useful to Republicans, however, as a campaign issue, and they even mentioned it in the 1888 party platform, “We denounce the Mills bill as destructive to the general business, the labor and the farming interests of the country, and we heartily indorse the consistent and patriotic action of the Republican Representatives in Congress in opposing its passage.” Mills campaigned across the country for his bill, but Cleveland narrowly lost reelection and for the first time since 1872 Republicans won united government.
Mills for Speaker of the House
Democratic control of the House had had an interruption after the 1888 election but returned with a vengeance in the 1890 midterms, and Mills threw his hat into the ring to be the next House speaker. Although initially he commanded high support and even received enough pledges to vote for him sufficient for him to win, he proved overly principled in his refusal to promise individual Democrats placement in powerful positions in exchange for their votes. Another factor was that Mills had a temper and lost it often enough to give his fellow Democrats pause. On the final ballot 15 representatives defected and he lost to Charles Crisp of Georgia. Although embittered that he didn’t get to be speaker, the resignation of Senator John H. Reagan got him elected to the Senate the following year.
Senator Mills and Retirement
As a senator, Mills largely voted the Democratic line and passionately took up the cause of Cuban independence from Spain and was an opponent of the American form of imperialism, opposing the annexation of Hawaii in 1897. However, it was an act of loyalty to President Cleveland that harmed him in Texas, when he voted for the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act in 1893, contrary to his past free coinage of silver advocacy. Indeed, Cleveland’s signing this law was considered a massive betrayal by many rank-and-file Democrats, who abandoned Cleveland in 1896 in favor of free silverite William Jennings Bryan. By 1899, a coalition had formed against him with House Minority Leader Joseph Weldon Bailey (D-Tex.) and Governor James Hogg as key actors, which resulted in him not running for another term (Putnam). His DW-Nominate score, accounting for his House and Senate career, was a -0.471.
Mills retired from politics after and only became wealthy after oil was discovered on his property, which permitted him to live his last years in comfort. Four years after his wife died, Mills passed on September 2, 1911.
References
Barr, A. (2016, July 2). Mills, Roger Quarles. Texas State Historical Association.
I know I’ve covered some of this subject in an earlier post this year, but that was primarily focused on FDR’s precarious health in the 1944 election. This is a more comprehensive post that also covers legislative elections.
Contrary to the popular image of a united America during World War II, the 1942 midterms produced the least cooperative Congress President Roosevelt ever had…the unity of the American public was on winning the war, not on the smorgasbord of Roosevelt’s policies. Although the Congress was not Republican, one would be forgiven for thinking it was given how often it and Roosevelt butted heads. For the first time in the history of the United States, for instance, Congress overrode the President’s veto on a revenue bill. This Congress also overrode President Roosevelt’s veto of the Smith-Connally Labor Disputes Act, which provided a method for the president to intervene in wartime strikes in response to John L. Lewis’s United Mine Workers going on strike. Conservatism was rapidly rising among Southern Democrats, many who had previously been willing to give FDR a lot of leeway in his first and even second terms. Numerous New Deal programs were axed by Congress including the Works Progress Administration, the National Youth Administration, and the Civilian Conservation Corps. To make matters worse for Roosevelt, his health was starting to severely decline. FDR securing yetanother term would be contingent on how well the war was going.
The Republican Headliner
The Republicans selected a man who was a genuinely compelling candidate in Thomas E. Dewey. He was New York’s governor and had been the mob-busting district attorney of Manhattan. Although his past effort at the Republican nomination in 1940 had come up short, him being governor as well as Wendell Willkie neglecting to help with party building resulted in him winning the nomination. On certain fundamentals one could say Dewey was conservative; he reduced taxes as governor and was a strong supporter of the usage of the death penalty. However, Dewey was overall of the moderate wing of the GOP. His vice presidential pick, Governor John W. Bricker of Ohio, was staunchly conservative and governed mostly in the opposite manner that FDR did and enjoyed success in his state. Dewey was aggressive in campaigning against Roosevelt, and some thought that this hurt him on the campaign, which would inform his future thinking. However, he held back on any questioning surrounding Pearl Harbor, namely on what FDR knew before the attack. The GOP also embraced the creation of a United Nations while broadly criticizing the New Deal and calling for a reduction in the size of the federal government. There were lingering questions about FDR’s health, although he toured the country to dispel such questions, even though they turned out to be well-grounded in reality.
Ultimately, it was crucial gains in the war that proved critical for Roosevelt’s reelection, just as they had for Lincoln in the War of the Rebellion 80 years earlier. Many don’t realize that Lincoln’s reelection was in doubt before the Union victory at Gettysburg. Roosevelt’s message of don’t “change horses in mid-stream” was effective (Roosevelt House). The Dewey campaign, realizing that FDR was popular among soldiers and regarding them as subject to pro-Administration propaganda, challenged overseas ballots. Dewey also campaigned against, in an early indicator of the postwar politics, against Roosevelt as being “indispensable” to corrupt large city Democratic machines and to Communists (Jordan, 266). By the time of Election Day 1944, however, D-Day had occurred along with other major American military victories to the point that it was no longer a matter of if, but when Germany and Japan were going to lose the war. Although Dewey gained three states in 1944 that Willkie had not won in Ohio, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, this was far from enough and Roosevelt got Michigan, which he had lost in 1940. Roosevelt was held to his lowest percentage of the vote at 53% while Dewey got 46%, popular vote figures that contrast considerably with Roosevelt’s Electoral College victory of 432 to 99.
The House
The election in the House was a victory for Democrats, with them gaining 22 seats, halving the losses they incurred in the 1942 midterms. The elections with turnover included:
The defeat for renomination in the Democratic primary of Alabama’s Joe Starnes and John Newsome by Albert Rains and Luther Patrick respectively. This was a big win for FDR in the state, as Starnes and Newsome were antagonistic to the Roosevelt Administration while Rains and Patrick were Southern liberals.
The defeat of four California Republicans for reelection. This election could also be said to be the start of the Bay Area moving towards the Democrats, as San Francisco’s Thomas Rolph and Alameda County’s Albert Carter were among the losers. Rolph’s loss was a comeback for Democrat Franck Havenner, who had lost in 1940. Carter’s district would never again send a Republican to Congress. Los Angeles’s Norris Poulson lost to Democrat Ned Healy, but he would make a comeback in 1946 and stay in office until being elected the city’s mayor. Also defeated was William W. Johnson by Democrat Clyde Doyle. The Republicans did get one victory though in Los Angeles County with Gordon McDonough, who won the election after Democratic Congressman John Costello, who was anti-Administration, was defeated for renomination.
The defeat of four of six of Connecticut’s Republican members of Congress. Democrat Herman P. Kopplemann won back his seat from Republican William J. Miller for the second time (Miller would win it again in 1946), Democrat Chase Woodhouse defeated Republican incumbent John D. McWilliams, Democrat James P. Geelan defeated Republican incumbent Ranulf Compton, and Democrat Joseph F. Ryter would win against Republican incumbent B.J. Monkiewicz One of the two Republican survivors was that great wit and lady of letters Clare Boothe Luce, who prevailed by a point.
Delaware’s sole member of Congress, Earle Willey, went down to defeat to Democrat Phillip Traynor, the man he had defeated in 1942.
Four Illinois Republicans lost reelection in Fred Busbey, Charles Dewey, Calvin Johnson, and Stephen Day to Democrats Edward Kelly, Alexander Resa, Melvin Price (who would serve until his death in 1988!), and Emily Taft Douglas. Perhaps the sweetest victory among the bunch was that of Day, who was an extremist on foreign policy and represented all of Illinois. Busbey would win back his seat in 1946, lose again in 1948, and win in 1950 and 1952 before being booted out for good in 1954.
The victory of Republican Chester Carrier in the 1944 special election in Kentucky was made temporary by the victory of Democrat Frank Chelf.
In Michigan, ultra-liberal Democrat Frank Hook won his seat back from Republican John B. Bennett. Bennett would, however, win the seat back in 1946 and serve until his death in 1964.
Republican Daniel Ellison of Baltimore was defeated for reelection by Democrat George Fallon. Ellison was the last Republican to ever represent any portion of Baltimore in Congress.
Republicans Richard Gale and Melvin J. Maas would lose reelection in Minnesota to Democrats William Gallagher and Frank Starkey. Maas kept getting reelected to his otherwise Democratic St. Paul district due to the left being split in their votes by the Democratic and Farmer-Labor parties, but the 1944 election marked the merger of the two. The Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party would long-run prove a highly successful merger.
Republicans William P. Elmer and Louis Miller would lose reelection in Missouri to Democrats A.S.J. Carnahan and John B. Sullivan respectively. Sullivan was winning his seat back.
In New Jersey, Republican T. Millet Hand would win the open 2nd district, previously occupied by Democrat Elmer Wene.
In New York, Roosevelt’s sweetest victory in the whole House election would occur, with moderate Republican Augustus W. Bennet toppling Republican Hamilton Fish. Fish was the most public and hated of Roosevelt’s foes in the House, and Roosevelt had even wanted to include Fish (along with Clare Hoffman of Michigan) in an anti-sedition indictment. Republican Joseph J. O’Brien also lost reelection to Democrat George F. Rogers.
Ohio Republicans Harry Jeffrey, Edmund Rowe, and Henderson Carson lost reelection to Democrats Edward Gardner, Walter Huber, and William Thom respectively. This was a comeback for Thom, but Carson would defeat him in 1946.
Oklahoma Republican George B. Schwabe won the open seat left by Democrat Wesley Disney’s decision to run in the Democratic Senate primary. This was not that bad of a loss for the Administration…Disney had become one of the most anti-Roosevelt Democrats in Congress by this time.
There was quite a bit of activity in Pennsylvania in this election…
Republican James Gallagher of Philadelphia lost reelection to Democrat William Barrett. Although Gallagher would win his seat back in 1946, Barrett would take the seat back in 1948 and Democratic control would hold for good after. Barrett would die in office in 1976.
Republican C. Frederick Pracht of Philadelphia would lose reelection to Democrat William Green, who like Barrett, would lose in 1946 only to win again in 1948 and stay in office until his death.
Republican Hugh Scott of Philadelphia would suffer the only defeat of his career in Congress to Democrat Herbert McGlinchey but would come back in 1946 and keep winning reelection in the increasingly Democratic Philadelphia until winning the Senate election in 1958. He would stay in the Senate until 1977, serving as minority leader from 1969 to 1977.
Republican Thomas B. Miller lost reelection to Democrat Daniel J. Flood. Although Flood would be turned out in the 1946 election, he would come back in the 1948 election, be defeated in 1952, and come back in 1954. From then on, he would stay in office until a bribery scandal forced him from office in 1980.
Republican Robert Corbett, who had previously served in Congress from 1939 to 1941, made a comeback by defeating Democrat Thomas Scanlon for reelection. He was of the liberal to moderate wing of the party, but this helped him get reelected until his death in 1971.
Republican James G. Fulton defeated Democrat James A. Wright in a bright spot for the GOP. However, Fulton would be ideologically similar to Corbett and like him would serve in office until his death in 1971.
Republican Fred Norman, who had been first elected in 1942, was defeated for reelection by staunchly liberal Democrat Charles Savage. Norman would make a comeback in 1946, but his time in office wouldn’t be long as he would die only three months after his term started.
Republicans A.C. Schiffler and Edward G. Rohrbough would lose reelection in West Virginia. Schiffler was defeated by Democratic veteran Matthew Neely and Rohrbough would make a comeback in 1946 before again being defeated by Democrat Cleve Bailey in 1948.
Republican John W. Byrnes would defeat Democratic incumbent LaVern Dilweg in Wisconsin. Byrnes would serve in office until 1973.
As an added bonus, Republican Frank Barrett of Wyoming would win reelection against one Charles E. Norris. You thus might say that Barrett beat a CHUCK NORRIS!
Senate
The Senate was a less positive picture for Roosevelt and the Democrats, and Republicans on net gained a seat.
In Connecticut, the good year for the Democrats applied too with the defeat of Republican Senator John A. Danaher by Democrat Brien McMahon.
In Idaho, the Roosevelt Administration had a great win after Glen H. Taylor defeated sometimes supporter of the Roosevelt Administration D. Worth Clark in the primary and then won the election.
In Indiana, Republican Homer Capehart was elected to the Senate, the previously elected incumbent for a full term having been Democrat Frederick Van Nuys, who had died in 1943.
In Iowa, Democrat Guy Gillette, a sometimes supporter of the Roosevelt Administration, was defeated for reelection by Republican Governor Bourke Hickenlooper.
A victory turned into defeat for the Roosevelt Administration in Missouri when Bennett Champ Clark, a Democratic antagonist of the administration, was defeated in the primary only for his successor to be Republican Forrest Donnell.
The greatest victory of all perhaps for the Roosevelt Administration was the defeat of Gerald Nye, one of the most prominent opponents of American entry into World War II before Pearl Harbor by Democratic Governor John Moses. Nye was harmed by multiple factors that didn’t involve his foreign policy record including his fairly quick divorce and remarriage to a younger woman, regular Republicans remembering his largely pro-New Deal record during the 1930s and approving of the fiscal conservatism of Governor Moses, and the entry of Independent candidate Lynn Stambaugh, who got 21% of the vote. This victory was short-lived, however, as Moses was in poor health and died only two months after being sworn in. Republican Milton Young would be elected in his place.
In Oregon, the Roosevelt Administration certainly gained a victory, although not a party one at the time. Republican Rufus Holman, a former Klansman with a penchant for conspiracism who had before the US’s entry into World War II praised Hitler on the floor of the Senate, was defeated for renomination by liberal Wayne Morse, who won the election. Morse would be the most liberal Senate Republican before leaving the party in 1952 and finally switching his affiliation to Democrat in 1955.
In Pennsylvania, Republican Jim Davis, formerly Secretary of Labor under Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover until he was elected to the Senate in 1930, was defeated by Democratic Congressman Francis Myers.
In South Carolina, the Roosevelt Administration got a victory that they had previously tried for in 1938: Governor Olin Johnston defeated Administration foe “Cotton Ed” Smith for renomination. It was just as well, as Smith died before the general election.
Dewey would try again in 1948 only to meet his most infamous defeat, one of the most prominent upsets in American history with the Chicago Tribune’s notorious “Dewey Defeats Truman” headline proudly held up by the reelected Truman. Bricker would be elected to the Senate in 1946 and serve two terms as one of the most conservative senators of his day.
References
1944’s Fourth Presidential Campaign. See How They Ran!
I have written in the past about the defeat of the Bricker Amendment as an achievement of LBJ, but I felt this subject needed a bit of a deeper dive, so here it is. National sovereignty is a subject that has long greatly concerned American conservatives. This concern, in addition to extraordinarily bad relations between President Wilson and Senator Lodge (they refused to be in the same room together), resulted in the rejection of the Versailles Treaty. Another monumental event came quite close to happening on account of this concern, and this was the proposed Bricker Amendment to the Constitution. Over the history of the United States, the use of executive agreement has risen considerably overtime as opposed to treaties for convenience as the US has become a more prominent actor on the global stage (Lindsay). After World War II, there were several international developments that gave conservatives concern. The first was the Yalta Agreement, in which in addition to planning the postwar fate of Germany, Stalin succeeded in convincing the US and Britain that he would allow free and fair elections in Poland and contributed to the domination of the USSR of Eastern Europe.
Another was the UN Charter, of which the US is a signatory, which pledged members to promote “conditions of economic and social progress” and rights “without distinction as to race” (Time Magazine, 1954). This could be seen by conservatives nationally as international pushing for increasing government and by Southern conservatives as bringing an end to Jim Crow. The latter concern was bolstered by a Truman-appointed committee in 1947 suggesting that the UN Charter gave authority for civil rights laws previously lacking (Time Magazine, 1954).
Furthermore, the US endorsed but did not ratify until 1988 the Genocide Convention. One might think ratifying the Genocide Convention today to be a no-brainer, but there were substantial reasons why it was a cause for concern for the US at the time. One part of this was because of an expansive definition of genocide that included, “causing..mental harm” to members of “a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group” which Time Magazine opined “expressions of honest opinion might become crimes” (Time Magazine, 1954). This is an interesting early warning of “hate speech” laws that have been passed in numerous European nations and have attracted a disturbing level of support among American youth, who seem to have failed to account for who might be defining what “hate speech” is and the controversies that have occurred in European nations over such laws, such as the prosecution and conviction of politician Geert Wilders in the Netherlands for calling for less Moroccans in the nation. There was also the 1951 document authored by the communist Civil Rights Congress, “We Charge Genocide”, presented to the UN in Paris meetings in December that charged the US with genocide based on Jim Crow practices in the South as well as discrimination throughout the nation that had basis in this expansive definition, and claimed that US “endorsement” of racism and “monopoly capitalism” made this possible (Martin). Thus, the Genocide Convention could serve as at least an effective propaganda tool by the USSR, if not something worse for the US. There was also the UN Covenant of Human Rights.
The UN Covenant of Human Rights was a far-reaching document with Eleanor Roosevelt at the helm for two years in drafting. However, Time Magazine (1953) reported that there was a great deal of influence from Soviet delegates as well as from other dictatorships, which resulted in a dilution of “such natural rights as freedom of religion, speech, press and assembly by mixing them with highly dubious “rights”. Some of these “rights” would enlarge government powers instead of restricting them. According to the covenant, for example, the state is obliged to see such things as “healthy development of the child” and “environmental hygiene” and “the right of everyone” to a job, fair wages, adequate housing, education and a “continuous improvement of living conditions””. Desirable goals become state mandated, and result in both Big Brother and Big Sister taking hold.
The Treaty Power in General in a Postwar World
John Foster Dulles observed this potential danger in 1952 when he stated, “The treatymaking power is an extraordinary power liable to abuse. Treaties make international law, and they make domestic law…They are, indeed, more supreme than ordinary laws. [They] can override the Constitution…cut across the rights given to the people by their Constitutional Bill of Rights” (Time Magazine, 1953). However, only the next year he was tapped by President Eisenhower to be Secretary of State. By the time the Bricker Amendment came up for consideration, he came out against it, rationalizing given his previous statement that such abuses had not happened (Time Magazine, 1953). Thus, his argument as Secretary of State amounted to that the Bricker Amendment was seeking to solve a problem that wasn’t existing.
Time Magazine (1953) described the situation with treaties thusly, “In the 166 years since 1787, virtually the only limit put upon the treaty power by the Supreme Court is that a treaty may not “authorize what the Constitution forbids.” Even that limitation has been questioned. A circuit court of appeals declared: “It is doubtful if the courts have power to declare the plain terms of a treaty void and unenforceable”. Given that this was what the understanding was of the time, concern over the state of the treaty-making power of the Constitution is at least understandable. Worse yet, there wasn’t necessarily a dividing line as to what distinguishes a treaty from an executive agreement policy-wise. Senator Guy Gillette (D-Iowa) discovered this when he asked the State Department this question and received the following answer, “A treaty was something they had to send to the Senate to get approval by two-thirds votes. An executive agreement was something they did not have to send to the Senate” (Lindsay). There have been Supreme Court decisions that clarified this matter more since then. Speaking of the Supreme Court…
Further Concern: Troublesome Supreme Court Decisions
The American Bar Association considered the possibility of a treaty superseding the Constitution as “One of the greatest constitutional crises the country has ever faced” and urged the adoption of a Constitutional amendment to clarify the supremacy of the Constitution (Time Magazine, 1954). After all, in 1920 in Missouri v. Holland the Supreme Court upheld the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (for It’s Always Sunny fans, yes, bird law nearly influenced the adoption of a Constitutional amendment.) in a decision that held that treaties superseded state laws, the same decision in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. articulated the notion of the “living Constitution”, a notion contemptible to judicial conservatives. This decision alarmed many conservatives, who came to believe that the president could amend the Constitution by making treaties with other nations, thereby encroaching on functions that were otherwise reserved to the states (Sutherland, 1951). Two more that caused alarm and added ambiguity to the situation were United States v. Belmont (1937) and United States v. Pink (1942). In the former, it was ruled that an executive agreement overrode New York State law and in the latter, it was ruled that treaties and executive agreements are interchangeable (Lindsay). If there is such ambiguity and executive agreements are to carry the same force on states as treaties, why bother submitting a treaty to the Senate just for it to potentially meet the fate of the Versailles Treaty?
Conservatives Act
On September 14, 1951, John W. Bricker (R-Ohio), one of the staunchest conservatives in the Senate, introduced what came to be known as the “Bricker Amendment” for the first time. This amendment proposed three limitations on executive power on foreign relations. These were, as Professor Cathal J. Nolan (1992) writes, “(1) the Executive was to be barred from entering into treaties which conflicted with the Constitution; (2) all treaties henceforth would require implementing legislation “which would be valid in the absence of a treaty” (a so-called ‘which clause’); and (3) executive agreements now would be overseen – and could be rejected – by Congress just as were treaties”. Not only was the American Bar Association in support as earlier mentioned, but so was the American Medical Association. Both groups were at the time considered conservative organizations. However, the Senate had a Democratic majority and had it come to a vote, the Bricker Amendment would have surely failed. The 1952 election, in addition to electing Dwight Eisenhower, also produced Republican majorities in Congress.
With a Republican president in the White House as well as a Republican Senate, the time seemed right for Senator Bricker, formerly the Republican vice-presidential candidate in 1944, to again propose his amendment. Unfortunately for Bricker, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time was Wisconsin’s Alexander Wiley, a former non-interventionist who had since become a staunch internationalist. Wiley decried the measure as “the most dangerous thing that has ever been brought before Congress” (Time Magazine, 1953). Even worse for Bricker, President Eisenhower wanted the amendment defeated. He wrote to Majority Leader Knowland that he was “unalterably opposed” to the amendment as reported to the Senate Judiciary Committee and believed that it would “shackle the federal government so that it is no longer sovereign in foreign affairs” (CQ Almanac).
The “Which Clause”
Bricker’s amendment was weakened in committee to make it more palatable to the Eisenhower Administration, but he sought to restore its original strength by attempting to add Section 3. This, known as the “which clause”, read, “A treaty or other international agreement shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation by the Congress unless in advising and consenting to a treaty by the Senate, by a vote of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting, shall provide that such treaty may become effective as internal law without legislation by the Congress” (CQ Almanac). If incorporated, this amendment had great potential to cause trouble for a president who wished to have executive agreements with other nations not rising to the level of treaty. This proposal was defeated 42-50, notably getting votes against by some who otherwise supported the Bricker Amendment, such as Majority Leader William Knowland (R-Calif.) and Walter George (D-Ga.). Senator George brought up a version that although was weaker than the original Bricker Amendment, was stronger than the committee version of the Bricker Amendment. The George Substitute was now the central proposal.
LBJ Engineers Amendment’s Demise
I have covered LBJ’s role in greater detail in the past, but Senate Minority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Tex.) was privately opposed to the Bricker Amendment. He had presidential ambitions and like Eisenhower he believed it would hamper the president’s ability to conduct foreign policy. However, Johnson could not simply vote against it. He had to pull off a tricky act as Texans were in strong support, therefore he had to appear to support the Bricker Amendment while getting it defeated. His vote on this amendment was “yea”, but he managed to get a vote adopting the George (D-Ga.) substitute defeated by one vote. With this one vote, the Bricker Amendment had met its Waterloo. Senator Bricker was embittered by this event and blamed Eisenhower for its defeat. In truth, both Eisenhower and Johnson were the necessary players for the Bricker Amendment’s fall. The cause for the Bricker Amendment was largely neutered through the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid v. Covert (1957), in which a plurality found that although executive agreements could be entered by the president, they couldn’t contradict the US Constitution. Had the Bricker Amendment been adopted, it would have been perhaps the most substantial alteration to the Constitution in the 20th century. The notion of the imperial presidency on foreign policy would be firmly out, and the balance of power would have gone more to the legislative branch, as some conservatives have argued was intended by the Founders, but as others could argue is inappropriate on foreign policy. Historian Walter LaFeber wrote that with the defeat of the Bricker Amendment that the Constitution was “saved from the most radical overhauling in its history” (Tananbaum). The most recent legal development involving the treaty power was the 6-3 Supreme Court decision Medellin v. Texas (2008), in which at-the-time Texas Solicitor General Ted Cruz successfully argued that a treaty is not binding as domestic law until an act of Congress has occurred to implement it, that rulings from the International Court of Justice are not binding on US courts, and cannot be enforced without authority from Congress or the Constitution (552 U.S. 491). If there is a heaven (which I happen to believe there is), then surely Bricker smiled from above at this decision.
Differing Perspectives
Interpretations for the motives behind the Bricker Amendment vary, and this is simply because there were multiple motives behind the amendment. As might be expected, a 2021 paper out of Columbia University on this emphasized the racial cause (Glusman). But frankly, certain segments of society are completely and utterly obsessed with racial identity. There were far more people with motives that differed from those of the white South. This was, for instance, not the motive of Bricker and his fellow Midwestern Republicans…he on multiple occasions had voted in the civil rights direction while in the Senate, including for the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and against weakening it by a jury trial amendment, as well as against Senator Richard Russell’s (D-Ga.) effort to undermine desegregation of the army in 1950. Rather, he was of the Old Guard Midwest Republicans who were skeptical to hostile to internationalism and constantly on guard for America’s national sovereignty. There is, however, a degree of truth in this narrative as the amendment had strong support from Southern legislators. Indeed, only three senators from former Confederate states in Lister Hill of Alabama, J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, and Estes Kefauver of Tennessee voted against the Bricker Amendment as amended by George, and they were among the most amenable to the politics of the national Democratic Party. Looking back, it is ultimately for the best that the US addressed civil rights without any sort of international force behind it, as such an approach would have only weakened, not strengthened, support for civil rights as the issue of national sovereignty could have been introduced as a reason to oppose in addition to the existing argument of state sovereignty to oppose. Another perspective, embraced by multiple scholars, was that the Yalta Agreement was the central cause of the proposal of the Bricker Amendment (Tananbaum).
Glusman, G. (2021, December 2). The Long Afterlife of the Bricker Amendment: Jim Crow, Human Rights, and the Genocide Convention. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law.
Martin, C. (1997). Internationalizing ‘The American Dilemma’ – The Civil Rights Congress and the 1951 Genocide Petition to the United Nations. Journal of American Ethnic History, 16(4), 44-45.
Medellin v. Texas (2008), 552 U.S. 491.
National Affairs: The Bricker Amendment: A Cure Worse Than the Disease? (1953, July 13). Time Magazine.
Nolan, C.J. (1992). The Last Hurrah of Conservative Isolationism: Eisenhower, Congress, and the Bricker Amendment. Freedom and Security, 22(2), 337-349.
S.J.Res.1. Amend. To Committee Substitute Adding to Clause 2, Article IV, of the Constit. A Provision That No Treaty Shall by the Supreme Law of the Land Unless Made in Pursuance of the Constitution. Govtrack.
S.J.Res.1. Bricker Amend. Providing That a Treaty or Other International Agreement Shall Become Effective as Internal Law Only Through Act of Congress, But That Senate in Ratifying a Treaty May, by 2/3’s Vote, Make it so Effective Immediately. Govtrack.
Mad Politics: The Bizarre, Fascinating, and Unknown of American Political History 