history

Fascinating Politics

Jimmy Carter’s Most Controversial Achievement: The Panama Canal Treaties

In 1903, the US sought to carve an interoceanic canal in Central America, and negotiated the Hay-Herran Treaty with Colombia, which at the time had Panama as a province. However, the Colombian legislature rejected the treaty, and the US subsequently gave support to the cause of Panamanian independence, which was declared that year and recognized by the US, resulting in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which granted the US the rights to a canal zone in perpetuity, and Panama getting $10 million from the US as well as an annual rental payment. The Canal Zone that resulted was an American enclave in the otherwise sovereign nation of Panama, and tensions rose between Canal Zoners and Panamanians over the next sixty years, and this resulted in two more treaties in 1936 and 1955.

Cold War tensions in Central and South America changed the political equation, and on January 9, 1964, an anti-American riot occurred at the canal after a scuffle between American and Panamanian high school students and Canal Zone police resulted in the tearing of a deeply symbolic Panamanian flag. The matter of who instigated the scuffle is a subject of dispute to this day. The riot resulted in the deaths of 4 US soldiers and at least 22 Panamanians. One of the deaths of the soldiers was accidental, and among the Panamanian deaths, some were killed by Canal Zone police after demonstrators threw rocks in response to tear gassing, but at least six were killed in a fire set by Panamanian rioters. This event resulted in the Panamanian government breaking off diplomatic relations with the US, to be renewed only when negotiations were opened for a new treaty regarding the Panama Canal, and President Johnson started negotiations. Although an agreement on three treaties was reached in 1967, political uncertainty in Panama resulted in a setback. The talks, however, continued during the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advised President Ford that “If these [Canal] negotiations fail, we will be beaten to death in every international forum and there will be riots all over Latin America” (Department of State). Gerald Ford was thus in favor of relinquishing the Panama Canal during the 1976 campaign. However, Jimmy Carter signaled opposition at the time, pledging not to surrender “practical control of the Panama Canal any time in the foreseeable future” (Department of State). Despite Carter’s initial opposition, his advisors were for it, and they ended up convincing him to be for it too.

The Carter Administration finalized the talks with Panama, signing two treaties on September 7, 1977. The first was that the 1903 treaty was to be scrapped, that the Canal Zone would cease to exist as a separate entity on October 1, 1979, and that the US would turn over control of the Panama Canal by December 31, 1999. The second was that the Panama Canal would be neutral and that the US would have the authority to defend its neutrality with military force. Thus, the US sought to ensure instead of ownership in perpetuity, use in perpetuity.

Carter managed to get the support of Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-W.V.) and Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.). For both men, neither among the staunchest partisans in their respective parties, this was an early test of their leadership abilities, as this was the first session of Congress that both men were their party leaders. As Byrd would recount, it was his “trial by fire” (U.S. Senate). Baker definitely had a lot more to lose; he was up for reelection in 1978, and he had presidential aspirations for 1980. Byrd, on the other hand, had been reelected in 1976. The political establishment of Washington faced major headwinds over this issue; 38 senators signaled their opposition to the Panama Canal Treaty, and public opinion was against, with only 23% of Americans supporting while 50% opposed. Ronald Reagan strongly opposed the treaties, famously stating, “We bought it, we paid for it, it’s ours, and we’re going to keep it” (Lindsay). He had also used this issue against Gerald Ford in the 1976 Republican primary, and Reagan had come close to winning. The Senate’s top opponent was James B. Allen (D-Ala.), an ally of George Wallace who frequently championed conservative causes and had even received one vote for vice president at the 1976 Republican National Convention. Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) declared that “The loss of this canal would contribute to the encirclement of the United States” (Department of State). Indeed, conservative legislators were suspicious of Panamanian dictator Omar Torrijos, who was thought to be favorable to communism.

Although 38 senators signaled their opposition to the Panama Canal Treaty, Democrat Ed Zorinsky, the first to be elected to the Senate from Nebraska since the Great Depression, indicated his private support for the treaty, but that Nebraskans were strongly opposed and that he would only vote for it if President Carter could convince Nebraskans to support it. Carter, Byrd, and Baker proceeded to lobby senators, and for the first time in the Senate’s history, the proceedings of the Senate for the treaty debate were live on radio in an effort to educate the public on the treaty (U.S. Senate). They also got support from a few unexpected people: famously conservative actor John Wayne as well as National Review’s William F. Buckley Jr. came out in favor of the treaties. Wayne was a friend of General Omar Torrijos, and accused Reagan of misinforming people in his arguments (Lindsay). One of the senators who played a significant role in trying to shape the treaty in the Senate was Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.). Arizona didn’t typically elect Democrats, and DeConcini’s election in 1976 had been the product of an unusually bitter Republican primary. He thus sought to add language that would make his vote in favor easier for him to explain to his conservative constituents, and proposed a reservation giving the United States the explicit right to use military force to defend the Panama Canal, which threatened Panamanian support for the treaty. Ultimately, this reservation was adopted but with language added that nothing in the treaty was to be “interpreted as a right” of intervention in the domestic affairs of Panama (Time Magazine). Senator Ed Brooke (R-Mass.) sought and got some minor technical reservations to the treaty, winning his vote. A senator with a bit of a different angle on this matter was James Abourezk (D-S.D.). Abourezk, who was staunchly liberal, was not actually against the treaty, but wanted to make a deal with President Carter that he would vote for the treaty if he would veto a bill deregulating natural gas, but Carter was not inclined to be cutting deals (Time Magazine). A senator the Carter Administration hotly pursued was California’s Republican S.I. Hayakawa. Hayakawa was an interesting fellow to say the least, and he had in his 1976 campaign said regarding the canal that we “stole it fair and square” (Lindsay). However, he turned out to be persuadable and Carter buttered up his ego by voicing an eagerness to consult Hayakawa on foreign policy regularly. He came to support the treaties, and, contrary to a budding consultative partnership forming, neither man spoke to the other again. One senator who was in a difficult position was Byrd’s West Virginia colleague, Jennings Randolph. Randolph was well into his seventies, and he was facing a tough reelection, with Republicans having recruited their strongest candidate yet against him in Governor Arch Moore. He was one of three or four senators would only vote for if his vote was needed, and it turns out it wasn’t. He would narrowly survive his reelection in 1978. The vote on the Neutrality Treaty on March 16th was 68-32 (D 52-9; R 16-22; I 0-1).

https://voteview.com/rollcall/RS0950702

This would be followed up with an identical vote for the Panama Canal Treaty on April 18th. This was one more vote than was needed to ratify, and although this vote was close, the pro-side actually had three to four more senators they could have flipped if their votes were needed. This would be Senator Allen’s last battle; he died less than two months after Senate ratification of a heart attack on June 1st.

The Fight Over Funding and Consequences for Pro-Treaty Senators

This was a tough vote, and the battle wasn’t over. Congress had to approve funds to implement the Panama Canal Treaties, and by the time Congress was considering the measure, a midterm had occurred. While it wasn’t too shabby for Carter and the Democrats given the history of midterms, he nonetheless faced a less friendly Congress, and there had been senators who lost reelection at least in part over their vote for the Panama Canal Treaties. These included Democrats Floyd Haskell of Colorado, Dick Clark of Iowa, William Hathaway of Maine, Wendell Anderson of Minnesota, and Thomas J. McIntyre of New Hampshire. Republican Clifford Case of New Jersey, long a frequent dissenter from Republican positions, lost renomination to anti-tax activist Jeffrey Bell. This would also contribute to the Republican sweep of the Senate in 1980, with pro-treaty senators Herman Talmadge of Georgia (although his segregationist past and his censure for ethics violations hurt him more), John Culver of Iowa, John A. Durkin of New Hampshire, and Robert B. Morgan of North Carolina. Perhaps the most notable loss among the Democrats up for 1980, though, was Frank Church of Idaho, who had been the floor manager of the treaties and lost to Congressman Steve Symms, an ultra-conservative who was critical of the treaties. Minority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), however, managed to handily win his bid for a third term in 1978, but his leadership on the Panama Canal Treaties cost him any hope of winning a Republican nomination for president. The vote to implement the Panama Canal Treaties lacked the need for the 2/3’s majority the treaties had, and indeed it fell just short of 2/3’s when the Senate voted for it 63-32 on September 25, 1979. However, it also had to be approved by the House unlike with the treaties, and the House was a bit less persuadable. Congressman John Dingell (D-Mich.), for instance, was far from receptive, stating, “We in the House are tired of you people in the State Department going to your tea-sipping friends in the Senate. Now you good folks come up here and say you need legislation [to implement the treaties] after you ignored the House. If you expect me to vote for this travesty, you’re sorely in error” (Lindsay). Adoption of the conference report was on a narrower margin of 232-188 the following day, with President Carter signing the law on the day after. Carter said in his statement on signing the Panama Canal Act into law that the treaties “express the commitment of the United States to the belief that fairness, and not force, should lie at the heart of our dealings with the nations of the world” (The American Presidency Project).

Although a staunch opponent of the Panama Canal Treaties had been elected to the presidency in Ronald Reagan, he did not attempt to undo the treaties…he had enough on his plate in Central America with the situations in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Although many analysts regard the Panama Canal Treaties as a success given the fears of what would happen if they were not ratified, there are still issues surrounding the canal, notably China’s growing influence through the subsidiary of a Chinese business managing two ports and Chinese businesses funding the construction of a new bridge over the canal.

References

Lindsay, J.M. (2011, March 16). TWE Remembers: The Fight over the Panama Canal Treaties. Council on Foreign Relations.

Retrieved from

https://www.cfr.org/blog/twe-remembers-fight-over-panama-canal-treaties

Nation: How the Treaty Was Saved. (1978, May 1). Time Magazine.

Retrieved from

https://time.com/archive/6853512/nation-how-the-treaty-was-saved/

Panama Canal Act of 1979 Statement on Signing H.R. 111 Into Law. The American Presidency Project.

Retrieved from

https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/panama-canal-act-1979-statement-signing-hr-111-into-law

Senate Leaders and the Panama Canal Treaties. United States Senate.

Retrieved from

https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/treaties/senate-leaders-and-the-panama-canal-treaties.htm

The Panama Canal and the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. Department of State.

Retrieved from

https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/panama-canal#:~:text=One%20of%20President%20Jimmy%20Carter%27s,control%20of%20the%20Panama%20Canal.

Fascinating Politics

Differing Interpretations of Jimmy Carter’s Record

Although many obituaries on Jimmy Carter are laudatory, he is generally much better regarded for his post-presidency than his presidency. President Carter had an interesting way about him in being a source of dissatisfaction for both conservatives and liberals, although considerably more for the former than the latter. While obviously liberals would prefer his policies to those of his successor, the characterization of Carter as a liberal Democrat does have some contesting from them, and dissatisfaction with Carter was sufficient for Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) to challenge him for renomination in 1980. One article that caught my eye was that from liberal columnist Timothy Noah writing for Politico, who regards labeling Carter as a liberal a mistake, and although the headline of his article seems to point to Carter being labeled a conservative, he gets labeled instead a liberal Southerner within the article. However, this seems to be considered some form of conservatism, although a lesser form than practiced by the GOP. Liberals not counting Carter as one of their own does have a degree of basis in one of the three standards I like to use in examining politicians, Americans for Democratic Action. ADA finds Carter to have embraced their position on issues 75% of the time, with him at lowest embracing their positions 63% of the time in the Senate in 1979 and at highest, the House in the same year at 90%. Although clearly backing what ADA regards as the “liberal” position 3 in 4 times is not acceptable to conservatives, it also unsatisfactory for liberals. One notable issue in which Carter sided with conservatives was in the retaining of the Hyde Amendment in 1977, a big no-no for contemporary Democrats. Interestingly, Carter by his own admission related better to Southern Democrats and Republicans than he did his liberal allies, who voted with him more (Noah). This is similar to Lyndon B. Johnson when he was Senate Majority Leader. Although he was much more with liberals in how he voted than conservatives and he would prove even more liberal in his presidency, his personal relations with liberals were testier than his chummy relations with fellow Southern Democrats. What this translates to, however, is that liberals largely get the wheat and conservatives largely get the chaff. Carter agrees with Americans for Constitutional Action, ADA’s conservative counterpart, 13% of the time. However, there are a few interesting aspects to this judging of Carter, including on three occasions ADA and ACA taking the same position on an issue! This occurred twice for the Senate in 1980, when both ADA and ACA objected to Senator Dan Moynihan’s (D-N.Y.) proposal for federal funds for private school tuitions and supported Senator Jake Garn’s (R-Utah) amendment maintaining the status quo for housing instead of a new housing subsidy program. President Carter was on the same page as both organizations. In the House that year, both ADA and ACA approved of Representative Samuel Devine’s (R-Ohio) motion to recommit and thus kill the bill establishing the Energy Mobilization Board. This board, if put in place, would have empowered the president to override environmental laws on a federal, state and local level. While overturning environmental laws might appeal to conservatives eager to promote development for economic growth, the full implications of what this could establish for federalism (meaning proper relations between the federal government and states) became clear to most by 1980. Liberal Democrats found this objectionable for two reasons. The first is the environmental angle, and the second was the very real possibility at the time that came true that the next president would be Ronald Reagan. Contrary to the position of both organizations, Jimmy Carter opposed killing the bill. I always find these incidents in which on major issues the most conservative and the most liberal people align to be fascinating. Those weren’t the only votes ADA counted that are questionable from an ideological standpoint. Counting the vote for lifting controls on gas by 1985 is questionable given that many conservatives opposed the proposal as too long retaining controls, and senators from the oil-rich Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas were against. If anything, this vote is a vote of the political center against the strong left and right. It should also be noted that DW-Nominate gives Jimmy Carter a score of -0.504, which is quite liberal indeed! However, it should be noted that I’ve noticed that the ideological bent of presidents does seem exaggerated by this standard and this is because presidents don’t weigh in on every or sometimes even a lot of issues that Congress votes on that have ideological salience. I will proceed with examining Carter’s stances on the issues of his time.

Foreign Policy

Jimmy Carter was a supporter of the postwar consensus surrounding foreign aid, backing foreign aid bills and he also sought to present to the world you might say a kinder, gentler United States. He supported sanctions for the white minority ruled Rhodesia in 1977 and opposed lifting them to support the government of the black majority government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa elected in 1979, opening the path for China-backed Robert Mugabe’s election in an election fraught with violence in 1980. Mugabe, although considered a symbol of Pan-Africanism, brought Zimbabwe to ruin with his economic and social policies. Although many people point to the Camp David Accords, normalizing relations between Israel and Egypt, as a great accomplishment of the Carter Administration, the more consequential action of his was the Panama Canal Treaties. The first treaty scrapped the old 1903 treaty that granted the US rights in perpetuity over the canal, instead turning over control to Panama by December 31, 1999, and the second was the neutrality treaty, which mandated that the canal be neutral and that the US was authorized to militarily intervene to enforce neutrality. Carter also ceased support to the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, which allowed the Marxist Sandinistas to have a successful coup and he then supported providing aid to the new government.  Carter also dropped support for the Shah of Iran in the fall of 1978 after Black Friday, in which 88 religious demonstrators were gunned down for failing to disperse, and the national strike of October which shut down the nation’s petroleum industry. Unlike Rhodesia, Nicaragua, and the Panama Canal Treaties, there was no Congressional vote regarding the situation in Iran.

Domestic Policy

Carter was fairly strong with liberals on domestic policy. He supported the creation of the Department of Education, opposed weakening an increase in the minimum wage, opposed maintaining the requirement that food stamp recipients pay for part of it, supported a windfall profits tax, supported retaining the 1969 credit control law, and backed conservation measures reserving lands in Alaska, California, and Idaho for national parks and wildlife refuges. Carter also backed a set of mandatory and voluntary price controls for the healthcare industry in response to inflation, which died in Congress. He opposed conservative efforts to end price controls on natural gas in 1977 on new onshore that year and new offshore by 1982, instead supporting a compromise proposal the following year to end price controls on all newly discovered gas by 1985. Although Carter indicated support for budget reductions, he opposed several conservative proposals at budget reduction and budget balancing. Although Carter supported trucking deregulation and opposed an effort by Senator Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.) to weaken it with an amendment placing a “burden of proof” on applicants for a trucking certificate to demonstrate that their proposed service works towards present or future public needs, he also opposed allowing Congress to check the executive on this matter by having the ability to vote to overturn regulations that might stem from the legislation. Carter was also opposed to efforts to end gas rationing and supported bailing out the Chrysler Corporation. Carter did oppose a consumer co-op bank bill in 1977, but backed a subsequent proposal. Despite being portrayed as a fiscal conservative, Carter backed Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert Giamo’s (D-Conn.) budget for fiscal year 1981 increasing the deficit.

Jimmy Carter on Civil Rights and Women’s Rights

Carter supported strengthening the fair housing act in a way that gave authority for enforcement to administrative law judges instead of jury trials and supported the Equal Rights Amendment, with the latter he signed into law the measure extending the deadline for its ratification to 1982, but no additional states ratified between then and the deadline. Ronald Reagan had supported the ERA while California’s governor but by 1980 he had turned against it, and Reagan would sign a measure strengthening the fair housing act that provided for jury trials for violations in 1988.

Jimmy Carter on Military Issues

On military issues, Carter had a mixed record. He opposed the construction of five B-1 Bombers and managed to get support for this from some politicians who were usually defense hawks such as Armed Services Committee chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) and Appropriations Committee chairman George Mahon (D-Tex.). Carter tended to oppose stronger measures to cut military spending, including Rep. Ted Weiss’s (D-N.Y.) 1977 attempt to delete all funds for the neutron bomb and Rep. Paul Simon’s (D-Ill.) 1980 effort to delete funds for the MX Missile Basing System.

Jimmy Carter was more liberal than Ronald Reagan on every issue during the 1980 election…except the institution of the Selective Service. Carter was receptive to arguments that this measure was needed in case the US had to mobilize for a full-scale war. Although instituting the selective service is the conservative position, there were numerous conservatives who opposed it as opening the door to the government viewing the nation’s youth as their property, and Reagan was among them. Liberals were opposed to this measure, not wanting to potentially bring back the draft, with many of the Vietnam War doves against. However, after the 1980 election he would decide instead to form a commission to investigate the issue and then he would decide whether to continue supporting ending it. They advised him to keep the selective service, and he did. In 1978, Carter backed sales of aircraft and other munitions to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, but supporters of Israel were opposed to this measure as on balance benefiting its at the time enemies. Indeed, the original arrangement had Israel being sold more arms and Egypt and Saudi Arabia were not in the arrangement. The Senate rejected the effort to overturn this sale, the effort being supported by ADA and opposed by ACA. Conservatives at this time supported an approach to the Middle East that was comprehensive…or backing both Israel and Islamic nations in the region.

I think that with this I have largely if not entirely dismantled the notion that Carter was not a liberal. Perhaps you could say he was a moderate liberal as that’s what ADA puts him at, but ACA and DW-Nominate find him to be considerably stronger in liberalism than Timothy Noah gives him credit.

References

ADA’s 1977 Voting Record. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Click to access 1977.pdf

ADA’s 1978 Voting Record. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Click to access 1978.pdf

ADA’s 1979 Voting Record. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Click to access 1979.pdf

ADA’s 1980 Voting Record. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Click to access 1980.pdf

Carter, James Earl, Jr. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/99906/james-earl-carter-jr

Noah, T. (2024, December 30). Jimmy Carter Wasn’t a Liberal. Politico.

Retrieved from

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/12/30/jimmy-carter-conservative-00084028

Fascinating Politics

The Warren Commission – The Flawed Quest for Consensus, Part II: Breakdown of Consensus and Criticisms

The Warren Commission presents their report to President Johnson

While today few who investigate the Kennedy assassination walk away believing that the Warren Commission was adequate, the outcome of the Warren Commission initially seemed uncontroversial. Time Magazine’s (1964) appraisal was even laudatory, “In its final form, the Commission’s report was amazing in its detail, remarkable in its judicious caution and restraint, yet utterly convincing in its conclusions. The wonder was that the commission took such a long time to complete its report but that it did so much so swiftly”. However, even within the commission itself there was a lot of disagreement despite Earl Warren getting a unanimous vote on the report. This unanimous vote papered over the fact that three of the commissioners did not agree with the single bullet theory: Richard Russell, John Sherman Cooper, and Hale Boggs. Russell mistrusted CIA testimony based on past dealings with the agency and was deeply unsatisfied with what he saw as the lack of depth with the Warren Commission’s investigation (Wilkes, 3). History would vindicate Russell’s mistrust and criticism. Furthermore, in 1970, he told The Washington Post that he believed that Oswald had encouragement to kill Kennedy and asserted that the members of the Commission “weren’t told the truth about Oswald”. Russell also reiterated that he supported the conclusion that Oswald was the assassin. Interestingly, LBJ agreed with Russell when he expressed his disbelief that a single bullet went through Kennedy and Connally (The New York Times, 1994). This wasn’t the only conclusion that Johnson doubted on the commission. He also believed, contrary to the Warren Commission’s conclusion that no conspiracies foreign or domestic were responsible for Kennedy’s assassination, that Castro had masterminded the conspiracy (Davison). Commissioner John J. McCloy, whose long career was due in part to his mastery at building consensus, also did so with the final report of the Warren Commission. Although he initially had doubts about the single bullet theory, he came around to it, siding with Allen Dulles and Gerald Ford. However, the most influential figure to dissent from the Warren Commission would be one of the people who testified as a witness, Mark Lane.

Rush to Judgment

In 1966, the consensus bubble surrounding the Kennedy assassination burst with the publication of Rush to Judgment by Mark Lane. Lane had had a short stint in the New York State Assembly as a liberal Democrat whose candidacy was endorsed by Kennedy and Eleanor Roosevelt and had publicly expressed skepticism about Lee Harvey Oswald’s guilt as far back as December 19, 1963, and subsequently twice testified before the Warren Commission. In this book, he serves essentially as the defense for Lee Harvey Oswald and challenged numerous narratives of the Kennedy assassination, including the “single-bullet theory”, questioned that Oswald was the killer of officer J.D. Tippit based on a witness testimony of the perpetrator that was inconsistent with Oswald’s appearance, and introduced witness accounts of hearing shots coming from a nearby grassy knoll. It should be noted that of the witnesses of the Kennedy assassination, less than 12% heard the shot as coming from the grassy knoll, with more reporting hearings shots either from the Texas School Book Depository or another building (National Archives, 492).  Earl Warren himself did not think highly of Lane. He dismissed him as “a publicity seeker who played fast and loose with the subject” (Cray, 430-431). This view on him was bolstered by JFK assassination journalist and researcher Gene Russo. Russo found that what Lane wrote was “completely inaccurate, there were a lot of falsehoods in it…it was total fiction” and that he had been fed disinformation without his knowledge from a KGB source (The Mob Museum). Nonetheless, with the doubts that he presented to the public, Lane became the father of JFK conspiracy theories, and his aim to sow doubt over the Warren Commission’s conclusions was undoubtedly a roaring success by the 1970s. In 1976, 81% of the public did not believe that Oswald acted alone according to a Gallup poll (Swift). Lane would write a total of ten books on the subject, with the last one being Last Word: My Indictment of the CIA (2013).

Criticisms of the Commission

One of the major criticisms of the Warren Commission was that the investigation was incomplete, with numerous witnesses not interviewed and questions remaining to this day about Lee Harvey Oswald’s visit to Mexico City several weeks before the assassination. Indeed, the commission did not make a conclusion on Oswald’s motives to kill Kennedy. In Mexico City, he had visited both the Soviet and Cuban embassies in an effort to get a visa to Cuba. What Oswald said at those embassies and whether he had indicated that he wanted to kill Kennedy to them or whether he had been encouraged to do so is up for debate. Indeed, per author and researcher Philip Shenon, this was never sufficiently investigated by the CIA, FBI, or the Warren Commission. FBI Director Clarence Kelley wrote in his memoirs in 1987 that he believed that Mexico City held the key to Oswald’s motives, writing “Oswald’s stay in Mexico City apparently shaped the man’s thinking irrevocably” (Shenon). Furthermore, there was a desire to provide closure for the American public in time for the 1964 election with the conclusion that had pretty quickly been reached by FBI director J. Edgar Hoover. As Edward Jay Epstein wrote of the Warren Commission in Inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of Truth (1966), “sincerely convinced that the national interest would best be served by the termination of rumors, and predisposed by its make-up and by pressure of time not to search more deeply, failed to answer some of the essential questions about the tragedy” (Wilkes, 4).

Other major criticisms of the commission stem from the testimony of the FBI and the CIA, as both organizations were seeking to cover their operations and behinds. The FBI concealed how much was known about Oswald, with Hoover testifying under oath that “there was nothing up to the time of the assassination that gave any indication that this man was a dangerous character who might do harm to the president” (Shenon). However, the Kennedy assassination was not the first time Oswald had come up on the FBI’s radar. In 1975, FBI director Clarence Kelley revealed that the FBI’s Dallas office had only days before the Kennedy assassination received a threatening letter from Oswald in response to FBI agent James Hosty’s inquiries into his wife, Marina (The New York Times, 1975). Two days after the Kennedy assassination, Hosty destroyed the letter on the orders of his superior.

The CIA did not tell the Warren Commission that they had been surveilling Oswald in Mexico City and they also omitted that they had engaged in numerous operations to try to assassinate Fidel Castro. Indeed, these multiple attempts on Castro’s life was why President Johnson suspected that Cuba was behind President Kennedy’s assassination. The presence of Allen Dulles on the Warren Commission was for the purpose of making sure that other Commissioners didn’t ask CIA operatives questions that would imperil operations.

Journalist and professor Edward Jay Epstein discovered after the Warren Commission Report’s release that of the seven commissioners, Russell, Cooper, and Boggs disagreed with the “single bullet theory”, believing that separate bullets had penetrated Kennedy’s throat and hit Governor Connally (Bickel). None of the three, however, had made secret their issues with the commission.  

John Sherman Cooper publicly criticized the conclusion of the Warren Commission as “premature and inconclusive” and doubted that Kennedy and Governor Connally were hit by the same bullet, or the “single-bullet theory” and told Robert and Ted Kennedy in 1964 that he didn’t believe Oswald had acted alone (Simkin, Cooper). Cooper did, however, agree with the Warren Commission’s conclusion that Oswald was the only assassin in a 1980 interview. He said, “We’ve all said if someone could find something that we didn’t, we want it to be found because the truth is what we want. But I think all of us believe and I still believe, even after the last investigation by the House, that our decision will stand. There are some places in it which are hard to explain but every evidence pointed to Oswald as the sole assassin and no conspiracy” (Gerth).

Hale Boggs of Louisiana was critical of FBI director J. Edgar Hoover in this matter. He believed that Hoover had “lied his eyes out” to the commission (Simkin, Boggs). By the early 1970s Boggs was an overall critic of J. Edgar Hoover, and his criticisms would be bolstered by revelations about the FBI’s activities after his death. Incidentally, John Connally, whose injuries were severe enough for him to have nearly joined Kennedy, also doubted the single bullet theory.

Earl Warren suppressed key evidence from other commissioners. For instance, he was the only commissioner to see Kennedy autopsy photos and did not allow the commission to interview certain people Oswald knew in Mexico, notably an employee at the Cuban consulate in Mexico, Sylvia Duran. Warren would not hear her testimony with the rationale that the commission could not count on truthful testimony from communists, which may have shed more light on his activities there and what he was talking to the Cubans about (Andrews). However, Warren kept all but one investigator in the dark that the commission had managed to interview Fidel Castro, who denied all involvement. So much for no testimony from communists! 

Gerald Ford, His Defense of the Warren Commission, and His Role

Gerald Ford would consistently defend the conclusions of the Warren Commission. On February 5, 1999, he issued the following statement, “In 1964, the Warren Commission unanimously decided:

  • Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin, and
  • The Commission found no evidence of a conspiracy, foreign or domestic.

As a member of the Commission, I endorsed those conclusions in 1964 and fully agree now as the sole surviving Commission member” (UA University Archives).

He would do so until the day he died. Interestingly, in 1997 it was revealed that Ford had pushed for changing the description of where the bullet entered Kennedy from “A bullet had entered his back at a point slightly below the shoulder to the right of the spine” to “A bullet had entered the back of his neck slightly to the right of the spine”, with the final report reading, “A bullet had entered the base of the back of his neck slightly to the right of the spine” (UPI). Ford had sought to alter the description to make it higher on his body to give further credence to the “single bullet theory”. Ford regarded the change as minor, but this certainly added to the view that the single bullet theory was cooked up. What’s more, while the CIA had a man on the commission in Allen Dulles, Ford was the FBI’s man on the commission, secretly providing information to Hoover about its proceedings (Andrews).

It is entirely possible that the Warren Commission got the big picture conclusion correct that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in killing Kennedy, but there was an undisputably political nature to the investigation, and numerous stones were left unturned in the process. The incompleteness of the Warren Commission would result in the also flawed House Committee on Assassinations in the 1970s and the proliferation of Kennedy assassination conspiracy theories. The effort to tamp down on rumors long run completely and utterly backfired. One element that was not ruled on in the investigation, but we now have information for is Oswald’s motivation.

Motivation of Lee Harvey Oswald

I do not wish to dive too deeply into the possibility of conspiracy, as that itself would require A LOT more coverage than this post, but I do want to say that the Warren Commission was quite incomplete and this is due not only to some self-imposed limitations by Chairman Earl Warren, the FBI and CIA misleading in their testimony, and failing to ascertain a motive for Oswald. The failure to ascertain a motive and the misleading by the CIA, however, are connected.

Ever since the Warren Commission’s conclusion, a convincing motive for Oswald has since been revealed. There is clear evidence indicating that he was a staunch supporter of Castro’s communist regime in Cuba, and this was a known fact to the Warren Commission. Indeed, he was a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and there is a photograph that exists of him passing out literature from said committee in New Orleans. He also invented the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and despite his claims of having 35 members, he was the only member. Oswald had engaged in activities he’d hoped would please the Cubans, including taking a shot at the right-wing activist General Edwin A. Walker.

Seven weeks before the Kennedy assassination, Oswald visited the Cuban embassy in Mexico, and he went to the Soviet and Cuban embassies, including meeting the KGB’s chief of assassinations in the region. The CIA as well as Cuban intelligence were monitoring him, and the Cubans had been keeping tabs on him since the past year. It has since been alleged, particularly by author and journalist Gus Russo, who wrote in his book on the Kennedys and Castros, Brothers in Arms, that representatives of the Cuban government egged him on to kill Kennedy, although they did not act beyond that. LBJ, as I noted earlier, thought that the Cubans were behind the assassination and feared that if the American public came to that conclusion that they would demand vengeance, potentially resulting in nuclear war. This, plus the CIA not wanting the public to know about its multiple operations to assassinate Castro, were reasons for the possibility of conspiracy to be tossed and for the CIA to mislead the Warren Commission. Furthermore, the FBI and CIA wished to avoid potential blame for failing to prevent President Kennedy’s assassination.

References

Andrews, E. (2013, November 18). 9 Things You May Not Know About the Warren Commission. History Channel.

Retrieved from

https://www.history.com/news/9-things-you-may-not-know-about-the-warren-commission

Assassination Expert Says Cubans Encouraged Oswald to Kill JFK. (2021, November 22). The Mob Museum.

Retrieved from

https://themobmuseum.org/blog/assassination-expert-says-cubans-encouraged-oswald-to-kill-jfk/

Bickel, A. (1966, October). The Failure of the Warren Report. Commentary Magazine.

Retrieved from

The Failure of the Warren Report

Bush, B. (2024, September 24). 60 years on, Warren Commission witness testimony adds intrigue to story of JFK death. The Columbus Dispatch.

Retrieved from

https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/history/2024/09/24/warren-commission-report-released-60-years-ago-today-still-intrigues/75279059007/

Cray, E. (1997). “Facts So Simple”. Chief justice: a biography of Earl Warren. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Davison, P. (1997, October 11). LBJ thought Cuba had Kennedy killed. The Independent.

Retrieved from

https://www.the-independent.com/news/lbj-thought-cuba-had-kennedy-killed-1235502.html

Erickson, M. (2013, November 8). JFK: Why JFK’s assassination has spawned so much speculation. The State Journal-Register.

Retrieved from

https://www.sj-r.com/story/special/special-sections/2013/11/08/jfk-why-jfk-s-assassination/41952936007/

F.B.I. Says Oswald Threatened Agent. (1975, August 31). The New York Times.

Retrieved from

Gerald Ford Reaffirms Warren Commission Conclusion That Oswald Assassinated JFK. UA University Archives.

Retrieved from

https://www.universityarchives.com/auction-lot/gerald-ford-reaffirms-warren-commission-conclusio_7BD4722AE4

Gerth, J. (2013, November 22). Cooper said serving on Warren Commission “too personal”. The Courier-Journal.

Retrieved from

https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2013/11/22/cooper-said-serving-on-warren-commission-too-personal-/3674217/

Johnson Said He Doubted Finding on Assassination. (1994, April 17). The New York Times.

Retrieved from

Kaplan, R. (2013, October 27). New book reveals how much FBI, CIA knew about Oswald before Kennedy assassination. CBS News.

Retrieved from

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-book-reveals-how-much-fbi-cia-knew-about-oswald-before-kennedy-assassination/

Report: Ford edited JFK report. (1997, July 3). UPI.

Retrieved from

https://www.upi.com/Archives/1997/07/03/Report-Ford-edited-JFK-report/9274867902400/

Sabato, L.J. (2013, November 21). Is there more to JFK assassination? CNN.

Retrieved from

https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/15/opinion/sabato-jfk-assassination/index.html

Senator Clarifies His View On Oswald. (1970, January 20). The New York Times.

Retrieved from

Shenon, P. (2015, February 2). What the Warren Commission Didn’t Know. Politico.

Retrieved from

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/warren-commission-jfk-investigators-114812/

Shenon, P. (2015, March 18). What Was Lee Harvey Oswald Doing in Mexico? Politico.

Retrieved from

https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/jfk-assassination-lee-harvey-oswald-mexico-116195/

Simkin, J. (1997). John Sherman Cooper. Spartacus Educational.

Retrieved from

https://spartacus-educational.com/USAcopperJS.htm

Simkin, J. (1997). Thomas Hale Boggs. Spartacus Educational.

Retrieved from

https://spartacus-educational.com/JFKboggs.htm

Special Section: The Warren Commission Report. (1964, October 2). Time Magazine.

Retrieved from

https://time.com/3422341/the-warren-commission-report/

Swift, A. (2013, November 15). Majority in U.S. Still Believe JFK Killed in a Conspiracy. Gallup.

Retrieved from

https://news.gallup.com/poll/165893/majority-believe-jfk-killed-conspiracy.aspx

Views and Dissent of Members of the Committee. National Archives.

Retrieved from

https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-4.html

Wilkes, D.E. (2003, November 8). Sen. Richard Russell and the Great American Murder Mystery. University of Georgia School of Law.

Retrieved from

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1137&context=fac_pm

Fascinating Politics

The Warren Commission – The Flawed Quest for Consensus, Part I: Foundations and Investigation

Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and chairman of the Warren Commission

On November 22, 1963, the United States faced one of its greatest tragedies in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Although a controversial president in his day, Kennedy has since become an admired figure for Americans of many stripes. Only two days later, his assassin Lee Harvey Oswald was shot dead in the Dallas Police Garage while being transferred from city to county jail by Jack Ruby. In the wake of these events, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued Executive Order 11130 on November 29th, authorizing the creation of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, which would popularly become known as the Warren Commission. Johnson was initially not for doing this, rather this was done to head off potential Senate and House investigations into the matter. The chairman was Chief Justice Earl Warren, whose tenure over the Supreme Court was highly transformative and controversial, and who had resisted multiple lobbying efforts by LBJ to place him on the commission, only being convinced to do so as Johnson foretold catastrophe if he wasn’t there. Also tapped for the committee were:

Senator Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and de facto leader of the Southern Democratic bloc of the Senate. He initially refused to be on the committee because he didn’t want to serve with Warren over his desegregation decisions, but the crafty fox LBJ basically voluntold him to be on the committee by publicly stating that Russell was going to be on the committee.

Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.), formerly Ambassador to India and highly respected on both sides of the aisle, one of the least partisan senators.

Representative Hale Boggs (D-La.), majority whip of the House.

Representative Gerald Ford (R-Mich.), a rising star in the GOP and chairman of the House Republican Conference.

John J. McCloy, chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations. McCloy is quite the figure, and one of the most powerful men in American politics to have never been elected to public office, as he held multiple positions of power in the government throughout his long life. I intend to write an extensive post about him one of these days.

Allen Dulles, director of the CIA, 1953-1961. Dulles was placed on the commission by LBJ to make sure that questions were not asked of CIA operatives that could expose operations.

On December 5th, the Warren Commission met for the first time to formally begin the investigation. 552 witnesses testified before the Warren Commission, including Oswald’s mother and wife, people present on the day of the assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnson and other politicians, police officers, contacts of Oswald and Ruby, CIA director John McCone and FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, and some others. Not all witness testimony proved productive. For instance, Professor Revilo P. Oliver was called to testify before the Warren Commission because of his article titled “Marxmanship in Dallas”, in which he claimed the possibility that Kennedy was assassinated because he was turning away from the communist mission. Oliver’s testimony proved both contradictory and based on speculation. However, more relevant problems would arise with the testimony of others to the committee, which will be covered in the second part. In the process of the investigation, Warren Commission staff member Arlen Specter (who would later have a 30-year career in the Senate) concluded that a single bullet went through both President Kennedy and Governor Connally, and this would become accepted in the report of the committee, although there was a lot more internal controversy than people at the time knew of the report’s release, but that will be for the second part.

On September 24, 1964, the Commission officially released its findings, exactly ten months after Oswald had been killed. The Commission reached the following major conclusions with all members signing the report:

  1. There was no conspiracy, foreign or domestic, to kill JFK.
  2. Lee Harvey Oswald was the sole man responsible for the assassination of JFK.
  3. There was a single bullet fired that went through both Kennedy and Governor Connally.
  4. Oswald had also shot Officer J.D. Tippit 45 minutes later.
  5. Jack Ruby acted alone in murdering Lee Harvey Oswald.

At first, the public seemed to accept this conclusion. However, with time flaws and complications surrounding the committee and its work would come to public attention and the public would increasingly doubt the Warren Commission’s conclusions, as many do to this day. The next post will cover reactions, criticisms, and an overall takeaway from the Warren Commission’s views.

References

Andrews, E. (2024, August 19). 9 Things You May Not Know About the Warren Commission. History Channel.

Retrieved from

https://www.history.com/news/9-things-you-may-not-know-about-the-warren-commission

Erickson, M. (2013, November 8). JFK: Why JFK’s assassination has spawned so much speculation. The State Journal-Register.

Retrieved from

https://www.sj-r.com/story/special/special-sections/2013/11/08/jfk-why-jfk-s-assassination/41952936007/

Special Section: The Warren Commission Report. (1964, October 2). Time Magazine.

Retrieved fromhttps://time.com/3422341/the-warren-commission-report/

Fascinating Politics

Walter F. George: Georgia’s Dignified Statesman 

The state of Georgia has had the benefit of having some political heavy-hitters in the Senate, most notably Richard Russell and Walter Franklin George (1878-1957). George was an attorney by profession, and he reached the prominence of serving on the state’s Supreme Court from 1917 until his resignation in 1922.

George in his early years in the Senate.

On September 26, 1922, Senator Thomas E. Watson, a fiery populist, died suddenly of a cerebral hemorrhage. Governor Thomas Hardwick, an anti-suffragist seeking to improve his political position with women, appointed Rebecca Latimer Felton to serve for a single day when the Senate was out of session, thus she cast no votes and the appointment was only symbolic. The true successor to Watson would be George. In this time, he was considered to be a liberal, and yes, in the more modern sense. The progressive The Searchlight magazine affirms this, “Among the new Senators, Dill, Wheeler, Mayfield, Copeland, and George are reported as fighting liberals, with Ferris and Ralston not far behind” (5). He undoubtedly was compared to the Republican presidents and most of the GOP’s officeholders of the day, opposing most of the policies of the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover Administrations. This may seem rather strange given George’s historical reputation as a conservative, but there were numerous figures who were considered progressive or liberal in the 1920s who would prove a lot more conservative during the Roosevelt Administration. Indeed, among George’s positions were higher income taxes on the wealthy and backing veterans bonus legislation over President Coolidge’s veto. As a senator, he carried a respectable and dignified demeanor and even his wife, Lucy, would address him as “Senator George” (Hill). Speaking of his wife, she was something of a contrast to him. While George conveyed himself as a man of high dignity, Lucy was more down-to-earth and liked on Capitol Hill, including for her willingness to listen to and tell risqué stories (Hill). Like all other Georgia politicians of his day who won public office, George opposed all civil rights proposals, but he refrained from making race an issue in his campaigns and never promoted race hatred.

George and The New Deal

Although George had not backed FDR in the Democratic primary, he did support his 1932 campaign as well as most of the early New Deal measures, seeing in particular value in regulating the stock market with the Securities and Exchange Act, aid to agriculture through the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. He also backed the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933 and the Wagner Act in 1935, the latter being known as the “magna carta” of law protecting organized labor. George also supported veterans’ bonus legislation in 1935 and 1936, but this was in opposition to FDR, who wanted to hold down expenditures.

George vs. FDR

Although when he was first appointed to the Senate in 1922, George had a reputation as a progressive, by 1935 he was beginning to have some reservations about the New Deal, and he crossed FDR in his opposition to the “Death Sentence Clause” of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act and to bituminous coal regulation. He also opposed FDR’s court packing plan and his reorganization plan, the latter which critics dubbed the “dictator bill”. On August 11, 1938, Roosevelt delivered a speech in Barnesville, Georgia with George directly behind him, in which he sought to influence the Democratic primary. He stated after praising George for his intelligence and character, “Here in Georgia, my old friend, the senior Senator from the State, cannot possibly in my judgment be classified as belonging to the liberal school of thought – and, therefore, the argument that he has long served in the Senate falls by the wayside” and finished his assessment of George and politics with, “Therefore, answering the requests that have come to me from many leading citizens of Georgia that I make my position clear, I have no hesitation in saying that if I were able to vote in the September primaries in this State, I most assuredly should cast my ballot for Lawrence Camp” (The American Presidency Project). With this speech, Roosevelt, who was making an early effort at creating ideologically responsible parties, essentially read George out of the party. After the speech, George shook his hand and reportedly said, “I regret that you have taken this occasion to question my democracy. I accept the challenge” (Hill). Roosevelt had miscalculated badly on his purge effort, believing that his personal popularity in Georgia would move the needle in the primary, and George was renominated with FDR’s preferred candidate, Camp, coming in third behind Eugene Talmadge, who FDR wanted in office even less than George. With this victory, George both gained more stature in the Senate, particularly among FDR’s opponents, and subsequently opposed him more on domestic policy. FDR had made things worse for himself with this effort, and he would not attempt to meddle in primaries again. Reportedly, when someone around him remarked that Roosevelt was his own worst enemy, George remarked, “Not while I am still alive!” (Hill)

Committee Chairmanships and Influence

On November 10, 1940, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Key Pittman (D-Nev.) died as a consequence of his alcoholism and George was next in line. He had come in at a rather critical time, and was chairman when FDR was pushing through Lend-Lease. Unlike on domestic policy, George was supportive of Roosevelt as his foreign policy was consistent with Wilsonian moralism and he was instrumental in pushing the measure through. However, his time on the Foreign Relations Committee would be short, and in 1941 he would reluctantly move to the chairmanship of the Senate Finance Committee, which was and is of similar importance to the Foreign Relations Committee. A confidential intelligence report on him from the British Foreign Office’s Isaiah Berlin read, “an honourable but narrow Southern Conservative, who incurred the displeasure of the New Deal in 1938 when an unsuccessful attempt to “purge” him was made by its then leaders (in particular [Edward] Flynn, [Harry] Hopkins, and [Thomas] Corcoran). This attempt increased his popularity in his State and in the Senate. He left the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee in order to head the equally important Finance Committee, and is an exceedingly influential figure in the Senate, and the hope of Conservatives in many parts of the United States” (Hachey, 141-153). World War II would bring a tragedy to George and his wife, as one of their sons was a casualty. His other son, Heard, would later serve as his administrative assistant.

As chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, taxation was under his purview, and he was supportive of wartime tax relief, which FDR opposed. The final tax relief legislation would pass in 1944 over President Roosevelt’s veto, the first time a revenue bill had ever become law over a president’s veto. George would also support the Republican 80th Congress on income tax reduction, contrary to the position of the Truman Administration. He would also oppose the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations on labor policy, voting to override President Roosevelt’s veto of the Smith-Connally Labor Disputes Act in 1943 and President Truman’s veto of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.

Although George’s realm was in the Finance Committee, he remained a respected and influential voice on foreign affairs, and he backed the Truman Administration on Greek-Turkish aid and the Marshall Plan as did most Democrats. He also defended the latter from conservative efforts to cut the program on multiple occasions, but did not support Point IV aid, or foreign aid to poor rather than war-torn nations.

The George Amendment

In 1954, Senator John W. Bricker (R-Ohio) pushed for amending the Constitution for Congress to check the power of the presidency on foreign policy, and such a proposal was proving popular in the South. Minority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Tex.), however, was privately opposed to this measure, holding that it was “the worst bill I can think of” and asserted that it would be “the bane of every president we elect”, and was of course thinking of himself as well (Caro, 528). He thus courted Senator George to offer a substitute, and offer he did, while opposing a stronger version of the Bricker Amendment that was voted down. The Bricker Amendment as amended by George was adopted as a substitute, but its ratification failed by one vote.

George seemed to lessen in his conservatism a bit during the Eisenhower Administration if Americans for Democratic Action and Americans for Constitutional Action ratings are good measures for judging legislators, and in 1956 he sponsored a proposal to reduce the minimum age of receiving disability benefits under Social Security to 50, which was narrowly adopted 47-45. After all, George was something of a liberal on Social Security, having voted against the Knowland Amendment in 1950 which restricted the ability of the Social Security Administration to place mandatory minimums on unemployment compensation on states. By this time, George was 78 years old and looking at a strong primary challenge from former Governor Herman Talmadge, who was more willing to focus on race than George. He opted not to run for reelection given his heart condition as well as many of his supporters wavering on whether they’d vote for him in the primary (Hill). George’s DW-Nominate score, which covers his entire career, was a -0.064, which is high for a Democrat; from 1947 to 1956 he sided with the ADA position on key votes they counted 38% of the time, but only sided with the ACA position on key votes they counted 18% of the time. However, for the latter, this is a much more limited measure as they only counted votes for 1955 and 1956. George was overall his own man, his vote being one of dignified independence of presidential and party priorities. President Dwight Eisenhower subsequently selected him as the ambassador to NATO. However, it turned out to be just as well that he hadn’t run for reelection as he suffered a fatal heart attack on August 4, 1957. President Eisenhower subsequently ordered all US flags at federal buildings and other properties flown at half-mast in mourning.

References

ADA Voting Records. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

ADA Voting Records

Address at Barnesville, Georgia. The American Presidency Project.

Retrieved from

https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-barnesville-georgia

Borglum, G. (1922, November 30). Harding’s Challenge to Democracy. The Searchlight.

Retrieved from

https://books.google.com/books?id=1ZAeAQAAMAAJ&pg=RA5-PA8&lpg=RA5-PA8&dq#v=onepage&q&f=false

Caro, R. (2002). The years of Lyndon B. Johnson: Master of the Senate. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

George, Walter Franklin. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/3536/walter-franklin-george

Hachey, T.E. (1973-1974, Winter). American Profiles on Capitol Hill: A Confidential Study for the British Foreign Office in 1943. Wisconsin Magazine of History, 57(2): 141-153.

Retrieved from

Click to access bib139a.pdf

Hill, R. Senator Walter F. George: George of Georgia. The Knoxville Focus.

Retrieved from

https://www.knoxfocus.com/archives/senator-walter-f-george-george-of-georgia/

Pou, C. (2008, January 29). Walter F. George. New Georgia Encyclopedia.

Retrieved from

https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/walter-f-george-1878-1957/

Fascinating Politics

John Overton: Huey Long’s Defender and Hater of Daylight Savings Time

In the stead of larger-than-life characters, their key helpers get overlooked, and that is certainly the case with John Holmes Overton (1875-1948), whose time in politics was longer than that of his famous friend, Huey Long.

An attorney by profession, Overton attempted to get into office in 1918 when he ran for the Senate, but lost the primary to Edward Gay, who served only a short time before opting to call it quits. In the meantime, Overton befriended the considerably younger Huey Long of the Louisiana Public Service Commission, which if it was in any part political calculation, it was a highly intelligent one. Although Long’s first bid for governor failed in 1924, four years later he was elected. His methods of using (and abusing) his power resulted in his impeachment in 1929, and in the process, Overton served as his counsel. He defended him thusly, in language that perhaps we find familiar, “I’ve supported every governor that has been elected in Louisiana for twenty-five years, all on promises that they have made to the people. Not one of them has been able or, if able, willing to carry out what was expected of him. The present governor is throwing out of office the clique that all other governors promised to throw out. He is backed to the wall in his efforts to redeem his campaign pledge” (Long, 149). After a round robin statement was issued by a group of state senators that they wouldn’t impeach him under any circumstances, it was clear that Long would remain in office. In 1930, Overton was elected to the House for a single term, and his voting was at that time on the liberal side. As a loyal Long man, Long was sure to throw his weight in support of him in the 1932 Senate election, in which he defeated Edwin Broussard, who was of the Democratic Party’s conservative wing. It sure didn’t help Broussard that he hadn’t supported Long’s run for the Senate two years earlier. From 1933 to 1935, Overton served with Long in the Senate, and Overton mostly voted with Long, although unlike Long he voted for the Reciprocal Trade Act in 1934.

Overton’s political benefactor was assassinated in 1935, but his career survived; he was easily renominated in his own right in 1938. Incidentally, after his reelection, his record began increasingly shifting to the right. Like many Southerners during the Roosevelt Administration, Overton grew more conservative over time despite his initial support of New Deal laws. In 1939, Overton voted against the Neutrality Act Amendments, which repealed the arms embargo, thus permitting the US to trade arms with belligerent nations. However, he would support the Lend-Lease Act in 1941. By 1944, the rotund Overton was in declining health, and he initially announced that he would not run again. However, pleas to reconsider from many of his Senate colleagues as well as Governor James Noe announcing that he would run for the Senate convinced him to reconsider, and he won renomination (which was tantamount to reelection for a Democrat in Louisiana).

Overton vs. Daylight Savings Time

Of all the senators, no one was more opposed to Daylight Savings Time than John Overton. Daylight Savings Time was used inconsistently since World War I, but President Roosevelt reenacted it in 1942, which lasted until September 30, 1945 (national daylight savings time would come long-term with the Uniform Time Act of 1966). Overton in response threatened to place an ad in the lost and found section of the newspaper reading, “Lost — somewhere between sunrise and sunset, one golden hour, set with 60 diamond minutes. No reward is offered; it is lost forever” (Hill). Overton would not even in practice accept it during this time. His office’s schedule ran on what he referred to as “God’s time”, placing a sign on his office that read, “This Office Runs on God’s Time”, and this humorously made coordinating meetings with him a bit of a challenge for his fellow Louisianan Allen Ellender (Hill).

The 80th Congress and the End

In 1947, Overton attempted to have Senator Theodore Bilbo (D-Miss.) seated, which the Republican majority refused to do due to Bilbo’s publicly implying that intimidation and violence should be used to prevent blacks from voting. Although Huey Long was seen as favorable to the working man, Overton came to the conclusion that many Southerners and Republicans had…labor unions had become too powerful. To liberals, his vote for the Taft-Hartley Act was a repudiation of the working man. George S. Long, Huey Long’s brother, wrote to him that “you have quit the people who elected you to office” (Hill). In the 80th Congress, the liberal Americans for Democratic Action found that in 1947 he had voted their way 5 out of 9 times and the following year 5 out of 8 times. His overall DW-Nominate score was -0.053, which is just a hair higher than that of departing Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia, and lower than that of Susan Collins. Per that scaling system, Overton is both to the right of all Democrats serving in Congress and to the left of all Republicans serving in Congress. Overton supported Truman’s foreign policy as well as his stance against GOP-pushed tax reductions in the 80th Congress, while opposing public housing and the nomination of David Lilienthal to head the Atomic Energy Commission. His poor health caught up with him in May 1948 when he developed an intestinal obstruction. Although he had emergency surgery, he died on the 14th.

References

Congressional Supplement. (1948). Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Click to access 1948.pdf

Hill, R. (2016, May 1). Huey Long’s Lawyer: Senator John Overton of Louisiana. The Knoxville Focus.

Retrieved from

Huey Long’s Lawyer: Senator John Overton of Louisiana

Long, H.P. (1933). Every man a king: the autobiography of Huey P. Long. New Orleans, LA: National Book Club, Inc.

Overton, John Holmes. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/7126/john-holmes-overton

Report Card for 80th Congress. (1947). Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

Click to access 1947.pdf

S. Res 1. White Motion That the Oath of Office be Administered to Brewster. Taft Motion to Table Overton Motion to Substitute the Name of Bilbo. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/80-1947/s2

Fascinating Politics

FDR vs. Veterans Benefits

The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) is aiming to find waste, inefficiency, and areas to cut government spending. One subject that they have touched on is veterans benefits as has prospective Trump nominee to the post of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. On that one from a historical perspective, they are in for one hell of a fight! Veterans’ benefits have a long history of being politically difficult to resist. In 1949, for instance, the House by only one vote rejected Veterans Affairs Committee chairman John Rankin’s (D-Miss.) measure that would have provided for a massive pension program for World War I and World War II veterans at $90 a month (or $1,193.69 in October 2024 dollars) starting at age 65 that at the same time would have served to fiscally prevent President Truman from expanding Social Security as he planned (Time Magazine). The measure’s defeat was in no small part due to the vocal opposition of certain World War II veterans in Congress, most notably Olin “Tiger” Teague of Texas, the second-highest decorated soldier of the war. Even President Roosevelt at the height of his power struggled with the issue.

Speaker Henry Rainey (D-Ill.) was perfectly willing to let the executive branch write laws and have the House rubber stamp them, but there was a fight in the early New Deal that Roosevelt lost, and not even the opposition of Speaker Rainey could overcome this, and this was on funding New Deal programs in part through cuts in veterans’ benefits.

The first New Deal law to pass, and one that actually got substantial support from conservatives, was the Economy Act, which cut spending for the purposes of making room in the budget for FDR’s New Deal programs and served to effectively repeal all laws passed after the War of the Rebellion for veterans’ pensions, granting FDR the power to restructure veterans’ benefits, and he did so by cutting benefits by over $400 million. This provoked a lot of bipartisan opposition, including from individuals thought of as progressive in this time, such as Senator Burton Wheeler (D-Mont.). On June 14, 1933, the Senate responded to FDR’s veterans’ benefits reduction with the Steiwer (R-Ore.)-Cutting (R-N.M.) amendment 51-39 (D 19-39; R 31-0; P 1-0) to the Independent Offices Appropriations bill, which if enacted into law would have only permitted Roosevelt to cut up to 25% of an individual veteran’s benefits, amounting to a maximum overall reduction between $100-160 million. Interestingly, this vote presaged further opposition to Roosevelt’s agenda in the future, most notably on foreign policy, from certain senators who were at least nominally for the New Deal at this point, including Wheeler, Pat McCarran of Nevada, and Robert R. Reynolds of North Carolina. This was also a point of contention between the flamboyant Huey Long of Louisiana and the president. Roosevelt was prepared to veto the bill if the amendment remained, but the House came to his rescue and refused to adopt Steiwer-Cutting 177-209 (D 79-201; R 93-8; FL 1-0) the following day. However, the battle was far from over on veterans’ benefits, the most hotly contested part of the Economy Act, and the House voted to increase veterans benefits to largely offset Roosevelt’s cuts. Although President Roosevelt vetoed the bill, the House overrode his veto of the bill 310 to 72 (D 209-70; R 97-2; FL 4-0) on March 27, 1934. Among Republicans, only Robert Luce and George Tinkham of Massachusetts, normally opponents of Roosevelt and the New Deal, voted against this effort. Although Majority Leader Robinson (D-Ark.) was more successful at persuading his fellow Democrats to sustain Roosevelt’s veto, his veto was overridden the following day 63-27 (D 29-27; R 33-0; FL 1-0) that same day. This would be predictive of the override of another of President Roosevelt’s vetoes, on the Patman Bonus bill. Like President Hoover before him, Roosevelt opposed the Patman Bonus bill, which permitted veterans to collect their bonuses at any time as opposed to 1945 as established by the 1924 World War Adjusted Compensation Act as a budget-busting measure. Unlike with the appropriations bill, he got some sizeable conservative Republican support for his position. Although the House overrode President Roosevelt’s veto on May 22, 1935, 322-98 (D 248-60; R 64-38; P 7-0; FL 3-0), Majority Leader Joseph Robinson (D-Ark.) was successful in getting the Senate to sustain the veto the following day 54-40 (D 41-28; R 12-12; P 1-0). However, a compromise Patman bill was pressed into 1936. This one managed to pass over President Roosevelt’s veto, with members of Congress feeling more pressure as the next election approached. The House voted to do so on January 24th 326-61 (D 249-32; R 67-29; P 7-0; FL 3-0) and the Senate voted to do so 76-19 (D 57-12; 17-7; P 1-0; FL 1-0) three days later. Although veterans’ organizations advised veterans to wait until 1945 to collect, many chose to do so right away. This measure would essentially serve as a stimulus for veterans. Roosevelt would later do quite well for veterans in his signing of the GI Bill in 1944.

References

Ortiz, S.R. (2009). Beyond the Bonus March and GI Bill: How Veteran Politics Shaped the New Deal Era. New York, NY: NYU Press.

Retrieved from

https://academic.oup.com/nyu-press-scholarship-online/book/16388/chapter-abstract/171539464?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Senate Votes 51 to 39; Adopts New Increases for Veterans Despite Leaders’ Pleas. (1933, June 15). The New York Times.

Retrieved from

https://www.nytimes.com/1933/06/15/archives/senate-votes-51-to-39-adopts-new-increases-for-veterans-despite.html

The Congress: Rankin’s Revenge. (1949, February 28). Time Magazine.

Retrieved from

https://time.com/archive/6602178/the-congress-rankins-revenge/

To Amend H.R. 5389, by Amending Sec 20, Authorizing President to Establish Review Boards Dealing with Veterans Pensions. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/73-1/s97

To Concur in an Amendment to H.R. 5389. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/73-1/h61

To Override the President’s Veto of H.R. 3896. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/74-1/s69

To Override the Veto of H.R. 9870. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/74-2/s138

To Pass H.R. 3896, the Objections of the President of the United States Notwithstanding. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes#session=217&chamber%5B%5D=2

To Pass H. 9870 Over the Objections of the President of the United States. Govtrack.

Retrieved from

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/74-2/h138

Fascinating Politics

Franklin D. Roosevelt…Jr.: An Underwhelming Presidential Son

Although there is no royalty in the United States and never can be as a matter of constitutionality (unless we decide to repeal that part of the Constitution for reasons that escape me), there have been political families who have been tremendously influential: the Kennedys, the Bushes, and the Roosevelts. Two of FDR’s sons had political careers of their own in FDR Jr. and James Roosevelt. Today I will be writing about the former, who fell far from the tree of his father in terms of political acumen.

When it came to war service, President Roosevelt was no hypocrite, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt Jr. (1914-1988) served in the war and he did so with honor. In his personal life, however, Roosevelt Jr. had issues, being married a grand total of five times. In 1948, he sought to recruit Dwight Eisenhower for the Democratic nomination, not knowing that his true sympathies lay with the Republicans. His time for public office would come in 1949.

Congressional Career

In 1949, longtime Congressman Sol Bloom, who had been chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, died, and Roosevelt Jr. ran to succeed him, managing to defeat the Tammany Hall picked candidate as the Liberal candidate. Roosevelt Jr., who would win his subsequent reelections as a Democrat, was per Americans for Democratic Action a perfect liberal during his time in Congress, never having voted against a single one of the issues they regarded as a key vote. He supported public housing, price controls, foreign aid, reciprocal trade, public power, more immigration, and opposed the McCarran Internal Security Act. His DW-Nominate score was quite a low -0.619. Although Roosevelt Jr. was a perfect liberal by the standards of Americans for Democratic Action, he proved a poor member of Congress for laziness and general lack of enthusiasm for the job. Speaker Sam Rayburn of Texas would tell his brother James upon his entrance into Congress in 1955 to “not waste our time like your brother did”, and James himself would recount that Jr. “had a dreadful record in Congress. He was smart, but not smart enough. He had good ideas and the power of persuasion, but he did not put them to good use. He coasted instead of working at his job, considering it beneath him, while he aimed for higher positions. He may have had the worst attendance record of any member of those days, and it cost him those higher positions” (Roosevelt, 314). Instead of running for reelection for Congress, Roosevelt Jr. ran for attorney general, but was defeated by fellow Congressman Jacob Javits, thus being the only Democrat to lose a statewide election that year.

In 1960, he served as something of a bulldog for his friend John F. Kennedy’s campaign in the hopes that he could revive his faltering political career, and falsely insinuated during the West Virginia primary that Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.), who was also running for the nomination, had been a draft-dodger during World War II (Time Magazine). The truth was that Humphrey was not allowed to fight due to a disability, and Roosevelt would subsequently apologize. Kennedy’s win in that race tipped the primary decisively for him. Although Kennedy had initially wanted Roosevelt to be Secretary of the Navy, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara nixed the idea. Roosevelt would instead serve as Under Secretary of Commerce from 1963 to 1965. Any hope Roosevelt Jr. had of further rise died with Kennedy, although he did serve in one more federal position as head of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from 1965 to 1966. Roosevelt made one last bid for elective office in running for governor on the Liberal Party ticket in 1966, but he didn’t stand a snowball’s chance in hell against the powerhouse of incumbent Nelson Rockefeller.

Roosevelt would pursue business ventures for the remainder of his life, including the distribution of imported cars. He died on August 17, 1988, his 74th birthday, of lung cancer.

References

ADA Voting Records. Americans for Democratic Action.

Retrieved from

ADA Voting Records

Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr. Dies of Lung Cancer at 74. Los Angeles Times.

Retrieved from

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-08-17-mn-651-story.html

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr. Columbian College of Arts & Sciences.

Retrieved from

https://erpapers.columbian.gwu.edu/franklin-delano-roosevelt-jr-1914-1988

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, Jr. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/8050/franklin-delano-roosevelt-jr

Roosevelt, J. (1976). My Parents: A Differing View. Los Angeles, CA: Playboy Press.

The Administration: Roosevelt’s Reward. (1963, February 8). Time Magazine.

Retrieved from https://time.com/archive/6626000/the-administration-roosevelts-reward/

Fascinating Politics

Worcester v. Georgia: The Ignored Supreme Court Decision

The idea of defiance of the Supreme Court is one that seems remote in the minds of many, although the court is certainly unpopular among liberals right now, an outright defiance of any one decision still seems remote. The closest that a president came to defying the Supreme Court as far as my memory goes was if the Supreme Court had ruled against FDR in the Gold Clause Cases in 1935. They ruled for the Administration 5-4, but Roosevelt had every intention to defy the court if they ruled otherwise, and the Supreme Court had ruled against numerous New Deal laws without FDR defying their verdicts. Andrew Jackson and the state of Georgia, however, did in 1832.

Samuel A. Worcester

One of President Jackson’s priorities, which really appealed to the South at the time, was moving the five civilized tribes out of their ancestral lands to make room for settlers to farm. Although popular in the South, the issue was highly controversial, and the Whig Party was opposed. The vote in the House was exceptionally close at 102 to 97. In the meantime, the tribes had a number of white sympathizers, which included missionaries. One of these missionaries was Samuel A. Worcester, who was helping the Cherokee, and Georgia’s state government didn’t appreciate their efforts. The state in response passed a law that prohibited whites from living in tribal land unless they got a special license from Georgia’s governor and swore an oath to the state. Worcester and his fellow missionaries were subsequently arrested, convicted, and imprisoned. He appealed his imprisonment to the Supreme Court, and in 1832 they ruled 5-1 in Worcester v. Georgia that Georgia had no authority to make laws regarding Cherokee land, and that treating tribal land as separate nations was consistent with the history of treaties by the United States with the tribes. Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the court, holding that “the nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights as the undisputed possessors of the soil” (31 U.S. 515) Marshall conceded that the Cherokee had surrendered some sovereignty with treaties, that this was not sufficient for enacting such a law.

John Marshall

That was all well and good, except who was going to enforce it? Georgia refused to comply, and President Jackson refused to enforce the ruling. Although Jackson is famously reputed to have said to Brigadier General John Coffee, “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it”, what he actually said was, “The decision of the supreme court has fell still born, and they find that it cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate” (Garrison). Not as defiant, memorable, or smooth, right? After intense public pressure and criticism, the missionaries were pardoned the following year, and Indian removal would proceed in the coming years in what was infamously known as the Trail of Tears. That subject undoubtedly warrants a separate post.  Andrew Jackson would have greater appreciation of the Supreme Court, however, when it came to the Nullification Crisis, another subject that warrants a separate post in which South Carolina nullified two tariff laws as it found them unconstitutional, and Jackson proclaimed that South Carolina had no authority to determine constitutionality of federal legislation and that the Supreme Court had the ultimate authority on constitutionality (Rosen). The full stories of the Trail of Tears and nullification will be written about at a later date. Overall, it would be quite foreign and scandalous to us if a Supreme Court decision was actively defied and the White House would not enforce the ruling, indeed it would produce a Constitutional crisis. However, Worcester was not in vain and remains good law, thus it has served as a precedent for numerous Indian rights cases.

References

Garrison, T.A. (2004, April 27). Worcester v. Georgia. New Georgia Encyclopedia.

Retrieved from

https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/worcester-v-georgia-1832/

Rosen, J. (2006, December). The Supreme Court – The First Hundred Years. PBS 13.

Retrieved from

https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/supremecourt/antebellum/history2.html

Worcester v. Georgia. Encyclopedia Britannica.

Retrieved from

https://www.britannica.com/topic/Worcester-v-Georgia

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). Justia.

Retrieved from

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/31/515/

Fascinating Politics

Warren Austin: Conservative Internationalist

In 1930, Senator Frank Greene died during an operation, and selected to succeed him by Governor John E. Weeks was Frank C. Partridge, a personal friend and longtime presence in Vermont politics. The following year, however, there was to be an election to finish out the term, and prominent attorney Warren Austin (1877-1962) of St. Albans was persuaded to challenge Partridge, announcing shortly before the end of 1930. Although incumbency is often an advantage, in Partridge’s case it was not; he had to attend to the Senate while Austin was free to campaign across the state, delivering 60 speeches (Mazuzan, 130). Austin’s age was also to his advantage as he was 15 years younger than the 68-year old Partridge, and he won the Republican nomination for the election to finish the late Greene’s term. In 1931, winning the Republican nomination was tantamount to election, as Vermont was the Wyoming of its day in Republicanism.

Austin became a quick study of the Senate, and he thought there was some room for procedural change, namely that his fellow senators had too much room to bloviate (Mazuzan, 130-131). He voted like a traditional Republican, with a wariness of a largesse in federal government, spending, and the powers of the executive. This translated to a strong opposition to FDR’s New Deal, with him voting against all major “first 100 days” legislation except the Economy Act. As Austin wrote to his mother, “I am very apprehensive of the arbitrary powers which are being placed in the hands of one man” (Mazuzan, 131). Austin was opposed to measures he saw as intruding on states and localities as well as on individuals, and saw this in the New Deal. In particular, Austin strongly opposed the cancellation of air mail contracts based on ultimately unsubstantiated charges of fraud and collusion, writing “However unfortunate may seem the material and intimate results of the cancellations of the air-mail contracts and the acts which have succeeded that, the poignancy of the event was the grave and serious doubt excited in the minds of men and women of the purpose of the “New Deal” which is neither Republican nor Democratic. Is it an emergency policy? Or is it a permanent departure from free institutions and a surreptitious establishment, without the knowledge or consent of the people of ideas of government which are in conflict with the breeding, the traditions, and the settled purpose of the American people” (Mazuzan, 134). However, the politics of old were under increasing fire, even in Vermont. Austin’s opponent for reelection in 1934 was Fred C. Martin, FDR’s IRS collector for the state, who ran as a New Dealer and challenged Austin’s record as well as touted areas of Vermont that were assisted by New Deal programs. In a portend of Vermont’s future, this message got a lot of traction, particularly in the state’s western portion. In response Austin touted Vermont’s traditions, regarded the administration as pushing “foreign doctrines and socialistic ideas”, and asserted that there was a need for an independent voice from that of the Roosevelt Administration (Mazuzan, 138-139). Although the election result of Austin winning reelection was “business as usual”, he only won with 51% of the vote, and three western counties had voted for Martin. He would not change his ways for the most part in his next term on domestic issues and in 1935 he voted against Social Security. Only seven other senators either voted or paired against. In 1937, Austin would participate in the drafting of the Conservative Manifesto, a ten-point document proposing alternative policies to the New Deal that emphasized private enterprise and state as opposed to federal authority (Moore). In 1939, he was elected assistant minority leader and would serve as acting minority leader while Oregon’s Charles McNary was running for vice president.

Foreign Policy

Austin was well-versed in dissent, but this dissent was not confined to the ruling Democratic Party. Unlike most of his Republican colleagues before World War II, Austin was an internationalist. In 1935, he had voted for the US joining the World Court (one of FDR’s few policy defeats in his first term), and this debate largely portended the internationalist/anti-interventionist divide. Austin would vote for repealing the arms embargo in 1939, vote for the peacetime draft, be the Senate’s strongest supporter of Lend-Lease, and support permitting merchant ships to enter belligerent ports. He was even one of two Senate Republicans to oppose an amendment to the Lend-Lease bill striking aid for the USSR. He was interestingly at odds with his new colleague George Aiken both from right and left, as Aiken was significantly more liberal than him on domestic policy but was opposed to FDR’s foreign policy before World War II and more willing to permit age-based deferments to the draft. Austin strongly supported the creation of the United Nations, but kept national sovereignty in mind when he voted for the Connally Reservation, which excludes domestic disputes from the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. During the 1940s, Austin also moderated somewhat on domestic issues, for instance supporting retaining the National Youth Administration in 1943 and his support (albeit limited) of wartime price control. On August 2, 1946, Austin resigned from the Senate as President Truman announced his appointment as Ambassador to the United Nations. Austin’s DW-Nominate score was a 0.106, which seemed to strongly reflect his internationalism given that his record was mostly oppositional to the New Deal.

UN Ambassador

As Ambassador to the UN, Austin became known as a forceful advocate of the West as a cold warrior. During this time, he allegedly gaffed, “I hope Arabs and Jews will settle their differences in a truly Christian spirit”, but his assistant who was present held that what Austin was communicating was that as a Christian he would be impartial towards Muslims and Jews regarding the creation of Israel (Traveling for History). In 1951, Austin presented to the United Nations Security Council a Soviet submachine gun found in possession of captured North Korean troops to demonstrate that the Soviets were providing arms to them.

He served until two days after the end of the Truman Administration, with President Eisenhower picking another New England internationalist who had served in the Senate to replace him in Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.

Austin retired from public service after and was forced to curb his activities after suffering a stroke in October 1956. He died on December 25, 1962. Times have changed much in Vermont since he left office in 1946. For instance, his old Senate seat is held by none other than Bernie Sanders, a marked contrast to Austin’s anti-New Deal politics.

References

Austin, Warren Robinson. Voteview.

Retrieved from

https://voteview.com/person/296/warren-robinson-austin

Mazuzan, G.T. (1971). Vermont’s Traditional Republicanism vs. the New Deal: Warren Austin and the Election of 1934. Vermont Historical Society, 39(2).

Retrieved from

Click to access WarrenRAustin.pdf

Moore, J.R. (1965). Senator Josiah W. Bailey and the “Conservative Manifesto” of 1937. The Journal of Southern History, 31 (1), 21-39.

Retrieved from

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2205008

Warren Robinson Austin: First UN Ambassador Representing US. (2022, May 8). Traveling for History.

Retrieved from

Warren Robinson Austin: First UN Ambassador Representing US