Frank Church: Idaho’s Last Liberal in Congress

The year is 1956, and Senator Herman Welker is in a uniquely weak position. Although President Eisenhower writes a letter of endorsement of him, it is perceived as lukewarm, and furthermore he pointedly refuses to come to Idaho to campaign for him. In the world of politics, a lukewarm endorsement can be worse than no endorsement. Welker was a staunch ally of Senator Joseph McCarthy and not seen as an individual who could be relied upon by the Eisenhower Administration. Worse yet, as I covered in my last post, Welker’s behavior was noticeably increasingly erratic and his increasingly poor balance to many pointed to heavy drinking (it turned out to be a terminal brain tumor). Enter young Boise attorney Frank Church (1924-1984).

Church contrasted positively to Welker as well as the third-party nominee, Glen H. Taylor, who was extremely liberal. His campaign slogan was highly effective, “Idaho Will Be Proud of Frank Church”, and he also refused to engage in negative campaigning, rather contrasting his positions with those of Welker. Welker repeatedly voted to cut foreign aid and supported the Bricker Amendment while Church was an internationalist, Welker supported private power development while Church supported public power. Church was also greatly assisted in his campaigns and career by his wife, Bethine, whose influence was such that she would be commonly known as “Idaho’s third senator”. Although Eisenhower won Idaho convincingly with 61% of the vote, Welker ran 23 points behind him, with Church getting 56% of the vote. Something to bear in mind about Idaho at the time was that it was less conservative than than it is now. Democrats, for instance, from Democrat Compton White’s win of the 1^st district in 1932 until Republican James McClure’s win of the district in 1966 were able to win the district in all elections save 1946 and 1950.

Relations with LBJ and Ideology

Church’s initial relations with Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Tex.) were difficult because he voted for a Senate rule to curb the filibuster, and he was frozen out for six months. However, Church got back in Johnson’s good graces by agreeing to support two amendments to ease passage of civil rights legislation; the Anderson-Aiken Amendment striking the authority of the Attorney General to initiate 14^th Amendment lawsuits under the bill, and co-sponsoring the O’Mahoney-Kefauver-Church Jury Trial Amendment to require jury trials in voting rights cases of criminal contempt, although Church was sure to include a proviso that required such juries not be segregated. He would prove himself in the Senate as a solid liberal, strongly supporting most New Frontier and Great Society programs, such as the Economic Opportunity Act, Medicare, Mass Transit legislation, and federal aid to education. Despite his earlier record supporting limiting amendments on civil rights legislation, he would not support Lyndon Johnson’s (D-Tex.) maneuvering to limit the Attorney General’s authority for the 1960 Civil Rights Act and voted for all of the 1960s civil rights laws. Although a liberal, he was not without exceptions. For example, in 1966, he supported both of Minority Leader Everett Dirksen’s (R-Ill.) proposed Constitutional amendments counteracting Warren Court decisions, namely on state legislative reapportionment and school prayer. He also supported the conservative position on some hot-button social issues, such as his opposition to strong gun control, his support for a federal death penalty, and for restricting federal funds for abortion. Church sided with the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action 17% of the time during his career, while he conversely sided with the liberal Americans for Democratic Action 83% of the time. His DW-Nominate score was a -0.384. However, Church wasn’t a politician who merely catered to the political whims of his state.

Vietnam War Critic

Church became an early Senate critic of the Vietnam War along with Foreign Relations Committee chairman J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), and his stance provoked enough dissatisfaction with him in Idaho that a recall effort was initiated by conservative Kootenai County commissioner Ron Rankin, but not only did this effort get snuffed when a federal court found that recall laws don’t apply to US senators but it also backfired on Church’s opponents as many Idahoans came to sympathize with the senator. In 1968, he won reelection with 60% of the vote, his best performance, against Congressman George Hansen. Church’s opposition to the Vietnam War continued into the Nixon Administration, and he became a legislative leader in opposition. In 1970, Church sponsored with John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) the Cooper-Church Amendment, which if enacted would have blocked funds for US troops in and over Cambodia and Laos. While this amendment passed the Senate, it lost a vote in the House. Nonetheless, this was the first time that an amendment to limit the Vietnam War passed a House of Congress, and indeed, the first time the Senate had ever adopted a proposal to limit the president’s authority to deploy troops during a war. Church would also support the McGovern-Hatfield “End the War” Amendment that year, which if adopted would have set a timetable for withdrawal from Vietnam. He would get a successful amendment through in 1973 that he sponsored with Senator Clifford Case (R-N.J.) that barred any funds for further operations in Indochina (Vietnam), Laos, or Cambodia or off the shores of these nations after August 15, 1973. Faced with veto-proof margins of support, President Nixon reluctantly signed it into law on July 1^st.

The Church Committee

On December 22, 1974, The New York Times published Seymour Hersh’s expose of CIA operations attempting assassinations on foreign officials, and this plus revelations about the domestic surveillance program of the US Army resulted in the Senate voting 82-4 to create a committee to investigate intelligence agencies (The Levin Center). This committee was chaired by Church, and vice-chaired by Senator John Tower (R-Tex.). This committee was one of three governmental bodies to investigate such activities, and this included the Rockefeller Commission in the Executive Branch as well as the Pike Committee in the House, but the Church Committee was the most successful of the three. This can be in part due to Church’s approach of seeking bipartisanship as well as pushing for consensus. The Church Committee’s investigations uncovered numerous operations that constituted abuses of power or were outright illegal. The FBI operation was COINTELPRO, that had agents infiltrate numerous groups, primarily left-wing, that they regarded as subversive (The Levin Center). The CIA had multiple operations exposed. These were Project MKUltra (CIA mind control experiments with LSD), Project HTLINGUAL (interception of mail to the USSR and China), Project MKNaomi (collaborating with the military to stockpile biological weapons without executive or legislative authority), Project Mockingbird (journalists working for the CIA to spread propaganda), and the “Family Jewels” (operations attempting to assassinate foreign officials) (The Levin Center). The National Security Agency was also found to have their own illicit operations. These were Project SHAMROCK (intercepting mail coming to and from the USSR and China) and Project MINARET (monitoring with the cooperation of telecommunication companies of numerous individuals on its “watchlist” including Senator Church himself) (The Levin Center). The CIA also opened the mail behind the back of the US Postal Service, including the mail of that of prominent US politicians. One of these was presidential candidate Richard Nixon in 1968 (The New York Times, 1975). Nixon would ban the mail reading program during his administration. Also revealed was that the FBI from 1942 to 1968 conducted illegal burglaries at least 238 times against 14 targeted groups and individuals (The New York Times, 1975).

The Committee’s final report was unanimous. They concluded that “intelligence excesses, at home and abroad”, were not the “product of any single party, administration, or man”, but had been endemic from the administrations of FDR to Nixon and amped up with the Cold War (U.S. Senate). The committee issued 96 recommendations for change. Church would also that “The technological capacity that the intelligence community has given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there would be no way to fight back because the most careful effort to combine together in resistance to the government … is within the reach of the government to know” (Healy, 2013). Reforms enacted after the Church Committee’s conclusion included President Ford’s Executive Order 11905 prohibiting political assassinations, included the establishment of permanent Select Senate and House Committees on Intelligence for oversight, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and the limiting to ten-year terms of the post of FBI director so there couldn’t be a repeat of J. Edgar Hoover (The Levin Center).

Church for President

Critics of Church and the Church Committee asserted that this committee was a springboard for his presidential ambitions, and they weren’t necessarily wrong. In March 1976, he announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination. Although he won the primaries of Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, and Oregon, there was too much momentum behind Jimmy Carter and he dropped out. Church would prove to be of great help to the new president.

Church and Carter

As an important member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Church was the floor manager of the Panama Canal Treaties and worked closely with the Carter Administration, Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-W.V.), and Minority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) to get them ratified, as I had written about in an earlier posting. However, this did not mean that Church would always go along with Carter. He voted, for instance, to cancel the sale of jet fighters to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Another key collaborative effort between President Carter and Senator Church was the establishment of the Central Idaho Wilderness Act in 1980, conserving over 2 million acres of wilderness. However, this act was not popular in Idaho, nor were the Panama Canal Treaties, and the Anybody But Church Committee formed to defeat him in the next election, and Republican Congressman Steve Symms was their nominee.

The 1980 Election and The End

In 1980, Church faced his toughest challenge yet as he was up against the arch-conservative Symms who ran as a staunch supporter of Ronald Reagan. The election was very close, but Symms won by less than a point. With the departure of Church there left the last liberal to represent the state of Idaho in Congress and the last Democrat to represent it in the Senate, and he would practice international law after his term. Sadly, the fate of Frank Church bears some resemblance to that of his predecessor, Welker, in the sense that he would not have survived another term in the Senate and that he would die of a malignant tumor in his fifties.

On January 12, 1984, Church was hospitalized for what was discovered to be a malignant pancreatic tumor. Senator James McClure (R-Idaho) quickly introduced legislation to rename the wilderness established under his act “The Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness” so he could be recognized before his death, and it was signed four weeks before Church’s passing on April 7^th. The wilderness today is commonly known in the area as “The Frank”.

References

40^th anniversary: The act that created the largest wilderness in the lower 48 and honored an Idaho lawmaker. (2020, July 23). Boise State University.

Retrieved from

40th anniversary: The act that created the largest wilderness in the Lower 48 and honored an Idaho lawmaker

Church, Frank Forrester. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/1721/frank-forrester-church

Even Nixon’s Mail Was Read By the CIA. (1975, September 28). The New York Times.

Retrieved from

Click to access CIA-RDP90-01208R000100240073-7.pdf

Healy, G. (2013, September 30). ‘No Place to Hide’ from NSA, Then or Now. CATO Institute.

Retrieved from

https://www.cato.org/commentary/no-place-hide-nsa-then-or-now

Portraits in Oversight: Frank Church and the Church Committee. The Levin Center.

Retrieved from

Frank Church and the Church Committee

Reeves, P. (1984, April 7). Frank Church, a U.S. senator for 24 years, one-time… UPI.

Retrieved from

https://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/04/07/Frank-Church-a-US-senator-for-24-years-one-time/3877450162000/

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. U.S. Senate.

Retrieved from

https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/investigations/church-committee.htm

February 2, 2025 Fascinating Politics

Hells Canyon Dam – Private vs. Public Power

The 1952 election brought Dwight Eisenhower to the presidency as well as Republicans to a majority in Congress. One of Eisenhower’s policies was instead of public construction of dams, as had been the norm with the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations, that there would be a partnership between government and private companies, with government using private companies to construct and own the dams generating power. This proved highly controversial in the West, and the proposal for constructing the Hells Canyon Dam was at the center of this controversy.

Hells Canyon is a deep canyon between Idaho, Oregon, and a small portion of Washington, and has the snake river, and was seen as a rich source of hydroelectric power. The Eisenhower Administration favored the Idaho Power Company constructing three dams to generate power, but this met strong opposition from Democrats. Unfortunately for the Republicans, there was more opposition than that among the public. In 1954, Oregon Republican Senator Guy Cordon, the last conservative to represent the state in the Senate, narrowly lost reelection to Democrat Richard Neuberger despite President Eisenhower coming to Oregon to campaign with him, and one of the key issues Neuberger pushed was opposition to private power as opposed to public power, painting it as a giveaway of public rights (LaLande). After the 1954 election, Oregon had two Democratic senators for the first time since the Wilson Administration.

Votes on Hells Canyon Dam and an Alleged Deal

In 1956, the Senate voted down public construction of Hells Canyon Dam 41-51 on July 19th. Most Republicans voted against it along with several Southern Democrats. The 1956 election didn’t produce a different party makeup of the Senate, as Republicans and Democrats both gained and lost different seats. Yet, on June 21, 1957, the Senate approved public construction of Hells Canyon Dam 45-38. The senators who had voted against in 1956 but voted for this time were George Smathers (D-Fla.), Richard Russell (D-Ga.), Russell Long (D-La.), Margaret Chase Smith (R-Me.), James Eastland (D-Miss.), Sam Ervin (D-N.C.), and George Aiken (R-Vt.). The flip of five Southern Democrats was key to securing this victory, and Senator Charles Potter (R-Mich.), a supporter of a strong civil rights bill and opponent of public ownership of Hells Canyon Dam, alleged right after the vote that this flip was done in exchange for the support of Western Democrats for watering down the pending civil rights bill (The New York Times). Senator Wayne Morse (D-Ore.), a supporter of strong civil rights legislation and a co-sponsor of the Hells Canyon Dam denied the charge. Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), who had voted for both of the key amendments weakening the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and had co-sponsored the Jury Trial Amendment as well as the Hells Canyon Dam bill, denied that a deal had occurred. He stated, “There was never any understanding between Lyndon Johnson and me that I would take a role in the Civil Rights Bill or I would join in the sponsorship of the Jury Trial Amendment in exchange for his help on Hells Canyon. That’s pure fiction utterly without any basis in fact” (Gellman). Although this flip of the Southern senators is suggestive of a deal, there was a public explanation for the flip from the de facto leader of the Southern Democrats. Senator Richard Russell (D-Ga.) stated as to his own reason, “I happen to be one of the five Democrats who changed his vote on Hells Canyon. I did it because of the tax amortization feature which made it very apparent that the Federal Government was going to pay for the dam in any event. If we were going to pay for it, I thought we ought to have title to it” (Bill Downs, War Correspondent). Several senators who were alleged to be participants in this deal denied that a deal occurred, but historian Robert Caro gave this allegation credence as he reported that Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Tex.) masterminded this deal. However, historian Irving Gellman (2015) contests this, holding that Hells Canyon Dam had been killed in a House subcommittee before the vote on the Jury Trial Amendment. However, this counter-argument might be off as well, as the exchange, according to Time Magazine, was over the vote to send the Civil Rights Act of 1957 to the Judiciary Committee, chaired by segregationist James Eastland (D-Miss.), to undo Minority Leader William Knowland’s (R-Calif.) maneuver bypassing it. Indeed, the vote on sending the bill to the Judiciary Committee was held the day before the Hells Canyon Dam vote and numerous Western senators voted with the South on this one, with the five Southern senators voting for the dam allegedly in gratitude for the support of Western senators. Interestingly, Frank Church was not among the senators to vote to bring it back to committee, pointing to his denial being accurate that he didn’t make a deal. Although Wayne Morse voted to send it back, his record was consistent as a stickler for legislative procedure and he voted against efforts to weaken the bill, making his denial credible as well. Although several senators had denied there was a deal, Russell Long (D-La.) would give credence to the notion of an informal deal, stating, “Johnson put together sort of a gentleman’s agreement where about four of us would vote for the high dam at Hells Canyon and about four on the other side would vote with us (…) on a completely unrelated subject: civil rights” (Lange, 69).

Political Consequences of Support for Private Power

There were significant political consequences for those in the Pacific Northwest who supported private construction and ownership of the Hells Canyon Dam; although President Eisenhower easily won reelection in Oregon, Oregon Republicans got hit hard; Oregon Republican Congressmen Sam Coon and Harris Ellsworth lost reelection in districts that had been held by Republicans since the 1942 election. Coon’s loss was directly attributed to his opponent Al Ullman’s opposition to private construction of dams in Hells Canyon (Foss). Indeed, the 1956 election had bad results for Oregon Republicans by and large. That year, Republican Governor Elmo Smith lost reelection to Democrat Robert Holmes and Democrats won control of the state legislature for the first time since 1878 (Swarthout). In Idaho, Democrat Frank Church, a supporter of public ownership of dams at Hells Canyon, defeated Republican incumbent Herman Welker, a supporter of private ownership, in the last election in which a Democrat would defeat a Republican Senate incumbent in Idaho. Although in this case, Welker’s loss was attributable to more than that as his behavior was increasingly volatile and erratic, with him being prone to temper tantrums and bouts of depression as well as appearing to have poor balance, which included a public incident of stumbling and falling down airplane stairs (Hill). At the time his critics alleged that this was the product of heavy drinking, but the truth was worse: it turned out Welker had a brain tumor, and it would kill him on October 30, 1957. Welker’s strong support of Joseph McCarthy also proved a hindrance rather than a help by 1956.

Despite these political consequences, the Hells Canyon legislation being killed in the House subcommittee proved to be the final word on it, as the Idaho Power Company would later construct three dams on the Snake River.

References

Foss, C. Albert Conrad “Al” Ullman. Oregon Encyclopedia.

Retrieved from

https://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/articles/ullman_al/

Gellman, I.F. (2015, November 9). Robert Caro Gives LBJ More Credit than He Deserves for the Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957. History News Network.

Retrieved from

https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/robert-caro-gives-lbj-more-credit-than-he-deserves

Hill, R. Idaho’s Conservative: Herman Welker. The Knoxville Focus.

Retrieved from

https://www.knoxfocus.com/archives/this-weeks-focus/idahos-conservative-herman-welker/rom

HR. 6127. Civil Rights Act of 1957. Point of Order Against Objection by Knowland to Referral of Bill to Judiciary Committee. Rejected. (Bill Thus Bypassed the Judiciary Committee). Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/85-1957/s57

LaLand, J. (2022, September 16). Guy Cordon. Oregon Encyclopedia.

Retrieved from

https://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/articles/cordon_guy_1890_1969_/

Lange, O.M. (2017). “The Miracle of 1957”: Southern senators and the making of the 1957 Civil Rights Act (Master’s thesis). University of Oslo.

Retrieved from

Click to access MASTEROPPGAVE—Opplasting-til-print.pdf

National Affairs: Balance Tipped. (1957, July 1). Time Magazine.

Retrieved from

https://time.com/archive/6611890/national-affairs-balance-tipped/

Potter Charges Dam – Rights Deal. (1957, June 22). The New York Times.

Retrieved from

Russell Rejects Criticism of South on Civil Rights. (2024, February 13). Bill Downs, War Correspondent.

Retrieved from

https://www.billdownscbs.com/2024/02/1957-senator-richard-b-russell-rejects.html

S. 1333. Authorize Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of Hells Canyon Dam. Govtrack.

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/84-1956/s200

S. 555. Authorize Federal Construction of Hells Canyon Dam. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/85-1957/s59

Swarthout, J.M. (1957). The 1956 Election in Oregon. The Western Political Quarterly, 10(1).

Retrieved from

https://www.jstor.org/stable/444252

January 29, 2025 Fascinating Politics

The 1920 Election: A Massive Mandate

I’ve noticed these days that any win gets portrayed as some great mandate for leadership in a presidential election, both for the president and his party. However, there have been no elections that I would call a major mandate since Barack Obama’s win in 2008. Democrats expanded on their House majority and turned a slight Senate majority into one that could overcome a filibuster. Obama also won the states of Indiana and North Carolina, not ones that have landed in the Democratic column since. Since that election, wins have either been narrow or in the case of Obama in 2012, still having one of the House of Congress in the control of the opposing party. The 1920 election, however, was one for the ages.

Given the unpopularity of the defeated Versailles Treaty as well as a mini-depression that was occurring, it was nigh impossible for anyone to take up Woodrow Wilson’s mantle and win. Ohio’s Governor, James M. Cox, attempted it anyway. Ohio Senator Warren Harding’s call for “normalcy” resounded across the nation as the nation stood disillusioned with progressivism, tired of extensive involvement in foreign affairs, alarmed by race riots, strikes, and an anarchist bombing of Wall Street, and hurting from the depressed economy. Although old rumors that Harding had black ancestry made their way to the public, it didn’t seem to have much of an impact, and he won in a landslide, getting 404 to Cox’s 127 electoral votes. Only the states of the former Confederacy plus Kentucky backed Cox. The Solid South also had a breakaway in Tennessee, the first former Confederate state to vote for a Republican presidential candidate since Reconstruction. Harding could fully claim a mandate, especially with the legislative results that accompanied his election.

House

The House results were catastrophic for Democrats in the North, with Republicans, already having a majority, gaining 63 seats. The following House delegations became or remained entirely Republican after the 1920 election:

Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming

Pennsylvania was with one exception entirely Republican, and that exception, Guy Campbell, would vote like a Republican in the 67^th Congress and subsequently switch parties.

Outside the South and Border States, Democrats were reduced to 19 representatives:

Carl Hayden, Ariz.

Clarence Lea, Calif.

John Raker, Calif.

Edward Taylor, Colo.

John Rainey, Ill.

Adolph Sabath, Ill.

Thomas Gallagher, Ill.

Peter Tague, Mass.

James Gallivan, Mass.

Charles O’Brien, N.J.

John Kindred, N.Y.

Thomas Cullen, N.Y.

Christopher Sullivan, N.Y.

Daniel Riordan, N.Y.

W. Bourke Cockran, N.Y.

John Carew, N.Y.

Anthony Griffin, N.Y.

Peter Ten Eyck, N.Y.

James Mead, N.Y.

Guy Campbell, Penn.

The Urban Areas

Republicans had massive success in urban areas, particularly shocking being in New York City, where they won a majority of the city’s districts in Congress. This feat has not been repeated since and was achievable because Tammany Hall largely sat on their hands in this election as well as some of the left-wing vote going to Socialist Party candidates arguably cost Democrats victories in New York’s 3^rd, 7^th, 8^th, and 23^rd districts. By contrast, today the only New York City district that Republicans often win is Staten Island. New York’s 12^th district once again elected Socialist Meyer London, one of only two members of the Socialist Party to ever win a seat in Congress. In neighboring New Jersey, a Republican won a seat in the Northern portion of Jersey City, a feat that has only been repeated once since.

In Illinois, Republicans won all but three of Chicago’s House seats, although Chicago was considerably more Republican than it is now. Outside of Chicago, this election produced future House Speaker Henry T. Rainey’s only reelection loss.

In Ohio, Republicans won both seats in Cleveland, a feat they have yet to achieve again.

Ethnic Germans and Irish, usually rich sources for the Democratic vote in major cities, were hostile to the Versailles Treaty and to President Wilson. These groups had beefs with Britain, and yes, at that time anti-British politics were still something that could be capitalized on in the US. The result was many ethnic Germans and Irish either voted Republican or stayed home in 1920, and the Democratic machines that served these groups were not particularly willing to help the Cox/Roosevelt ticket. The degree of success Republicans had in the 1920 election in urban areas has been unheard of since.

The Border states were a disaster for Democrats too, with them only holding the staunchly Democratic 2^nd and 11^th districts in Missouri, the latter based in St. Louis. In Maryland, Democrats only won Maryland’s 1^st and 4^th districts, the latter based in Baltimore. In Oklahoma, Republicans won five of the eight House seats. The norm was for Republicans to only hold the 8^th district while the 1^st district, based in Tulsa, was highly competitive. The Socialist Party in Oklahoma arguably cost Democrats the 2^nd, 4^th, and 6^th districts. Kentucky was the only state in which things were fairly normal for Democrats, with them holding 8 of 11 of the state’s House seats.

The South remained mostly solid for Democrats, but Republicans won three seats in Tennessee that they didn’t usually win, putting Republicans on par with Democrats. The status quo of only two Republican representatives from East Tennessee would return with the 1922 election. They also won a single seat in Texas based in San Antonio, which they managed to win a few more times, as well as kept a seat in Virginia.

The Senate

The Senate Democrats took a bad lump, but the six-year terms of the Senate shielded them from worse. One retiring Democrat, Edwin Johnson of South Dakota, was succeeded by Republican Peter Norbeck, while 12 incumbents either lost reelection or renomination.

Arizona: Democrat Marcus A. Smith was defeated for reelection by Republican Ralph Cameron, making Cameron the first ever Republican elected to Congress from the young state, which at the time was usually strongly Democratic.

Arkansas – Democrat William F. Kirby lost renomination to Congressman Thaddeus Caraway, and in the South statewide the Democratic nomination contest was the real election.

California – Democrat James Phelan lost reelection to Republican Samuel Shortridge.

Colorado – Democrat Charles Thomas’s political independence resulted in him refusing to run for renomination with Democrat Tully Scot winning the primary, and then Thomas lost reelection as a member of the Nationalist Party.

Georgia – Democrat Hoke Smith lost renomination to fiery populist Thomas E. Watson.

Idaho – Democrat John F. Nugent lost reelection to Republican Frank Gooding.

Kentucky – Democrat J.C.W. Beckham lost reelection to Republican Richard P. Ernst.

Maryland – Democrat John W. Smith lost reelection to Republican Ovington Weller.

Nevada – Democrat Charles Henderson lost reelection to Republican Tasker Oddie.

North Dakota – Republican Asle Gronna lost renomination to Edwin F. Ladd, who won the election.

Oklahoma – Democrat Thomas P. Gore’s independence from the Wilson Administration cost him renomination to Congressman Scott Ferris, who lost the election to Republican Congressman John W. Harreld.

Oregon – Democrat George E. Chamberlain lost reelection to Republican Robert N. Stanfield.

The major gains of this election would result in many Republican policies being passed in the 1920s, but the extent of them would prove temporary as in 1922 Republicans would more than lose their 1920 House gains. Senate Republicans would lose seven seats. However, a Republican majority would persist in the House until the 1930 election and the Senate until the 1932 election, when the United States was in the Great Depression.

January 26, 2025 Fascinating Politics

The AWACS Controversy: The Reagan Administration and Saudi Arabia

President Carter had controversy over his sales of F-15s to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, but the disapproval effort failed in a bipartisan vote. Israel and its advocates in the United States were against this sale, which was seen as part of diplomatic efforts in the Middle East. President Reagan, however, took it a step further in his sale of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) radar planes to Saudi Arabia in his first year of office. This was, at the time, the largest arms sale in history to another country, and it attracted even more opposition than Carter’s sale had. Although Israel didn’t like this, they didn’t make major efforts against this sale since Reagan had offered the nation $600 million in credits, the sale of 15 more F-15s, and relaxing export restrictions on Israel’s Kfir planes (Bard). By 1981, Israel was the only strategic asset in the Middle East after the fall of the Shah of Iran, and the US was looking to strengthen ties with other nations in the region, and one of those was the oil-rich Saudi Arabia, a vital priority given the US’s oil troubles in the 1970s. Cold War considerations motivated the US to make such arms sales to Saudi Arabia as well.

The American public was, after the Iran hostage crisis, hostile to the sale of arms to any other nation, with 52% polled against any sales and only 19% of the public supported this sale (US-Saudi Business). The giving away of the Panama Canal, which had been politically devastating for numerous Democrats, had better polling numbers than this proposal. The opponents of this sale argued that Israel would face greater threat from a nation that had declared “holy war” on it, that this sale would not be effective in deterring any potential Soviet attack, and questioned whether the secrets behind the development of AWACS could be protected (CQ Almanac). This seemed an easy issue for Democrats to oppose President Reagan on given that numerous Republicans were dissenting as well. Senator Joe Biden (D-Del.), while acknowledging as valid concerns that US-Saudi relations could be damaged if the sale failed, saw the alternative as worse, stating, “I’m afraid we’re in a position here where we are limiting damage” (CQ Almanac). There were also fears at the time that the Saudi royal family would fall in a coup like in Iran, and thus the AWACS technology could fall into hostile hands. Senator Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), who had clashed with Reagan before in California state politics, cheekily stated “I would like to paraphrase the words of Ronald Reagan when he opposed President Carter on the Panama Canal issue. ‘We built the AWACS. We paid for them. We should keep them” (CQ Almanac).

Round One: The House

The Reagan Administration started to lobby the House to back the sale and they had not only the power of the office behind them but also the active support of all three living former presidents: Nixon, Ford, and Carter, although the former did some harm to this effort when he remarked that “parts of the American Jewish community” were holding up the sale and possibly “embarrassing and undermining the authority of their indispensable friend in the White House” (Bard). The Saudis had intensely lobbied numerous American businesses to support the sale, and they did. One event that had some potential to build support was the assassination of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat on October 6^th, which postponed the vote on blocking the AWACS sale and permitted Reagan to argue that the US was down a friend in the Arab world and that they needed Saudi Arabia more than before (CQ Almanac).

Despite the assassination of Sadat and the efforts of Reagan and former presidents, the House on October 14, 1981, voted to disapprove, and the vote was strongly bipartisan at 301-111. Democrats voted for the resolution 193-33 while Republicans voted for 108-78. Even some conservative hardliners in Congress who were almost always on board with Reagan voted for this, including John Rousselot of California and John Ashbrook of Ohio. Ron Paul of Texas was also another notable vote for.

Round Two: The Senate

Round one of this battle had ended badly for the Reagan Administration and it looked like the sale at the outset was set to go down in the Senate, as the resolution to disapprove had 50 Senate sponsors. Reagan secured the help of Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) to get the deal. Baker asserted that “Anyone who believes the security of Israel will be enhanced by reducing our influence in the Arab world is fundamentally wrong” (CQ Almanac). The measure also received the backing of Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Charles Percy (R-Ill.), who initially advised President Reagan to postpone the sale (Bard). The leading opponent on the Republican side was Oregon’s Bob Packwood, a moderate. However, the Reagan Administration went full on the offensive in securing support, including securing private meetings with 22 Republican senators and 22 Democratic senators. Reagan managed to persuade 14 of the 22 Republicans to vote for the sale and 10 of the 22 Democratic senators (Bard). Some of these votes were secured only the day before the vote, and in some cases, downright horse trading occurred. The Reagan Administration, for instance, won Senator John Melcher’s (D-Mont.) vote by pledging support for a coal-conversion facility near Butte as well as a letter of support for the sale from his predecessor and Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield (Bard). The Reagan Administration did not only offer carrots but also sticks in its approach. Iowa’s Roger Jepsen, who had been one of the Senate sponsors of the resolution to disapprove of the sale, was subject to the threat of sticks. The Reagan Administration painted a bleak picture of his political future were he to vote for the resolution, that he would be politically frozen out from the Reagan White House, especially since Iowa’s other Republican senator, Charles Grassley, had come to support the sale (Bard). However, horse trading and threats were not required in many cases. Arguments that Reagan’s influence and credibility in the Middle East would be damaged were sufficient for numerous Republicans to switch their positions (CQ Almanac). There were also some real consequences for Republican senators who opposed the sale. After Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.) voted against the sale in committee, he found out that an air force base in Duluth was to be shut down (Bard). The intense lobbying efforts, it turns out, did the trick. On October 28^th, the Senate rejected the resolution disapproving of the sale, with 48 senators voting to disapprove and 52 voting against (Mohr). Republicans voted against disapproval 12-41 and Democrats voted to disapprove 36-11. And just in case you were of the impression that a senator being Jewish meant support for this resolution, only 57% of the Senate’s Jews voted for it, with Senators William Cohen (R-Me.), Ed Zorinsky (D-Neb.), and Warren Rudman (R-N.H.) voting against disapproving the sale.

Although Reagan got his sale, he did not attempt more arms sales to Arab nations in the Middle East. Thus, although lobbying efforts against it did not prevent this sale, it did deter the Reagan Administration from pushing for more. Although there has been more talk about the Israel lobby since the October 7, 2023, attack from Hamas and the war that resulted, this is an example of when the Israel lobby didn’t get its way. Indeed, according to a study conducted by Mitchell Bard, in 782 American policy decisions between 1945 and 1984 Israel got its way 60% of the time, and when the president supported Israel’s position, it won 95% of the time, but Israel also won 27% of the time that the president opposed its position (Bard, 2009). The lobbies of Israel and its US-based supporters are indeed powerful, but where the president stands is of tremendous importance to whether Israel gets its way.

References

Bard, M. (1981). How Reagan Snatched Victory from the Jaws of Defeat On AWACS. Jewish Virtual Library.

Retrieved from

https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/how-reagan-snatched-victory-from-the-jaws-of-defeat-on-awacs

Bard, M. (2009). The Pro-Israel & Pro-Arab Lobbies. Jewish Virtual Library.

Retrieved from

https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-pro-israel-and-pro-arab-lobbies

Mohr, C. (1981, October 29). Senate, 52-48, Supports Reagan on AWACS Jet Sale to Saudis; Heavy Lobbying Tips Key Votes. The New York Times.

Retrieved from

Senate Supports Reagan on AWACS Sale. CQ Almanac.

Retrieved from

https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal81-1171966#_=_

The vote by which the House, on a 301-111 vote, rejected the sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. (1981, October 14). UPI.

Retrieved from

https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/10/14/The-vote-by-which-the-House-on-a-301/7088371880000/

US military business export to Saudi Arabia. US-Saudi Business.

Retrieved from

https://www.us-saudi-business.org/us-military-export-to-saudi-arabia/

January 22, 2025January 22, 2025 Fascinating Politics

RINOs from American History #23: Jacob Javits

In this series, I have for some time avoided a certain figure to cover, primarily because I wanted to make a bit of a long post on him, and now the time has finally come for an entry on Jacob Koppel Javits (1904-1986).

Born to a Jewish immigrant family in New York City, Javits’s background really was one that would have been expected for a Democrat, but he was a bit different. To rise up in life, Javits went to night school at Columbia University while working part-time and then earned a law degree from New York University. As a young man, he would become attracted to the Republican Party because of the reform politics of Fiorello La Guardia and would support his campaigns for mayor. In 1945, Javits would lead the research team for Jonah Goldstein’s Republican-Liberal campaign for mayor. Although Goldstein lost, Javits was recognized for his talents and in 1946 was nominated by the Republican Party to run for Congress from the Upper West Side of Manhattan. The odds were on their face daunting: the district was strongly Democratic and the GOP last won the seat in the landslide election of 1920, but Javits pulled it off and the unfavorable environment to Democrats helped as well. Javits to this day, by the way, is the last Republican to have held this district.

Congressman Javits

Jacob Javits was without doubt the most liberal Republican in the House during the Truman Administration. Although he backed the tax reduction and agriculture cuts pushed by Republicans in the 80^th Congress, he agreed with them on little else on the liberal-conservative spectrum domestically. Always a supporter of organized labor, Javits opposed the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act. He also was a regular foe of anti-subversive legislation and was one of eight House Republicans to vote against the Nixon-Mundt bill for Communist registration. Javits was also unfailingly internationalist, and would be so for the rest of his career. In 1948, he narrowly won reelection against Democrat Paul O’Dwyer, and he voted with the Truman Administration on nearly every question of national significance. He did not disagree with the liberal Americans for Democratic Action on any of the key votes they counted for their 1950-1953 ratings. This approach was popular, and he won reelection in 1950 with over 60% of the vote. Javits was also notably one of only two House Republicans to vote against the McCarran Internal Security Act in 1950, which among other provisions included Communist registration. In 1954, Javits sought the post of New York Attorney General, and in an election that was mostly narrow victories for Democrats statewide, Javits won against Congressman Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr. In this post, he was vigorous in his enforcement of the state’s Fair Employment Practices law to combat racial discrimination in employment. Javits served in this post until 1956, when he decided to run for the Senate as incumbent Herbert Lehman was not running again. He once again defeated the son and namesake of a prominent New York Democrat in Robert F. Wagner Jr., who had also won the Liberal Party nomination. The Liberal Party would subsequently back Javits’s campaigns for reelection. Javits was a beneficiary of the four-party system that existed in New York in the mid to late 20^th century with Republicans and Democrats but also the Liberal and Conservative Parties. The Liberal Party became a useful groundswell of support for Javits, with many voters of the Liberal Party strongly disliking the machine politics of the Democrats while wanting their policies.

Senator Javits

Javits would quickly make a splash on the scene, challenging numerous points of Senate authority including Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Tex.). He was also the most maverick member of the Senate Republicans during the Eisenhower Administration with the possible exception of the aging prairie populist William Langer of North Dakota. Time Magazine (1966) wrote of Javits as a senator that although he was “a member of the minority party and something of a maverick, whose abrasiveness and hustle have always barred him from the Senate’s cozy inner establishment, he has achieved rare respect and stature by force of intellect, diligence, and integrity”. To a degree, he let this get to his head. As Time Magazine (1966) wrote, “the public figure and the private man have fused and become virtually indistinguishable; his handsome wife Marion complains, only half in jest, that even at home he will not answer a question without clearing his throat and buttoning his coat. When approached by a streetwalker late one night in Manhattan, the Senator introduced himself, shook her hand and proceeded to solicit her vote. He loves his eminence and supports it with a sober single-mindedness matched by few, if any, of his colleagues”.

Senator Javits was a bit more amenable to conservative positions during the Eisenhower Administration than he was while in the House during the Truman Administration. Although he supported high-profile liberal causes, he supported several budget cutting proposals supported by the Eisenhower Administration and backed its efforts at easing price floors on agricultural products. In 1960, Javits voted against Senator Clinton Anderson’s (D-N.M.) proposal to institute a Medicare program, but he would support subsequent Medicare proposals. He retained his opposition to domestic anti-Communist measures and unsuccessfully pushed to end the student loyalty oath and non-communist affidavit, which were required for university students to receive financial aid under the National Defense Education Act. Javits also opposed all major amendments in the 1958 and 1959 bills on organized labor reform, which included requiring secret ballots for union votes, curbing “hot cargo” contracts, curbing use of union dues for political purposes. He was also one only two Republican senators to vote against the McClellan (D-Ark.) “Bill of Rights” amendment for union members. Javits saw the role of himself and his fellow liberal Republicans as charting a middle course between “those who ignore international realities and look back with nostalgia to the economic jungle of the 19^th century” and those who would seek “increasing control over the nation’s economic and social life” (Time Magazine).

The second term of Eisenhower proved Javits’ high-water mark of conservatism, as during the 1960s, he would be one of the strongest Republican supporters of New Frontier and Great Society measures, including anti-poverty legislation, federal aid to education, funding the arts and humanities, and rent supplements. Javits was also an unwavering supporter of civil rights legislation, and in 1965 he appointed Lawrence Wallace Bradford Jr. as the first black Senate page, and in 1971 in another first he picked Paulette Desell as the institution’s first female page. A member of the Judiciary Committee in the 89^th Congress, he proved a pain in the neck for its segregationist chairman James Eastland (D-Miss.) for his dogged persistence on civil rights. Once, when pressuring him to bring the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to a vote, Eastland stared down Javits and acidly said, “I don’t like you or your kind” (Weaver). In the following session, the Southern bloc would successfully pressure Senate leadership to reduce membership of the Judiciary Committee by one just to remove Javits. He then would move to the Appropriations Committee. Despite this and his aides recalling anti-Semitic comments from senators and their staffers, Javits would later in his career state, “I have never felt any anti-Semitism in the Senate. I should warn you, I’m not quick to feel that sort of thing, but not in my worst struggles with Dick Russell did I ever feel it. The Senate is an admirable institution from that point of view” (Weaver). He would also, unusually for a Republican, gain the support of numerous liberal groups for reelection, including Americans for Democratic Action. Javits had also been one of the Republicans to refuse to endorse Barry Goldwater’s presidential run. This was not the first time he had declined to endorse the Republican nominee, having endorsed FDR for reelection in 1940. Javits was also one of only two Republican senators to vote against both a school prayer amendment and an amendment permitting state legislative redistricting on a basis other than solely population. He also played key roles in drafting legislation for the National Endowment of the Arts and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Although Javits was not a direct sponsor of many laws, he was able to form effective coalitions with liberal Democrats to pass legislation and was able to influence how said bills were written (Weaver). In 1966, he set his eyes on the vice presidency, but he did not really have a chance to make it to that office in the GOP, not with his record. Unlike in 1964 with Goldwater, Javits endorsed Richard Nixon in 1968 and, despite numerous disagreements with him, would do so again in 1972.

Although initially a supporter of the Vietnam War, Javits became a critic, supporting both the Cooper-Church Amendment block funding of US forces in Cambodia and Laos as well as setting a timetable to end the war with the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment. His foremost legislative achievement regarding this subject was his leadership in passing the War Powers Act in 1973, an effort to reassert the power of the legislative branch. However, he occasionally supported a measure supported by defense hawks, most notably the Selective Service Act in 1980. As previously noted, Javits was often in disagreement with President Nixon, and he voted against unsuccessful Supreme Court nominees Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell as well as being one of three Republicans to vote against William Rehnquist in 1971. He was also less willing to back spending cuts backed by the Nixon Administration than he was under the Eisenhower Administration. However, on Watergate, Javits was highly cautious in his approach, contrasting with the public criticism issued by his fellow New York senator, Conservative James L. Buckley. He also publicly cautioned Nixon not to play “impeachment politics” by cutting his programs “to please a given number of senators: 33 plus one” (Tolchin). Javits had observed the Nixon Administration retreating on certain legislative programs, including his abandonment of the Family Assistance Plan, mass transit, and consumer protection. Indeed, President Nixon given his positions on legislation in his second term comes off considerably more conservative than in his first term. In 1974, Javits faced a difficult reelection but won a three-way race with his chief opposition being Democrat Ramsey Clark, LBJ’s former attorney general who had become a man of the radical left and had a long controversial career after of radical left activism that included defending Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein. Javits’ position in 1974 was compromised due to his Nixon connection as well as him not taking a leadership role in opposing the Vietnam War, and as one aide remarked, “If he had been running against anyone else but Ramsey Clark, he would have lost” (Weaver).

Why Was Javits a Republican Anyway?

Despite Jacob Javits being a maverick in his party and far more often voting with the Democrats, he insisted to the very end that he was a Republican. It turns out he had a permanent distaste for the Democratic Party of New York City due to the corrupt bossism of New York City’s Tammany Hall. He saw his father work for the organization, and he was disgusted by their practices (Pearson). Thus, no matter how often he disagreed with the GOP, he never considered switching parties. This is a complaint that today, at least applied to Tammany Hall is no longer an issue as Tammany Hall is defunct. However, to what degree at least some of their practices continue in major Democratic controlled cities is an open question.

Final Term

Javits was a true blue liberal as usual, and his status in Washington seemingly higher than ever after victory. In 1976, he campaigned hard for the election of Gerald Ford to a full term and watched the election results at the White House. That year, with the loss of James Buckley for reelection, Javits got a much more similar colleague in Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and the two closely collaborated. He also played a more prominent role in foreign affairs, working with the Carter Administration to produce the Camp David Accords. However, there were problems ahead for him, both politically and on his health.

Decline

In 1979, Javits was diagnosed with ALS (aka Lou Gehrig’s Disease), albeit an unusually slowly progressing version. Thus, he decided on running for yet another term in 1980. This time, the Republican Party, which had been getting more conservative as the 1970s dragged on, were not on board. Javits lost renomination to Al D’Amato, the vice chairman of the Nassau County Board of Supervisors. However, he was not out of the running! While he lost the Republican nomination, he still won the Liberal Party nomination, which resulted in a three-way race between him, D’Amato, and Democratic Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman. While the Liberal Party nomination had succeeded in getting Mayor John Lindsay a second term in 1968, this time it resulted in a split of the liberal vote, resulting in D’Amato’s election. The Conservative Party had gotten on board with D’Amato, and thus no split among the right existed. This outcome resulted in the decline of support for the Liberal Party as a force in New York politics, and part of why New York is predominantly Democratic today is that the Liberal Party no longer exists to throw a spanner into the works. When it comes to measuring the ideology of Javits, he only agreed with the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action 14% of the time during his career in the Senate, agreed with the liberal Americans for Democratic Action a whopping 85% of the time throughout his career in Washington, and his DW-Nominate score was a -0.124, exceptionally low for a Republican.

Although ALS resulted in his confinement to a wheelchair, Javits maintained a positive outlook, and in 1983, President Ronald Reagan awarded him the Presidential Medal of Freedom. It appears that Javits would have mostly survived another term in the Senate, as he succumbed to ALS on March 7, 1986.

References

ADA Voting Records. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

ADA Voting Records

Jacob Koppel Javits. The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers.

Retrieved from

https://www2.gwu.edu/~erpapers/mep/displaydoc.cfm?docid=erpn-jacjav

Javits, Jacob Koppel. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/4898/jacob-koppel-javits

Nation: Trustee for Tomorrow: Republican Jacob Javits. (1966, June 24). Time Magazine.

Retrieved from

https://time.com/archive/6629620/nation-trustee-for-tomorrow-republican-jacob-javits/

Pearson, R. (1986, March 7). Former Senator Javits is Dead at 81. The Washington Post.

Retrieved from

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/03/08/former-senator-jacob-javits-is-dead-at-81/f86e8a21-6461-431c-b766-f20dcc942401/

Tolchin, M. (1974, April 4). Javits Says Nixon Plays ‘Impeachment Politics’. The New York Times.

Retrieved from

Weaver, W. (1977, September 5). Javits’s Rise Slow but on His Terms. The New York Times.

Retrieved from

January 19, 2025 Fascinating Politics

RINOs from American History #22: Charles Percy

The state of Illinois is not exactly the friendliest ground for Republicans these days, but Illinois’ prominent Republican figures was Charles Harting Percy (1919-2011), who was a big name in Rockefeller Republican circles. His life before politics was a series of great successes. At the age of 30, after working for the Bell & Howell Corporation for several years (with an interruption for service in the Navy from 1942 to 1945), he became its president. He served for 15 years, and Percy proved an astute businessman, growing the company and multiplying revenues by 32 and the number of employees by 12 and making the company go public (The San Diego Union-Tribune). The Bell & Howell Corporation, which makes cameras, camera lenses, and other film equipment, still exists today. During his time as president, he became involved in politics, supporting President Dwight Eisenhower, who encouraged him to write Decisions for a Better America, a book outlining policies for Republicans to promote for the future.

In 1964, Percy resigned his post to run for governor, but the national environment weighed too heavily with Barry Goldwater’s unpopularity and his endorsement of him and he narrowly lost to Democratic incumbent Otto Kerner. The 1966 campaign would prove more successful for him. Percy ran against 74-year old Senator Paul Howard Douglas, long a prominent and principled independent liberal voice in Illinois. He benefited from a backlash to the Johnson Administration’s social policies, including support for a fair housing law. Although Percy also favored a fair housing law and civil rights legislation overall, some voters saw voting for him as a way to stick it to the Johnson Administration. Percy also received sympathetic support because of the brutal murder of his 21-year-old daughter and campaign manager, Valerie, by a home intruder. The case remains officially unsolved. Percy won the election by 11 points, and he was almost immediately considered a strong candidate for a possible future presidential run, with many seeing him as Kennedy-esque. In late 1967, a Louis Harris poll placed Percy ahead of Lyndon B. Johnson for the 1968 election (Clymer). Johnson was not the only big name who Percy was a potential threat. Richard Nixon thought him a potential threat in the Republican primary in 1968, noting, “Percy and Nixon are two to one…Percy has a good forum in Washington and he’s smart, but he doesn’t have a delegate base” (Chicago Tribune). However, Percy did not think himself sufficiently experienced to run for president, and endorsed Nelson Rockefeller. Nixon gave Percy some consideration as a running mate, but he did not land on his list of finalists due to him having endorsed Rockefeller during the primary. In 1968, he sponsored a proposal to permit communities to use federal law enforcement grants to recruit, train, and pay young people to aid the police in community relations, which attracted the support of many moderate and liberal Republicans. Percy was a rising star among Rockefeller Republicans to the point that he was considered a contender for the Republican nomination for president in 1968. His record in the Senate reflected his moderate liberalism. The Chicago Tribune (1985) wrote in a retrospective of his career, “As a Senator, Percy was good but not great. Early in his legislative career, Ralph Nader’s Congress Project described Percy as “one of the most diligent, well-prepared and effective men in the Senate””. Percy was effective in altering how federal judges were picked in Illinois, considering selection on a merit basis, to the consternation of Illinois Republican leaders (Chicago Tribune).

Like Percy did with many Republicans in Illinois, he also crossed President Nixon on numerous occasions. He voted against the nominations of both Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court, but he did vote for William Rehnquist in 1971. Percy also supported both the Cooper-Church Amendment in 1970 to pull out of Laos and Cambodia but he also opposed the McGovern-Hatfield “End the War” Amendment, the first to establish a timetable for withdrawal from Vietnam. In 1972, Percy decided to leave the Appropriations Committee for the Foreign Relations Committee, seeing this as a more optimal committee for which to boost himself for a presidential run. On the Foreign Relations Committee, Percy advocated for pulling out of Vietnam and in support of détente (Chicago Tribune). Despite all the talk of him being president, he only seriously considered running once, and that was in 1973 when he formed an exploratory committee for the 1976 presidential election. That year, Percy sponsored a resolution for an independent prosecutor to investigate the Watergate break-in and called on President Nixon to “tell the whole truth” about Watergate (Naughton). However, Nixon’s resignation and Ford’s succession to the presidency ended Percy’s presidential ambitions. He would instead endorse Ford for a full term. Americans for Constitutional Action regarded Percy poorly, with him supporting their positions only 34% of the time during his career, with him at worst backing ACA positions only 7% of the time in 1969 and 71% at most in 1984. The liberal group Americans for Democratic Action, on the contrary, found a good deal more to like about him. He agreed with them on the issues 57% of the time and his agreement ranged from 35% in 1981 to 79% in 1968. DW-Nominate scores him at 0.099, lower than any Republicans serving in Congress today. Percy described himself as “a conservative on money issues but a liberal on people issues” (Hawkins, 2011).

In 1974, Percy introduced legislation to make 55 miles per hour the limit for national freeways as a fuel conservation measure and this became law in 1975, lasting until 1987. In 1975, Percy recommended John Paul Stevens for the Supreme Court to President Ford. Stevens was Ford’s only pick for the Supreme Court. In 1978, Percy, at first thought to have an easy road to reelection, was surprised when relatively unknown Democrat Alex Seith proved to be a more formidable challenger than he thought. Polling had originally put Percy at 20 points ahead of Seith, but Seith embraced some hardline anti-communist stances and fiscal conservatism, which resulted in some conservative defections and a Chicago Sun-Times poll had Seith up by seven points in the week before the election. Percy had to campaign hard in the last week, airing a blitz of TV ads and using his own money to fund his reelection (Time Magazine). Percy pulled through by roughly the reverse of the Chicago Sun-Times poll.

Final Term

Although often a liberal on foreign policy including voting for the Panama Canal Treaties, he also tried to push through an amendment to make clear to China in 1979 that aggression to Taiwan would be considered against the interests of U.S. national security. The amendment failed to pass, but Percy’s pushing of this amendment was a clear indicator that he at least wanted to appear tougher on the international stage. The 1980 election would elevate him to the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee. Despite his chairmanship, his historical approach to foreign relations was considerably different from that of the Reagan Administration, and President Reagan often went to Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) instead for help on his foreign policy initiatives. Percy, perhaps seeing the writing on the wall of the party’s direction, was a bit more accommodating to Reagan Republicanism than he would have been in the past. However, he maintained a significant degree of independence, and in 1981 he spearheaded opposition to the construction of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, a project that Reagan had gotten behind and environmentalists had gone against. Ironically, one of the ways in which he did help Reagan harmed him when he sought reelection. In 1981, Percy had voted for President Reagan’s sale of Airborne Warning and Control Systems radar planes to Saudi Arabia, which supporters of Israel had opposed as a potential threat to the nation’s security. Percy also crossed Israel and its supporters the next year when he condemned Israel’s invasion of Lebanon (Broder). Due to Percy’s sometimes critical stance on Israel, he was now a target for defeat. It also didn’t help that Percy had once described Yasser Arafat as a “relative moderate” (Cornwell). Despite President Reagan coming to Illinois to campaign for him, the Israel factor as well as Illinois having a weak economy and becoming an increasingly Democratic state, resulted in his narrow 1984 defeat for reelection by liberal Democratic Congressman Paul Simon. Percy, like the man he beat for reelection, had served three terms. Percy’s loss has been interpreted by some as having significant future implications as it showed the power of the pro-Israel lobby.

References

Broder, J. (2003, December 10). The battle of the Mideast lobbies. NBC News.

Retrieved from

https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna3071599

Clymer, A. (2011, September 17). Charles Percy, Former Ill. Senator, Is Dead at 91. The New York Times.

Retrieved from

Cornwell, R. (2011, September 22). Charles Percy: Politician hailed early in his career as the Republicans’ answer to John F. Kennedy. The Independent.

Retrieved from

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/charles-percy-politician-hailed-early-in-his-career-as-the-republicans-answer-to-john-f-kennedy-2358670.html

Former Illinois Sen. Charles Percy dies at 91. (2011, September 17). The San Diego Union-Tribune.

Retrieved from

Former Illinois Sen. Charles Percy dies at 91

Hawkins, K. (2011, September 17). Former US Sen. Charles Percy of Illinois was ‘fervently moderate’. The Christian Science Monitor.

Retrieved from

https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2011/0917/Former-US-Sen.-Charles-Percy-of-Illinois-was-fervently-moderate

Nation: Percy’s Problem. (1978, November 6). Time Magazine.

Retrieved from

https://time.com/archive/6881366/nation-percys-problem/

Naughton, J.M. (1973, June 3). Percy Calls on Nixon to Tell Truth About Watergate. The New York Times.

Retrieved from

Percy, Charles Harting. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/11205/charles-harting-percy

Percy Endured and Endeared, But Was Nagged By Career as Might-Have-Been. (1985, January 13). Chicago Tribune.

Retrieved from

PERCY ENDURED AND ENDEARED, BUT WAS NAGGED BY CAREER AS MIGHT-HAVE-BEEN

To Agree to That Portion of a Percy Amendment to S. 917 Which Adds to the Stated Purpose of Grants to Improve Law Enforcement the Purpose of Recruiting and Training of Community Service Officers to Assist Police in Discharge of Certain Duties. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://www.voteview.com/rollcall/RS0900414

To Amend S. 245 By Stating That the Security Interests of the U.S. Would Be Threatened if Taiwan Were To Be Attacked. (Motion Failed). Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://www.voteview.com/rollcall/RS0960013

January 15, 2025 Fascinating Politics

The Battle on the Battle Act

John F. Kennedy, the man who defeated the Battle Act

By 1951, the Cold War had heated up quite a bit with the Korean War, and as part of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, a provision was included by Rep. Laurie C. Battle (D-Ala.), which prohibited foreign aid to any nations that traded with the USSR. Although this was accepted in the heat of the Korean War, over time internationalists thought that this tied the president’s hands excessively when it came to Cold War maneuvering. India, for instance, sold a small amount of Thorium nitrate to China in 1953 after a deal fell through with the US, prohibited under the Battle Act for receiving aid. India was a tricky nation for the US to deal with at the time as it was one of the non-aligned nations, and its government under Jawaharlal Nehru was left-wing, nationalizing many industries and subjecting others to tight bureaucratic regulations. Yet, India was not a nation that the United States wanted to make a foe either, even though they were more aligned with Pakistan at the time, which was with the Western Bloc. Multiple efforts were made subsequently to cut aid to India, including a successful one in 1955 cutting $10 million by a vote of 68-16 on July 22nd, and an effort by staunchly anti-Communist Senator Styles Bridges (R-N.H.) to cut aid to India by 50% the following year which was rejected 23-56 on June 29th.

Given complications with India as well as Stalin no longer being a factor in the USSR, it was thought that perhaps American aid to Soviet satellite nations may push them to break way from Soviet control. This thought was shared by President Dwight Eisenhower and Senator John F. Kennedy (D-Mass.), who sponsored such a proposal. The Kennedy Amendment stipulated that aid could be extended to these nations if the President believed that it would loosen the grip of “Sino-Soviet domination” (Time Magazine). This proposal was also endorsed by Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. However, Eisenhower could not wave a wand for this provision to come into law, as it had to go through Congress. Although it is true that many Republicans lined up to support Eisenhower on foreign aid, less were willing to support granting aid to communist nations, and these included the previously mentioned Bridges as well as Senate Minority Leader William F. Knowland (R-Calif.) and Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.). All three were influential and willing to vote against foreign aid cuts, but they were not willing to provide aid to Soviet satellites. Dirksen and Bridges had voted against Eisenhower’s nomination of Chip Bohlen as Ambassador to the USSR in 1953 as they regarded him as too accommodating to the Soviets and all three voted against censuring Joseph McCarthy in 1954. These three pressured Eisenhower with the threat of foreign aid cuts to back down on revision of the Battle Act, with him instead calling for the measure as a separate bill instead of an amendment to Mutual Security legislation. Senator Knowland’s motion to table Kennedy’s amendment prevailed by a single vote, and Eisenhower being on record opposing Kennedy’s amendment undoubtedly sunk it. However, President Eisenhower would back a separate bill to revise the Battle Act the following year, which met an easier time in a significantly more Democratic Senate. However, the House declined to act. President Kennedy tried again as president in 1961 with a separate bill that passed the Senate 45-36, but the House once again declined to act. However, the Battle Act itself was ended as the Mutual Security program was replaced with the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961 later in the year, and this measure stipulated that the president could provide aid to any Communist nation if he regarded it as vital to the security of the United States.

References

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2. State Department Office of the Historian.

Retrieved from

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1047

HR 11356. Foreign Aid. Amendment to Reduce Development Assistance and Technical Cooperation Funds to India. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/84-1956/s183

HR 12181. Mutual Security Act of 1958. Amendment to Strike Language Giving the President Authority to Approve Aid to Communist Nations Other Than Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/85-1958/s185

HR. 7724. Mutual Security Appropriations for Fiscal 1956. Committee Amendment to Reduce by $10 Million Funds for Development Assistance for India. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/84-1955/s74

Nomination of Charles Bohlen to be Ambassador to Russia. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/83-1953/s9

S. 1215. Amend 1951 Battle Act to Give President Authority to Give Aid to Countries Other Than U.S.S.R. and Communist Far East. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/87-1961/s36

S. 1697. Give President Authority to Approve Economic Aid for Communist-Dominated Countries Other Than Soviet Union & Those in the Far East When Important for National Security. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/86-1959/s210

S. Res. 301. Passage. Govtrack.*

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/83-1954/s271

* – This source has an error on the vote of Nebraska senators, it was Hazel Abel who voted to censure McCarthy while the hardcore conservative Roman Hruska voted against.

The Congress: Retreat & Defeat. (1958, June 16). Time Magazine.

Retrieved from

https://time.com/archive/6800916/the-congress-retreat-defeat/

January 12, 2025 Fascinating Politics

Power-Balancing and Peaceful Relations in the Middle East: Jimmy Carter and Military Aircraft Sales

The McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagle

President Carter’s foremost achievement in the Middle East is widely regarded as the Camp David Accords, but a critical part of the strategy of the Carter Administration in the Middle East was for the United States to be friendly with all the Middle Eastern nations that they could. After all, OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) had flexed its economic muscle in October 1973 with an oil embargo in response to the Nixon Administration and other nations that supported Israel in the Yom Kippur War, the US shipment of arms having been credited with saving the nation. This produced an oil shock in the United States that resulted in oil shortages and higher prices and ended in March 1974. The US thus sought to find ways to improve their relations with Arab nations while continuing their historic support for Israel. One of these ways was through military sales.

Israel had asked the Carter Administration in early 1978 to sell it 25 McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagles, but the Administration only agreed to 15 as well as 75 F-16s, which were less powerful models of military aircraft. Egypt was to get 50, and Saudi Arabia 60 F-15s, the total sale amounting to $4.8 billion (Hovey). Israel had previously been sold 25, so their total arsenal of F-15s would stand at 40 by 1981, when deliveries were to occur. The Carter Administration had in mind a balance of power in the Middle East with the inclusion of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. However, this was before the Camp David Accords and advocacy groups for Israel saw this arrangement as on net against its interests, fearing that Egypt and Saudi Arabia would use their F-15s against Israel, and campaigned against it. How the politics of the Middle East looked in 1978 as compared to today is a marked contrast; the foremost critic of Israel in the Senate at the time was North Carolina’s Jesse Helms (he would change his tune after the 1984 election), while liberals tended to be the strongest defenders of Israel. Liberal Republican Lowell Weicker of Connecticut issued a scathing critique of this new approach in May 1978, accusing Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski of exchanging a “balance of power” approach for a “world order” approach, and that Jews were an obstacle to this, darkly warning that “We know from history that time and again, when national leaders ran into difficulties, they found it convenient to blame their problems on the Jews. And we know what were the results” (Wald). However, Carter had more to contend with on his own side of the aisle in opposition. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), for instance, commented that “It certainly seems to be an ill‐timed intrusion into the peacemaking process” (Hovey). This measure also met the total opposition of Rep. Clarence Long (D-Md.), chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee on foreign operations.

Opponents introduced Senate Continuing Resolution 86 to disapprove of the sale, and there was considerable support for the resolution. In response, President Carter wrote a letter to the Senate, urging them to accept the deal, arguing, “The long-term interests of Israel are served by the proposed sales to Egypt and Saudia Arabia. It is in Israel’s interest to encourage the forces of moderation in the Middel East, and to promote their close relationship with the United States. It would not serve Israel’s interest if we were to fail to keep bi-partisan commitments, made by the prior Administration as well as by mine, to provide aircraft for the defense of Saudi Arabia. It would be against Israel’s interest if moderate nations are brushed aside by the United States, opening vast possibilities for the intrusion of hostile influences” (Carter).

On May 15, 1978, the Senate voted on the resolution disapproving of the sale, and they were persuaded of the Carter Administration’s position, with the resolution failing 44-54 (D 33-27; R 11-26; I 0-1). The conservative Americans for Constitutional Action counted a “yea” on this resolution as against their position while the liberal Americans for Democratic Action counted a “yea” as for their position. This was one issue in which conservatives and the Carter Administration were in accord, with Senate conservatives by and large backing the sale, and even some normally quite liberal people went to bat for Carter, including Maine’s Edmund Muskie and South Dakota’s George McGovern. Senator John J. Sparkman (D-Ala.), the aging chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations and 1952 candidate for vice president, came to the sale’s defense. However, a young Joe Biden of Delaware, who had been the first of the Democratic senators to endorse Jimmy Carter in the 1976 primary, voted for the resolution, as did Frank Church of Idaho, who would succeed Sparkman as chairman and had been a strong supporter of the Panama Canal Treaties. Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia would use their planes to attack Israel, as opponents of the sale had feared as a possibility, and Israel would make great use of F-15s in military operations. The Reagan Administration, interestingly enough, would have a similar controversy surrounding military aircraft sales to the Middle East only three years later, and would have an even tougher battle on the matter. However, that’s a post for another time.

References

Carter, J. (1978, May). Letter to Members of Congress on Middle East Arms Sales. Jewish Virtual Library.

Retrieved from

https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/president-carter-letter-to-members-of-congress-on-middle-east-arms-sales-may-1978#google_vignette

Hovey, G. (1978, February 15). U.S. Plans First Jet Sale to Cairo, Reduces Israeli Order for Craft; Saudis Get 60. The New York Times.

Retrieved from

To Agree to S. Con. Res. 86, The Resolution Expressing Disapproval of the President’s Proposal to Sell Aircraft and Related Defense Articles to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/95-1978/s797

Wald, M.L. (1979, September 23). Weicker Still Jousting With All Comers. The New York Times.

Retrieved from

January 8, 2025 Fascinating Politics

Jimmy Carter’s Most Controversial Achievement: The Panama Canal Treaties

In 1903, the US sought to carve an interoceanic canal in Central America, and negotiated the Hay-Herran Treaty with Colombia, which at the time had Panama as a province. However, the Colombian legislature rejected the treaty, and the US subsequently gave support to the cause of Panamanian independence, which was declared that year and recognized by the US, resulting in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which granted the US the rights to a canal zone in perpetuity, and Panama getting $10 million from the US as well as an annual rental payment. The Canal Zone that resulted was an American enclave in the otherwise sovereign nation of Panama, and tensions rose between Canal Zoners and Panamanians over the next sixty years, and this resulted in two more treaties in 1936 and 1955.

Cold War tensions in Central and South America changed the political equation, and on January 9, 1964, an anti-American riot occurred at the canal after a scuffle between American and Panamanian high school students and Canal Zone police resulted in the tearing of a deeply symbolic Panamanian flag. The matter of who instigated the scuffle is a subject of dispute to this day. The riot resulted in the deaths of 4 US soldiers and at least 22 Panamanians. One of the deaths of the soldiers was accidental, and among the Panamanian deaths, some were killed by Canal Zone police after demonstrators threw rocks in response to tear gassing, but at least six were killed in a fire set by Panamanian rioters. This event resulted in the Panamanian government breaking off diplomatic relations with the US, to be renewed only when negotiations were opened for a new treaty regarding the Panama Canal, and President Johnson started negotiations. Although an agreement on three treaties was reached in 1967, political uncertainty in Panama resulted in a setback. The talks, however, continued during the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advised President Ford that “If these [Canal] negotiations fail, we will be beaten to death in every international forum and there will be riots all over Latin America” (Department of State). Gerald Ford was thus in favor of relinquishing the Panama Canal during the 1976 campaign. However, Jimmy Carter signaled opposition at the time, pledging not to surrender “practical control of the Panama Canal any time in the foreseeable future” (Department of State). Despite Carter’s initial opposition, his advisors were for it, and they ended up convincing him to be for it too.

The Carter Administration finalized the talks with Panama, signing two treaties on September 7, 1977. The first was that the 1903 treaty was to be scrapped, that the Canal Zone would cease to exist as a separate entity on October 1, 1979, and that the US would turn over control of the Panama Canal by December 31, 1999. The second was that the Panama Canal would be neutral and that the US would have the authority to defend its neutrality with military force. Thus, the US sought to ensure instead of ownership in perpetuity, use in perpetuity.

Carter managed to get the support of Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-W.V.) and Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.). For both men, neither among the staunchest partisans in their respective parties, this was an early test of their leadership abilities, as this was the first session of Congress that both men were their party leaders. As Byrd would recount, it was his “trial by fire” (U.S. Senate). Baker definitely had a lot more to lose; he was up for reelection in 1978, and he had presidential aspirations for 1980. Byrd, on the other hand, had been reelected in 1976. The political establishment of Washington faced major headwinds over this issue; 38 senators signaled their opposition to the Panama Canal Treaty, and public opinion was against, with only 23% of Americans supporting while 50% opposed. Ronald Reagan strongly opposed the treaties, famously stating, “We bought it, we paid for it, it’s ours, and we’re going to keep it” (Lindsay). He had also used this issue against Gerald Ford in the 1976 Republican primary, and Reagan had come close to winning. The Senate’s top opponent was James B. Allen (D-Ala.), an ally of George Wallace who frequently championed conservative causes and had even received one vote for vice president at the 1976 Republican National Convention. Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) declared that “The loss of this canal would contribute to the encirclement of the United States” (Department of State). Indeed, conservative legislators were suspicious of Panamanian dictator Omar Torrijos, who was thought to be favorable to communism.

Although 38 senators signaled their opposition to the Panama Canal Treaty, Democrat Ed Zorinsky, the first to be elected to the Senate from Nebraska since the Great Depression, indicated his private support for the treaty, but that Nebraskans were strongly opposed and that he would only vote for it if President Carter could convince Nebraskans to support it. Carter, Byrd, and Baker proceeded to lobby senators, and for the first time in the Senate’s history, the proceedings of the Senate for the treaty debate were live on radio in an effort to educate the public on the treaty (U.S. Senate). They also got support from a few unexpected people: famously conservative actor John Wayne as well as National Review’s William F. Buckley Jr. came out in favor of the treaties. Wayne was a friend of General Omar Torrijos, and accused Reagan of misinforming people in his arguments (Lindsay). One of the senators who played a significant role in trying to shape the treaty in the Senate was Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.). Arizona didn’t typically elect Democrats, and DeConcini’s election in 1976 had been the product of an unusually bitter Republican primary. He thus sought to add language that would make his vote in favor easier for him to explain to his conservative constituents, and proposed a reservation giving the United States the explicit right to use military force to defend the Panama Canal, which threatened Panamanian support for the treaty. Ultimately, this reservation was adopted but with language added that nothing in the treaty was to be “interpreted as a right” of intervention in the domestic affairs of Panama (Time Magazine). Senator Ed Brooke (R-Mass.) sought and got some minor technical reservations to the treaty, winning his vote. A senator with a bit of a different angle on this matter was James Abourezk (D-S.D.). Abourezk, who was staunchly liberal, was not actually against the treaty, but wanted to make a deal with President Carter that he would vote for the treaty if he would veto a bill deregulating natural gas, but Carter was not inclined to be cutting deals (Time Magazine). A senator the Carter Administration hotly pursued was California’s Republican S.I. Hayakawa. Hayakawa was an interesting fellow to say the least, and he had in his 1976 campaign said regarding the canal that we “stole it fair and square” (Lindsay). However, he turned out to be persuadable and Carter buttered up his ego by voicing an eagerness to consult Hayakawa on foreign policy regularly. He came to support the treaties, and, contrary to a budding consultative partnership forming, neither man spoke to the other again. One senator who was in a difficult position was Byrd’s West Virginia colleague, Jennings Randolph. Randolph was well into his seventies, and he was facing a tough reelection, with Republicans having recruited their strongest candidate yet against him in Governor Arch Moore. He was one of three or four senators would only vote for if his vote was needed, and it turns out it wasn’t. He would narrowly survive his reelection in 1978. The vote on the Neutrality Treaty on March 16th was 68-32 (D 52-9; R 16-22; I 0-1).

https://voteview.com/rollcall/RS0950702

This would be followed up with an identical vote for the Panama Canal Treaty on April 18^th. This was one more vote than was needed to ratify, and although this vote was close, the pro-side actually had three to four more senators they could have flipped if their votes were needed. This would be Senator Allen’s last battle; he died less than two months after Senate ratification of a heart attack on June 1^st.

The Fight Over Funding and Consequences for Pro-Treaty Senators

This was a tough vote, and the battle wasn’t over. Congress had to approve funds to implement the Panama Canal Treaties, and by the time Congress was considering the measure, a midterm had occurred. While it wasn’t too shabby for Carter and the Democrats given the history of midterms, he nonetheless faced a less friendly Congress, and there had been senators who lost reelection at least in part over their vote for the Panama Canal Treaties. These included Democrats Floyd Haskell of Colorado, Dick Clark of Iowa, William Hathaway of Maine, Wendell Anderson of Minnesota, and Thomas J. McIntyre of New Hampshire. Republican Clifford Case of New Jersey, long a frequent dissenter from Republican positions, lost renomination to anti-tax activist Jeffrey Bell. This would also contribute to the Republican sweep of the Senate in 1980, with pro-treaty senators Herman Talmadge of Georgia (although his segregationist past and his censure for ethics violations hurt him more), John Culver of Iowa, John A. Durkin of New Hampshire, and Robert B. Morgan of North Carolina. Perhaps the most notable loss among the Democrats up for 1980, though, was Frank Church of Idaho, who had been the floor manager of the treaties and lost to Congressman Steve Symms, an ultra-conservative who was critical of the treaties. Minority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), however, managed to handily win his bid for a third term in 1978, but his leadership on the Panama Canal Treaties cost him any hope of winning a Republican nomination for president. The vote to implement the Panama Canal Treaties lacked the need for the 2/3’s majority the treaties had, and indeed it fell just short of 2/3’s when the Senate voted for it 63-32 on September 25, 1979. However, it also had to be approved by the House unlike with the treaties, and the House was a bit less persuadable. Congressman John Dingell (D-Mich.), for instance, was far from receptive, stating, “We in the House are tired of you people in the State Department going to your tea-sipping friends in the Senate. Now you good folks come up here and say you need legislation [to implement the treaties] after you ignored the House. If you expect me to vote for this travesty, you’re sorely in error” (Lindsay). Adoption of the conference report was on a narrower margin of 232-188 the following day, with President Carter signing the law on the day after. Carter said in his statement on signing the Panama Canal Act into law that the treaties “express the commitment of the United States to the belief that fairness, and not force, should lie at the heart of our dealings with the nations of the world” (The American Presidency Project).

Although a staunch opponent of the Panama Canal Treaties had been elected to the presidency in Ronald Reagan, he did not attempt to undo the treaties…he had enough on his plate in Central America with the situations in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Although many analysts regard the Panama Canal Treaties as a success given the fears of what would happen if they were not ratified, there are still issues surrounding the canal, notably China’s growing influence through the subsidiary of a Chinese business managing two ports and Chinese businesses funding the construction of a new bridge over the canal.

References

Lindsay, J.M. (2011, March 16). TWE Remembers: The Fight over the Panama Canal Treaties. Council on Foreign Relations.

Retrieved from

https://www.cfr.org/blog/twe-remembers-fight-over-panama-canal-treaties

Nation: How the Treaty Was Saved. (1978, May 1). Time Magazine.

Retrieved from

https://time.com/archive/6853512/nation-how-the-treaty-was-saved/

Panama Canal Act of 1979 Statement on Signing H.R. 111 Into Law. The American Presidency Project.

Retrieved from

https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/panama-canal-act-1979-statement-signing-hr-111-into-law

Senate Leaders and the Panama Canal Treaties. United States Senate.

Retrieved from

https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/treaties/senate-leaders-and-the-panama-canal-treaties.htm

The Panama Canal and the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. Department of State.

Retrieved from

https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/panama-canal#:~:text=One%20of%20President%20Jimmy%20Carter%27s,control%20of%20the%20Panama%20Canal.

January 5, 2025 Fascinating Politics

Differing Interpretations of Jimmy Carter’s Record

Although many obituaries on Jimmy Carter are laudatory, he is generally much better regarded for his post-presidency than his presidency. President Carter had an interesting way about him in being a source of dissatisfaction for both conservatives and liberals, although considerably more for the former than the latter. While obviously liberals would prefer his policies to those of his successor, the characterization of Carter as a liberal Democrat does have some contesting from them, and dissatisfaction with Carter was sufficient for Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) to challenge him for renomination in 1980. One article that caught my eye was that from liberal columnist Timothy Noah writing for Politico, who regards labeling Carter as a liberal a mistake, and although the headline of his article seems to point to Carter being labeled a conservative, he gets labeled instead a liberal Southerner within the article. However, this seems to be considered some form of conservatism, although a lesser form than practiced by the GOP. Liberals not counting Carter as one of their own does have a degree of basis in one of the three standards I like to use in examining politicians, Americans for Democratic Action. ADA finds Carter to have embraced their position on issues 75% of the time, with him at lowest embracing their positions 63% of the time in the Senate in 1979 and at highest, the House in the same year at 90%. Although clearly backing what ADA regards as the “liberal” position 3 in 4 times is not acceptable to conservatives, it also unsatisfactory for liberals. One notable issue in which Carter sided with conservatives was in the retaining of the Hyde Amendment in 1977, a big no-no for contemporary Democrats. Interestingly, Carter by his own admission related better to Southern Democrats and Republicans than he did his liberal allies, who voted with him more (Noah). This is similar to Lyndon B. Johnson when he was Senate Majority Leader. Although he was much more with liberals in how he voted than conservatives and he would prove even more liberal in his presidency, his personal relations with liberals were testier than his chummy relations with fellow Southern Democrats. What this translates to, however, is that liberals largely get the wheat and conservatives largely get the chaff. Carter agrees with Americans for Constitutional Action, ADA’s conservative counterpart, 13% of the time. However, there are a few interesting aspects to this judging of Carter, including on three occasions ADA and ACA taking the same position on an issue! This occurred twice for the Senate in 1980, when both ADA and ACA objected to Senator Dan Moynihan’s (D-N.Y.) proposal for federal funds for private school tuitions and supported Senator Jake Garn’s (R-Utah) amendment maintaining the status quo for housing instead of a new housing subsidy program. President Carter was on the same page as both organizations. In the House that year, both ADA and ACA approved of Representative Samuel Devine’s (R-Ohio) motion to recommit and thus kill the bill establishing the Energy Mobilization Board. This board, if put in place, would have empowered the president to override environmental laws on a federal, state and local level. While overturning environmental laws might appeal to conservatives eager to promote development for economic growth, the full implications of what this could establish for federalism (meaning proper relations between the federal government and states) became clear to most by 1980. Liberal Democrats found this objectionable for two reasons. The first is the environmental angle, and the second was the very real possibility at the time that came true that the next president would be Ronald Reagan. Contrary to the position of both organizations, Jimmy Carter opposed killing the bill. I always find these incidents in which on major issues the most conservative and the most liberal people align to be fascinating. Those weren’t the only votes ADA counted that are questionable from an ideological standpoint. Counting the vote for lifting controls on gas by 1985 is questionable given that many conservatives opposed the proposal as too long retaining controls, and senators from the oil-rich Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas were against. If anything, this vote is a vote of the political center against the strong left and right. It should also be noted that DW-Nominate gives Jimmy Carter a score of -0.504, which is quite liberal indeed! However, it should be noted that I’ve noticed that the ideological bent of presidents does seem exaggerated by this standard and this is because presidents don’t weigh in on every or sometimes even a lot of issues that Congress votes on that have ideological salience. I will proceed with examining Carter’s stances on the issues of his time.

Foreign Policy

Jimmy Carter was a supporter of the postwar consensus surrounding foreign aid, backing foreign aid bills and he also sought to present to the world you might say a kinder, gentler United States. He supported sanctions for the white minority ruled Rhodesia in 1977 and opposed lifting them to support the government of the black majority government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa elected in 1979, opening the path for China-backed Robert Mugabe’s election in an election fraught with violence in 1980. Mugabe, although considered a symbol of Pan-Africanism, brought Zimbabwe to ruin with his economic and social policies. Although many people point to the Camp David Accords, normalizing relations between Israel and Egypt, as a great accomplishment of the Carter Administration, the more consequential action of his was the Panama Canal Treaties. The first treaty scrapped the old 1903 treaty that granted the US rights in perpetuity over the canal, instead turning over control to Panama by December 31, 1999, and the second was the neutrality treaty, which mandated that the canal be neutral and that the US was authorized to militarily intervene to enforce neutrality. Carter also ceased support to the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, which allowed the Marxist Sandinistas to have a successful coup and he then supported providing aid to the new government. Carter also dropped support for the Shah of Iran in the fall of 1978 after Black Friday, in which 88 religious demonstrators were gunned down for failing to disperse, and the national strike of October which shut down the nation’s petroleum industry. Unlike Rhodesia, Nicaragua, and the Panama Canal Treaties, there was no Congressional vote regarding the situation in Iran.

Domestic Policy

Carter was fairly strong with liberals on domestic policy. He supported the creation of the Department of Education, opposed weakening an increase in the minimum wage, opposed maintaining the requirement that food stamp recipients pay for part of it, supported a windfall profits tax, supported retaining the 1969 credit control law, and backed conservation measures reserving lands in Alaska, California, and Idaho for national parks and wildlife refuges. Carter also backed a set of mandatory and voluntary price controls for the healthcare industry in response to inflation, which died in Congress. He opposed conservative efforts to end price controls on natural gas in 1977 on new onshore that year and new offshore by 1982, instead supporting a compromise proposal the following year to end price controls on all newly discovered gas by 1985. Although Carter indicated support for budget reductions, he opposed several conservative proposals at budget reduction and budget balancing. Although Carter supported trucking deregulation and opposed an effort by Senator Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.) to weaken it with an amendment placing a “burden of proof” on applicants for a trucking certificate to demonstrate that their proposed service works towards present or future public needs, he also opposed allowing Congress to check the executive on this matter by having the ability to vote to overturn regulations that might stem from the legislation. Carter was also opposed to efforts to end gas rationing and supported bailing out the Chrysler Corporation. Carter did oppose a consumer co-op bank bill in 1977, but backed a subsequent proposal. Despite being portrayed as a fiscal conservative, Carter backed Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert Giamo’s (D-Conn.) budget for fiscal year 1981 increasing the deficit.

Jimmy Carter on Civil Rights and Women’s Rights

Carter supported strengthening the fair housing act in a way that gave authority for enforcement to administrative law judges instead of jury trials and supported the Equal Rights Amendment, with the latter he signed into law the measure extending the deadline for its ratification to 1982, but no additional states ratified between then and the deadline. Ronald Reagan had supported the ERA while California’s governor but by 1980 he had turned against it, and Reagan would sign a measure strengthening the fair housing act that provided for jury trials for violations in 1988.

Jimmy Carter on Military Issues

On military issues, Carter had a mixed record. He opposed the construction of five B-1 Bombers and managed to get support for this from some politicians who were usually defense hawks such as Armed Services Committee chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) and Appropriations Committee chairman George Mahon (D-Tex.). Carter tended to oppose stronger measures to cut military spending, including Rep. Ted Weiss’s (D-N.Y.) 1977 attempt to delete all funds for the neutron bomb and Rep. Paul Simon’s (D-Ill.) 1980 effort to delete funds for the MX Missile Basing System.

Jimmy Carter was more liberal than Ronald Reagan on every issue during the 1980 election…except the institution of the Selective Service. Carter was receptive to arguments that this measure was needed in case the US had to mobilize for a full-scale war. Although instituting the selective service is the conservative position, there were numerous conservatives who opposed it as opening the door to the government viewing the nation’s youth as their property, and Reagan was among them. Liberals were opposed to this measure, not wanting to potentially bring back the draft, with many of the Vietnam War doves against. However, after the 1980 election he would decide instead to form a commission to investigate the issue and then he would decide whether to continue supporting ending it. They advised him to keep the selective service, and he did. In 1978, Carter backed sales of aircraft and other munitions to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, but supporters of Israel were opposed to this measure as on balance benefiting its at the time enemies. Indeed, the original arrangement had Israel being sold more arms and Egypt and Saudi Arabia were not in the arrangement. The Senate rejected the effort to overturn this sale, the effort being supported by ADA and opposed by ACA. Conservatives at this time supported an approach to the Middle East that was comprehensive…or backing both Israel and Islamic nations in the region.

I think that with this I have largely if not entirely dismantled the notion that Carter was not a liberal. Perhaps you could say he was a moderate liberal as that’s what ADA puts him at, but ACA and DW-Nominate find him to be considerably stronger in liberalism than Timothy Noah gives him credit.

References

ADA’s 1977 Voting Record. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Click to access 1977.pdf

ADA’s 1978 Voting Record. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Click to access 1978.pdf

ADA’s 1979 Voting Record. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Click to access 1979.pdf

ADA’s 1980 Voting Record. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Click to access 1980.pdf

Carter, James Earl, Jr. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/99906/james-earl-carter-jr

Noah, T. (2024, December 30). Jimmy Carter Wasn’t a Liberal. Politico.

Retrieved from

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/12/30/jimmy-carter-conservative-00084028

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