The McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagle
President Carter’s foremost achievement in the Middle East is widely regarded as the Camp David Accords, but a critical part of the strategy of the Carter Administration in the Middle East was for the United States to be friendly with all the Middle Eastern nations that they could. After all, OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) had flexed its economic muscle in October 1973 with an oil embargo in response to the Nixon Administration and other nations that supported Israel in the Yom Kippur War, the US shipment of arms having been credited with saving the nation. This produced an oil shock in the United States that resulted in oil shortages and higher prices and ended in March 1974. The US thus sought to find ways to improve their relations with Arab nations while continuing their historic support for Israel. One of these ways was through military sales.
Israel had asked the Carter Administration in early 1978 to sell it 25 McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagles, but the Administration only agreed to 15 as well as 75 F-16s, which were less powerful models of military aircraft. Egypt was to get 50, and Saudi Arabia 60 F-15s, the total sale amounting to $4.8 billion (Hovey). Israel had previously been sold 25, so their total arsenal of F-15s would stand at 40 by 1981, when deliveries were to occur. The Carter Administration had in mind a balance of power in the Middle East with the inclusion of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. However, this was before the Camp David Accords and advocacy groups for Israel saw this arrangement as on net against its interests, fearing that Egypt and Saudi Arabia would use their F-15s against Israel, and campaigned against it. How the politics of the Middle East looked in 1978 as compared to today is a marked contrast; the foremost critic of Israel in the Senate at the time was North Carolina’s Jesse Helms (he would change his tune after the 1984 election), while liberals tended to be the strongest defenders of Israel. Liberal Republican Lowell Weicker of Connecticut issued a scathing critique of this new approach in May 1978, accusing Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski of exchanging a “balance of power” approach for a “world order” approach, and that Jews were an obstacle to this, darkly warning that “We know from history that time and again, when national leaders ran into difficulties, they found it convenient to blame their problems on the Jews. And we know what were the results” (Wald). However, Carter had more to contend with on his own side of the aisle in opposition. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), for instance, commented that “It certainly seems to be an ill‐timed intrusion into the peacemaking process” (Hovey). This measure also met the total opposition of Rep. Clarence Long (D-Md.), chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee on foreign operations.
Opponents introduced Senate Continuing Resolution 86 to disapprove of the sale, and there was considerable support for the resolution. In response, President Carter wrote a letter to the Senate, urging them to accept the deal, arguing, “The long-term interests of Israel are served by the proposed sales to Egypt and Saudia Arabia. It is in Israel’s interest to encourage the forces of moderation in the Middel East, and to promote their close relationship with the United States. It would not serve Israel’s interest if we were to fail to keep bi-partisan commitments, made by the prior Administration as well as by mine, to provide aircraft for the defense of Saudi Arabia. It would be against Israel’s interest if moderate nations are brushed aside by the United States, opening vast possibilities for the intrusion of hostile influences” (Carter).
On May 15, 1978, the Senate voted on the resolution disapproving of the sale, and they were persuaded of the Carter Administration’s position, with the resolution failing 44-54 (D 33-27; R 11-26; I 0-1). The conservative Americans for Constitutional Action counted a “yea” on this resolution as against their position while the liberal Americans for Democratic Action counted a “yea” as for their position. This was one issue in which conservatives and the Carter Administration were in accord, with Senate conservatives by and large backing the sale, and even some normally quite liberal people went to bat for Carter, including Maine’s Edmund Muskie and South Dakota’s George McGovern. Senator John J. Sparkman (D-Ala.), the aging chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations and 1952 candidate for vice president, came to the sale’s defense. However, a young Joe Biden of Delaware, who had been the first of the Democratic senators to endorse Jimmy Carter in the 1976 primary, voted for the resolution, as did Frank Church of Idaho, who would succeed Sparkman as chairman and had been a strong supporter of the Panama Canal Treaties. Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia would use their planes to attack Israel, as opponents of the sale had feared as a possibility, and Israel would make great use of F-15s in military operations. The Reagan Administration, interestingly enough, would have a similar controversy surrounding military aircraft sales to the Middle East only three years later, and would have an even tougher battle on the matter. However, that’s a post for another time.
References
Carter, J. (1978, May). Letter to Members of Congress on Middle East Arms Sales. Jewish Virtual Library.
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Hovey, G. (1978, February 15). U.S. Plans First Jet Sale to Cairo, Reduces Israeli Order for Craft; Saudis Get 60. The New York Times.
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To Agree to S. Con. Res. 86, The Resolution Expressing Disapproval of the President’s Proposal to Sell Aircraft and Related Defense Articles to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Govtrack.
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https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/95-1978/s797
Wald, M.L. (1979, September 23). Weicker Still Jousting With All Comers. The New York Times.
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Mad Politics: The Bizarre, Fascinating, and Unknown of American Political History 