We are now one week away from yet another election which is called the “most important of our lifetimes”, and the third election in which Donald Trump is the Republican nominee. Many observers, myself included, are regularly checking polls and even trying to be so bold as to predict outcomes. The first election that featured Trump, 2016, was the greatest upset in American political history since Truman defeated Dewey in 1948. The worst example of average polling being off was Wisconsin, in which Clinton, per the RealClearPolitics polling average, was up by 6.5, but Trump won by 0.7. None of the latest polls had put Trump on top, including the Republican firm Remington Research, which found Clinton at 8 points ahead. In fact, none of the polls from August until Election Day had Trump up. In the case of 1948, however, polling ended two weeks before the election. The 1936 poll by The Literary Digest, however, takes the cake. The magazine The Literary Digest issued a presidential straw poll every election year, and this had been predictive of the winner since 1916. Yet, their 1936 poll projected Republican Alf Landon as the winner with 57% of the vote and 370 electoral votes. As anyone with even a cursory knowledge about American history should know, we have not had a President Landon. Landon actually only won 37% of the vote and 8 electoral votes; only the voters of Maine and Vermont (they were very different states back then!) saw fit to vote out FDR. The Literary Digest had predicted 1916, which merits credit as it was a close race, but the others were landslides. All this, however, begs the question: how did this publication blow an even bigger landslide? Let’s look at their methodology.
The Literary Digest conducted one election straw poll per year, and they used three lists as sources: phone numbers, drivers’ registrations, and country club memberships (Emory Oxford College). For 1936, they contacted 10 million people for their survey, and from this they got 1,293,669 people who supported Landon and 972,897 people who supported Roosevelt. This approach had multiple methodological problems. The first, the conventional story, is that The Literary Digest had failed to account for the class polarization that came with the Roosevelt Administration…Americans in previous elections had voted more similarly based on class. Many working-class Americans in the North voted Republican in the past elections, and while the 1920s prosperity was part of it, they also supported the GOP’s high tariff platform, a mainstay as old as the party’s 1856 platform. However, FDR’s New Deal programs were highly appealing to many Americans going through hard times, while many in the upper strata had the luxury to think more about FDR’s growing political power as a source of peril and his policies were coming greatly out of their pockets. That the wealthy were overrepresented among those who had telephones, vehicle registrations, and country club memberships should go without saying.
Thus, wealthy people were way overrepresented in the straw poll, as they were disproportionately represented in their opposition to FDR. However, subsequent research pointed the finger at a much more important factor, the response rate to the poll. 10 million people had been sent the poll, but only 2.4 million responded! This constitutes a mere 24% response rate, which is sufficiently low to make the poll worthless. Substantially compromising the class narrative is that a majority of Americans who had telephones and vehicle registrations also supported Roosevelt (Lusinchi). Rather, it was people who were opposed to Roosevelt who had much stronger motivation to respond to the poll. This research partially debunked this traditional narrative, holding that the poor response rate to the poll was sufficient to produce the off result and that the overrepresentation was a secondary factor.
The error was so catastrophic that The Literary Digest folded in 1938. But with the demise of the magazine was the elevation of the Gallup poll. George Gallup was one of the pollsters who got 1936 right, and through his polling predicted an FDR win, albeit with 54% of the vote (PBS). Gallup had nonetheless managed to get the correct outcome by polling a representative sample of 3,000 people as opposed to The Literary Digest’s sample of 2.4 million people. This case illustrates the value of solid methodology in polling. We will not see an error of this magnitude in the polling averages of these races, and it is doubtful we will get something like 2016, which I regard as a black swan event.
References
2016 Wisconsin: Trump vs Clinton. RealClearPolling.
The role of Confederates in American political life after the War of the Rebellion is truly remarkable, even if their influence could never translate to being elected to the presidency or vice presidency. One of the more prominent figures in postwar America was Roger Quarles Mills (1832-1911) of Texas.
Early Political Life
As a young man, Mills was an attorney by profession in Corsicana and identified as a Whig, which is strange when you consider his stance on trade in his time in Congress. However, the dissolution of the Whig Party due to both to their devastating 1852 presidential election loss and most finally the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 had him move into the American (“Know Nothing”) Party, which was common for Southern Whigs. Mills was as a Texas politician a defender of slavery and shifted into the Democratic Party in the late 1850s as the Republican Party overtook the American Party as the core opposition to the Democrats. Even before the outcome of the 1860 election he was supporting secession over the issue of slavery. That year, he voted for Democrat John Cabell Breckinridge, but Breckinridge’s support was largely confined to the South. After this loss, Mills solidly supported secession, and this position was highly popular in Texas including Navarro County, which included Corsicana. 94% of the people who voted in Navarro County’s public referendum on secession were in support (Putman). With Texas’s departure from the Union, he left with it, serving as an officer in the Confederate Army, participating in numerous battles and rising to the rank of colonel.
During Reconstruction, Mills coordinated the activities of Texas’s KKK, but as a very loosely organized group, he may have had no direct hand in its violence. As historian Christopher Long (2021) notes, “Members of every social stratum belonged to the Klan, though the more respectable elite usually shied away from acts of violence”. In 1869, Grand Wizard Nathan Bedford Forrest ordered the disbanding of the Klan, but the Klan continued into the early 1870s.
Although the 1872-1873 elections were a triumph for Grant and the Republicans, this was not the case in Texas. In 1873, Republican Governor Edmund Davis was seeking reelection and in Corsicana a big barbeque dinner was held with a politically and racially mixed audience with black policemen part of the governor’s entourage he delivered a speech defending his policies and advocating for his reelection. Stepping up to retort was Mills. Researcher Wyvonne Putnam (1988) wrote on the impact of the speech, “Paying no attention to the Negro police he broke into one of those extemporaneous speeches so typical of him when roused. He lambasted Davis’ administration up one side and down the other. Especially did he denounce Davis’ use of the Negro police. The crowd was taken off its feet by his oratory, and when he sat down they cheered long and loud. The Negroes, who as a race always know a strong man when they see one, were not a whit behind the whites in the applause. So taken back was Davis by the demonstration that he did not stay to partake of the barbecue dinner, but got in his buggy and headed for Austin. Largely on the strength of this episode Mills was elected to Congress”.
As a member of Congress, Mills was a loud and proud Democrat, and embraced the label of “free trader”, a label that even many Democrats shied away from in the late 19th century. He supported inflationary currency through free coinage of silver as did many Texans of the time. However, this didn’t mean that Mills always was voting the way his constituents wanted him to. He was highly principled and was an unwavering opponent of Prohibition, a position gaining popularity in Texas in the 1880s. Mills regarded many of its proponents as hypocrites, and in 1887, he delivered a speech condemning such a proposal, “Prohibition was introduced as a fraud; it has been nursed as a fraud. It is wrapped in the livery of Heaven, but it comes to serve the devil. It comes to regulate by law our appetites and our daily lives. It comes to tear down liberty and build up fanaticism, hypocrisy, and intolerance. It comes to confiscate by legislative decree the property of many of our fellow citizens. It comes to send spies, detectives, and informers into our homes; to have us arrested and carried before courts and condemned to fines and imprisonments. It comes to dissipate the sunlight of happiness, peace, and prosperity in which we are now living and to fill our land with alienations, estrangements, and bitterness. It comes to bring us evil– only evil– and that continually. Let us rise in our might as one and overwhelm it with such indignation that we shall never hear of it again as long as grass grows and water runs” (Putnam). After the 1886 election, Mills would become the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and it was there that he proposed his most famous (or infamous by Republican standards) legislation, his tariff reduction bill known as the Mills Bill, which struck at the heart of the tariff system that the Republicans so staunchly embraced. As passed by the House, this bill removed tariffs on wool, lumber, and salt and overall reduced rates by an average of 7%. Although justified as a necessary measure to reduce the surplus in the treasury (which was a problem at the time!), Republican opponents feared that this measure would constitute the first step towards the dismantling of the tariff system altogether (Ann Arbor Register). They didn’t have to fear that measure becoming law in that Congress though, as the bill was DOA in the Republican Senate. It was quite useful to Republicans, however, as a campaign issue, and they even mentioned it in the 1888 party platform, “We denounce the Mills bill as destructive to the general business, the labor and the farming interests of the country, and we heartily indorse the consistent and patriotic action of the Republican Representatives in Congress in opposing its passage.” Mills campaigned across the country for his bill, but Cleveland narrowly lost reelection and for the first time since 1872 Republicans won united government.
Mills for Speaker of the House
Democratic control of the House had had an interruption after the 1888 election but returned with a vengeance in the 1890 midterms, and Mills threw his hat into the ring to be the next House speaker. Although initially he commanded high support and even received enough pledges to vote for him sufficient for him to win, he proved overly principled in his refusal to promise individual Democrats placement in powerful positions in exchange for their votes. Another factor was that Mills had a temper and lost it often enough to give his fellow Democrats pause. On the final ballot 15 representatives defected and he lost to Charles Crisp of Georgia. Although embittered that he didn’t get to be speaker, the resignation of Senator John H. Reagan got him elected to the Senate the following year.
Senator Mills and Retirement
As a senator, Mills largely voted the Democratic line and passionately took up the cause of Cuban independence from Spain and was an opponent of the American form of imperialism, opposing the annexation of Hawaii in 1897. However, it was an act of loyalty to President Cleveland that harmed him in Texas, when he voted for the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act in 1893, contrary to his past free coinage of silver advocacy. Indeed, Cleveland’s signing this law was considered a massive betrayal by many rank-and-file Democrats, who abandoned Cleveland in 1896 in favor of free silverite William Jennings Bryan. By 1899, a coalition had formed against him with House Minority Leader Joseph Weldon Bailey (D-Tex.) and Governor James Hogg as key actors, which resulted in him not running for another term (Putnam). His DW-Nominate score, accounting for his House and Senate career, was a -0.471.
Mills retired from politics after and only became wealthy after oil was discovered on his property, which permitted him to live his last years in comfort. Four years after his wife died, Mills passed on September 2, 1911.
References
Barr, A. (2016, July 2). Mills, Roger Quarles. Texas State Historical Association.
I know I’ve covered some of this subject in an earlier post this year, but that was primarily focused on FDR’s precarious health in the 1944 election. This is a more comprehensive post that also covers legislative elections.
Contrary to the popular image of a united America during World War II, the 1942 midterms produced the least cooperative Congress President Roosevelt ever had…the unity of the American public was on winning the war, not on the smorgasbord of Roosevelt’s policies. Although the Congress was not Republican, one would be forgiven for thinking it was given how often it and Roosevelt butted heads. For the first time in the history of the United States, for instance, Congress overrode the President’s veto on a revenue bill. This Congress also overrode President Roosevelt’s veto of the Smith-Connally Labor Disputes Act, which provided a method for the president to intervene in wartime strikes in response to John L. Lewis’s United Mine Workers going on strike. Conservatism was rapidly rising among Southern Democrats, many who had previously been willing to give FDR a lot of leeway in his first and even second terms. Numerous New Deal programs were axed by Congress including the Works Progress Administration, the National Youth Administration, and the Civilian Conservation Corps. To make matters worse for Roosevelt, his health was starting to severely decline. FDR securing yetanother term would be contingent on how well the war was going.
The Republican Headliner
The Republicans selected a man who was a genuinely compelling candidate in Thomas E. Dewey. He was New York’s governor and had been the mob-busting district attorney of Manhattan. Although his past effort at the Republican nomination in 1940 had come up short, him being governor as well as Wendell Willkie neglecting to help with party building resulted in him winning the nomination. On certain fundamentals one could say Dewey was conservative; he reduced taxes as governor and was a strong supporter of the usage of the death penalty. However, Dewey was overall of the moderate wing of the GOP. His vice presidential pick, Governor John W. Bricker of Ohio, was staunchly conservative and governed mostly in the opposite manner that FDR did and enjoyed success in his state. Dewey was aggressive in campaigning against Roosevelt, and some thought that this hurt him on the campaign, which would inform his future thinking. However, he held back on any questioning surrounding Pearl Harbor, namely on what FDR knew before the attack. The GOP also embraced the creation of a United Nations while broadly criticizing the New Deal and calling for a reduction in the size of the federal government. There were lingering questions about FDR’s health, although he toured the country to dispel such questions, even though they turned out to be well-grounded in reality.
Ultimately, it was crucial gains in the war that proved critical for Roosevelt’s reelection, just as they had for Lincoln in the War of the Rebellion 80 years earlier. Many don’t realize that Lincoln’s reelection was in doubt before the Union victory at Gettysburg. Roosevelt’s message of don’t “change horses in mid-stream” was effective (Roosevelt House). The Dewey campaign, realizing that FDR was popular among soldiers and regarding them as subject to pro-Administration propaganda, challenged overseas ballots. Dewey also campaigned against, in an early indicator of the postwar politics, against Roosevelt as being “indispensable” to corrupt large city Democratic machines and to Communists (Jordan, 266). By the time of Election Day 1944, however, D-Day had occurred along with other major American military victories to the point that it was no longer a matter of if, but when Germany and Japan were going to lose the war. Although Dewey gained three states in 1944 that Willkie had not won in Ohio, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, this was far from enough and Roosevelt got Michigan, which he had lost in 1940. Roosevelt was held to his lowest percentage of the vote at 53% while Dewey got 46%, popular vote figures that contrast considerably with Roosevelt’s Electoral College victory of 432 to 99.
The House
The election in the House was a victory for Democrats, with them gaining 22 seats, halving the losses they incurred in the 1942 midterms. The elections with turnover included:
The defeat for renomination in the Democratic primary of Alabama’s Joe Starnes and John Newsome by Albert Rains and Luther Patrick respectively. This was a big win for FDR in the state, as Starnes and Newsome were antagonistic to the Roosevelt Administration while Rains and Patrick were Southern liberals.
The defeat of four California Republicans for reelection. This election could also be said to be the start of the Bay Area moving towards the Democrats, as San Francisco’s Thomas Rolph and Alameda County’s Albert Carter were among the losers. Rolph’s loss was a comeback for Democrat Franck Havenner, who had lost in 1940. Carter’s district would never again send a Republican to Congress. Los Angeles’s Norris Poulson lost to Democrat Ned Healy, but he would make a comeback in 1946 and stay in office until being elected the city’s mayor. Also defeated was William W. Johnson by Democrat Clyde Doyle. The Republicans did get one victory though in Los Angeles County with Gordon McDonough, who won the election after Democratic Congressman John Costello, who was anti-Administration, was defeated for renomination.
The defeat of four of six of Connecticut’s Republican members of Congress. Democrat Herman P. Kopplemann won back his seat from Republican William J. Miller for the second time (Miller would win it again in 1946), Democrat Chase Woodhouse defeated Republican incumbent John D. McWilliams, Democrat James P. Geelan defeated Republican incumbent Ranulf Compton, and Democrat Joseph F. Ryter would win against Republican incumbent B.J. Monkiewicz One of the two Republican survivors was that great wit and lady of letters Clare Boothe Luce, who prevailed by a point.
Delaware’s sole member of Congress, Earle Willey, went down to defeat to Democrat Phillip Traynor, the man he had defeated in 1942.
Four Illinois Republicans lost reelection in Fred Busbey, Charles Dewey, Calvin Johnson, and Stephen Day to Democrats Edward Kelly, Alexander Resa, Melvin Price (who would serve until his death in 1988!), and Emily Taft Douglas. Perhaps the sweetest victory among the bunch was that of Day, who was an extremist on foreign policy and represented all of Illinois. Busbey would win back his seat in 1946, lose again in 1948, and win in 1950 and 1952 before being booted out for good in 1954.
The victory of Republican Chester Carrier in the 1944 special election in Kentucky was made temporary by the victory of Democrat Frank Chelf.
In Michigan, ultra-liberal Democrat Frank Hook won his seat back from Republican John B. Bennett. Bennett would, however, win the seat back in 1946 and serve until his death in 1964.
Republican Daniel Ellison of Baltimore was defeated for reelection by Democrat George Fallon. Ellison was the last Republican to ever represent any portion of Baltimore in Congress.
Republicans Richard Gale and Melvin J. Maas would lose reelection in Minnesota to Democrats William Gallagher and Frank Starkey. Maas kept getting reelected to his otherwise Democratic St. Paul district due to the left being split in their votes by the Democratic and Farmer-Labor parties, but the 1944 election marked the merger of the two. The Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party would long-run prove a highly successful merger.
Republicans William P. Elmer and Louis Miller would lose reelection in Missouri to Democrats A.S.J. Carnahan and John B. Sullivan respectively. Sullivan was winning his seat back.
In New Jersey, Republican T. Millet Hand would win the open 2nd district, previously occupied by Democrat Elmer Wene.
In New York, Roosevelt’s sweetest victory in the whole House election would occur, with moderate Republican Augustus W. Bennet toppling Republican Hamilton Fish. Fish was the most public and hated of Roosevelt’s foes in the House, and Roosevelt had even wanted to include Fish (along with Clare Hoffman of Michigan) in an anti-sedition indictment. Republican Joseph J. O’Brien also lost reelection to Democrat George F. Rogers.
Ohio Republicans Harry Jeffrey, Edmund Rowe, and Henderson Carson lost reelection to Democrats Edward Gardner, Walter Huber, and William Thom respectively. This was a comeback for Thom, but Carson would defeat him in 1946.
Oklahoma Republican George B. Schwabe won the open seat left by Democrat Wesley Disney’s decision to run in the Democratic Senate primary. This was not that bad of a loss for the Administration…Disney had become one of the most anti-Roosevelt Democrats in Congress by this time.
There was quite a bit of activity in Pennsylvania in this election…
Republican James Gallagher of Philadelphia lost reelection to Democrat William Barrett. Although Gallagher would win his seat back in 1946, Barrett would take the seat back in 1948 and Democratic control would hold for good after. Barrett would die in office in 1976.
Republican C. Frederick Pracht of Philadelphia would lose reelection to Democrat William Green, who like Barrett, would lose in 1946 only to win again in 1948 and stay in office until his death.
Republican Hugh Scott of Philadelphia would suffer the only defeat of his career in Congress to Democrat Herbert McGlinchey but would come back in 1946 and keep winning reelection in the increasingly Democratic Philadelphia until winning the Senate election in 1958. He would stay in the Senate until 1977, serving as minority leader from 1969 to 1977.
Republican Thomas B. Miller lost reelection to Democrat Daniel J. Flood. Although Flood would be turned out in the 1946 election, he would come back in the 1948 election, be defeated in 1952, and come back in 1954. From then on, he would stay in office until a bribery scandal forced him from office in 1980.
Republican Robert Corbett, who had previously served in Congress from 1939 to 1941, made a comeback by defeating Democrat Thomas Scanlon for reelection. He was of the liberal to moderate wing of the party, but this helped him get reelected until his death in 1971.
Republican James G. Fulton defeated Democrat James A. Wright in a bright spot for the GOP. However, Fulton would be ideologically similar to Corbett and like him would serve in office until his death in 1971.
Republican Fred Norman, who had been first elected in 1942, was defeated for reelection by staunchly liberal Democrat Charles Savage. Norman would make a comeback in 1946, but his time in office wouldn’t be long as he would die only three months after his term started.
Republicans A.C. Schiffler and Edward G. Rohrbough would lose reelection in West Virginia. Schiffler was defeated by Democratic veteran Matthew Neely and Rohrbough would make a comeback in 1946 before again being defeated by Democrat Cleve Bailey in 1948.
Republican John W. Byrnes would defeat Democratic incumbent LaVern Dilweg in Wisconsin. Byrnes would serve in office until 1973.
As an added bonus, Republican Frank Barrett of Wyoming would win reelection against one Charles E. Norris. You thus might say that Barrett beat a CHUCK NORRIS!
Senate
The Senate was a less positive picture for Roosevelt and the Democrats, and Republicans on net gained a seat.
In Connecticut, the good year for the Democrats applied too with the defeat of Republican Senator John A. Danaher by Democrat Brien McMahon.
In Idaho, the Roosevelt Administration had a great win after Glen H. Taylor defeated sometimes supporter of the Roosevelt Administration D. Worth Clark in the primary and then won the election.
In Indiana, Republican Homer Capehart was elected to the Senate, the previously elected incumbent for a full term having been Democrat Frederick Van Nuys, who had died in 1943.
In Iowa, Democrat Guy Gillette, a sometimes supporter of the Roosevelt Administration, was defeated for reelection by Republican Governor Bourke Hickenlooper.
A victory turned into defeat for the Roosevelt Administration in Missouri when Bennett Champ Clark, a Democratic antagonist of the administration, was defeated in the primary only for his successor to be Republican Forrest Donnell.
The greatest victory of all perhaps for the Roosevelt Administration was the defeat of Gerald Nye, one of the most prominent opponents of American entry into World War II before Pearl Harbor by Democratic Governor John Moses. Nye was harmed by multiple factors that didn’t involve his foreign policy record including his fairly quick divorce and remarriage to a younger woman, regular Republicans remembering his largely pro-New Deal record during the 1930s and approving of the fiscal conservatism of Governor Moses, and the entry of Independent candidate Lynn Stambaugh, who got 21% of the vote. This victory was short-lived, however, as Moses was in poor health and died only two months after being sworn in. Republican Milton Young would be elected in his place.
In Oregon, the Roosevelt Administration certainly gained a victory, although not a party one at the time. Republican Rufus Holman, a former Klansman with a penchant for conspiracism who had before the US’s entry into World War II praised Hitler on the floor of the Senate, was defeated for renomination by liberal Wayne Morse, who won the election. Morse would be the most liberal Senate Republican before leaving the party in 1952 and finally switching his affiliation to Democrat in 1955.
In Pennsylvania, Republican Jim Davis, formerly Secretary of Labor under Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover until he was elected to the Senate in 1930, was defeated by Democratic Congressman Francis Myers.
In South Carolina, the Roosevelt Administration got a victory that they had previously tried for in 1938: Governor Olin Johnston defeated Administration foe “Cotton Ed” Smith for renomination. It was just as well, as Smith died before the general election.
Dewey would try again in 1948 only to meet his most infamous defeat, one of the most prominent upsets in American history with the Chicago Tribune’s notorious “Dewey Defeats Truman” headline proudly held up by the reelected Truman. Bricker would be elected to the Senate in 1946 and serve two terms as one of the most conservative senators of his day.
References
1944’s Fourth Presidential Campaign. See How They Ran!
I have written in the past about the defeat of the Bricker Amendment as an achievement of LBJ, but I felt this subject needed a bit of a deeper dive, so here it is. National sovereignty is a subject that has long greatly concerned American conservatives. This concern, in addition to extraordinarily bad relations between President Wilson and Senator Lodge (they refused to be in the same room together), resulted in the rejection of the Versailles Treaty. Another monumental event came quite close to happening on account of this concern, and this was the proposed Bricker Amendment to the Constitution. Over the history of the United States, the use of executive agreement has risen considerably overtime as opposed to treaties for convenience as the US has become a more prominent actor on the global stage (Lindsay). After World War II, there were several international developments that gave conservatives concern. The first was the Yalta Agreement, in which in addition to planning the postwar fate of Germany, Stalin succeeded in convincing the US and Britain that he would allow free and fair elections in Poland and contributed to the domination of the USSR of Eastern Europe.
Another was the UN Charter, of which the US is a signatory, which pledged members to promote “conditions of economic and social progress” and rights “without distinction as to race” (Time Magazine, 1954). This could be seen by conservatives nationally as international pushing for increasing government and by Southern conservatives as bringing an end to Jim Crow. The latter concern was bolstered by a Truman-appointed committee in 1947 suggesting that the UN Charter gave authority for civil rights laws previously lacking (Time Magazine, 1954).
Furthermore, the US endorsed but did not ratify until 1988 the Genocide Convention. One might think ratifying the Genocide Convention today to be a no-brainer, but there were substantial reasons why it was a cause for concern for the US at the time. One part of this was because of an expansive definition of genocide that included, “causing..mental harm” to members of “a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group” which Time Magazine opined “expressions of honest opinion might become crimes” (Time Magazine, 1954). This is an interesting early warning of “hate speech” laws that have been passed in numerous European nations and have attracted a disturbing level of support among American youth, who seem to have failed to account for who might be defining what “hate speech” is and the controversies that have occurred in European nations over such laws, such as the prosecution and conviction of politician Geert Wilders in the Netherlands for calling for less Moroccans in the nation. There was also the 1951 document authored by the communist Civil Rights Congress, “We Charge Genocide”, presented to the UN in Paris meetings in December that charged the US with genocide based on Jim Crow practices in the South as well as discrimination throughout the nation that had basis in this expansive definition, and claimed that US “endorsement” of racism and “monopoly capitalism” made this possible (Martin). Thus, the Genocide Convention could serve as at least an effective propaganda tool by the USSR, if not something worse for the US. There was also the UN Covenant of Human Rights.
The UN Covenant of Human Rights was a far-reaching document with Eleanor Roosevelt at the helm for two years in drafting. However, Time Magazine (1953) reported that there was a great deal of influence from Soviet delegates as well as from other dictatorships, which resulted in a dilution of “such natural rights as freedom of religion, speech, press and assembly by mixing them with highly dubious “rights”. Some of these “rights” would enlarge government powers instead of restricting them. According to the covenant, for example, the state is obliged to see such things as “healthy development of the child” and “environmental hygiene” and “the right of everyone” to a job, fair wages, adequate housing, education and a “continuous improvement of living conditions””. Desirable goals become state mandated, and result in both Big Brother and Big Sister taking hold.
The Treaty Power in General in a Postwar World
John Foster Dulles observed this potential danger in 1952 when he stated, “The treatymaking power is an extraordinary power liable to abuse. Treaties make international law, and they make domestic law…They are, indeed, more supreme than ordinary laws. [They] can override the Constitution…cut across the rights given to the people by their Constitutional Bill of Rights” (Time Magazine, 1953). However, only the next year he was tapped by President Eisenhower to be Secretary of State. By the time the Bricker Amendment came up for consideration, he came out against it, rationalizing given his previous statement that such abuses had not happened (Time Magazine, 1953). Thus, his argument as Secretary of State amounted to that the Bricker Amendment was seeking to solve a problem that wasn’t existing.
Time Magazine (1953) described the situation with treaties thusly, “In the 166 years since 1787, virtually the only limit put upon the treaty power by the Supreme Court is that a treaty may not “authorize what the Constitution forbids.” Even that limitation has been questioned. A circuit court of appeals declared: “It is doubtful if the courts have power to declare the plain terms of a treaty void and unenforceable”. Given that this was what the understanding was of the time, concern over the state of the treaty-making power of the Constitution is at least understandable. Worse yet, there wasn’t necessarily a dividing line as to what distinguishes a treaty from an executive agreement policy-wise. Senator Guy Gillette (D-Iowa) discovered this when he asked the State Department this question and received the following answer, “A treaty was something they had to send to the Senate to get approval by two-thirds votes. An executive agreement was something they did not have to send to the Senate” (Lindsay). There have been Supreme Court decisions that clarified this matter more since then. Speaking of the Supreme Court…
Further Concern: Troublesome Supreme Court Decisions
The American Bar Association considered the possibility of a treaty superseding the Constitution as “One of the greatest constitutional crises the country has ever faced” and urged the adoption of a Constitutional amendment to clarify the supremacy of the Constitution (Time Magazine, 1954). After all, in 1920 in Missouri v. Holland the Supreme Court upheld the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (for It’s Always Sunny fans, yes, bird law nearly influenced the adoption of a Constitutional amendment.) in a decision that held that treaties superseded state laws, the same decision in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. articulated the notion of the “living Constitution”, a notion contemptible to judicial conservatives. This decision alarmed many conservatives, who came to believe that the president could amend the Constitution by making treaties with other nations, thereby encroaching on functions that were otherwise reserved to the states (Sutherland, 1951). Two more that caused alarm and added ambiguity to the situation were United States v. Belmont (1937) and United States v. Pink (1942). In the former, it was ruled that an executive agreement overrode New York State law and in the latter, it was ruled that treaties and executive agreements are interchangeable (Lindsay). If there is such ambiguity and executive agreements are to carry the same force on states as treaties, why bother submitting a treaty to the Senate just for it to potentially meet the fate of the Versailles Treaty?
Conservatives Act
On September 14, 1951, John W. Bricker (R-Ohio), one of the staunchest conservatives in the Senate, introduced what came to be known as the “Bricker Amendment” for the first time. This amendment proposed three limitations on executive power on foreign relations. These were, as Professor Cathal J. Nolan (1992) writes, “(1) the Executive was to be barred from entering into treaties which conflicted with the Constitution; (2) all treaties henceforth would require implementing legislation “which would be valid in the absence of a treaty” (a so-called ‘which clause’); and (3) executive agreements now would be overseen – and could be rejected – by Congress just as were treaties”. Not only was the American Bar Association in support as earlier mentioned, but so was the American Medical Association. Both groups were at the time considered conservative organizations. However, the Senate had a Democratic majority and had it come to a vote, the Bricker Amendment would have surely failed. The 1952 election, in addition to electing Dwight Eisenhower, also produced Republican majorities in Congress.
With a Republican president in the White House as well as a Republican Senate, the time seemed right for Senator Bricker, formerly the Republican vice-presidential candidate in 1944, to again propose his amendment. Unfortunately for Bricker, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time was Wisconsin’s Alexander Wiley, a former non-interventionist who had since become a staunch internationalist. Wiley decried the measure as “the most dangerous thing that has ever been brought before Congress” (Time Magazine, 1953). Even worse for Bricker, President Eisenhower wanted the amendment defeated. He wrote to Majority Leader Knowland that he was “unalterably opposed” to the amendment as reported to the Senate Judiciary Committee and believed that it would “shackle the federal government so that it is no longer sovereign in foreign affairs” (CQ Almanac).
The “Which Clause”
Bricker’s amendment was weakened in committee to make it more palatable to the Eisenhower Administration, but he sought to restore its original strength by attempting to add Section 3. This, known as the “which clause”, read, “A treaty or other international agreement shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation by the Congress unless in advising and consenting to a treaty by the Senate, by a vote of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting, shall provide that such treaty may become effective as internal law without legislation by the Congress” (CQ Almanac). If incorporated, this amendment had great potential to cause trouble for a president who wished to have executive agreements with other nations not rising to the level of treaty. This proposal was defeated 42-50, notably getting votes against by some who otherwise supported the Bricker Amendment, such as Majority Leader William Knowland (R-Calif.) and Walter George (D-Ga.). Senator George brought up a version that although was weaker than the original Bricker Amendment, was stronger than the committee version of the Bricker Amendment. The George Substitute was now the central proposal.
LBJ Engineers Amendment’s Demise
I have covered LBJ’s role in greater detail in the past, but Senate Minority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Tex.) was privately opposed to the Bricker Amendment. He had presidential ambitions and like Eisenhower he believed it would hamper the president’s ability to conduct foreign policy. However, Johnson could not simply vote against it. He had to pull off a tricky act as Texans were in strong support, therefore he had to appear to support the Bricker Amendment while getting it defeated. His vote on this amendment was “yea”, but he managed to get a vote adopting the George (D-Ga.) substitute defeated by one vote. With this one vote, the Bricker Amendment had met its Waterloo. Senator Bricker was embittered by this event and blamed Eisenhower for its defeat. In truth, both Eisenhower and Johnson were the necessary players for the Bricker Amendment’s fall. The cause for the Bricker Amendment was largely neutered through the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid v. Covert (1957), in which a plurality found that although executive agreements could be entered by the president, they couldn’t contradict the US Constitution. Had the Bricker Amendment been adopted, it would have been perhaps the most substantial alteration to the Constitution in the 20th century. The notion of the imperial presidency on foreign policy would be firmly out, and the balance of power would have gone more to the legislative branch, as some conservatives have argued was intended by the Founders, but as others could argue is inappropriate on foreign policy. Historian Walter LaFeber wrote that with the defeat of the Bricker Amendment that the Constitution was “saved from the most radical overhauling in its history” (Tananbaum). The most recent legal development involving the treaty power was the 6-3 Supreme Court decision Medellin v. Texas (2008), in which at-the-time Texas Solicitor General Ted Cruz successfully argued that a treaty is not binding as domestic law until an act of Congress has occurred to implement it, that rulings from the International Court of Justice are not binding on US courts, and cannot be enforced without authority from Congress or the Constitution (552 U.S. 491). If there is a heaven (which I happen to believe there is), then surely Bricker smiled from above at this decision.
Differing Perspectives
Interpretations for the motives behind the Bricker Amendment vary, and this is simply because there were multiple motives behind the amendment. As might be expected, a 2021 paper out of Columbia University on this emphasized the racial cause (Glusman). But frankly, certain segments of society are completely and utterly obsessed with racial identity. There were far more people with motives that differed from those of the white South. This was, for instance, not the motive of Bricker and his fellow Midwestern Republicans…he on multiple occasions had voted in the civil rights direction while in the Senate, including for the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and against weakening it by a jury trial amendment, as well as against Senator Richard Russell’s (D-Ga.) effort to undermine desegregation of the army in 1950. Rather, he was of the Old Guard Midwest Republicans who were skeptical to hostile to internationalism and constantly on guard for America’s national sovereignty. There is, however, a degree of truth in this narrative as the amendment had strong support from Southern legislators. Indeed, only three senators from former Confederate states in Lister Hill of Alabama, J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, and Estes Kefauver of Tennessee voted against the Bricker Amendment as amended by George, and they were among the most amenable to the politics of the national Democratic Party. Looking back, it is ultimately for the best that the US addressed civil rights without any sort of international force behind it, as such an approach would have only weakened, not strengthened, support for civil rights as the issue of national sovereignty could have been introduced as a reason to oppose in addition to the existing argument of state sovereignty to oppose. Another perspective, embraced by multiple scholars, was that the Yalta Agreement was the central cause of the proposal of the Bricker Amendment (Tananbaum).
Glusman, G. (2021, December 2). The Long Afterlife of the Bricker Amendment: Jim Crow, Human Rights, and the Genocide Convention. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law.
Martin, C. (1997). Internationalizing ‘The American Dilemma’ – The Civil Rights Congress and the 1951 Genocide Petition to the United Nations. Journal of American Ethnic History, 16(4), 44-45.
Medellin v. Texas (2008), 552 U.S. 491.
National Affairs: The Bricker Amendment: A Cure Worse Than the Disease? (1953, July 13). Time Magazine.
Nolan, C.J. (1992). The Last Hurrah of Conservative Isolationism: Eisenhower, Congress, and the Bricker Amendment. Freedom and Security, 22(2), 337-349.
S.J.Res.1. Amend. To Committee Substitute Adding to Clause 2, Article IV, of the Constit. A Provision That No Treaty Shall by the Supreme Law of the Land Unless Made in Pursuance of the Constitution. Govtrack.
S.J.Res.1. Bricker Amend. Providing That a Treaty or Other International Agreement Shall Become Effective as Internal Law Only Through Act of Congress, But That Senate in Ratifying a Treaty May, by 2/3’s Vote, Make it so Effective Immediately. Govtrack.
The year is 1958, and Congress is not happy with the Supreme Court. In addition to Brown v. Board of Education (1954) other decisions that attracted criticism included Mallory v. United States (1957) in which it was ruled that any confessions brought out during an unlawfully long period of detention were inadmissible in court and Pennsylvania v. Nelson (1956), which overturned the conviction of a communist for sedition for his advocacy of overthrowing the US government by violent means by ruling that the 1940 Smith Act superseded Pennsylvania’s much older anti-sedition statute (350 U.S. 497). Interestingly, that law’s sponsor, Representative Howard W. Smith (D-Va.), was not only still in Congress, but he was also the powerful chairman of the House Rules Committee and objected, as he did not intend his measure to intrude on state anti-subversive laws.
Smith proceeded to introduce the “Anti-Preemption bill”, which would explicitly overturn Nelson and generally restrict Federal courts in the application of the preemption doctrine by only allowing them to block enforcement of state laws if Congress had explicitly intended to preempt and that there was direct and irreconcilable conflict in Federal and state laws (CQ Press). Furthermore, Federal anti-subversive laws would be clarified as not preempting state anti-subversive laws. Smith argued that Federal courts had been finding preemption in multiple cases where no evidence existed of intent to do so by Congress, with one other notable recent decision being Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board (1957), which ruled that states could not get involved in labor disputes that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) refused to intervene (CQ Press, 353 U.S. 1). The House, in which the Conservative Coalition was strong, passed the bill 241-155 (D 101-109, R 140-46) on July 17th after an effort by Representative Kenneth Keating (R-N.Y.) to kill it failed. Critics contended that it would result in state intrusion in areas in which Federal laws were desirable and that since it would retroactively apply it would potentially result in a massive reevaluation of precedents in Federal-state relationships and burdening the courts with litigation (CQ Press). The opponents of the measure did have some strong allies in other places. Namely, President Dwight Eisenhower (who opposed as the bill would apply retroactively) as well as Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Tex.).
The Anti-Preemption Bill Makes the Senate
Two key votes were held on the anti-preemption bill as it was debated in the Senate. The first was on Senator Thomas Hennings’s (D-Mo.) motion to table Senator John McClellan’s (D-Ark.) amendment substituting the House-passed anti-preemption bill for the much more moderate court bill, which failed 39-46 (D 25-19, R 14-27) on August 20th, and the second was a vote to kill the bill for the session. With the first vote, it looked like the Smith Anti-Preemption bill would pass the Senate. However, Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Tex.) had faced greater odds before, and he set to work to get the measure killed the next day. Journalist James J. Kilpatrick (1960) of the Richmond News Leader described how this went down, “He talked Florida’s Senator Smathers into pairing his vote for the bill with the vote of Oklahoma’s absent Senator Monroney against the bill. He persuaded Senator Young of North Dakota, Senator Frear of Delaware, and Senator Kerr of Oklahoma, all supporters of the bill, to take a walk down the corridors when the bell sounded for a roll call vote. He induced Senator Lausche of Ohio – against the Ohioan’s better judgment, as he ruefully confessed the next day – to switch his vote. And while the roll call actually was in progress, he saw to it that Republican Senator Bennett of Utah was high-pressured into voting against the bill in order to prevent a tie that might have embarrassed the Vice President”. Johnson had also managed to persuade Senator Malone (R-Nev.) to switch his vote, and while advocates gained reversals from Senators Kuchel (R-Calif.) and Gore (D-Tenn.), it was not enough. The Anti-Preemption bill was killed by Senator John Carroll’s (D-Colo.) motion to recommit 41-40 (D 27-17, R 14-23).
Although the House did pass another anti-preemption bill in the next Congress by a vote of 225-192 (D 111-162, R 114-30) on June 24, 1959, after a failed attempt by Representative John Lindsay (R-N.Y.) to kill the bill, the Senate, now much more liberal than before, did not take up the bill. Enthusiasm for this bill also died down after the Supreme Court ruled in Uphaus v. Wyman (1959) that the states had the right to investigate and penalize subversion directed against themselves, and that year the Guss decision had been overturned by Congress in passing the Landrum-Griffin Act, which explicitly permitted states to intervene in areas of Federal and state jurisdiction in which the NLRB refused to get involved (CQ Press).
References
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957)
HR 3. BAR COURTS FROM RULING THAT FEDERAL LAW NULLIFIES STATE LAW IN SAME FIELD UNLESS SPECIFIED BY CONGRESS. PASSED AS AMENDED.
HR 3. Bar Courts from Ruling That Federal Law Nullifies State Law in Same Field Unless Specified by Congress. Passed as Amended. Govtrack.
S. 654. Permit States to Enact Laws Barring Subversive Activities. Hennings Motion to Table McClellan Amendment Providing That No Act of Congress Should Be Construed as Nullifying Unless Congress So Specifies. Govtrack.
President Eisenhower is often looked back with fondness by many as a figure of a more stable time in the United States (although there were social conflicts brimming and a lot of what was seen in the 1960s started developing in the 1950s), and indeed the representative of what President Joe Biden once called “your father’s Republican Party”. Given that Eisenhower is most certainly thought of as representative of “your father’s Republican Party”, what was he like ideologically? I already wrote in a previous post that he’s moderately conservative, but what are the details?
In his first term, Eisenhower took the side of states over the federal government in granting title for offshore natural resources (read: oil) and signed into law a bill making it so as he had promised in 1952. This issue was one of the reasons that Texas for the first time since 1928 had voted Republican. He was a convinced internationalist, and a major reason he ran for president was to stop the rise of Senator Robert Taft to the presidency, who would have been much more of a skeptic of foreign aid and the US role in the world). The relationship between Republicans and Eisenhower, although overall positive, had nuance and was complex. Although certainly far friendlier to business than his predecessor or his successor, Eisenhower was far from a turn back to his three Republican predecessors. Indeed, there was no great concerted effort to outright repeal portions of the New Deal (although there were efforts to scale back government in agriculture and to alter the Tennessee Valley Authority). He initially supported some public housing, but later turned against authorizing more. Although Eisenhower appointed some people who were not pleasing to the conservative wing of the GOP such as Charles Bohlen for Ambassador to the USSR and liberal Republican Paul Hoffman as a delegate to the UN General Assembly, he also picked some staunch conservatives in Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks, and especially Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson. Examining Eisenhower’s official positions on votes counted by Americans for Constitutional Action for the Senate from 1955 to 1960 and for the House from 1957 to 1960 reveals that had he been a legislator, he would have scored an overall 69% by the group. ACA would endorse a legislator for reelection if their score was 65% or above, so the fiction of Eisenhower the legislator would have been endorsed for reelection (had the also fictional scenario existed in which he could and would have run), albeit not with enthusiasm by the group. Although much is made out of the 1956 Republican platform by contemporary liberals, indeed the platform was written by members of the party’s moderate to liberal wing, but Eisenhower was certainly less liberal than the platform made out the GOP to be. The Democratic Party overall was undoubtedly more liberal than Eisenhower, but Eisenhower was definitely to the left of the average Republican in his views by ACA standards. However, his DW-Nominate score was a 0.281 and places him a little to the right of the middle among Senate Republicans.
Eisenhower’s positions on votes counted by ACA were:
Supporting the elimination of a $20 tax credit, which if enacted would have had an estimated impact of removing 5 million taxpayers from the rolls (1955).
Opposed Senator Long’s (D-La.) amendment to cut foreign aid by $318 million (1955).
Supported Senator Capehart’s (R-Ind.) amendment to cut public housing to 35,000 units annually over two years (1955).
Supported the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s amendment increasing foreign aid by $420 million (1955).
Supported Senator Anderson’s (D-N.M.) amendment to the farm bill for 90% of parity price supports (1956).
Supported Senator Aiken’s (R-Vt.) amendment to delete dual parity from the farm bill (1956).
Opposed the adoption of the farm bill for 90% of mandatory price supports for one year and for a soil bank program (1956).
Supported Senator Bridges’s (R-N.H.) amendment to reduce the increase in defense department spending from $960 to $500 million (1956).
Opposed Senator Bridges’s (R-N.H.) amendment to delete funding in future foreign aid bills for Yugoslavia (1956).
Opposed legislation authorizing the construction of the Hells Canyon Dam by the Federal Government as opposed to private development (1956, 1957).
Supported a foreign aid increase by an overall figure of $108.5 million over what was approved by the House (1956).
Supported legislation to authorize federal aid for economically depressed areas (1956).
Supported Senator Hruska’s (R-Neb.) motion to recommit the Rivers and Harbors bill with instructions reducing river and harbor projects by a minimum of $350 million and to consider deletion of new projects (1957).
Opposed Representative Fisher’s (D-Tex.) amendment to delete $50 million in grants for sewage plant construction (1957).
Opposed Minority Leader Knowland’s (R-Calif.) amendment to maintain the restriction on bartering commodities with communist nations (1957).
Opposed Representative Harrison’s (D-Va.) amendment, prohibiting the use of funds for a soil acreage reserve program on 1958 crops (1957).
Opposed Senator Morse’s (D-Ore.) amendment to increase public housing from 35,000 annually to 200,000 annually for fiscal years 1958 and 1959 (1957).
Supported Representative Boland’s (D-Mass.) motion to concur in the Senate amendment providing funds to enact the flood insurance program enacted in the previous year (1957).
Opposed Senator Ellender’s (D-La.) amendment to cut military assistance by $500 million (1957).
Supported Representative Arends’s (R-Ill.) amendment, deleting the requirement that the Secretary of Defense notify Congress of transfers of military public works projects to private industry and to subject these transfers to Congressional approval (1957).
Opposed the Anderson (D-N.M.)-Aiken (R-Vt.)-Case (R-S.D.) amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1957, deleting Title III, which granted the attorney general the authority to institute civil action for preventative relief in 14th Amendment cases, even if all legal remedies hadn’t been exhausted (1957).
Opposed Representative Smith’s (R-Wis.) motion to recommit the Mutual Security Act with instructions to delete the creation of the Development Loan Fund (1957).
Opposed Senator Goldwater’s (R-Ariz.) motion to kill the bill allowing the Tennessee Valley Authority to issue and sell bonds for up to $750 million (1957).
Opposed Representative Taber’s (R-N.Y.) motion to recommit the 1958 Fiscal Supplemental Appropriation bill, reducing Tennessee Valley Authority funds (1957).
Supported Representative Judd’s (R-Minn.) motion to recommit the 1958 Mutual Security Fiscal 1958 Appropriations, restoring funds cut by Congress (1957).
Opposed the bill barring reducing price supports of agricultural commodities except tobacco (covered by separate legislation) below their 1957 level (1958).
Supported Representative McGregor’s (R-Ohio) motion to recommit the River and Harbor and Flood Control Acts of 1958, deleting four projects and reducing costs on fourteen others (1958).
Opposed Senator Jenner’s (R-Ind.) amendment to bar the sales of farm surpluses to any nation that has not pledged that it will not back communist governments in case the Cold War with them goes hot (1958).
Opposed Senator Fulbright’s (D-Ark.) amendment to limit interest rates on loans to states and localities to 3% instead of 3.5% (1958).
Supported Representative Herlong’s (D-Fla.) amendment to substitute the Eisenhower Administration’s proposals on unemployment compensation instead of the more generous committee bill backed by Democratic leadership (1958).
Opposed Senator Kennedy’s (D-Mass.) amendment to expand coverage of unemployment compensation and provide for a federally mandated standard of 39 weeks of unemployment benefits (1958).
Supported Minority Leader Knowland’s (R-Calif.) amendment, deleting allowing foreign aid to communist nations aside from the USSR, China, and North Korea (1958).
Opposed an open rule for debate on the second effort to pass legislation preventing reductions in agricultural price supports (1958).
Supported allowing States to assume jurisdiction in cases in which the National Labor Relations Board will not act (“no man’s land” disputes) (1958, 1959).
Opposed Senator Douglas’s (D-Ill.) amendment to provide for a reduction of personal income taxes by $50 a person along with other reductions in personal and excise taxes, which are unfunded and estimated to loss $6-6.3 billion in annual revenue (1958).
Opposed Senator McNamara’s (D-Mich.) amendment providing for a two-year school construction program at a cost of $2 billion (1958).
Supported three separate efforts to kill anti-preemption legislation by Senator Hennings (D-Mo.) and Representatives Keating (R-N.Y.) and Lindsay (R-N.Y.) respectively to provide that an act of Congress does not undo a state law unless explicitly stated in the legislation, designed to restore anti-subversive powers of states (1958, 1959).
Opposed Representative Hays’s (D-Ohio) motion to strike the enacting clause of a bill for mineral subsidies, thereby killing it for the session (1958).
Opposed Senator Ellender’s (D-La.) amendment reducing by $50 million funds for defense support (1958).
Supported Senator Capehart’s (R-Ind.) amendment reducing funds under the housing bill by $1.3 billion (1959).
Supported Representative Teague’s (R-Calif.) motion to delete a $300 million direct loan program from the Veterans Housing bill (1959).
Supported Senator Schoeppel’s (R-Kan.) amendment reducing from $165 million to $63 million in annual grants for airport construction over four years (1959).
Supported Representative Davis’s (D-Ga.) motion to reduce airport construction funding for fiscal years 1961 and 1962 by $32.3 million and for fiscal year 1963 by $32.4 million (1959).
Opposed the bill authorizing $389.5 million for Federal loans and grants to economically depressed areas (1959).
Supported Senator McClellan’s (D-Ark.) amendment prohibiting unions from coercing or inducing employers or employees to not do business with other entities (1959).
Supported Representative Scherer’s (R-Ohio) motion to add provisions to the Tennessee Valley Authority financing bill to increase control of executive agencies and Congress over the issuing of bonds (1959).
Opposed Senator Humphrey’s (D-Minn.) amendment to the wheat bill, enacting 85% of parity price supports on wheat for farmers who reduce acreage by 20% (1959).
Supported the amendment of Senator Williams (R-Del.) to reduce from $450 million to $375 million in funds for soil bank payments (1959).
Supported his nomination of Lewis Strauss as Secretary of Commerce (1959).
Supported Representative Kilburn’s (R-N.Y.) motion to recommit the Housing Act of 1959 to adopt the Herlong (D-Fla.) substitute, which authorizes no public housing and reduces funds for other housing programs by $1.3 billion (1959).
Opposed Majority Leader Johnson’s (D-Tex.) motion to raise parity in the wheat bill from 75% to 90% and incorporates a 25% acreage reduction (1959).
Supported Senator Dirksen’s (R-Ill.) motion to reduce funds for the Departments of Labor and of Health, Education, and Welfare by $365,061,000, in accordance with his budget (1959).
Opposed Senator Long’s (D-La.) amendment to increase funds for public assistance by $150 million (1959).
Supported Senator Williams’s (R-Del.) motion to recommit the Public Works Appropriations bill, reducing funds by $80,159,300, in keeping with his budget (1959).
Opposed the adoption of the wheat price support bill (1959).
Vetoed the Housing Act of 1959 (1959).
Opposed the proposed Federal Youth Conservation Corps to employ 150,000 young people, which would have cost between $375 and $400 million (1959).
Opposed concurring in the Senate amendments to the TVA Revenue Bond bill, thereby ending all efforts to place the TVA’s budget under the President’s control (1959).
Opposed Senator Anderson’s (D-N.M.) amendment capping interest rate at 4.25% for savings bonds, encouraging short-term borrowing for government funding (1959).
Supported the adoption of the Landrum (D-Ga.)-Griffin (R-Mich.) substitute labor bill, which curbed secondary boycotts as well as organizational and recognition picketing, and granting states authority to address “no man’s land” disputes (1959).
Opposed Representative Kearns’s (R-Penn.) motion to recommit and thus kill the Landrum-Griffin Act (1959).
Opposed the bill expanding Federal grants for sewage plant construction and permitting localities to request Federal grants, vetoing the bill in 1960 (1959, 1960).
Supported Representative Hiestand’s (R-Calif.) motion to recommit the Housing Act of 1959, spreading the $550 million urban renewal program over two years rather than one and deleting $50 million for college classroom construction loans (1959).
Vetoed a bill adding 67 public works projects not contained in his budget, which was sustained (1959)
Vetoed a second bill adding public works projects to an estimated over $800 million cost, but his veto was overridden (1959).
Passage of the bill eliminating prohibitions on foreign aid to Communist-dominated nations aside from the USSR, China, and North Korea (1959).
Supported Representative Simpson’s (R-Penn.) motion to recommit the bill permitting an increase in the interest rate of government bonds to permit the issuance of securities at over 4.25% should the President determine it in the national interest (1959).
Opposed Senator Ellender’s (D-La.) amendment to the 1959 Mutual Security Appropriations bill, reducing military assistance by $100 million (1959).
Opposed the $1.5 billion bill providing aid for school construction (1960).
Supported Representative Yates’s (D-Ill.) amendment to appropriate $50 million for urban renewal and slum-clearance grants (1960).
Supported Majority Leader Johnson’s (D-Tex.) motion to delete Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, granting the Attorney General authority to seek injunctions in civil rights cases (1960).
Supported Senator Williams’s (R-Del.) amendment to reduce subsidized ship voyages from 2,400 to 2,225, saving an estimated $20 million (1960).
Opposed the Emergency Home Ownership bill, providing for an additional $1 billion to enable the Federal National Mortgage Association to buy Federally insured home mortgages on new homes worth $13,500 or less (1960).
Opposed the Area Redevelopment Act to provide Federal grants to economically depressed areas, vetoing the bill (1960).
Supported Senate approval of Executive N, an executive agreement for the compulsory settlement of disputes between nations (1960).
Supported the bill authorizing the United States to participate in the International Development Association and authorizing a subscription of $320,290,000 (1960).
Opposed Senator Clark’s (D-Penn.) amendment authorizing 37,000 more public housing units (1960).
Supported Representative Kitchin’s (D-N.C.) amendment substituting a bill that extends $1 an hour wage protection but no overtime protection to employees of interstate retail chains and raising the hourly minimum for previously covered workers to $1.15 instead of the stronger Democratic minimum wage bill (1960).
Opposed Senator Anderson’s (D-N.M.) Medicare amendment to the Social Security Act Amendments, providing for a system of medical benefits to all Social Security retirees 68 and older, financed by an increase in the Social Security tax (1960).
Supported Representative Ford’s (R-Mich.) amendment adding $65 million to the Mutual Security Program for defense support (1960).
Supported $190 million more for foreign aid (1960).
Most people know of the great investor Warren Buffett, but how many people know of his political father? This was Howard Homan Buffett (1903-1964) of Omaha, Nebraska. Buffett was in the investment business and was very politically conservative. His views led him to politics, and in 1942, he was elected to Congress, representing Omaha, despite the widespread belief that he would lose to moderate Democrat Charles McLaughlin (Klein).
While in Congress, he voted a strongly conservative line, opposing wartime subsidies and price controls as well as backing tax relief over President Roosevelt’s objections. He was skeptical of foreign aid as well as of the authority of the military. During his second term, he darkly warned that the United States would become a dictatorship if curbs were not enacted on the power of the military brass (The New York Times). Buffett was strongly opposed to civilian military training as well as to the draft, regarding such measures as coercive. He voted against both Greek-Turkish Aid in 1947 and the Marshall Plan in 1948. On the latter, Buffett stated, “If the Marshall Plan meant $100 million worth of profitable business for your firm, wouldn’t you invest a few thousands or so to successfully propagandize for the Marshall Plan? And if you were a foreign government, getting billions, perhaps you could persuade your prospective suppliers here to lend a hand in putting that deal through Congress” (Klein). He mostly backed the agenda of the 80th Congress, with the occasions in which he dissented from his fellow Republicans appearing to be of a horseshoe theory nature, being in opposition to certain measures as not conservative enough. Buffett represented a strongly liberty-oriented conservatism (American conservatism is to be seen as a striking of a balance between order and liberty, rather than preferring order over liberty as certain non-conservative intellectuals seem to think) that was skeptical of state power in multiple ways. Buffett repeatedly called for a full return to the gold standard and wrote, “With a restoration of the gold standard, Congress would have to again resist handouts…Congress would be forced to confront spending demands with firmness. The gold standard acted as a silent watchdog to prevent unlimited public spending” (Buffett). He proved time and again that the voters had elected a man of high ethical caliber. This was particularly evident by his refusal to go on junkets (taxpayer funded trips), his refusal to accept a pay raise, and he was recounted by his wife as considering legislation on the basis of, “Will this add to, or subtract from, human liberty?” (Klein) On civil rights, he thrice voted to ban the poll tax, voted for a Powell Amendment in 1946, and voted against establishing a VA hospital that would only serve black patients that attracted the opposition of the NAACP and the two black members of Congress at the time. His DW-Nominate score was 0.686, in the top tier for Republicans of his day and exceeding that of Barry Goldwater.
The 1948 election proved a surprising boon to President Truman and the Democrats, and Buffett was among the legislators swept away, in this case by liberal Eugene O’Sullivan. He did, however, make a comeback in the ideologically favorable 1950 election. Americans for Democratic Action judged four years of his service in Congress, and his scores come out thusly:
1947 – 8
1948 – 17
1951 – 8
1952 – 0
Something to note about these scores is that for 1948, the two votes he cast that were “liberal” could be seen as a horseshoe effect and the 1951 vote regarded that VA hospital previously mentioned. In 1952, Buffett opted not to run for another term, departing electoral politics for good. He remained active in conservative causes after his departure from Congress, being part of the Board of Trustees for Americans for Constitutional Action from its founding until his death and also was a member of the John Birch Society. In 1956, he delivered a lecture in which among other things, he stated, “Today’s situation is the result of an alarming and devious government intervention in the economic affairs of the nation for objectives not contemplated by the men who wrote the Constitution” (Klein). Buffett died of cancer on April 30, 1964, at 60.
Despite the apple having fallen a bit far from the tree on politics, with Warren adopting many of the opposite politics of his father, he credits him as a great teacher who inspired a lifelong love of reading and investing, and said of him that “The best advice I’ve ever been give is by my father, who told me it took 20 years to build a reputation and 20 minutes to lose it” (Elkins).
References
ADA Voting Records. Americans for Democratic Action.
In the last post, I covered the ideology of Jimmy Carter as president, and indeed as far as presidents go, he was quite liberal by DW-Nominate and solidly liberal by Americans for Constitutional Action. I thought I might as well cover his defeated 1976 opponent in Gerald Ford. Ford’s record on national issues goes far further back than Carter, having first been elected to the House in 1948. His record in the House is too expansive for me to cover fully key vote by key vote, but he was moderately conservative overall. ACA gave Ford a high score of 100% in 1959 (many Republican representatives aced by their standards that year) and a low score of 53% in 1969 (many Republican representatives did unusually poorly by their standards that year). His overall modified ACA score was a 78%. His DW-Nominate score stands at a 0.281.
Ford was mostly fiscally conservative on domestic matters, although he did in 1958 vote to establish a trial-run food stamp program (he voted against a similar proposal in 1959) and in 1960 voted for $50 million in urban renewal and slum clearance grants. Ford loyally supported President Eisenhower’s vetoes of public works bills and a sewage plant funding bill in 1960 and sided with the administration on agriculture issues. During the 1960s, Ford opposed Kennedy’s accelerated public works program, tax reduction (he regarded it as inflationary combined with domestic spending), the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, and federal aid for school construction. He was even the only Michigander to vote against Medicare in 1965, perhaps as part of his being the new Republican House leader. Ford did, however, vote to increase the minimum wage in 1966 but only after backing Rep. John Anderson’s (R-Ill.) substitute to limit the measure’s impact on retail establishments based on gross sales. He routinely backed conservative substitutes to minimum wage increases, even if he voted for the final bills. Ford’s differences with conservatism in the 1960s largely surrounded foreign policy and civil rights issues. Speaking of civil rights…
Ford on Civil Rights
Gerald Ford was mostly supportive of civil rights measures. He voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (although he preferred the substitute he backed with Rep. William McCulloch (R-Ohio) that attempted to balance state and federal interests), and although he voted for Rep. Arch Moore’s (R-W.V.) motion to strike fair housing from the Civil Rights Act of 1966, he did vote for the bill itself and voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Ford notably pushed a Nixon Administration backed substitute to the Voting Rights Act extension in 1969 that would have applied the temporary provisions of the act nationwide, but McCulloch didn’t back him on this one. He also backed Nixon on the adoption of the Philadelphia Plan, voting against Rep. George Mahon’s (D-Tex.) effort to kill it. As president, the issue of extending the Voting Rights Act of 1965 fell to him, and he simply signed a law extending the act for seven years. Ford, like Nixon, opposed busing as a means of desegregation. On other matters surrounding states vs. federal, Ford took conservative positions: on federal vs. state title over the Tidelands he voted in 1951, 1952, and 1953 for state title and voted in 1958 and 1959 for anti-preemption legislation to grant states greater leeway in anti-subversive legislation, all in response to Supreme Court decisions. Speaking of the Supreme Court…
Ford on the Supreme Court
Ford was a critic of the Warren Court, and in multiple ways he voted to counter to decisions of the court. He repeatedly voted for legislation against the Mallory rule of evidence that invalidates confessions extracted by criminal defendants if kept for an unreasonably long period in detention from arrest to court appearance whether there had been evidence of coercion or torture or not. In 1964, Ford voted for the Tuck (D-Va.) bill to strip state legislative apportionment from Supreme Court jurisdiction. In 1971, Ford voted for a school prayer amendment to the Constitution in response to Supreme Court decisions ruling state school prayer statutes unconstitutional. In 1970, he attempted to impeach Justice William O. Douglas, in what was at least in part a retaliatory move against Democrats for twice in a row tanking Nixon’s nominees to the court. Yet, Ford’s sole nomination to the Supreme Court, John Paul Stevens (who succeeded Douglas), would become known later in life as one of the most liberal justices.
Ford on Foreign Policy
Gerald Ford was heavily influenced in his politics by Senator Arthur Vandenberg. He reflected in a 2001 speech, “He holds a very special place in my life. Before Pearl Harbor, I emulated the isolationist outlook of my fellow Midwesterners – – Senator Vandenberg included at the time. A tour of duty in the South Pacific, aboard a combat aircraft carrier with nine battle stars, convinced me very strongly otherwise. After four years in the Navy, I came home to Grand Rapids a convert to the bipartisan foreign policy espoused by my fellow townsman, Arthur Vandenberg.
Inspired by Vandenberg’s example, I came to believe that only American leadership could shape a future where peace was possible and freedom was secure” (United States Senate). As a protégé of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, he not only supported post-war aid to Europe but also, like his fellow townsman and hero, backed Point IV aid to poor nations. He backed every foreign aid vote counted by Americans for Constitutional Action during the Eisenhower Administration, and sponsored an amendment increasing foreign aid in 1960. Ford would, however, support some foreign aid cuts during the 1960s and repeatedly backed stronger anti-communist positions in foreign affairs, such as his support for blocking grain shipments to the USSR and Hungary in 1963. Ford’s retention of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State was strongly disliked by anti-détente conservatives. Interestingly, however, his presidency was more conservative than his time in the House, as if his positions on ACA-counted votes are counted as votes, he scores an 84%. By DW-Nominate, he’s much higher, registering at a 0.506.
As President, Ford opposed the following:
. Agriculture Act Amendments (1975). . A strip mining bill that would set federal standards for surface mining regulation, which he vetoed (1975). . A House resolution disapproving of his plan to decontrol prices for domestic oil over a 39-month period (1975). . A tax reduction bill reducing 1976 individual and business taxes without establishing a $395 billion fiscal 1977 federal spending ceiling, which he vetoed (1975). . A bill authorizing $6.5 billion in financial assistance to railroads, which would simultaneously reduce regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission (1975). . A bill that would grant Congress the right to review any proposal to decontrol oil prices and require the president to place price ceilings on any oil not currently controlled (1975). . Deleting funds for the B-1 Bomber (1975). . Deferring funds for the Flight-Testing Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle until it can be established that the Soviets are flight testing their own system (1975). . The Clark Amendment, limiting US involvement in Angola to gathering intelligence (1975). . Only deregulating small oil producers while keeping big oil producers price-controlled (1976). . Extending 65-week employment assistance until March 31, 1977 and special benefits for the uninsured to December 31, 1976 (1976). . Permitting federal civilian and postal workers to participate as private citizens in political campaigns and protecting employees from improper political solicitation, a scaling back of the Hatch Act (1976). . The Public Works Anti-Recession bill, making grants for public works programs for the explicit purpose of reducing employment, his veto being overridden (1976). . The proposed Voter Registration Act, which would have created a voter registration commission in the Federal Elections Commission to register voters by mail (1976). Note on this one: Republicans opposing measures that are touted by their Democratic proponents as expanding voting access is nothing new. . A bill increasing funding for the Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare by $915,839,318 over his budget, with his veto being overridden (1976). . A bill providing financial assistance for low-income people to insulate their homes and to push state and local adoption of energy conservation standards in new buildings (1976). . A bill for no-fault auto insurance (1976). . A bill establishing a government agency for grain inspection that would not be limited to federal export ports, thus moving into authority previously in the purview of states (1976). This is consistent with Ford’s consistent sense of federalism, his belief that liberal Democrats push measures on the federal level that improperly intrude in state prerogatives. . A bill increasing Congressional control over U.S. arms sales (1976). . A bill providing for federal child day care services under the Social Security Act, which he vetoed (1976). . An amendment barring funds for the B-1 Bomber program before February 1, 1977 (1976). . Another bill for public works for the purposes of increasing employment, in which Congress overrode his veto (1976). He supported: . The proposed South Vietnam Assistance Act, which if enacted would have spent $327 million for humanitarian and evacuation programs in South Vietnam and for the use of U.S. troops to assist evacuations. This measure got a lot of opposition out of fear that the US would be dragged into conflict in Vietnam again (1975). . A bill providing for automatic cost-of-living increases in pay for members of Congress and top officials in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches (1975). . Killing a proposal that disapproved of his proposed 5% pay increase for members of Congress, military personnel, and federal government officials, which would have instead resulted in a 8.66% pay increase proposed by the Advisory Committee on Federal Pay (1975). . $2.25 billion in funds for the Inter-American Development Bank and funds of up to $25 million for the African Development Fund (1975). . Partially lifting an arms embargo to Turkey (1975). . Loaning up to $2.3 billion annually to New York City (1975). Ford however did not approve of any measure that would fully bail out the city, resulting in a famous headline from the New York Daily News: Ford to City: Drop Dead (New York Daily News). Although Ford never uttered such words, this was how his threat to veto any bailout was taken. . The proposal by Rep. Charles Wiggins (R-Calif.) to investigate whether increasing fines is effective for anti-trust regulation instead of an anti-trust bill (1976).
Ford’s presidency was substantially limited on domestic policy due to the Democrats holding a supermajority, and sometimes he caved and reluctantly signed bills that he otherwise opposed (such as continuing federal price control on oil). Ford was essentially a fiscally conservative president, an internationalist, a supporter of increasing US military firepower, an opponent of federal encroachments into state functions, moderately socially conservative, and a compromiser.
References
Address by President Gerald R. Ford, May 23, 2001. U.S. Senate.
On October 1st, 1924, Jimmy Carter was born, and he still lives today. This makes him the first centenarian president in American history. An interesting minor coincidence is that on the day Carter turned 100 the debate between Walz and Vance was occurring. Like Carter’s running mate Mondale, Walz is from Minnesota. Maybe that’s a good portend for Democrats in this election? I don’t know. But what I do know is how Carter was seen ideologically during his presidency.
Unfortunately, I cannot at this time produce a proper Americans for Democratic Action rating for him, and this is because ADA’s 1979 page lacks descriptions of the first four Senate votes. I certainly can find out what those are, but not in time to post this before midnight PST. Liberals from what I’ve seen so far seem to regard him as a moderate liberal, and sometimes have counted as against the liberal position measures that most Republican conservatives went against. For instance, the 1978 administration-backed proposal to deregulate natural gas by 1985. This was unsatisfactory in its slowness for conservative Republicans, and deregulation itself of natural gas was unsatisfactory to liberals. Thus, Carter’s liberalism may be lessened in ways that conservatives wouldn’t agree with. I will also note later on in this post some votes on which ADA actually sided with Americans for Constitutional Action! DW-Nominate scores him a -0.504, which is pretty solidly liberal and places him to the left of many, many Democrats of his day (and today).
As for ACA…
If Jimmy Carter’s official positions on votes were to be counted as votes, he would score for his presidency a 13%. I can offer far more details here, because I have already compiled ACA votes for the Carter era. Areas in which Carter took a liberal position on issues were:
. $23.3 billion in federal programs for anti-recession purposes, which included public works financing (1977).
. Weakening the Hatch Act through the Federal Employees’ Political Rights Act, permitting greater allowances for participation in politics by Federal employees (1977).
. Opposing an effort by Congressman Beard (R-Tenn.) to prohibit VA funds to benefit individuals upgraded by his special discharge program that allowed certain individuals discharged as less than honorable to be upgraded (1977).
. Opposed a House and Senate effort to sunset price controls on natural gas, for new onshore in 1977 and new offshore in 1982 (1977).
. Supported House and Senate efforts to delete funds for five B-1 Bombers (1977).
. Opposed Congressman Erlenborn’s (R-Ill.) amendment for a more gradual increase in the federal minimum wage than the committee bill (1977).
. Supported Majority Leader Byrd’s (D-W.V.) motion to table the Allen (D-Ala.) resolution expressing the opposition of the Senate to pardoning draft resisters and evaders (1977).
. Supported his nomination of Paul Warnke as chief negotiator of the Strategic Arms Limitation talks with the USSR. Warnke had previously called for reducing military spending by a third, and his nomination was a clear signal of continuing détente (1977).
. Opposed Senator Curtis’s (R-Neb.) amendment keeping the requirement that food stamp recipients pay for part of their cost (1977).
. Supported Majority Leader Byrd’s (D-W.V.) motion to end debate on the bill permitting public financing of Senate campaigns (1977).
. Supported an increase in the federal minimum wage (1977).
. Opposed Congressman Breaux’s (D-La.) substitute for outer continental shelf legislation that grants the states more money and limits government intervention in exploratory drilling (1978).
. Supported the proposed creation of the Office of Consumer Representation for consumer protection (1978).
. Supported deleting Senator Stennis’s (D-Miss.) motion to rescind funds for the production of two additional B-1 Bombers (1978).
. Supported the enactment of the Panama Canal Treaties, as well as supported tabling an effort to authorize the disposal of all US property before the treaties took effect (1978).
. Supported Appropriations Committee Chairman Mahon’s (D-Tex.) motion for the House to rescind funds for the production of three B-1 Bombers (1978).
. Opposed Congressman Young’s (R-Alaska) proposal to permit Alaska to choose lands to be conserved under the Alaska Lands bill and to remove five million acres from coverage (1978).
. Opposed Congressman Stratton’s (D-N.Y.) amendment to maintain troops at a minimum of 26,000 in South Korea (1978).
. Supported up to $1.65 billion in federal loan guarantees to New York City (a bailout, in other words) (1978).
. Supported Senate and House efforts to retain indirect U.S. Aid to Uganda, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (1977, 1978).
. Opposed Congressman Hansen’s (R-Idaho) amendment prohibiting funds for Panama in the Foreign Aid Appropriations bill (1978).
. Supported an alternative version of the Consumer Cooperative Bank bill (1978).
. Opposed Senator Lugar’s (R-Ind.) proposed reduction in funding of food stamps by $250 million (1978).
. Opposed Congressman Kramer’s (R-Colo.) amendment reaffirming the position the US took in the 1955 mutual defense treaty regarding aggression against Taiwan (1979).
. Opposed an anti-busing amendment to the U.S. Constitution (1979).
. Supported the bill implementing the Panama Canal Treaties (1979).
. Supported the creation of the Department of Education (1979).
. Supported the Emergency Energy Conservation Act (1979).
. Opposed Congressman Courter’s (R-N.J.) amendment to prohibit funds for controlling the price of gasoline (1979).
. Supported $1.5 billion in federal loan guarantees to be matched by $2.1 billion from other sources to bail out the Chrysler Corporation (1979).
. Opposed Senator Percy’s (R-Ill.) amendment declaring that aggression against Taiwan by China would be considered a threat to U.S. security interests (1979).
. Opposed Senator Stennis’s (D-Miss.) effort to end sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (1979).
. Opposed Senator Helms’s (R-N.C.) effort to retain a spending ceiling on food stamps for fiscal 1980-81 (1979).
. Supported Majority Leader Byrd’s (D-W.V.) tabling of Sen. Armstrong’s (R-Colo.) amendment for a higher military pay raise (1979).
. Supported the bill imposing a windfall profits tax (1979, 1980).
. Opposed Congressman Broyhill’s (R-N.C.) motion to provide for a legislative veto for Federal Trade Commission regulations (1980).
. Opposed Congressman Symms’s (R-Idaho) limited substitute for the Idaho Wilderness bill (1980).
. Supported Congressman Obey’s (D-Wis.) increasing in funds of domestic programs and oil tax credit reform to raise funds for the increase (1980).
. Opposed Congresswoman Holt’s (R-Md.) proposed transfer of funds from domestic programs for increases in defense spending (1980).
. Supported the International Development Bank bill (1980).
. Supported extending the debt ceiling at $879 billion through June 30, 1980 (1980).
. Supported Majority Leader Wright’s (D-Tex.) amendment providing $425 million in aid to Nicaragua (1980).
. Opposed Congressman Sensenbrenner’s (R-Wis.) motion to delete administrative (as opposed to judicial) enforcement of fair housing laws (1980).
. Opposed Congressman Levitas’s (D-Ga.) amendment permitting a Congressional veto of trucking regulations (1980).
. Opposed Congressman Pritchard’s (R-Wash.) amendment reducing by $200 million funds for the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway (1980).
. Supported the Defense Production Act amendments, providing for funds for synthetic and alcohol fuels as well as the creation of a conservation bank (1980).
. Opposed Congressman Devine’s (R-Ohio) motion to kill the proposed Energy Mobilization Board (1980). Note: ADA supported this motion too!
. Opposed disapproving of his gasoline rationing plan (1980).
. Opposed Senator Schmitt’s (R-N.M.) amendment permitting a one-house veto of Federal Trade Commission regulations (1980).
Opposed Senator Dole’s (R-Kan.) motion to recommit the windfall profits tax bill for hearings (1980).
. Opposed Senator Hollings’s (D-S.C.) motion to table Senator Nelson’s (D-Wis.) proposed deletion of $2 billion from defense spending and $400 million in interest payments, transferring the funds to domestic priorities (1980).
. Opposed Senator Armstrong’s (R-Colo.) amendment to repeal the Credit Control Act of 1969 (1980).
. Supported Senator Hollings’s (D-S.C.) budget resolution (1980).
. Opposed Senator Stone’s (D-Fla.) motion to block funds for military aid to Nicaragua (1980).
Areas in which Carter took a conservative position included:
. Opposing the National Consumer Cooperative Bank bill, which would have provided $750 million for a bank and a self-help development fund to issue loans to consumer cooperatives and to assist inner-city residents to start consumer cooperatives respectively (1977).
. Opposed Congressman Weiss’ (D-N.Y.) amendment blocking funds for research and development of neutron bombs (1977).
. Opposed the emergency farm bill for wheat, corn, and cotton (1978).
. Opposed a resolution disapproving his sale of jet fighters to Middle Eastern nations (1978).
. Supported outlining U.S. policy on settling the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus as part of repealing the arms embargo on Turkey (1978).
. Supported implementation of the Selective Service (1980).
. Opposed Congressman Simon’s (D-Ill.) reduction by $500 million for the MX intercontinental missile system (1980).
. Opposed Senator Magnuson’s (D-Wash.) amendment to place the burden of proof on an applicant for a trucking certificate to demonstrate that their proposed service is consistent with present or future public needs (1980).
. Supported Senator Garn’s (R-Utah) amendment to delete middle-income housing subsidies, instead having the funds go to current housing programs (1980). Note: ADA supported Senator Garn’s amendment too!
. Opposed Senator Moynihan’s (D-N.Y.) amendment to allow students in private elementary and secondary schools to receive Basic Educational Opportunity Grants of up to $750 annually (1980). Note: ADA opposed Senator Moynihan’s amendment too!
Carter was overall a liberal man who most often dissented from liberalism on matters regarding military policy. His opposition to Senator Magnuson’s burden of proof amendment serves to highlight his support for deregulation that conservatives see as a positive of his presidency.
Mad Politics: The Bizarre, Fascinating, and Unknown of American Political History 