The election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980 provided a real promise of conservative governance, with a conservative president, a Republican Senate, and a House that although was not Republican, promised to be majority conservative. However, what was the score for Reagan and the Congress on the issues? They counted for the 1981 and 1982 House 24 and 23 votes respectively, and for 1981 and 1982 Senate 21 votes for both years. Among the issues, they supported indexing tax brackets for inflation, retaining funds for the B-1 Bomber and MX Missile, the Solomon Amendment, overturning a Federal Trade Commission regulation requiring used car sellers to inform their customers of major known defects with automobiles, a Balanced Budget Amendment to the Constitution, and school prayer. They opposed busing, the proposed American Conservation Corps, raising the debt ceiling, bilingual ballot requirements, US participation in international development banks, and overriding President Reagan’s vetoes on spending bills. President Reagan himself gets, based on issues he made his opinion known on, an 80 and 100 in the House in 1981 and 1982, and a 70 and 73 in 1981 and 1982 in the Senate respectively. A bit lower than expected, honestly, but ACA finds him having gone wrong by supporting raising the debt limit in 1981 and 1982, supporting US involvement in international development banks in 1981, supporting the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway in 1981, opposing Sen. Harrison Schmitt’s (R-N.M.) amendment on disapproving federal regulations in 1982, and opposing a debt ceiling amendment to the Balanced Budget Amendment in 1982.
Some notable figures and their ACA scores, modified to count pairs for and against:
Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz. 1981 – 81 1982 – 72
John Rhodes, R-Ariz. – House Minority Leader 1981 – 74 1982 – 76
The ACA made their scores particularly tough to get all right or all wrong. In the 1981 Senate, for instance, only Chris Dodd of Connecticut scored a 0 and no senators scored a 100. In 1982, only Bill Armstrong of Colorado scored a 100 and no senators scored a 0. Jesse Helms of North Carolina missed one vote for each year. His sins by the standards of ACA? Voting to raise the debt limit in 1981 and voting to table an amendment allowing states to veto a nuclear waste storage site unless both Houses of Congress overrode the state’s veto.
Americans for Constitutional Action continued not to count abortion as an issue, a significant difference with the emerging new right It also counted the House vote for the conference report on the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act in 1982 as a vote FOR the conservative position, as opposed to Americans for Democratic Action, which considered it a vote FOR the liberal position and American Conservative Union, which considered it a vote AGAINST the conservative position. This highlights a difference in the emphasis ACA put on deficit reduction to tax reduction. This wasn’t the only issue in which the organization sided with Americans for Democratic Action in this Congress: they shared their opposition to the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, a project President Reagan favored.
Note: Errors
The data I used to ascertain the issues behind these scores comes from Voteview legacy’s website as well as the Almanac of American Politics 1984 edition. There were some errors in the process that I discovered, and this was through being unable to replicate the exact set of ratings. The 1981 Senate one given how much does fit I am 99% sure about.
The Senate has multiple instances, including:
Paula Hawkins (R-Fla.) – Improper in both 1981 and 1982, 1982 possibly a repeat of Lawton Chiles’ (D-Fla.) 57 score. Charles Mathias (R-Md.) – His 1981 score appears to be erroneously a repeat of his 1982 score of 14. Paul Tsongas (D-Mass.) – His 1981 score is listed as a 13, but appears to be a 16 instead. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) – His 1981 score appears to count a pair for ending debate on an anti-busing amendment as a vote for. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) – He is counted as 67, but has an absence for the Metzenbaum amendment on oil price deregulation, which he was for.
The House’s issues:
In 1981, Bill Hefner (D-N.C.) was listed as having a score of 49. This is not mathematically possible with 24 votes, he scored a 48. In 1982, Beryl Anthony (D-Ark.) was listed as having a score of 65. This happened to be the same as neighboring Congressman John Paul Hammerschmidt (R-Ark.) and I was unable to find a proper combination of votes that would give Hammerschmidt and Anthony both a 65. I conclude this score was put in by mistake as a duplicate of Hammerschmidt’s.
Despite these, I believe I have hit upon an accurate counting of ACA’s scores, as I have found no other way to reconcile how all the other senators’ scores can be achieved at the same time. It was a truly tall order to find how ACA counted ultra-conservative Steve Symms’ (R-Idaho) score as an 81 in 1981, meaning he voted against their position four times. Same goes for ultra-liberal Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) getting three votes right by their standards that year. What strikes me as interesting about these ratings is that they show how less ideological partisanship was in times past. Admittedly, the ACA has picked a few oddball votes for counting conservatism that contribute to this, but I can see how a case could be made for them.
Jamie Whitten of Mississippi, who underwent a tremendous change from 1965 to 1981.
A mere two posts ago, I talked about the 89th Congress, which most notably passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and tried for fair housing on civil rights as well as the ideologies at play given modified Americans for Constitutional Action scores. I have done it yet again and found the scores for 1981 and 1982, and the picture painted for civil rights remains, on final passage anyway, regional but also more ideological. I will post details on the ACA-Index for 1981 and 1982 in the near future. While the final passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 got 74 House votes against and 18 Senate votes against, the 1982 extension got 24 House votes against and 8 Senate votes against.
The vote of the 97th Congress regarding civil rights demonstrates that as a regional issue, the Voting Rights Act was largely dead, as the opposition was minimal. It is worth noting, however, that in the House only six votes against came from outside of the South: Bob Stump (D-Ariz.), Eldon Rudd (R-Ariz.), former John Bircher John Rousselot (R-Calif.), George Hansen (R-Idaho) (who had voted against the original act), and Dan Crane (R-Ill.). In the Senate, the regional factor was negligible as four nays came from outside the South: Republicans S.I. Hayakawa of California, James McClure and Steve Symms of Idaho, and Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire. The reason for Hayakawa’s vote was his staunch support for “English only” policies and thus he objected to bilingual ballots. The most opposed state by far was Virginia, with nine of ten representatives voting against extending as well as Senator Harry Byrd Jr. A “nay” that would come back to haunt him later would be Trent Lott (R-Miss.), who later as Republican Senate Majority Leader would get in hot water after his ill-considered approach to praising Strom Thurmond on his 100th birthday. The most opposed among the senators were easily North Carolina’s Jesse Helms and John Porter East. The former repeatedly voted against civil rights measures throughout his career and the latter, who had been the only senator on the Judiciary Committee to vote against sending the bill to the floor, condemned the Voting Rights Act as “punitive and vexatious” and a “slap in the face to the South” (CQ Press).
Of the elected officials listed, only Joe Biden (D-Del.), Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), Ed Markey (D-Mass.), and Chris Smith (R-N.J.), Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) are in elected office today. There were also some interesting changes from 1965 to 1982 on voting on the Voting Rights Act as well as ideology. Senators Russell Long (D-La.), John Stennis (D-Miss.), Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), John Tower (R-Tex.), and Robert Byrd (D-W.V.) had opposed both votes on the Voting Rights Act of 1965 but voted for the 25-year extension. The same went for Representatives Jack Edwards (R-Ala.), Don Fuqua (D-Fla.), Jamie Whitten (D-Miss.), Larry Fountain (D-N.C.), and Jim Broyhill (R-N.C.). Truth be told, many of the old foes of the Voting Rights Act were out of Congress by this point, although Bill Dickinson (R-Ala.) and George Hansen (R-Idaho) continued to oppose. There were also some notable ideological changes in 17 years; Paul Findley of Illinois, who I have written about before, went from 89% and 81% for 1965 and 1966 respectively to 58% and 48% for 1981 and 1982 respectively. Jamie Whitten of Mississippi’s change was even greater, going from 85% and 91% in 1965 and 1966 respectively to 35% and 33% in 1981 and 1982 respectively.
Vote on Voting Rights Act Amendments with modified ACA scores:
Florida right now is on a bit of a conservative kick, and it seems to be growing. There was, however, a time in which not only Florida was part of the Solid South for the Democrats, but also in which its voters statewide elected Claude Pepper (1900-1989).
The Florida Senatorial Deaths and Succession
The year 1936 saw both of Florida’s longtime senators die: Park Trammell on May 8th, and Fletcher Duncan on June 17th. Although the immediate successor for the latter was William Luther Hill, he was a mere placeholder. The man who won the 1936 election to succeed him was attorney and former state legislator Pepper. This had not been his first try for the Senate; in 1934 he had won the first round in the Democratic primary against incumbent Park Trammell thanks to his talented oratory, and Trammell only narrowly fended off defeat in the runoff.
Pepper became known for his staunch support of the New Deal, including the Fair Labor Standards Act. However, he also voted to kill the “court packing plan” in 1937, a point of contention with Roosevelt. The following year, Pepper won a full term in a victory for President Roosevelt in his toughest election year yet with over 58% of the vote (Hill). He would support Roosevelt in most matters and was one of the most outspoken interventionists, sponsoring Lend-Lease in 1941. Roosevelt was a big fan of Pepper’s, even once telling him, “Claude, if you were a woman, I’d kiss you!” (Mormino) Like the president, Pepper saw the federal government as a tremendous force for aiding poor Americans with tax dollars. His spirit of politics was expressed thusly, “My colleagues, when you go home tonight and you close your eyes and you sleep and you ask, ‘What have I done today to lighten the burden upon those who suffer,’ at least you could say, ‘I helped a little bit today; I voted to help those who needed help.’ It may not answer all the problems, and it does not, but it will give comfort. It will cool the brow of many who suffer. It will give hope to many who almost are despaired” (The Claude Pepper Foundation). Although Pepper was reelected in 1944, his strongly liberal views on domestic issues was taking its toll. He had won the Democratic primary with slightly over 51% of the vote when the challenger was the little known and poorly financed J. Ollie Edmunds (Hill).
Early Civil Rights Supporter
Claude Pepper was the first Southern Democrat to support civil rights legislation. Although he had opposed an anti-lynching bill in 1937 (which he later regretted), he would support banning the poll tax. Although Florida had no poll tax, the state was expected to stand with the rest of the South over a federal poll tax ban lest it open the door to other federal interventions on civil rights. He even sponsored the 1942 bill, which fell to a Senate filibuster.
Pepper and Communism
While many politicians were always suspicious of the USSR and saw Stalin as a threat, Pepper saw a potential long-term ally in Stalin and a global partner in the USSR. He saw himself as filling in the role of international statesman and, he hoped, FDR’s eventual heir to the White House. Pepper even visited Moscow, interviewed Stalin, and delivered a speech praising the USSR, stating, “Probably nowhere in the world are minorities given more freedom, recognition, and respect than in the Soviet Union and nowhere in the world is there so little friction, between minority and majority groups, or among minorities” (Hill). He would also call for the destruction of all atomic weapons, received praise from The Daily Worker for a pro-Soviet speech, and according to one FBI report he had spoken before 23 communist front groups (Clark, 77-79). Worse yet, according to FBI files, Pepper used economist Charles Kramer, who had worked in the Roosevelt Administration as part of his “brain trust”, as a speechwriter and advisor during the 1940s (Orlando Sentinel). Kramer was, per FBI files, a Soviet agent. He had participated in the Ware Group Soviet spy ring.
Pepper’s stance on the Soviets was deeply unpopular in Florida, and he was aware of this, believing that he would be able to mend fences in time to win reelection in 1950. In 1947, he voted against the Greek-Turkish Aid Act, which was a core component of Truman’s foreign policy, objecting to the aid not going through the UN. In the Republican 80th Congress, Pepper was otherwise a staunch liberal Democrat, and this included voting to sustain President Truman’s veto of the Taft-Hartley Act, standing alone among Florida politicians to do so. While Floridians in the past were more amenable to his liberal views, especially during the Great Depression, they had become far less so with the years.
“Red Pepper” vs. “Gorgeous George” Smathers: The 1950 Election
Pepper, never held in high esteem by President Truman, really crossed him by making it known that he tried to lobby General Dwight Eisenhower to replace him for the Democratic nomination, and he backed photogenic Congressman George Smathers to take him on. Pepper faced an uphill battle given the nation’s anti-communist mood and the stagnating war effort in Korea. Although “Gorgeous George” was far from the most conservative of Florida politicians, he aggressively ran against his record on communism in one of the most negative campaigns in the state’s history and joined others in calling Pepper “Red Pepper” for his prolonged support of the Soviets. Despite this, Pepper did vote to sustain a loan to Spain’s Francisco Franco in 1950. While it is fair to question his judgment regarding Stalin, the Soviets, and some of his associations, a communist he was not. Pepper lost renomination by nearly 10 points.
A Comeback and Remaking of Image
Although Pepper’s defeat for renomination in 1950 might have been the end, he made a remarkable comeback. Although he lost his bid to defeat Spessard Holland in the primary in 1958 by 14 points, after twelve years of absence in Congress he was elected to the House in 1962, representing Miami. Although still a New Dealer on domestic issues, he voted for a number of anti-communist measures on foreign policy. No doubt a factor in this was the staunchly anti-communist Cuban American population in his district. In 1964, he was the only member of the Florida delegation to Congress to vote for the Civil Rights Act. Pepper was the state’s most unflinching supporter of the Great Society as well and stood as a staunch advocate for maintaining Social Security, Medicare, and other programs for the elderly. He could be said to be one of the people who effectively made Social Security a third rail of American politics.
A Power in the Reagan Years
Claude Pepper’s second act was perhaps his greatest as he found himself in quite a position of power in the House in the 1980s; from 1983 to 1989, he was chairman of the House Rules Committee. Instead of a maverick as he was in his youth, he was now a major player in the Democratic Party’s establishment. The Los Angeles Times wrote of him, “As chairman, Pepper can bottle up legislation he considers obnoxious, and he can attach his pet causes to virtually any bill” (Rosenblatt). Even in his eighties, he proved a powerful campaigner. Pepper was considered by Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Chairman Tony Coelho (D-Calif.) to have been “…our most potent weapon, more responsible than any other individual in our party” for the Democrats gaining 26 House seats in the 1982 midterms and he went on to state that “In 1984, he protected Democrats when the issue was very tough, and in 1986 all the Senate winners used him” (Rosenblatt). Pepper’s peak of power in the House coincided with the presidency of one of the greatest challenges New Deal politics had ever faced in Ronald Reagan, but Pepper remained a New Dealer to the last, writing in his autobiography, “I was a New Dealer before there was a New Deal. I remained one when the ideology behind it came under bitter attack. I remain one today” (Rosenblatt).
On May 26, 1989, President Bush awarded Pepper the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Four days later, he passed away at the age of 88, 39 years after suffering a defeat that would have ended many a politician’s career and 20 years after the man who bested him had retired from politics. Pepper was a liberal contender for some time, but in the end the reality of Florida politics only allowed him to continue as a representative, albeit a successful one. In numerous ways Pepper stood alone among Florida colleagues, including when not politically expedient to do so, and that in itself merits some respect. He is also one of those examples of persistence paying off.
References
A Report Card for 80th Congress. (1947). Americans for Democratic Action.
One of my motivators, one that has been present since I was a teenager, has been to set the record straight regarding conservatives and civil rights, as I felt they got a bad shake and the implication of this approach is, “You were wrong on these issues, so you’ll be wrong on all the others” regardless of how out there, how anti-capitalist, or coercive certain proposals are. The 89th Congress presents an interesting picture on both ideology and civil rights. While conservative Republicans are mostly supportive of the Voting Rights Act, it should be noted that Americans for Constitutional Action counted a vote for the Voting Rights Act as against their position. There’s a bit of an uncomfortable dual reality for modern conservatives to face regarding civil rights: although historically the record pf conservative Republicans gets savaged far more than deserved, it was a post-World War II truth that major conservative organizations and numerous prominent thinkers opposed the civil rights legislation of the 1960s. While for some thinkers, such as Southerners Medford Bryan Evans and James J. Kilpatrick, it was about defending segregation, for others it was about defending wider concepts such as property rights, freedom of contract, and yes, state’s rights. Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA) was on record against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and fair housing laws. Their issues were the ones that applied nationally, although ACA assistant director John J. Synon was with Evans and Kilpatrick. They also were against granting the attorney general sweeping powers of enforcement. William F. Buckley Jr. himself underwent a major change between 1957 and 1965 on the subject. An interesting piece on Buckley’s change is listed in references, and its worth a read.
Many conservative officeholders on the Republican side, however, didn’t heed the call of these organizations on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, most of them didn’t on the Voting Rights Act (only two Republican senators, both from the South, did), but many did on fair housing. The latter two issues can be seen in this document, and the Civil Rights Act of 1966 would indeed not make it past the Senate, with fair housing having to wait until 1968. The latter issue was a far more national one than the previous two, both of which involved remedies for racial discrimination that primarily applied in the South, whereas housing discrimination was a far more national phenomenon. The GOP’s point man on civil rights, Bill McCulloch of Ohio, got an 85% in both 1965 and 1966, respectable scores from a conservative standpoint. One should bear in mind that for the House, of the five votes I include, four were counted by ACA. For voting rights, the regional character of support and opposition is quite striking as there were only five Republican representatives outside the South who were on record opposing both House passage and the conference report: H. Allen Smith of Glendale, California, James B. Utt of Santa Ana, California, George Hansen of Pocatello, Idaho, H.R. Gross of Waterloo, Iowa, and Robert McEwen of Ogdensburg, New York. Of these three, Gross and McEwen would support at least one other civil rights measure in the 89th Congress. Interestingly, times have largely changed for these districts, two are currently represented by Democrats: Glendale is currently represented by Adam Schiff of all people and Democrat Lou Correa represents Santa Ana. Ogdensburg is represented by Elise Stefanik, head of the House Republican Conference. There were only two Democrats outside of the former Confederacy to oppose the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Representative Paul C. Jones of Kennett, Missouri, and Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia. The former represented an area of Missouri that was culturally Dixie and today is represented by Republican Jason Smith, and Byrd had a past in the KKK.
The ACA scores I have here are modified to count for officially recorded pairs and on occasion, announcements for or against. I do this because I consider it a more complete picture on ideology. CQ polls for and against are not counted ideologically, although they are displayed for the listed civil rights votes. The file is below:
Nebraska has historically been a Republican state, but it hasn’t always been a conservative state. Although the voters were at heart social conservatives, they could embrace politicians who pushed reform from the left, most notably the populistic three-time presidential contender William Jennings Bryan and Senator George W. Norris. Bryan served to inspire many aspects of the New Deal while Norris was a strong supporter and was central to the passage of the Tennessee Valley Authority. However, all was not well for liberalism in Nebraska in the 1930s. The New Deal was declining in popularity in Nebraska, including on agricultural policy that was touted as helping the Midwest. The 1938 midterms were a conservative wave, and Curtis, who had switched from Democrat to Republican in 1936, was one of the beneficiaries, defeating populistic Democrat Charles Binderup for reelection.
Curtis stood for lower taxes, limited federal government, and against social welfare measures, and voted that way in Congress. The New York Times (2000) described him as a “…spirited critic of the New Deal and any program that smacked of social welfare. He opposed the school lunch program, for example, saying his own character had been bettered for having had to carry his own lunch to school as a youth”. He was also against American involvement in European wars, voting against all major Roosevelt Administration measures prior to Pearl Harbor. Unlike many Republicans who had taken such stances, Curtis remained firm after World War II, voting against aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947 and against the Marshall Plan in 1948.
Curtis would be elected to the Senate in 1954, and would only grow his conservative reputation from there. He voted against the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, food stamps, and Medicare. Curtis led the push in the Senate to defeat the latter, but was way outnumbered in the Great Society Congress. He also regarded organized labor as having become too powerful because of the 1935 Wagner Act and voted for efforts to curb their power, including the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Although a staunch conservative, Curtis didn’t forget the folks at home. He would vote at times for federal programs to aid farmers, and counted among his accomplishments bringing flood control and irrigation to the Midwest (Barnes). He frequently received scores between 90-100% from the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action and between 0-10% from the liberal Americans for Democratic Action.
Curtis and Civil Rights
Interestingly, Carl Curtis had a bit of a change in mindset on the subject of civil rights; in his early career in the House, he voted against anti-lynching legislation in 1940 as well as anti-poll tax legislation in 1943 and 1945. However, as a senator he would prove considerably more supportive. Curtis’ votes for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, retaining the public accommodations section of the 1964 act, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were the only votes that prevented him from scoring 100% by Americans for Constitutional Action in those years. In 1972, he was one of 84 senators to vote for the Equal Rights Amendment.
Curtis vs. Organized Labor
Carl Curtis was on the McClellan Committee investigating racketeering in labor unions and there became known for his piercing questions to witnesses on television. He supported numerous measures to counter union corruption, including the McClellan Union “Bill of Rights” amendment, which provided for freedom of speech of union members and fair elections for union leaders. Curtis was strongly opposed by organized labor for his repeated votes against strengthening unions as well as his opposition to strong minimum wage legislation.
Accomplishments
In addition to flood control and irrigation for the Midwest and his part in the McClellan Committee, Senator Curtis introduced the bill which would eventually become the Independent Retirement Act, resulting in the creation of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA), but would in his later years lament that most people eligible for IRAs didn’t use them (Schnert). Anyone who has an IRA has Curtis, among others, to thank for this wonderful way of growing their wealth for a secure retirement.
Curtis in the 1970s and Beyond
Although Curtis was distinctly to President Nixon’s right and most of the time voted against him when he took a liberal position. This included a busing compromise in 1969 as well as voting against ratifying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1969. He was also one of the foremost defenders of Nixon on Watergate. Curtis regarded Nixon as being held to a different standard, stating in 1975, “I believe Watergate was played all out of proportion. I believe a different yardstick was used in dealing with Mr. Nixon than was used on other presidents and officials” (The New York Times).
Although the most notable inner party development in 1975 was the ousters of Southern Democratic chairmen by the Watergate babies, a smaller albeit significant development occurred in the GOP. Curtis’ defeat of liberal Senator Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) for the chairmanship of the Senate Republican Caucus was a sign of what direction the GOP was moving (The New York Times). However, he didn’t stay in the Senate much longer, choosing to retire in 1978.
For conservatives, one of the elements of Curtis’ greatness was his longevity in fighting liberalism. His memoir was appropriately titled, “40 Years Against the Tide”. It was rather to Curtis’ dismay that Nebraska’s two senators from 1979 to 1997, with a sole two year exception, were Democrats, including his successor J. James Exon. However, like his career, he lived long. Upon the election of Republican Chuck Hagel to the Senate in 1996, the 91-year-old Curtis said, “Now I can die a happy man” (Schnert). He died on January 24, 2000, at the age of 94.
The quality of Curtis as a man in politics can be described by his political opponent, Frank Morrison, “Carl and I have always been good friends. I considered him a man of integrity, and I believe that he saw me in the same light. I liked him. We had a great deal in common. We both felt that in our own way we were helping Nebraska and the United States. We disagreed on the way things ought to be done” (Schnert).
References
Barnes, B. (2000, January 26). Carl T. Curtis Dies at 94. The Washington Post.
A legend exists in Florida politics that in one campaign, a speech called the “redneck speech” was delivered to a group of poorly educated North Florida voters: “Do you know that Claude Pepper is known all over Washington as a shameless extrovert? Not only that, but this man is reliably reported to practice nepotism with his sister-in-law and he has a sister who was once a thespian in wicked New York. Worst of all, it is an established fact that Mr. Pepper, before his marriage, habitually practiced celibacy” (Then New York Times). This little story is what politician George Smathers (1913-2007) was most known for, despite him having never delivered it. Even the Time Magazine reporter who brought this speech to public attention referred to it as a “yarn” and Smathers offered a $10,000 reward if it could be proven that he delivered this speech, a reward that was never collected (Raines; Brotemarkle). It would be like if George Washington was most known as “the guy who chopped down the cherry tree”. But what was the real story behind Smathers and what did he actually do?
The Start of Politics
Smathers’ first experience with politics, ironically, was in helping Claude Pepper get reelected in 1938 by organizing Gainesville and all of Alachua County. After graduating from law school at the University of Florida, he quickly became district attorney in Miami and was a vigorous prosecutor. Smathers managed to nail the local chief of the Office of Price Administration, a state’s attorney, and a county solicitor, a role he later saw himself as a bit overly ambitious (Szanton). By World War II, Smathers was married and had a son, and although he served for some time in the Marines, he cut his service short, an act that had potential to cause political problems. He contacted Tom Clark and one of Florida’s senators to get off of duty early. Smathers would point out to anyone who addressed this was that under draft rules he could have gone for a deferment given his status as a husband and father rather than serve at all (Szanton).
Smathers to Congress
In 1946, Smathers ran in the Democratic primary against Congressman Pat Cannon. He was confident about his prospects of defeating the young upstart, saying to him, “I’ve defeated 14 guys already, and you’ll be the 15th” (Szanton). However, this confidence was misplaced as Smathers beat him and was elected to Congress, serving as a freshman along with future presidents John F. Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Richard Nixon (R-Calif.). Fortune would smile on him within two years of being in office, as Senator Claude Pepper, known as strongly left-wing, tried to recruit General Dwight Eisenhower as a primary candidate against President Truman. Smathers recollected that after being reelected, Truman summoned him to the White House and told him to “beat that son-of-a-bitch Claude Pepper” (Barnes). Also compelling to Democratic voters to go against him was his record. He believed that Stalin would be a good post-war ally for too long and pushed for further relations with the Soviets. Pepper even interviewed Stalin for one hour on September 14, 1945, and then went on Soviet radio to praise him, stating, “I have had the honor to meet and talk to Generalissimo Stalin, one of the great men of history and of the world…Russia’s greatest era lies not in her glorious past but in her future…The people of America and good men and women everywhere owe a great debt to Generalissimo Stalin, to the Red Army and to the people of the Soviet Union for their magnificent part in turning back and destroying the evil Nazis” (Clark, 4-5).
This visit and praise were heavily criticized at home, yet he continued his advocacy and to speak for the Soviets, including before the National Citizens’ Political Action Committee (NC-PAC), which backed the Henry Wallace line of unity between the USA and USSR (Clark, 6). Pepper’s highly naive stand on the USSR would haunt him in an increasingly anti-communist environment. Worse yet for him, the conservative newspaper New York Mirror nicknamed him “Red Pepper” in 1946, and it stuck and made him particularly vulnerable in 1950 (Clark, 16).
Smathers and the 1950 Election
1950 was a particularly bad year for liberals, with some strong ones like Glen Taylor (D-Idaho) and Elbert Thomas (D-Utah) losing reelection to conservative Republicans. There were also a number of heated anti-communist campaigns and Smathers campaigned hard against his staunchly left-wing record and his friendly attitude to the USSR. Pepper lost renomination on May 2nd, with Smathers winning by 9.56%. This was the start of Smathers’ career in the Senate, but hardly the end of Pepper’s career; after an unsuccessful comeback bid to the Senate in 1958, in 1962 he would be elected to the House representing Miami and would serve until his death on May 30, 1989.
Smathers and Politics
Smathers was without doubt to Claude Pepper’s right, but how did he fare? While he was often regarded as a moderate, he also got seen as a conservative, and there’s some justification to each perspective on him. His average score from the liberal lobbying group Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), not counting unopinionated absences, is a 41%, although the reason it’s even this high is because he often voted in line with the Truman Administration but per ADA his record was more hostile to liberalism after. Although Smathers represented a state with many retirees, he voted against Medicare proposals in 1960, 1962, and 1964 before voting against killing Medicare Parts A & B in 1965. He did, however, vote for quite a number of Democratic programs, including JFK’s accelerated public works program in 1962 and the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964. Smathers also specialized in Latin American issues given an increasing population of Cubans, managing to secure aid and permanent visas for people fleeing communist Cuba, contributing ideas to Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress program, and President Kennedy praised him as “one of the first Americans to recognize the importance of Latin America” (Crispell, 102-112, 174-176). Smathers was overall one of the more amenable Southern Democrats to liberal legislation pushed by national Democrats. Americans for Constitutional Action was not so impressed with his record, and his scores by year ranged from 18% in 1962 to 73% in 1968.
Smathers and Kennedy
I noted earlier that Smathers and JFK were elected to the House in the same year, and they became close friends for the rest of Kennedy’s life, with Smathers being the only non-family member at wedding party for his marriage to Jackie. In 1959, however, when despite heading up the committee in the South to elect Kennedy, he launched his own bid for president which he did with the approval of Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Tex.) in the name of uniting Florida Democrats. Smathers recalled that this was a bump in the road of their friendship: “To make a long story short, he (Kennedy) kept after me to withdraw. “I want you to withdraw. I want you to withdraw…Damn it to hell, what kind of friend are you?” and so and so. I said, “Look, I’m not going to stand here and take all this abuse, so I’m going to go out. I’m leaving”” (Simkin). Smathers would support Kennedy in the general election. He reflected after Kennedy’s assassination, “A lot of joy and pleasure went out of my life when Kennedy was assassinated…I miss the guy something fierce” (UF Law).
Kennedy’s secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, reported after his assassination that before his trip to Dallas, he had told her he wanted to drop Johnson from the 1964 ticket. She stated that he would have replaced LBJ with Smathers or North Carolina Governor Terry Sanford. In the 1964 election, Smathers seconded Senator Hubert Humphrey’s (D-Minn.) nomination for vice president at the Democratic National Convention (Time). He counted LBJ as a personal friend as well.
Smathers and Civil Rights
George Smathers was one of the more moderate Southern politicians on civil rights. Despite signing the Southern Manifesto in 1956, he voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1957, the 24th Amendment, and the conference report of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 after voting against the original bill. He took part in the filibuster of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and proposed several weakening amendments, including exempting beauty parlors from the law’s provisions. Smathers was also a critic of Martin Luther King Jr., and after being called a racist for it, he responded, “I don’t like bigotry and intolerance…But they do exist and I don’t think you’re going to get them out by passing laws” and would later state, “There wasn’t any doubt that before 1964 if Spessard Holland (Florida’s other senator) or I had voted for civil rights – you couldn’t do it and survive” (Simkin). These words are consistent with Smathers’ at the time words in private and votes in public. Despite voting for every weakening amendment and against final passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Smathers strategized with Johnson on passage and said to him regarding ending debate, “I hope that he [Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield] has done his counting and that he has the votes” (LBJ Presidential Library). However, Smathers also paired against the confirmation of Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme Court (Voteview). This was a stance exclusively taken among those who voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The End of His Senate Career
In 1968, Smathers along with Senator John J. Williams (R-Del.) sponsored a successful amendment placing a 10% surcharge on individual and corporate income taxes while placing a $180.1 billion ceiling on fiscal 1969 spending (CQ Almanac). This move, supported by President Johnson, ensured that the government’s approach to reducing debt would not only rely on increasing taxes. While Smathers had backed Kennedy in 1960 and Johnson in 1964, he backed Richard Nixon in 1968. This endorsement would normally come with political consequences, but he knew he wasn’t running for another term, and it served as a sign of a Florida that was politically changing from its previously default Democratic allegiance. Smathers was also a friend of Nixon’s and introduced him to Bebe Rebozo in 1950, who would be his best friend for life. He also sold his home in Key Biscayne to Nixon. To further highlight the change Florida was undergoing, he would be succeeded by Representative Edward Gurney, the first Republican senator since Reconstruction.
References
Anderson, C. (2017, October 27). 10 surprising facts about John F. Kennedy. Cleveland 19 News.
HR 10606. Kerr motion to table Anderson amend. providing health insurance for most persons 65 and over, to be financed by an increase in the Social Security tax. Govtrack.
HR. 11865. Social Security Amendments of 1964. Gore amend. authorizing a new program of medical care for persons 65 & over financed through an increase in the Social Security tax & wage base & from general revenues. Govtrack.
HR. 12580. Anderson amend. providing medical benefits for all Social Security retirees 68 and over, to be financed by an increase in the Social Security payroll tax. Govtrack.
1942 was a good year for the Republican Party, including in Indiana. With this election, Indiana’s delegation in the House went from 7-4 Republican to 9-2 Republican. One of the victors was Charles La Follette (1898-1974), who defeated Democrat John W. Boehne for reelection. However, much to the chagrin of the party, La Follette would prove in the coming years to be to Boehne’s left. Although sometimes voting for the GOP position on price control amendments in the 78th Congress as well as against funds for the National Youth Administration on July 1st, 1943, he often voted for New Deal measures and would only grow more liberal over time.
La Follette’s record, true to his family reputation, was consistently favorable to organized labor, voting against a bill making extortion and robbery in interstate commerce illegal in 1943 (this measure was seen as directed at organized labor), Smith-Connally Labor Disputes Act in 1943, and the Case Labor Bill in 1946. He was also a critic of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and in one of his first votes he voted against its continuation. In the 78th Congress, his MC-Index score was 48%. On June 22, 1944, he was the only Republican representative to vote against a bill leaving insurance regulation to the states. By 1946, La Follette’s record had become nearly 100% liberal, with his MC-Index score at a 10% for the 79th Congress and none of his votes for conservative positions occurring the second session. La Follette voted for $400 million in housing subsidies and against Rep. Jesse Wolcott’s (R-Mich.) 1946 amendment to end price controls on March 31, 1947. His DW-Nominate score was a -0.125, which makes him one of the most liberal Republicans to ever serve by that standard. Perhaps the Republicans should have known better about him, as his third cousins were Senator Robert La Follette Jr. (Prog.-Wis.) and Governor Philip La Follette, both liberals.
In 1946, he announced his run in the Republican primary against conservative Senator Raymond Willis. One report on him noted, “Lawyer La Follette has startled his G.O.P. colleagues by voting for New Deal measures, dismayed them by lectures on the evils of states’ rights” (TIME). However, Willis withdrew from renomination and conservative hardliner William Jenner ran instead. The Republican Party in 1946 in Indiana, like in Wisconsin in which Joseph McCarthy defeated Robert La Follette Jr., had no appetite for a La Follette and Jenner won the primary with 95% of the vote.
Afterwards La Follette played a major role in the Nazi Judges’ Trial at Nuremberg, serving as deputy chief counsel to prosecutor Telford Taylor and crafted the case against them. He would also be part of the founding of the liberal lobbying group Americans for Democratic Action and even serve as a director from 1949 to 1950. Interestingly, he called for former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to form “something like ADA” for conservatives nationwide (The New York Times). Conservatives would commonly use reverse ADA and the AFL-CIO’s COPE (Committee on Political Education) ratings to determine legislator conservatism until the foundation of Americans for Constitutional Action in response to the 1958 midterms.
References
Conference Report on H.R. 2935, Dept. of Labor, Federal Security Appropriations, to recede and concur with a Senate amendment appropriating $45 million for the National Youth Administration, and allowing all youths between ages of 16 and 25 to participate in N.Y.A., rather than limiting the program to “needy” youth. Govtrack.
HR 4761 [Housing subsidies – $400 million]. Amend the National Housing Act by adding a new title relating to the prevention of speculation and excessive profits in the sale of housing, and insure the availability of real estate for housing purposes at fair and reasonable prices. Spence motion to instruct the House managers to agree to section 10(A) of the Senate amend. with the following amend. strike out $600,000,000 and insert $400,000,000. Govtrack.
HR 4908 [The “Case Bill”]. Provide for the appointment of fact-finding boards to investigate labor disputes seriously affecting the national public interest. On passage, the objections of the pres. to the contrary notwithstanding. (Failed). Govtrack.
HR 6042 [Wolcott Amendment]. Amend the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, and the Stabilization Act of 1942, as amended. On Spence amendments. Govtrack.
To Recommit H.Res.422 [it was actually a vote on passage], Affirming the Intent of Congress That Regulation of Insurance Business Stay Under State Control. Govtrack.
Some people are born bound to be in politics, and such was the case with John Little McClellan (1896-1977), who his parents named after at-the-time Congressman John S. Little. Some also are born for tragedy, and it was so with McClellan, as his mother died three weeks after giving birth to him, and it would portend numerous personal losses in his life.
McClellan’s professional start was working in his father’s law office in Sheridan and served in the US Army during World War I as a first lieutenant in the aviation section of the Signal Corps. His first marriage to Eula Hicks in 1913 produced two children but ended in divorce in 1921. The divorce was bitter, and Hicks died despising McClellan. While serving as city attorney of Malvern, he would marry Lucille Smith who would love him throughout her life.
Political Career
Elected to Congress in 1934, McClellan started as a loyal New Dealer in his first term, although he made clear from the start that he would not be told how to vote. When a Democratic whip curtly instructed him to vote for a certain measure, McClellan responded, “Look, you don’t know me and I don’t know you, but we’re going to get to know each other pretty darn quick. I vote as I please” (TIME, 3). This foreshadowed his move rightward in the next Congress, and from his dissenting he challenged incumbent Hattie Caraway for her Senate seat. Part of his campaign pitch was that her job needed to be done by a man. This was seen as a referendum on FDR’s policies, and Roosevelt poured all available resources into defending her, and she did win the primary by 8,000 votes.
McClellan would assert that his loss in the primary was due to nearly all the state’s WPA workers voting for her under orders from Washington and that two internal revenue agents came to the state and reviewed the tax returns of prominent McClellan supporters, then announced that Caraway was the candidate to back (TIME, 4). Although out of office, he would not remain so.
Second Time’s a Charm
In 1942, McClellan ran for the Senate nomination against Arkansas Attorney General Jack Holt, and despite the Roosevelt Administration and the state party organization backing the latter, McClellan prevailed by over 50,000 votes. As a senator, he was on the right wing of the Democratic Party. Although McClellan supported Greek-Turkish Aid and the Marshall Plan after World War II, he was usually opposed to foreign aid measures unlike his colleague J. William Fulbright. McClellan frequently voted to limit the power of organized labor, such as with his vote for the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. However, he had his limits. For instance, on June 16, 1958, he voted against the amendment by Senator Carl Curtis (R-Neb.) prohibiting “hot cargo” contracts, which prohibits an employer with a union from engaging in business with other businesses that the union is currently having a dispute with. He was also often opposed to intervention in the market unless it was on agriculture. McClellan was involved in efforts to deny the presidential nomination to Truman in the 1948 election (Johnson & Johnson, 97). However, the Dixiecrat movement flopped in Arkansas, with Truman winning 61.7% of the vote and even Republican Thomas E. Dewey came out ahead of Thurmond.
McClellan and the Government Operations Subcommittee
With the Republicans winning Congress in 1952, the Senate Republican leadership, albeit being publicly supportive of Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wis.), had realized that he was a loose cannon and sought to put him somewhere that they hoped would serve to contain him: the Government Operations Committee, which McClellan had chaired from 1949 to 1953. This committee was in the past committed to exposing waste and corruption in government. McCarthy, however, as chairman, had no intention of continuing the traditional work of the committee. As Roy Cohn recalled McCarthy telling him in December 1952, “You know, I’m going to be the chairman of the investigating committee in the Senate. They’re all trying to push me off the Communist issue…the sensible thing for me to do, they say, is start investigating the agriculture program or find out how many books they’ve got bound upside down at the Library of Congress. They want me to play it safe. I fought this Red issue. I won the primary on it. I won the election on it, and don’t see anyone else around who intends to take it on. You can be sure that as chairman of this committee this is going to be my work” (U.S. Senate, XVI). McCarthy held new investigations and hearings into his signature subject of communist subversion, and his chairmanship of the committee was such that he was taking up most of the time, with senators on the committee often not even bothering to attend as it was McCarthy’s show. Additionally, he would announce hearings on short notice, with senators sometimes sending their staffers to represent them. Per Harvard Law School Dean Erwin Griswold, McCarthy gave witnesses the impression that they were facing “judge, jury, prosecutor, castigator, and press agent, all in one” (U.S. Senate, XV).
McClellan grew critical of McCarthy’s methods, and in July 1953, he led a walkout of Democrats from the committee over McCarthy’s tactics and they would not return for months. He, along with all other voting Democrats, would vote to censure McCarthy the following year.
McClellan’s Numerous Losses
McClellan’s life had its share of tragedy. His first wife died of spinal meningitis in 1935 and all three of his sons died between 1943 and 1958; the first, Max, also from spinal meningitis while serving in Africa in 1943, the second, John Jr., from injuries in an auto accident in 1949. After the latter, and the third, James, from an airplane crash in 1958. A friend of his once said, “There’s not a man in the world with more excuse to throw up his hands and turn all his problems over to alcohol than John McClellan”, and indeed after the second son’s death he did, albeit for a brief period (TIME, 5). He was, however, spared from further loss as his third wife, Norma Myers, outlived him as did both his daughters, Doris and Mary Alice.
The McClellan Committee
Senator McClellan was well-aware of the issues of Joseph McCarthy’s (R-Wis.) approach on investigations, so he played the role of judge while he let counsel Robert F. Kennedy Jr. play the role of prosecutor. Interestingly, McCarthy was on this committee until his death on May 2, 1957. Other notable names on the committee included John F. Kennedy (D-Mass.), Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), and Frank Church (D-Idaho). Despite the team’s wariness of McCarthy’s practices, it still caught the ire of Senator Patrick McNamara (D-Mich.), who resigned in protest of what he saw as unfair treatment of union witnesses from Kennedy and numerous liberals argued that the committee did not try to see any culpability from management, rather just unions (Schlesinger). McNamara was one of the staunchest liberals in the Senate and a supporter of unions without qualification; he was essentially United Automobile Workers’ president Walter Reuther’s man in the Senate. That being said, McClellan had a record to limit the power of organized labor and Kennedy was not an expert interrogator and often lost his cool with unfriendly union witnesses, including insulting and bickering with them (Schlesinger). Nonetheless, testimony presented before the committee was devastating.
Union witness testimony revealed corruption, undemocratic practices in elections, as well as connections to organized crime in the Teamsters Union, the International Longshoremen’s Association, United Mine Workers, and other unions. This resulted in the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“Landrum-Griffin”), which included a slightly modified version of McClellan’s amendment providing for a labor bill of rights. I intend to go into much further detail about the McClellan Committee in a future post.
Hope for Retirement and Political Issues
A profile on McClellan by Time Magazine (1957) held that McClellan dreamed of retiring in 1960 and becoming law partner of his son Jimmy, although rival Sid McMath asserted, “McClellan swears he’ll run again in 1960 just to oppose me, and by God, I’ll be there to oppose” (7). Given Jimmy’s 1958 death and McClellan’s penchant for occupying himself with work in response to tragedy, it seems likely that his death called off any notion of retiring at that point.
McClellan voted against Medicare in 1960, 1962, and 1964, but in 1965 he voted against deleting Medicare from the Social Security Act Amendments. He also voted against the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the heart of the Great Society’s anti-poverty push. McClellan backed both Minority Leader Everett Dirksen’s (R-Ill.) efforts to amend the Constitution in permitting one house of a state legislature to use factors other than population to determine legislative districts and to permit school prayer. These amendments were in response to Supreme Court decisions Reynolds v. Sims (1964) and Engel v. Vitale (1962) respectively. McClellan voted for both of Nixon’s failed Supreme Court nominees from the South, Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell, who McClellan and other conservatives hoped would push back against liberal decisions.
Aside from ideological issues, a clincher for McClellan when it came to getting renominated was his ability to drive federal dollars to Arkansas for public works projects. He sponsored with Senator Robert S. Kerr (D-Okla.) a bill providing for the construction of the McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River Navigation System, which at the time was the largest such project undertaken by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, making the Arkansas River navigable and bringing billions in commerce to the state (Goss).
McClellan on Civil Rights – You Aren’t Surprised, Are You?
I’ve got a confession to make. I’m getting a little tired when writing of every figure from the former Confederacy in a certain period to call them a “segregationist”, as this was the rule rather than the exception with such politicians rendering such designations as redundant unless they were particularly egregious about it. Thus, I’ll say that McClellan voted on civil rights exactly as you would think a man of his time and place did. However, his outspoken opposition became notable in response to President Eisenhower’s order to send the National Guard to Little Rock, Arkansas to enforce desegregation, stating, “I believe it to be without authority of law, I am very apprehensive that such action may precipitate more trouble than it will prevent” (Cobb & Griffee, 237-238). He was in truth a cautious and judicious figure, much like his Mississippi colleague John C. Stennis as opposed to a demagogue like Governor George Wallace of Alabama or Senator James Eastland of Mississippi. In 1972, McClellan voted for the Equal Rights Amendment, although this was a popular proposal at the time and passed 84-8. He did continue voting against civil rights proposals into the 1970s, including being one of 12 senators to vote against extending the Voting Rights Act in 1975.
McClellan: Crime Fighter
Senator McClellan, in addition to investigations into union corruption and organized crime, repeatedly backed “tough on crime” proposals. In 1968, he opposed two amendments by Senator Joseph Tydings (D-Md.) to retain in criminal law that a confession could be rendered inadmissible by delay in arraignment alone and that a confession could be ruled inadmissible even if found to be given voluntarily. While in 1970, many Southern senators followed Senator Ervin (D-N.C.) in opposing “no knock” searches for drugs, McClellan was not among them, voting in accord instead with the Nixon Administration and the majority of Senate Republicans. That year, he also backed RICO.
Later Years
In 1972, McClellan faced a tough primary challenge from the far younger and more liberal Congressman David Pryor. This was the first major challenge he had since his election in 1942, and McClellan was 76 years old by this time. Pryor’s campaign was a fiery populist one, charging McClellan with being too favorable to “greedy corporations, “the big boys”, and “the arrogant rich” while voting against government programs to combat poverty (Reed). However, he pulled through with 52% of the vote. McClellan would go on to easily defeat his Republican opponent. In retrospect, it was quite fortunate for McClellan that his reelection year happened to be 1972 instead of 1974. His colleague, Fulbright, who was more liberal than him on many issues including civil rights, lost renomination badly that year to the even more liberal Governor Dale Bumpers.
In 1976, McClellan coauthored a revision of U.S. copyright laws, which had last been updated in 1909. One project he had put a lot of effort into was rewriting the federal criminal code. The trouble with federal law was explained in the New York Times, “The Federal Criminal Code has built up, bit by bit, over nearly 200 years as Congress felt called upon to impose national criminal sanctions. It has never before been codified and harmonized into a single coherent document with uniform classification of offenses and punishment” (Weaver). This new codification included modernizing language, implementation of some recommendations from the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, and innovations. This process was for a while viewed with suspicion by liberals as it presented opportunities for conservative revisions, which were initially in the legislation including reinstating the death penalty for murder and treason (Weaver). McClellan and his fellow conservatives voted for restoring the federal death penalty in separate legislation in 1974, but it did not become law. By 1977, McClellan had worked out an arrangement with Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) to get agreement on this codification, including maintaining the status quo on the federal death penalty at the time. Although it passed the Senate, it never made it out of the House Judiciary Committee. The U.S. to this day has not achieved a rewrite of its criminal code as such efforts have been bogged down by ideological controversies, although there are federal sentencing guidelines.
The End
McClellan began slowing down in the mid-1970s, having developed a heart condition and in the summer of 1976, he had a pacemaker surgically implanted. Although he remained mentally alert as ever, he grew increasingly tired (Rosenbaum). On November 21, 1977, McClellan announced he would be retiring rather than running for another term in 1978. One week later, he died in his sleep. In 1978, David Pryor won the election to succeed him.
The Washington Post (1977) summed up its view on him after his passing thusly, “In much of this [the issues of his time] we had found ourselves on the opposite side from John McClellan, especially where racial and civil-liberties questions were concerned. But none of that alters our view that Sen. McClellan was a man of personal dignity and fairness, who did not abuse his power in the Senate or seek to close out the views of those who disagreed with him”.
Note: The votes on Joseph Tydings’ (D-Md.) proposed amendments on crime can be found on my post regarding Americans for Constitutional Action on the 90th Congress. Nearly all of the other votes I mentioned can be found on Americans for Democratic Action’s website, search for the corresponding year:
Cobb, O. & Griffee, C.M. (1989). Osro Cobb of Arkansas: memoirs of historical significance. Little Rock, AR: Rose Publishing Company.
Executive Sessions of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, Vol. 1, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session. U.S. Senate.
S. 3974. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1958. Amendment to Bar “Hot Cargo” Contracts and to Strengthen Laws Against Secondary Boycotts, and Recognition and Organizational Picketing. Govtrack.
While many politicians are said to spit on their fingers and hold them up to the wind to ascertain where to stand, this could seldom be said for Millard Tydings. He served in the US Army from 1916 to 1919, where he served with distinction. War service, of course, is an excellent addition for a political resume, and Tydings was elected to the Maryland House of Delegates in 1919, serving as speaker from 1920 to 1922. He most notably in this role opposed the ratification of the 19th Amendment, a fact that would for a time upset his liberal feminist wife (Conroy). This interestingly was not unusual for Democrats in Maryland of the time: of the four Democrats in the House and Senate from that time, only Rep. J. Charles Linthicum voted for. He likewise opposed Prohibition. In 1922, Tydings moved up to the Maryland State Senate but wasn’t there for long as that year he defeated Republican Congressman Albert Blakeney for reelection in the midterms.
In Congress
As a representative, Tydings was one of the more conservative Democrats and this worked well for Maryland voters at the time: Senator William Cabell Bruce, elected in 1922, was much the same as Tydings, and in 1926 he ran for the Senate, defeating Republican incumbent Ovington Weller. In 1931, Tydings opposed restoring funds for the Sheppard-Towner Act, participating in a filibuster against it (Lemons, 786). This foreshadowed his stance on the programs of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Tydings was a seemingly more vociferous foe of Roosevelt than he had been for Hoover, and was the only Democratic senator to vote against all three of the following acts: the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the National Industrial Recovery Act. He didn’t vote on the Social Security Act and voted against the Wagner Act, the latter being regarded as the Magna Carta of labor union rights. Time Magazine (June 13, 1938) said he was the “Inheritor of the late Governor Ritchie’s conservative mantle…”. He was outspoken against Roosevelt’s efforts at increasing power with the “court packing plan” and his proposed executive reorganization, both battles he won in the 75th Congress due to dissenting Democrats. His political opponents, such as New Dealer journalist Drew Pearson, called him “Mi-Lord Tydings” as they regarded him as an American aristocrat. However, he had a working-class background and would in 1936 marry into money through Ambassador Joseph Davies’ daughter, Eleanor. In 1934, Tydings introduced a resolution condemning Nazi oppression of Jews in Germany, and requesting President Roosevelt to inform the German government of the U.S.’s disapproval, which would not make it out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. One of his most notable achievements was the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934, which provided for a gradual independence for the Philippines, to be completed in 1946. Despite World War II in the meantime, the plan was kept and the Philippines was independent in 1946.
FDR’s Purge Effort & Post-War Politics
In 1938, FDR saw a chance to remake the Democratic Party and aimed to do so by targeting primarily senators for defeat in the primary. Time Magazine (June 13, 1938) explained the president’s logic: “The Roosevelt reasoning is supposed to be that, since some Senate seats must probably be lost anyway, he would be wise to pick even losing nominees, in order to retain control of State machinery for the more important political year of 1940”. Of all the Democrats, Tydings was the one for who FDR’s wrath was most justified as his record had been the least loyal of the targets. Roosevelt personally loathed him and told Interior Secretary Harold Ickes to “Take Tydings’ hide off and rub salt on it” (Rosenfeld). Roosevelt also got a top recruit in Congressman David J. Lewis, an administration loyalist who played a major role in the drafting and passage of Social Security. However, what Roosevelt didn’t count on is that in this time state parties didn’t appreciate federal interference, and this theme was used effectively against Roosevelt’s efforts. All senators Roosevelt targeted won renomination and reelection.
Although an antagonist of FDR’s New Deal, he was on board with the administration on foreign policy: he supported repealing the arms embargo, the peacetime draft, and Lend Lease. However, he thought that permitting merchant ships to enter belligerent ports in 1941 was a step too far. Tydings’ views on foreign policy would become even more favorable to the Democratic Party after the start of World War II. Although Tydings was regarded as a conservative Democrat, by the Truman Administration he was perhaps a bit less so: Americans for Democratic Action gave him the following ratings adjusted to not count absences:
1947 – 60% 1948 – 67% 1949 – 50% 1950 – 53%
He was staunchly internationalist, supporting Greek Turkish Aid, the Marshall Plan, and Point IV foreign aid to poor nations while being somewhat opposed to the Fair Deal. In 1950, he opposed liberalizing housing credit and supported legalizing “basing point” pricing (pricing that includes freight costs, thus allowing for differences based on difficulty) while opposing limiting the Social Security Administrator’s authority over states and supporting extending rent control.
Millard Tydings vs. Joseph McCarthy
On February 9, 1950, a senator who at this point had been known most for launching an ill-conceived investigation into the military for alleged mistreatment (which didn’t happen) of Nazi defendants in the Malmedy Massacre trial and for accepting a $20,000 loan from Pepsi’s Washington representative after which he pushed against sugar rationing, made his big splash with his speech in Wheeling, West Virginia titled “Enemies from Within”, in which he famously held out a document, stating that in his hand he had a list of 205 communists within the federal government. There was a letter written by Secretary of State James Byrnes to Rules Committee Chairman Adolph J. Sabath (D-Ill.) in 1946 that 284 employees were recommended against permanent employment, but only 79 were out of the government (POTUS Geeks). There were a few problems with using this letter as a baseline for communists in government. First, these people were not necessarily communists, rather people thought of as security risks for one reason or another. It could have been political, but it could have also been due to gambling, alcoholism, or suspected homosexuality. Second, by the time of the Wheeling speech, only 65 of these people remained in government and they had undergone additional security checks. McCarthy would later clarify that there were 57 of such people, a figure which came from the “Lee List”, a list of individuals flagged by House Appropriations Committee investigator Robert E. Lee (Griffith, 51). The State Department had informed the House that of the 108 people Lee listed, 57 remained by 1948. These people were not flagged as “communists”, rather as “security risks” and the reasons included alcoholism and marital infidelity.
The Senate formed a committee to investigate these charges and the Democratic leadership selected Tydings to head it, as the thinking was, he couldn’t be accused of having communist sympathies given his reputation as a conservative Democrat. However, the committee devolved into partisan bickering. The majority report concluded McCarthy’s charges to be a “fraud and a hoax” while McCarthy ally William Jenner (R-Ind.) charged that Tydings had engaged in the “the most brazen whitewash of treasonable conspiracy in our history” (Fried, 124-125). The Senate voted three times on accepting the report, with each vote being a purely partisan split. Even Margaret Chase Smith (R-Me.), who issued a declaration of conscience against McCarthy’s methods and would vote to censure him charged the committee of having “…made the fatal error of subjectively attempting to discredit McCarthy rather than objectively investigating and evaluating his charges” (Schapsmeier & Schapsmeier).
The 1950 Election: McCarthy Tries to Purge Tydings
1950 was a bad year for Democrats and liberals in particular: they lost a net of five Senate seats and of six incumbents to lose reelection, five were Democrats including Majority Leader Scott Lucas of Illinois. While many attributed Republican gains in the 1950 election to the growing influence of Senator McCarthy, and there is a bit of truth here in Maryland given McCarthy’s sending of his staff to run Republican John Marshall Butler’s campaign as well the distribution of a composite photo (i.e. “photoshop”) of Tydings and CPUSA Chairman Earl Browder, there were other factors at play here. First of all, it was a midterm and the president’s party historically doesn’t tend to do well in such elections. Second, Tydings had alienated a number of key Democratic groups, including organized labor with his vote for the Taft-Hartley Act and with blacks; his record on civil rights legislation was spotty as in 1950 while he had supported cloture for a compromise Fair Employment Practices law, he had also voted for Senator Richard Russell’s (D-Ga.) proposal to weaken the implementation of army desegregation. This was a time in which the black vote was Democratic leaning but not monolithic, and this was thanks to the Dixiecrats as well as people like Tydings. Thus, the wrong Democrat or the right Republican could lose or win the black vote respectively. Such was the case with Millard Tydings, and McCarthy saw an opportunity and took it. The Republicans did in 1950 what FDR could not in 1938: on election day Butler won by over 43,000 votes.
In December 1950, Tydings filed a complaint with the Senate over the election over unfair and illegal campaign practices that he believed influenced the result. These included excessive campaign spending and major unlisted out-of-state contributions. Of particular note was the role played by the campaign’s public relations director Jon M. Jonkel, as he had formed the strategy as well as had been responsible for mismanagement of campaign finance records, for which he would be convicted in Maryland courts (U.S. Senate). Butler was found at fault for failing to properly oversee his campaign. He had allowed McCarthy to play an outsized role in his campaign including with illegal financial transactions with out of state donors and outright falsehoods, but no action was recommended against him absent a standard laid out for Senate campaigns (U.S. Senate).
Although in 1956 Tydings had planned to have a rematch with Butler and won the primary, his health was declining and it became clear to him that he wouldn’t be able to effectively serve, thus he dropped out. The Democrats were a bit divided in this traditionally Democratic state between the more conservative and segregationist wing and the liberal wing. Instead of picking Tydings’ wife Eleanor, they picked segregationist George P. Mahoney, who had previously lost the 1952 Senate race. This, plus Eisenhower’s resounding win, helped bring Butler, a staunch conservative normally ill-positioned to win in the state, another term. Tydings wouldn’t have survived another term in the Senate, as he died on February 9, 1961. His adopted son, Joseph Tydings, would serve in the Senate from 1965 to 1971, and politically be far more like his liberal mother than Millard.
Overall
Millard Tydings is the sort of Democrat who really doesn’t exist in federally elected office today and wouldn’t make it in either party, especially given how voters are now far more sensitive to how their party’s president feels about a candidate. I admit I have some level of admiration for him winning four terms in the Senate despite often moving against the popular opinion of his times. As he said about serving in the Senate, “If I can’t vote my convictions here, to hell with this job!” (TIME, Sept. 12, 1938)
References
Conroy, S.B. (1994, May 2). Her Front-Row Seat to History. The Washington Post.
I recently covered Prescott Bush, grandfather and father of Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush respectively, and he had a rather moderate approach to politics. Today I cover another figure whose son moved far ahead of him in the realm of politics: Howard Baker Sr. (1902-1964).
Baker started young in politics, winning election to the Tennessee General Assembly in 1928. His son, Baker Jr., was three years old at the time. In 1928, Republicans were a distinct minority in Tennessee, although not a hopeless one; from 1911 to 1915 Republican Ben Hooper was governor, and in 1920 Warren G. Harding had won the state and Republicans five of ten House seats. In 1928, Hoover had won Tennessee, but the state party continued to elect their only two usual Republicans to Congress: in the 1st (based in Johnson City) and the 2nd (based in Knoxville) districts. These were both in East Tennessee, a region that had been staunchly unionist during the War of the Rebellion. Baker’s activity in politics translated him rising to be head of the Scott County GOP in 1932, holding the post for sixteen years. He was also elected district attorney general of the 19th judicial circuit in 1934, a post held until 1938, when he was seeking higher office.
Running for Office
In 1938, Baker ran for governor against Democrat Prentice Cooper, who was overwhelmingly favored to win, and indeed Cooper won with 71.7% of the vote. We should bear in mind that Cooper was strongly backed by Memphis political powerhouse Edward Hull Crump, whose machine determined statewide elections at the time. In 1940, he tried yet again to run against the Crump machine by running for Senate against Kenneth McKellar, a senator who chaired the Appropriations Committee, funneling a lot of federal funds to Tennessee. Baker might have run for Congress back in the thirties had Knoxville’s representative not been the popular J. Will Taylor, known affectionately by his constituents as “Hillbilly Bill” who had completely and utterly dominated in patronage in the 1920s, with all federal money dispensed to Tennessee by Republican administrations going through him (Hill). However, in 1939 Taylor died and was succeeded by John Jennings Jr. Jennings was considerably more conservative, never had the following or power that Taylor wielded, and was vulnerable to primary challenges. Between 1941 and 1950 he was involved with the First National Bank of Oneida among the board of directors and as vice president and general counsel for the Western and Oneida Railroad.
Although 1950 was as an election an undoubtable shift to the right, and this is the way it was in Tennessee’s 1st based in Johnson City, this was not how it was in the Knoxville district, with Howard Baker Sr., his campaign being managed by his son Baker Jr., defeating Jennings 2-1 in the Republican primary (Hill, Baker). That year, perhaps the Democrat having a better chance as there was no incumbent to fight, held Baker to 52.2% of the vote. This would easily be his closest contest, and he would be a popular representative, often winning reelection with around 2/3’s of the vote and Democrats not even bothering to field a candidate against him in 1956 and 1960.
A Moderate Republican
Baker represented a bit of a different Republicanism than the Goldwater conservatism that was gaining in popularity in the party. Although on some questions he was fiscally conservative and was indeed socially conservative, including supporting a school prayer amendment to the Constitution, he was willing to on numerous occasions vote for legislation he regarded as helping the people of his district. This included the Area Redevelopment Act, an anti-poverty measure targeted at rural areas which was opposed by many Republicans, including his Republican colleagues in the 88th Congress Jimmy Quillen and Bill Brock. Both Americans for Constitutional Action and Americans for Democratic Action regarded Baker as moderate in his record based on average scores. Baker Sr.’s philosophy he told to his son, “You should always go through life working on the assumption that the other guy might be right” (Hunt). His middling Americans for Constitutional Action and Americans for Democratic Action scores reflect this approach:
Years
ACA
ADA
1951
n/a
17%
1952
n/a
25%
1953
n/a
36%
1954
n/a
33%
1955
n/a
78%
1956
n/a
100%
1957
29%
43%
1958
67%
42%
1959
63%
56%
1960
50%
44%
1961
55%
20%
1962
55%
25%
1963
72%
27%
Average
56%
42%
Baker’s advice to his son we seldom publicly see followed today in terms of attitudes (what goes on behind closed doors is probably a bit different). Baker Jr. would often heed his father’s words.
Baker and Civil Rights
Howard Baker maintained connections with black leaders in Tennessee such as George W. Lee, but his civil rights record was a bit mixed. While he didn’t sign the Southern Manifesto, voted for the Eisenhower-backed civil rights bill in 1956, the Civil Rights Act of 1960, and the 24th Amendment banning the poll tax in federal elections, he voted against all efforts at attaching anti-discrimination amendments to bills (most notably Powell Amendments directed at education funding) and voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1957. President Eisenhower also was against Powell Amendments as they undermined Southern support for education bills. The Powell Amendment would eventually become Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which cuts off federal funding for segregated schools.
Legacy
Baker did not live to see his son rise to even greater heights in politics, as he died suddenly and unexpectedly of a heart attack on January 7, 1964. Howard Baker Jr. would be elected to the Senate in 1966. He rose up in leadership and by 1977, he was Senate Minority Leader, and in 1981, he was Senate Majority Leader, being the father of the modern Tennessee GOP. Baker is a bit of an interesting figure as we don’t often associate Southern Republicanism, particularly that from Tennessee, as being the purview of political moderates, but Baker was one, and represented an older tradition of politicians from poor rural regions being willing to accept certain federal assistance, much like the more conservative Bible-thumping Eugene Siler of Kentucky. Baker’s district today is represented by Tim Burchett, whose current American Conservative Union score is a 91%, a stark contrast to Baker Sr.’s middling scores from ACA. I’m not necessarily saying that one must become less ideological, but I think we could see a lot less stridency nowadays.
Mad Politics: The Bizarre, Fascinating, and Unknown of American Political History 